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ABSTRACT 
In 1991 a new labour relations regime was introduced which overturned a 100 year 
old pattern of 'historic compromise' between capital and labour. In a labour market 
structured by gender and race, this major change in bargaining arrangements has 
already widened the pay gap between men's and women's average earnings and 
reduced union coverage, particularly among women workers in low paid clerical, 
sales and service work. This study, documenting recent feminist struggle in the area 
of labour relations, provides a first look at the collective organisation of women under 
two different labour relations regimes. 
In the 1980s a particular conjunction of occupational unionism and feminism in New 
Zealand facilitated some significant improvements in the situation of women in paid 
employment. The thesis examines feminist strategies which led to a Working 
Women's Charter adopted by unions, an increase in women holding office in unions, 
complaints procedures for sexual harassment, standing committees to represent 
women and Maori in the union movement, and legislation to implement equal 
. employment opportunity programmes and equal pay for work of equal value. It looks 
at how the institutionalisation of bargaining by occupation supported industrially weak 
workers and underpinned the unionisation of women, while occupational unions and 
women's own strategies of organisation provided the autonomous 'political space' to 
organise around issues specifically relevant to women. 
At the core of the thesis are three case studies of unions representing three of the 
occupations in which women are concentrated: clerical work, nursing and cleaning. 
It examines commonalities and contrasts in the industrial situations covered by these 
unions, and differences and similarities in the strategies they adopted. The focus of 
research, conducted between late 1990 and early 1993, was the views of officials of 
these unions in the context of radical change in the regulation of wage bargaining. 
Particular attention was given to the way issues relating to women workers were 
prioritised in unions led by women or by men. 
These case studies are contextualised in chapters examining the position of women 
in the labour market, feminist organisation within the union movement, and corporatist 
change in labour relations legislation. In tracing the development of feminist 
unionism in the 1980s, the thesis considers the strategies of the NZ Council of Trade 
Unions and looks at what the radical change in bargaining structure will mean for 
collective organisation by women in paid employment. 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
In 1991 the Employment Contracts Act radically changed the traditional pattern of 
wage bargaining in New Zealand. This thesis on feminism in the union movement 
presents research on unions for the female dominated occupations of clerical work, 
nursing and cleaning under the traditional labour relations system and under the new 
Act. It contributes to a first assessment of the Act's impact on collective organisation 
by women. 
The central concern of this thesis is forms of collective organisation which may serve 
women in resisting the ways in which they are disadvantaged in paid employment. 
The progress that New Zealand women achieved in the 1980s towards, for example, 
equal pay for work of equal value and protection against sexual harassment owed 
much to the efforts of large unions with women leaders and female dominated 
. memberships. Through studying unions for three typical but differing occupations for 
women, the thesis looks at how this progress was facilitated by the conjunction of a 
growing feminism movement with a particular pattern of wage bargaining and unionism 
organised around occupational labour markets. 
The patterns of labour relations regulation are political outcomes reflecting the 
changing interests and unequal power of unions, employers and the state (Jessop 
1979; Holt 1986). This research shows, however, that 'the unions' are not unitary but 
comprise groups of women and men in different employment situations with differing 
interests in labour relations regulation. The thesis looks at the way feminist unionists 
began to construct a new set of interests to be represented in bargaining and in the 
changing legislative framework. It takes a first look at how those interests have been 
set back as other partners in corporatism have withdrawn from New Zealand's 'historic 
compromise' (Jesson 1989: 17) on labour relations. 
1 
Feminism and Unionism 
The kinds of work typically done by women, and the connection between these and 
what the Women's Liberation movement called the 'subordination' of women (Burton 
1985), has been a focus of feminist theorising since the 1970s. Initial discussion 
centred on women's unpaid work in the family, its relation with paid work, and 
questions about who benefits from women's labour (Oakley 1984a; Kaluzynska 1980; 
Oelphy 1981; Burton 1985; Novitz 1982, 1987; Baxter 1990). Attention then turned to 
the labour market itself and the way limited opportunities and low earnings contribute 
to women's dependence within the family (Walby 1986; Beechey 1987). Watershed 
theoretical work by Heidi Hartmann (1979, 1981) and Zillah Eisenstein (1981) 
recognised the gender division of labour as a key point of intersection in the complex 
relations between capitalism and patriarchy. The gender division of labour became a 
research focus for feminist historians and sociologists through the 1980s (Bradley 
1989). They examined the connections between the active practices through which 
jobs are gendered as male or female, the segregation of men and women in 
workplaces and the labour market, and the gap between the average earnings of 
women and of men (Walby 1988:2). 
The centrality that western society gives to the differences, rather than the 
commonalities between women and men (Oakley 1972) both underpins and flows from 
the gender division of labour and occupational segregation. Although the tasks which 
women and men perform vary historically and between cultures, the most persistent 
and most internationally consistent characteristic of labour markets is differentiation 
between 'women's work' and 'men's work'. Occupational segregation survives wars 
and economic crises, restructuring and technological revolutions (Cockburn 1988:32; 
Milkman 1987). Where populations vary by race (or caste) within a country or when 
labour processes are internationalised, certain occupations also become characteristic 
of particular racial groups as well as gendered (Mies 1990; Phizacklea 1988). 
Research on the New Zealand labour market confirms this pattern of job segregation 
by gender and by race (Van Mourik, Poot & Sieger 1989; Smith 1982; Brosnan 1987, 
1988; MWA 1991 a, 1993). The number of occupational categories that are male or 
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female dominated or racially marked is slowly changing, but this has not disrupted the 
overall extent of segregation by numbers employed in those occupations (MWA 
1991a:15). 
In paid employment as well as in the home, work is a gendering process (Walby 1986) 
and occupations themselves come to be gendered within a discourse of masculinity 
and femininity (Cockburn 1985: 169) that perpetuates job segregation and the 
devaluing of women's work. The most typical occupations for women reflect both the 
content and the gender relations of women's traditional responsibilities in the 
heterosexual family. This connection is strong in the three occupations whose union 
organisation is studied for this thesis: clerical work, nursing and cleaning. 
In discussing the practices though which jobs become gendered and racially marked, 
Cynthia Cockburn argues that: 
Behind occupational segregation is gender differentiation, and behind that again 
is male power, which has to be confronted directly. The slow and steady route 
to change is undoubtedly through women's autonomous organisation outside 
and inside trade unions and political parties, changing the nature of demands 
concerning training and work. (Cockburn 1988:41) 
Feminist unionists in the United States 1, Britain and other countries have been critical 
of the under-representation of women in positions of union leadership, particularly at 
national level, and of the difficulties women have encountered in trying to raise 
concerns specific to women members within male dominated union organisations 
(Crain 1991; Beale 1982; Cockburn 1984; Charles 1986; ICFTU 1991 :43). Feminist 
historians have researched efforts by women to organise autonomously in ways which 
suited their own needs. These efforts have met resistance from male union leaders 
or fellow workers (Cobble 1990:520, 1991 c:184-6; Kessler-Harris 1985; Milkman 1985, 
1987). Early equal pay demands by unions were often to protect men's jobs rather 
than to raise women's wages (Boston 1980:41-42; Milkman 1987). Tensions with male 
unionists and accusations of disloyalty and divisiveness marked the 'limits of unionism' 
1 United States views are favoured in this discussion since New Zealand's shift from occupational 
to enterprise bargaining in 1991 has parallels with changes in the United States after World War II which 
limited unions to organising and negotiating company by company (Cobble 1991a:432; Boxall1990). 
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for women in the 1920s and 1940s (Milkman 1987:96; Kessler-Harris 1985). Dorothy 
Cobble reports that feminists in the United States initially 'dismissed unions as vehicles 
for female activism', sharing the view of some labour historians of unions as 'confining 
institutions designed to hold workers in check rather than to liberate them' (Cobble 
1990:519). However, labour historians and labour relations analysts have tended to 
focus on male workers, under reporting the occupations and militancy of women 
(Hartmann 1979; Boston 1980:13; Dickens 1989; Cobble 1990:520; Roper 1984:1; 
Street 1993:vii-xii). More recently, feminist historians have begun to examine 'the 
specific conditions under which unions have been effective vehicles for female 
collective action and empowerment' (Cobble 1990:519). 
Non-feminist commentators have often seen lower levels of unionisation among 
women (ILO 1988:4; Crain 1991:156; Sarr 1992:3; ICFTU 1991:40-41) as a problem 
pertaining to the women, not the unions (Moore 1986; Geare, Herd & Howells 1979; 
Griffin & Benson 1984, 1989). A typical focus is on family responsibilities and other 
barriers to participation, and women's concentration in occupations which are 
inherently difficult to organise. This study also confirms the importance of these 
factors for New Zealand women. However, as Marion Crain writes: 
These justifications for women's unorganisability have relieved scholars and 
unions from the need to seek alternative explanations that would raise 
fundamental questions about the definitions of work, collective organisation and 
collective action, labour power, and the structure of labour law itself. 
(Crain 1991: 1158) 
It is just such questions that this thesis seeks to raise. 
Although the gendering of jobs and occupational closure against women (Witz 
1988:74-78) are the means by which women are disadvantaged in the labour market 
(Walby 1988:1), DorotllY Cobble suggests that occupational segregation also offers 
potential for autonomous organisation and collective action among women (Cobble 
1990:537). This thesis examines the way a particular pattern of corporatism in New 
Zealand involving unionisation on the basis of occupation facilitated autonomy and 
effective activism by feminist unionists. 
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Despite parallels with the experiences of feminist unionists in other countries, this 
thesis argues that the union movement in New Zealand has provided feminists with 'a 
vehicle for activism'. In the 1970s and 1980s progress was achieved on equal pay, 
a Charter of rights for working women, increasing union leadership by women, 
parental leave, sexual harassment complaints procedures, specific representation of 
women and Maori in union federations, equal employment opportunity programmes 
and - very briefly - pay equity legislation providing for independent assessments of the 
comparable worth of male and female dominated occupations. This thesis focuses on 
the way feminist unionists have organised autonomously inside and outside the union 
movement and through campaigns for legislative change. This route to change was 
not 'slow and steady' but rather rapid - although some 'limits to unionism' and some 
political defeats have been experienced. 
This progress was achieved within the context of a particular set of corporatist 
arrangements between capital, labour and the state which set the pattern of labour 
legislation until 19912. Minimum wage rates were set for particular occupational 
labour markets by state arbitrated bargaining between a group of employers and a 
registered union with exclusive coverage of that occupation. From 1936 union 
membership was made compulsory by law for all those covered by such centralised 
wage settlements. This change supported the unionisation of women in low paid 
female dominated service occupations, improving rates of overall unionisation relative 
to other countries (Urban Research 1987; Hyman 1987; NZCWU 1987: 12-13). 
Unions were oq~anised around the occupational award(s)3 they negotiated. Awards 
were legally binding on all employers of the kind of labour described; that is, both the 
union and the award had blanket coverage of the market for specified types of labour. 
Even in unions covering female dominated occupations, 'union official' was almost 
entirely a 'male' occupation until the 1970s. It was only in the late 1970s that feminist 
2 The traditional system of bargaining and the changes it underwent are detailed in Chapter 4. 
3 The term 'award' for documents setting wages is derived from Court arbitration of bargaining 
between unions and employers. When direct negotiations ('free collective bargaining') became an option 
after 1973, the word continued to be used for documents with blanket coverage of an occupation or 
industry, as opposed to 'agreements' between signatories only. 
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women began to move into more unpaid and paid positions in the unions to which 
they belonged, and to take advantage of the opportunities for political action that these 
organisations provided. 
The concept of 'political space for women' was developed in historical work on women 
in United States unions (Milkman 1987:96-94, fn.49; Cobble 1990:541; Crain 
1991 :1169). Women created 'cultural space' by organising in women-focused ways 
which often had a social dimension (Kessler-Harris 1985). New Zealand feminist 
unionists also tried to increase the involvement of women members in their union in 
this way. However, the term 'political space' more accurately describes the way 
women-led unions and women's committees within the union movement were used 
as bases for organising gender politics within the union movement. It was from these 
political spaces that political campaigns were mounted, aimed at changes in labour 
relations legislation that would allow negotiation on matters specifically relevant to 
women in the workforce. 
As feminism developed in the 1970s, both in New Zealand and elsewhere, women 
were entering unions: 
... armed with a much more critical feminism than their seniors ... adapting not 
only to the demands of union work but striving to alter its style and content. 
(Heery & Kelly 1989:201) 
In the early 1980s feminist unionists in Britain, Italy and France were debating 
strategies in respect to equality rights, autonomous organisation among women and 
male power in union movements (Cockburn 1984:45). Many of the issues, debates 
and strategies of feminist unionists in New Zealand mirror women's union activism in 
other countries (Piva & Ingrao 1984; 'Antoinette' 1984; Elliott 1984; Ellis 1988), as 
ideas traversed national boundaries through feminist and union contacts. Autonomous 
organisation in women-only groups was an important feature of 1970s feminism 
worldwide. In New Zealand centralised bargaining and compulsory unionisation of 
large numbers of women workers in traditionally 'female' occupations meant some of 
the unions representing these workers provided feminists with the organisational power 
to address issues of specific concern to women, such as pay equity, equal employ-
ment opportunity, parental leave and sexual harassment. 
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The 'political space' offered by large private sector unions for female dominated 
occupations was an feature of the labour relations system itself, and had been 
important to the power of one charismatic male leader of the union movement through 
the 1940s and 1950s (Moynihan 1986:21,51; Scott 1952; Bassett 1972). What was 
new in the 1980s was that such spaces began to be filled by women. For the first time 
a few unions with highly female dominated memberships had women dominated 
executives and began to be led by union secretaries who were women. 
This thesis examines one of the most important of these female dominated unions, the 
clerical workers union, which covered the lower paid levels of the private sector clerical 
labour market. An account is given of the concerns and strategies of the feminist 
unionists who led this union in the 1980s. A contrasting case study looks at unions 
organising cleaners, whose male leaders held a more traditional class- based analysis 
of the situation and interests of their women members. The third study is of an 
organisation for a strongly female dominated profession, nursing, which has always 
been led by women, but had historically been reluctant to consider itself a union. The 
case studies examine commonalities and contrasts between the organising situations 
and bargaining power of members in these unions. It explores the differences and 
. similarities between the strategies adopted by the unions in response to their differing 
situations and differing potential for industrial action. The research focus is on the 
views of paid and unpaid officials as the unions' central decision makers, initiators and 
strategists. 
The particular corporatist arrangements which developed in New Zealand, particularly 
from the 1930s, supported unionisation and bargaining by industrially weak workers, 
as well as regulation of unions with potential for industrial disruption. Most unions 
were organised on the basis of occupations, or a group of occupations (Brosnan, 
Smith & Walsh 1990:31). Because the awards negotiated had blanket coverage of 
occupational labour markets, unions could deliver benefits to large numbers of 
workers whose employers were bound by an award - including large numbers of 
women in service work which is not unionised in most countries (ICFTU 1991; Hyman 
1987; NZCWU 1987:12-13). For unionised occupations, membership was essentially 
a requirement of employment (although legal mechanisms and the practical reality of 
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this varied over time). Because occupational unions reflected a labour market 
structured by gender, the unions which represented most women workers were female 
dominated organisations, and were large organisations by New Zealand standards. 
Some of these became effective vehicles for feminist unionism in the 1980s. Although 
some were industrially weak, they were able to wield a great deal of power, through 
voting based on membership numbers in the federal organisations of the union 
movement. In political arenas, their broad based campaigns for legislation change had 
the power to influence policy because of the potential of an identifiable 'women's vote' 
(Vowles & Aimer 1990: 178). This study explores how feminist unionists organised 
together, and with women's organisations outside the union movement, to use that 
pOlitical power. 
In addition to the few large female dominated unions in which women achieved 
leadership, feminist unionists created additional 'political spaces' in a series of 
women-only groups and committees inside and outside the union movement. These 
allowed women to meet, to learn from each other and to strategise across the 
boundaries of particular unions. Chapter 5 focuses on the organisational forms 
through which women organised in the Federation of Labour and its successor, the 
NZCouncil of Trade Unions, in the 1970s and 1980s. 
An interesting aspect of the case study of cleaners unions is the way standing 
committees for women, Maori and Pacific Islands members have been organised to 
provide 'political space' for these groups within the Service Workers Union. This 
struggle for representation in decision making through effective standing committees 
is a later reflection of a similar struggle in the mid 1980s within the Federation of 
Labour, discussed in Chapter 5. Organising through standing committees has allowed 
Maori and to a lesser extent Pacific Islands workers, male and female, to raise issues 
of specific concern to them as workers. However, these social groups lacked the 
numbers to dominate particular unions, as had been possible for women, although 
women-led unions and women's committees included some Maori and Pacific Islands 
women, just as Maori and Pacific Islands standing committees included feminist 
unionists. Evidence is given of close cooperation between these groups to achieve 
standing committees. However, all three case studies show both progress and 
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marginalisation of Maori and Pacific Islands concerns, such as tangihanga leave4, 
translation of information, and acknowledgement of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
'Political space' in female dominated unions and women-only committees allowed 
women to discuss commonalities and differences, and to develop a set of feminist 
strategies. These offered an alternative to 'classic unionism5, - industrial action and 
workplace organisation through delegates - for sections of the female workforce for 
whom these tactics were inappropriate or ineffective for reasons which are explored 
in the case studies. 
In the early 1970s and again in the 1980s Federation of Labour leaders favoured a 
loosening of the centralised arbitration of bargaining, to encourage a more active 
unionism in the classic mode. By the end of the 1980s, however, leaders of the new 
NZ Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU), comprising public and private sector unions, 
had develop a plan for 'strategic unionism'. This reasserted union political influence 
through a corporatist Compact which would ensure consultation at the highest level 
of union leadership and the Labour government. The difficulty with a common strategy 
to further 'union interests' at this level, however, was that the movement is made up 
. of unions operating in very different occupational labour markets, with different con-
cerns and differing degrees of industrial leverage. This thesis argues that, in a labour 
market structured by gender, changes in corporatist arrangements have gendered 
implications and debates about strategy within the union movement take on a 
gendered aspect. 
This research was carried out between October 1990 and February 1993, at a time 
when labour relations legislation underwent major change, following a change of 
government. Theories of corporatism have been developed to study the patterns of 
interaction between capital, labour and the state and the resulting legislative 
frameworks for labour relations (Schmitter & Lehmbruch 1979; Lehmbruch & Schmitter 
4 Tangihanga leave was successfully raised as a union issue in the 1980s by Maori and Pacific 
Islanders, because of greater obligations in relation to family and funerals than for Pakeha. 
5 The term is discussed in on page 28. 
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1982; Jessop 1979). In discussing studies of women affected by recession in Europe, 
Jill Rubery (1988:253-5) has commented on the difficulties of comparison between cor-
poratist arrangements in different countries because other policy variations - fiscal, 
family, welfare and education - affect the labour market position of women. What trlis 
thesis presents, however, is a study of the effect of two different labour relations 
regimes on collective organisation by women within the context of a single country. 
Changes directed at labour market deregulation also began in the 1980s, some of 
them in consultation with leaders of the union movement. A detailed analysis of the 
clerical workers, nurse's and cleaners unions reveals that the short period of voluntary 
unionism introduced by National in 1984 and the repeal by Labour of compulsory 
arbitration for unsettled award negotiations signalled the more major effect that the 
Employment Contracts Act, 1991 would have on low paid women workers. 
The key difference between occupational award bargaining supported by conciliation 
and arbitration mechanisms and enterprise bargaining introduced by the Employment 
Contracts Act, 1991 was that the traditional regime had facilitated collectivism while the 
new one individualised employment bargaining (Hince 1993:10; McAndrew 1992). 
These differing philosophical approaches were clearly discernible in the discourses 
which informed legislative changes in the 1930s (Olssen 1981 :277, 1986) and in the 
1990s (Upton 1987; Walker 1989; Hyman 1992; McAndrew 1992:260-1). Under the 
new Act, the bargaining outcomes documented in the case studies highlight the 
fragmentation typical of low paid sections of the female workforce and the conse-
quences of this for their bargaining power. The different organising situations and bar-
gain outcomes for different kinds of workers which are explored in this thesis indicate 
that the concentration of women and non-Pakeha in the lower paid 'secondary' labour 
market is an outcome of segregation into occupations with little opportunity for 
collective solidarity and little industrial leverage with which to back bargaining positions. 
As this thesis was being written, research at a more aggregate level (Harbridge & 
Moulder 1992; Hammond & Harbridge 1993; Sarr 1993) and labour force statistics 
(Statistics NZ 1993a&b) confirmed the analysis of these studies of clerical workers, 
nurses and cleaners unions with respect to the impact of the Employment Contracts 
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Act on women workers. These first research results indicate that the change to 
enterprise bargaining is further marginalising women in the labour market. Despite the 
increased involvement of women in their unions since the mid 1970s and more women 
in positions of leadership, these changes to the legislative framework for labour 
relations appear to be what Rosemary Pringle and Sophie Watson (1992:57) have 
described as 'government conducted as if men's interests are the only ones that exist'. 
What's Interesting About Women's Interests'? 
The case studies that form the core of this thesis and the account of feminist unionism 
which precedes them show feminist unionists coming together to articulate collective 
interests and political strategies across the differences arising from particular industrial 
situations or occupations. 
German sociologists Claus Offe & H. Wissenthal (1985) have formulated theories of 
collective action by looking at the way unions articulate collective interests through the 
subordination of individual self-interests in order to reap collective benefits, through the 
development of collective identity. A tension between the individual and the collectivity 
. has been at the heart of debates in New Zealand on compulsory unionism and 
bargaining 'reform'. It is built into the Employment Contracts Act itself, in the 
emphasis on freedom of association and 'choice' between individual and collective 
contracts. 
The achieved character of collective interests lies in not just identifying commonalities 
between individual interests or what members 'really' want through democratic 
decision making structures and improved communication. Those commonalities need 
to be filtered through a wider understanding of other members' situations, of the 
arenas in which union interests are pursued and the implications of various outcomes 
or changes for the collectivity. These understandings are fed back to members as 
part of a two-way flow which Offe & Wissenthal (1985:193) term 'dialogical communi-
cation'. Providing that wider analysis is part of the job for which union officials are 
elected or hired - which is one reason this research focuses on the views of union 
officials. Overcoming the distortion of members' interests by a dominant culture and 
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ideology based on employers' interests in a capitalist economy (Offe & Wissenthal 
1985:198-200) requires not only the development of union consciousness among 
members, but of an analysis of the social relations involved in employment and in the 
wider political economy. 
But more than one set of social relations is involved. For feminist unionists interviewed 
for this research, problems of 'dialogical communication' in unions were understood 
within a feminist analysis which recognised gender relations (and by the 1980s, race 
relations) as a central dynamic of social inequality. In the chapters ahead, union 
education for women and political campaigns on women's issues can be seen as 
forms of 'dialogical communication' to strengthen collective identity among women and 
to influence what constituted the collective interests of 'the unions'. The opportunity 
is taken in this introduction to highlight the different arenas in which feminist unionists 
constructed and pursued a distinct set of 'women's interests' within unionism. 
In discussing feminist politics in relation to the state, Pringle and Watson (1992:6069) 
argue that 'women's interests' are by no means pre-given. In the process of 
responding to some issues but not others, 'women's interests' are 'constructed' within 
particular discourses through a process of engagement with the machinery of the 
state. This machinery, particularly in New Zealand and Australia, includes corporatist 
arrangements governing labour relations and the union movement itself which have 
operated through regulation of occupational labour markets. 
New Zealand's traditional pattern of corporatism developed within particular historical 
and economic contexts and within a discourse of social equality and the right of 
workers to bargain collectively, but also debate about the social costs or limited 
effectiveness of industrial action (Olssen 1986, 1988; Olssen & Richardson 1986; 
Simpson 1987, 1990). As discussed in Chapter 4, the arbitration of occupational 
awards for minimum wages and conditions benefited industrially weak workers while 
curbing militant unions (Holt 1987; Simpson 1987; Franks 1987; Walsh & Fougere 
1987:188). Despite the institutionalisation of unequal male and female wage rates until 
1972, this system benefited low paid women workers (Robertson 1992; Urban 
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Research 1987:12; Hyman 1987:9; NZCWA 1987) by supporting collective bargaining 
across fragmented workforces. 
It was on this base that the feminist unionist activism of the 1970s and 1980s was built. 
This research shows the way specifically 'women's interests' were articulated within 
that framework for wage bargaining and unionism, within the light of a developing 
feminist analysis. These collective interests of women were constructed both within 
particular unions and across unions in ways which, as Pringle and Watson (1992:54) 
suggest, opened up new strategic possibilities. 
In the chapters which follow, feminist unionists are seen constructing and representing 
'women's interests' in several ways. Within particular unions, addressing members' 
concerns as women at work was a response by unionists to criticisms about 
compulsory unionism and inadequate servicing of members' workplace problems. 
This was 'dialogical communication' to reconcile the individual and collective interests, 
but in bringing a feminist analysis to the situation of women members feminist 
unionists began to construct a new set of collective interests. The goal of feminist 
unionists was not only to make the union more relevant to women members, but to 
. use union organisation among women to pursJ,Je 'women's interests' in relation to 
gender inequality. 
The collective interests of women in different unions were articulated in the Working 
Women's Charter (Dann 1985:70; Appendix 1) by women organising as much outside 
the union movement as within it. These were spoken of, not in terms of 'interests', but 
as 'women's issues' - as concrete items for negotiation with employers, or for remedy 
through legislation. A high level of support from women union members had to be 
demonstrated before the Charter was adopted as Federation of Labour policy. 
The issues addressed by the Charter had their origins in gender relations at work and 
in the labour market, and in the links between women's paid work and unpaid work 
in the family. As feminist ideas spread and developed in the 1970s and 1980s, gender 
relations and women's paid housework were being debated much more widely than 
just in the union movement (Dann 1985). Some Charter items, such as reproductive 
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rights and childcare, were pursued by women primarily in arenas other than the union 
movement and addressed through changes in government policy (Dann 1985; Briar, 
Munford & Nash 1992). Those related most closely to employment relations - sexual 
harassment, equal employment opportunity and pay equity - were taken up in 
campaigns led by feminist unionists. Although current state policy was implicated in 
all these areas (Ou Plessis 1993). these 'women's interests' were 'identified' by 
members as relating to their own experiences and as interests constructed within the 
constraints of gender relations, through a feminist analysis. State policy and legislation 
presented a possible solution. 
As issues arising from 'women's interests' within gender relations at work, the Charter 
and campaigns on sexual harassment and employment equity drew support from 
women at various levels of collective organisation - in unions, in the union movement, 
through women's organisations (both overtly feminist and more traditional), and 
through women in pOlitical parties (Corner 1988; Woodley 1993; Wilson 1992). These 
issues then became part of 'women's interests'.within the area of electoral politics (Hill 
1993b; Du Plessis 1993). 
Feminist unionists also constructed 'women's interests' in relation to the organisation 
of the union movement itself. Initially these focused on the underrepresentation of 
women in union leadership and lack of attention given to issues of concern to women 
members. When difficulties were met in implementing the Charter and in achieving 
policy on sexual harassment and workplace pornography, feminist unionists began to 
examine the organisational structures of unions and the union movement. Standing 
committees to allow specific representation of women and Maori on Federation of 
Labour and NZ Council of Trade Unions executives and in some unions were a 
strategy to further 'women's interests' within the constraints imposed by decision 
making structures which continued to be dominated by men. Analysis of information 
from the clerical and service workers unions suggests that support for standing 
committees from less active members depended on their level of understanding about 
how gender or race relations are institutionalised in organisations (see pages 135-6 
and 513). Feminist unionists also considered that women's interests would not be 
served by restructuring union by industry rather than occupation as this would reduce 
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the number of highly female dominated organisations in which women could achieve 
'political space'. 
Pringle and Watson (1992:68-69) see 'women's interests' as never fixed and coherent; 
they are actively constructed within the shifting constraints which result from the 
outcomes of past struggles in different arenas of the state. In this research their 
specific argument applies most closely to the responses of feminist unionists to moves 
towards deregulation of the traditional framework for bargaining. Because of the 
gendered structure of the labour market, corporatist arrangements and changes to 
them have gendered implications. But the correlation between gender and collective 
interests in the regulation of bargaining was not as clear cut as on the issues 
discussed above. 
With regard to voluntary unionism, arbitration of award negotiations and the fuller 
deregulation of the Employment Contracts Act, 1991, the construction of collective 
interests on which alliances and collective action can be built is complex. Here 
differences in organising logistics and industrial strength between female dominated 
occupations cut across commonalities on 'women's interests' in relations to issues like 
. sexual harassment and pay equity. Similarities of position could be found between 
female dominated occupations with male as well as female leadership, and also with 
some unions for male dominated occupations. Outcomes of bargaining could not, 
moreover, be directly predicted on the basis of these positions. In some negotiations, 
factors related to the bargaining strength of workers were crosscut by employer 
strategies related to other management concerns. These are some of the complexities 
that arise in the course of the case studies. 
Case Studies and Contexts 
Rather than providing a single chronologically organised narrative, this thesis moves 
backwards and forwards in time, analysing the contexts in which these female 
dominated unions operated before engaging with the detailed evidence of particular 
case studies. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examine the contexts of labour market segregation, 
corporatist change in the labour relations framework, and feminist organisation within 
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the union movement. Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 present case studies exploring the 
strategies adopted within these contexts by unions for three different female dominated 
occupations. These strategies are shown to reflect both the concrete situation of the 
occupational workforce and the differing social analyses held by key decision makers 
with regard to gender, race and class relations. Chapter 10 draws some conclusions 
at the level of similarities and differences between these cases within the context of 
strategies for the union movement as a whole. The short concluding chapter returns 
to more abstract consideration of corporatism and gender. 
At the core of this thesis are the three separate case studies of unions representing 
three typical occupations for women. These provide insight into the small world of 
each union and an understanding of the daily realities of organising a particular section 
of the labour market for women's work. The focus is on union officials, paid and 
unpaid, elected and appointed. Quotations are used extensively, allowing the voices 
of those interviewed to be heard directly. Interpretation and discussion occurs largely 
in other chapters to preserve the integrity of these separate accounts. 
Presenting the material as case studies, rather than thematically, preserves the unitary 
character of each of the organisations under study (Crompton & Sanderson 1990:20). 
This allows not only positions on particular issues to be considered, but also reveals 
the full complexity of factors which shape each union, and the creative tensions, 
internal and external, out of which their responses develop. As Crompton & 
Sanderson write: 
Because case studies are holistic, they facilitate theoretical/logical thinking, that 
is, causal explanations ... (They) are analytical rather than illustrative if they are 
embedded in an appropriate theoretical framework. Their utility rests upon their 
capacity to explain. (Crompton & Sanderson 1990:21) 
Several themes run through the case studies and the chapters which contextualise the 
analysis of these unions. The first theme is the organisational forms and strategies 
which feminist unionists developed in the 1970s and 1980s. A second theme is the 
pattern of labour relations regulation which has underpinned those organisational 
forms, and the effects of legislative change on the unionisation, bargaining power and 
activism of women. A third theme relates to tensions between feminist unionism and 
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'classic' unionism. This examines the industrial situations of these female dominated 
occupations with regard to strategies proposed by leaders of the union movement in 
response to recession and corporatist change. Weaving through these themes is a 
trlinner thread, that of Maori and Pacific Islands union members and the representation 
of their collective interests through the union movement. 
Through the case studies and contextualising chapters particular issues related to 
these themes are revisited. Discussion of the contrasts and commonalities between 
the unions studied is directed at challenging assumptions that 'the unions' are 
homogeneous. 
A more diverse reality is presented. The aim is to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding which acknowledges the particular situations in which women are 
placed in the labour market and validity of the strategies which they adopt. Setting 
these case studies in their changing contexts aims to provide not only insights into 
particular unions but a 1ll9!e sophisticated view of the role of unions in the creation of 
particular patterns of corporatism. 
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CHAPTER METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Introduction 
Methodology is the means by which theory and information are interconnected 
(Harding 1987:3) - not only through particular research methods, but at a more basic 
yet less obvious level, through assumptions about social reality and about knowledge 
which affect choices of research subject and design, and how information is 
interpreted. Before engaging with the evidence and arguments of the thesis itself, the 
opportunity is taken here to reflect on the process of the research and to make explicit 
the theoretical orientations which underlie both this research and the thesis. Some key 
concepts encountered in the thesis are defined, and some decisions on research 
design and thesis presentation are explained. 
This thesis draws on socialist feminist theorising which brings together two bodies of 
social theory, marxist and feminist, with differing theoretical objectives and 
emancipatory goals (Connolly & Segal 1986:18). Similarly, the writing of the thesis is 
an attempt to blend two sets of intellectual conventions, feminist and sociological, 
between which there are both connections and tensions (Cook & Furnow 1986; Smith 
1991). Sociology seeks to understand the social mechanisms that shape individual 
experience. In the process it routinely depersonalises and depoliticises analysis by 
attributing agency to abstractions (Smith 1991 :163), just as I am doing in this 
sentence. This convention has its uses in making the patterns of social processes 
discernable amid a lived chaos, though its history lies in a now largely outmoded claim 
to credibility as 'objective science'. 
In critiquing claims to objectivity, many feminists social researchers have emphasised 
the subjective experience at the base of both action and the production of knowledge 
(Cook & Furnow 1986; Smith 1987), returning always to the feminist principle that 'the 
personal is political'. A socialist feminist approach focuses on I relations, rather 
than abstract categories, exploring relationships between different sets of women and 
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men tl~lrough their interactive social practices and social institutions. From such a 
base flows a dialectical epistemology in which objectivity and subjectivity cannot be 
kept apart; it is their interpenetration which leads to knowledge (Ring 1987:761). 
Different positions within the social relations of gender, race and class, and the social 
structures - such the labour market - which result from the ongoing practices of such 
relations, mean that women's experience and knowledge will be different from men's, 
and there will be differences of experience and knowledge among different groups of 
women. As Nancy Hartsock comments: 
In any society with systematically divergent practical activities, one should 
expect the growth of logically divergent world views. That is, each division of 
labour, whether by gender or class, can be expected to have consequences for 
knowledge. (Hartsock 1983:286) 
In researching unions for three different but typical occupations for women, research 
for this thesis used qualitative methods to gather the subjective experience and 
knowledge of union officials organising groups of women in different positions in the 
labour market. This knowledge is presented through case studies, allowing the voices 
of officials to be heard through extensive use of quotations. These views from different 
positions in the labour market are used to explore structural relationships, such as the 
relation between the occupational segregation of women and particular patterns of 
union organisation, and the impact of two different labour relations regimes on a 
labour market structured by gender and race. 
The project of this doctoral research has been to practice both feminism and 
sociology, and to further the relationship between them by drawing on the conventions 
of each. Subjective experience, personal knowledge and language are drawn on to 
extract material on issues, strategies and organisational forms from the personalities 
and party politics involved. In the tight little union world of a workforce of a mere 
one-and-a-half million, individuals are active agents engaged in political change. In 
recording and analysing recent changes in labour relations and their consequences 
for women, in telling the stories of these unions, I am myself both recording history 
and actively engaging in politics. 
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Points of Departure 
This study was sparked by my curiosity about the tactics of unions with predominantly 
female members in the late 1980s. In 1989 as I began graduate studies, unions were 
struggling to settle three major awards for female dominated occupations; nurses in 
public hospitals held their very first one day strike; the Pay Equity campaign was in full 
swing. These issues for working women were brought to my attention not by the 
news media but by street stalls, petitions, badges and stickers. Something different 
was happening with unions - or was it just some unions? 
Yet when I sought academic enlightenment about New Zealand unions through 
university libraries what I found was marching miners and striking seamen. Inter-
national literature on labour relations and labour process generally equated labour with 
factory work by men. There was little that connected unionism or marxist analysis with 
my own work experience or that of my mother, sister and women friends. The starting 
point of this study was therefore the selection of three occupations in which women 
are typically employed - nursing, clerical work and cleaning. All are in the service 
sector in which three-quarters of New Zealand women work (Dept Stats 1988-89:331). 
Reasons for selection and contrasts between these typical 'women's work' 
occupations are discussed in Chapter 6 before the case studies themselves. 
The 1970s and 1980s has been a period of considerable change in the New Zealand 
economy and in labour relations. In 1989 I undertook a short exploratory study of the 
clerical workers unions (Hill 1989). As I began to plan this doctoral research in 1990, 
the pace of change was increasing. Voluntary union membership, bargaining reform 
and union amalgamations were all likely during the period of the research. How would 
these changes affect the female dominated unions I had selected? How and why 
would their responses differ? What were the strategies of these unions with regard to 
members, employers, the state and the union movement? Were the strategies of 
unions with a majority of women members feminist? How did women unionists 
perceive feminism within the union movement? 
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These were some of the initial questions which shaped the research on which this 
thesis is based. As I began interviewing unionists, I learned of the issues which 
preoccupied officials. Each union group was faced with a distinctive set of problems 
and dilemmas arising out of the situation of their members. Issues arose from the 
nature of the work, the employment relation, workforce distribution and the problems 
of the industries in which members were employed. There were also issues about 
how these unions should be organised and questions about the organisation of the 
union movement as a whole. Some of the union officials with whom I spoke offered 
feminist analyses of the situation of their members and were developing explicitly femi-
nist strategies. I then began to ask why some of the unions in which women are 
concentrated pursued strongly feminist strategies while others did not? 
Questions were raised or highlighted by research and analysis emerging from other 
sources. As part of the fourth Labour government's policy development on 
employment equity, two reports had explored issues of occupational segregation and 
average pay differentials between women and men (Urban Research 1987; Wilson 
1988). During the study period the National Advisory Committee on the Employment 
of Women (1990) produced a report on women's employment and government policy, 
and the Ministry of Women's Affairs (1991, 1993) undertook detailed study of 
occupational segregation. 
This research also drew on a growing international socialist feminist literature exploring 
the systematic structuring of labour markets by gender and race. Research showed 
that horizontal segregation between occupations and vertical segregation within 
occupations and organisations, though persistent, was not invariable (Witz 1986, 1988; 
Milkman 1987; Mark-Lawson 1988; 8agguley 1991). It '!Vas shaped by active pra¢tices 
and active resistance in concrete historical and cultural contexts. This reinforced the 
importance of gender as an important issl!,e for any examination of labour relations 
and unionism. It also indicated the importance of examining the specific situation of 
a set of female dominated occupations in a context of rapid change. 
Yet research on the labour market in New Zealand had pOinted out that the gap 
between average male and female earnings, while persistent, was narrower in New 
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Zealand and Australia than in most other industrialised countries. A significant factor 
in this low wage gap was centralised wage fixing through state regulated awards 
(Urban Research 1987:12; Hyman 1987:9). From the late 1930s, women in low paid, 
isolated and often parttime service occupations were covered by minimum rates of pay 
negotiated by unions. This is not the case for women in similar occupations in most 
other OECD countries (Hyman 1987; ICFTU 1991). This raised questions about how 
different institutional arrangements with respect to wage setting and unionisation affect 
the economic position of women. 
Questions about the impact on women of legislative 'frameworks and union 
organisation was also of importance in examining the achievements of feminist 
unionists in the 1980s. A decision was made to focus on unions representing three 
contrasting sets of women workers in order to highlight the difficulties and opportu-
nities of groups of workers differently placed in the labour market. The case studies 
of unions of nurses, clerical workers and cleaners also suggest which organisational 
structures, institutional supports and strategies might encourage collective organisation 
and effective bargaining by working women. What kind of unionism and what kind of 
labour relations framework best provides women with a base for resistance to the 
active practices which maintain women's disadvantage in the labour market? 
Sociological theories on the state, corporatism and unionism were also relevant to 
what I learnt about organisational structures and institutional supports, highlighting 
apparent contradictions to be explored (Offe 1984; Franzway, Court & Connell 1989; 
Pringle & Watson 1992; Jessop 1979; Lehmbruch & Schmitter 1982; Offe & Wissenthal 
1985). Had New Zealand's traditional corporatist arrangements improved women's 
pay rates or institutionalised pay inequality between men and women? Was a 
predominantly male leadership of the union movement a reason why women unionists 
looked to politics and legislation to address equity issues for women? While efforts 
were being made to involve women more in their unions, had centralised bargaining 
requiring little membership participation provided feminist unionists with the 'political 
space' to organise around issues they considered important to women workers? 
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The 'final shape of the thesis was significantly affected by the Employment Contracts 
Act, introduced midway through the research in May 1991. Although it will take some 
years to fully assess its impact on women workers, the situation of these unions before 
and after tile implementation of the Employment Contracts Act became a central focus 
of the research, reshaping and helping answer some of the questions raised. 
Theory to Union Research 
Like the unions it describes, this thesis is set within intersecting discourses of feminism 
and unionism. It draws on and will, I hope, contribute to the growing international 
body of socialist feminist theory, as well as to local political debate. The connection 
between theory, research design and thesis formulation has, however, been rather 
different from the linear process which my sociology methods classes led me to 
expect. 
I commenced the research from a clear socialist feminist theoretical standpoint, circa 
1989, and began reading my way into an literature which analysed the 'labour process' 
and 'labour markets', as well as local debates on economic and labour relations 
policies. I expected 'theory' to be largely confined to the first six months of the study 
period and 'analysis' to a six month period at the end of the 'empirical research'. It 
wasn't like that. Continuing political change relating to labour relations demanded 
constant analysis and led to the research continuing beyond the date I had set for 
completion of the project. Long after the formal interviews, unionists continued to tell 
me of likely contract breakdowns or organisers made redundant. Researchers 
continued to produce analyses of data gathered during the period of my research -
any cutoff point to information gathering seemed entirely artificial and would render my 
work instant history. Because of the one or two year time lag between publication 
outside New Zealand and my access to the latest feminist theory on women and work, 
theory fed into research through the whole period. In addition, each time I referred 
back to feminist theorists read earlier, my response differed, shaped by my under-
standing of local changes and of the unions under study. New levels of understanding 
arrived seemingly by themselves, when I had to explain something basic or woke at 
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3 a.m. The relation of theory to data was not linear, or even exponential; it was just 
as Alison Jagger (1983:364) describes it, an 'upward spiral'. 
In a dialectical epistemology, as Jenny Ring (1987:963-966) theorises, knowledge is 
dynamic not static. Since constant change is presupposed, knowledge can never be 
final or complete. 
The path towards momentary 'truth' in dialectics is chaotic, the affirmation of 
conflict, knowledge following action, wisdom taking flight at dusk, after the day's 
disorder subsides. This means that subject and object, ideas and 'material 
reality', consciousness and history, thought and action, theory and practice, 
must all confront each other, must be experienced as irreconcilably in conflict, 
before a temporary resolution does, surprisingly, emerge. 
(Ring 1987:763) 
This describes accurately my own, rather less poetic, experience of research and 
analysis, and also the continual process of experience, conflict, analysis and 
strategising that I witnessed among union officials. 
Feminist critiques of sociological claims to objectivity discuss the importance not only 
of preserving the subjectivity of research subjects in the text, but also of making the 
subjectivity and positioning of the researcher visible to the reader. That is the purpose 
of this chapter. As a sociologist and researcher who is gathering, presenting and 
interpreting the views, political positions and strategies of feminist unionists and other 
union officials, it is appropriate to make my own 'feminist standpoint'c clear (Hartsock 
1983; Jagger 1983:369-389; Smith 1979:163-172). To do this I want to discuss 
broader socialist feminist theorising which underlies the analysis in this thesis. This is 
not a discussion of varied feminist positions and on-going debate, however, but rather 
an expression of the theoretical perspective which I brought to this work. 
Underlying this study is an personal ontology of women and men as inherently social 
beings, and of society as a complex of social relations between individuals and 
between communities of people. We are all expert practitioners in our everyday 
worlds (Smith 1979:110), actively engaged in the social relations which produce and 
reproduce society. However, social practices in western society are characterised by 
unequal power and material resources which perpetuate and create social inequality. 
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It is the institutionalisation of these practices in expected behaviours, traditions, 
institutions of the state, laws and other 'social facts' that 'structure' and constrain our 
continuing practices within unequal social relations. It is women's struggles within and 
against particular institutionalised forms of social organisation that is the subject of this 
thesis. 
'v/~ocialist feminists recognise the inequalities of western society as arising out of social 
relations of gender and class (Hartmann 1981; Jagger .1983) - with a slightly belated 
recognition of the social relations of race (Barrett & Mcintosh 1985; Bhavnani & 
Coulson 1986; Phizacklea 1988; Bruegel 1989; Smith 1991). Patriarchy, racism and 
capitalism have been understood as whole systems in the marxist sense of sets of 
social relations based on a division of labour which is hierarchical and exploitative and 
facilitates the accumulation of bene'fits, control of resources and power in the hands 
of, respectively, men, whites, and capitalists - who, in fact though not necessarily in 
theory, are usually white men. The converse outcome of the gendered and racially 
marked division of labour through which these systems interlock is increasing poverty 
and disempowerment among brown women, both in New Zealand and internationally 
(Scott 1986; Mies 1986; Phizacklea 1988; Hill & Harvey 1990; Evans 1993; Stats NZ 
1991 a:23, 199-1 b:28, 1991 c: 1 08). 
While capitalism, patriarchy and racism as systems may benefit from the mutually 
reinforcing, dialectic relationsrlip between them (Eisenstein 1979), closer examination 
of practices in local contexts shows that gender, race and class are separate, if 
overlapping sets of material practices, each rationalised by norms and social 
stereotypes. Variations over time and between cultures are shaped and limited by 
inherent contradictions between each set of practices and their attendant ideologies 
(Franzway, Court & Connell 1989:26). It is in these shifts and contradictions that 
leverage for resistance is often found. Campaigns for equal employment opportunity 
and pay equity, for example, draw on the contradiction between the ideology of 
individual rights, individual merits and market exchange between equals through which 
capitalism is rationalised, and the reality of discrimination, segregation and low 
earnings experienced by women and racial minorities. 
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Gender, race and class are not merely demographic attributes, nor a simple 
juxtaposition or hierarchy of categories, but are social relations between individuals 
and between groups of people (Smith 1987:29-32). Each involves sets of complex 
practices, with the relationship between the three equally complex. Gender, race and 
class relations pattern and structure our society but they are not equally important in 
all situations. Although inequalities of power are central to class relations, gender and 
race, outcomes are not always predictable but are negotiated and contingent. The 
detailed pattern of divisions of labour - between men and women, those who buy 
labour and those who must sell it, colonisers and colonised - and associated cultural 
norms therefore show variation over time and between localities. These are a 
consequence of changes in production and the economy, both local and global, 
changes in family formation, and of ongoing and unequal resistance to practices 
producing inequality. In each situation, the particular intersection or importance of 
gender, race or class relations will differ. 
Dorothy Smith has argued that a 'sociology for women' should 'begin where women 
are', taking its problematic from the active concerns of women and creating a space 
for them as subjects whose voices are frequently absent from positivist sociology 
(Smith 1987:107). Starting from the standpoint of subjects in their everyday 
experience, a sociology for women preserves their presence as knowers and as actors 
(Smith 1987:105) but sets this knowledge in the context of wider social relations by 
exploring its historical, national and international context. It attempts to provide a map 
of relations beyond the immediate that can enlarge the subject's grasp of the world 
from where she stands (Smith 1987:106). It is an inquiry which suggests 'this is how 
it works' in ways that women can check against their actual experience (Smith 
1987:122). 
This understanding of sociology has informed the selection of topic and methods of 
inquiry used in this research, as well as the presentation of research material. It is 
active practices of unionists in a particular historical setting that are recorded and 
analysed in this study. Starting from where women are in a New Zealand labour 
market structured by a gendered and racially marked division of labour, I examine the 
position and strategies of particular unions representing predominantly women workers 
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within the regulatory frameworks for labour relations negotiation. A feminist analysis 
of those frameworks in the light of the case studies indicates how changing patterns 
of labour relations regulation have worked for women, and how feminist unionists have 
acted to widen the legislative framework for labour relations to include matters 
specifically relevant to women workers. 
But offering an account of feminist unionist activism and identifying feminist strategies 
requires some discussion of the term 'feminist'. In this thesis the term feminist is used 
to describe unionists or strategies which confront inequalities produced by the social 
relations of gender. In the context of this study of women and unionism, feminist 
unionists are those women members or officials who explore the juncture of gender 
relations and employment relations and who recognise the importance of these in 
making unionism relevant to women. After the passing of the Employment Contracts 
Act, however, some of the most overtly radical of the feminist unionists I interviewed 
were exercising pragmatism in identifying 'women's interests' on behalf of members. 
"Personally I am a feminist but my feminist views have moved significantly since 
the 1970s to now, the 1990s, twenty years. I am also a pragmatist and a realist, 
so the bottom line is what is serving the interests of our members ... What our 
members are saying is (a) they want jobs, (b) they want their pay packet to stay 
the same." (NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
As Charlotte Bunch (1983:250) points out, 'Feminism is an entire world view or gestalt, 
not just a laundry list of 'women's issues'. The construction of 'women's interests', 
and strategies defined in this thesis as feminist, were developed witt-lin a context of 
ongoing gender relations and changing state regulation (Pringle & Watson 1992). 
Nancy Hartsock (1983) argues that the gender division of labour forms the basis for 
a 'feminist standpoint' when the experiences and contradictions of systematically 
differing male and female activities lead to a questioning and analysis of social 
relations and social structures. Such an understanding rejects dominant ideologies 
about appropriate roles and relations between men and women. In a similar vein Offe 
& Wissenthal (1985) point to the role of unions in overcoming the distortion of workers' 
collective interests by dominant ideologies in a capitalist society. It is not experience 
directly but the analysis of experience that leads on to collective action for change. 
In this thesis the term 'feminist unionist' is used to describe women activists with both 
a feminist analysis and an analysis of employment and class relations. It is used: 
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· .. to indicate both the achieved character of a standpoint and that a standpoint 
by definition carries a liberatory potential. (Hartsock 1983:289) 
This thesis drawn on accounts by feminist unionists to construct an account which 
highlights and problematises gender inequality in the labour market. This does not 
universalise one viewpoint to all women, but emphasises commonalities between the 
situations and experiences of different groups of women workers which result from the 
way gender relations are organised through paid employment (Smith 1979:163, 1987: 
87; Hartsock 1983:290). 
The case studies explore differences as well as similarities among women in particular 
female dominated occupations. The situation and the strategies of some women-led 
unions representing predominantly women members are contrasted with mainstream 
union strategising and labour relations politics, which reflect a dominant 'malestream' 
standpoint in which women's experiences are marginalised. 
A second concept which requires discussion is 'classic unionism'. This term is not an 
academic one, but is taken from current debate among unionists and from interviews. 
The specific phrase was spontaneously used by a NZCTU official in discussing the 
demise of the NZ Clerical Workers Union. 'Classic unionism' refers to tactics and 
strategies which were effective in the historic development of unionism: workplace 
organisation through delegates, class consciousness, pickets and strike action. 
However, these tactics have typically been used by unions covering male dominated 
occupations in production industries where members were concentrated on large 
worksites. Among New Zealand unionists the term 'classic unionism' is frequently 
used in criticism of the strategies identified here as 'feminist'. A question that this 
thesis addresses is why some predominantly female unions were not practising 
'classic unionism' in the 1970s and 1980s and why they·were doing things differently. 
The case studies focus on the differing situations of women members within each 
union and the strategies adopted by each union. The term 'strategy' needs brief 
consideration. In discussing management strategies, Craig Littler (1991 :51) considers 
that choices made within constraints that fall into a pattern may be legitimately be 
referred to as a strategy. Thus historic union strategies to unionise and negotiate 
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awards for the whole workforce may be analysed as strategies which bene'fit women, 
whether or not that was a specifically articulated intention. Strategic directions by 
Federation of Labour or NZ Council of Trade Union leaders may be similarly analysed 
as strategies which marginalise women, Maori or Pacific Islands workers without 
inferring conscious intent to achieve that effect. When changes to wage bargaining 
for public servants fall into a pattern of labour market deregulation publicly advocated 
by the Business Roundtable, then it may be concluded that the government is 
pursuing the same strategy as large business employers - whether or not this is 
actually stated by government. 
As will be seen in the chapters ahead, the strategies of feminist unionists were 
consciously developed, both by particular unions and across the boundaries between 
unions. Chapter 5 focuses on the way feminist unionists organised a series of 
autonomous political spaces in which they could come together to construct common 
interests and develop strategies to pursue them, inside and outside the union 
movement. 
Like the Labour Relations Act, 1987, this thesis adopts the term 'labour relations' 
rather than industrial relations, to avoid images of heavy industry and factory work 
which are inappropriate to the work of most New Zealanders. However, this 
substitution would not be meaningful for the terms 'industrial action', 'industrial muscle' 
or 'industrial leverage'. Industrial action may include tactics like pickets, work-to-rule 
and other tactics as well as more narrowly understood 'strike action'. 'Collective 
action', discussed in Chapter 11, is shown by these case studies to include a broader 
range of tactics and strategies than industrial action. In the case study on nurses, 
however, I take my language from nurses' own debate on strategy and the ideal bal-
ance between 'the industrial' and 'the professional'. 
l The Research Process 
In keeping with an understanding of gender as social relations between sets of people, 
rather abstract categories to which attributes are ascribed, the research question was 
posed at the collective level of organisational response and strategies directed at 
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change. At this level, the choice of interviewees was structured by a rather pragmatic 
view of how unions operated within New Zealand's highly centralised labour relations 
system. Small numbers of officials and active members are the key decision makers 
and strategists in each union. A small core of officials, paid and unpaid, are 
responsible for the management of the union and for acting on the collective interests 
of members. 
The main research method was loosely structured in-depth interviews with unionists 
who were (or had been) in official positions with unions covering clerical workers, 
nurses and cleaners. Union secretaries, presidents, executive members, organisers, 
specialist officers such as educators, researchers and legal officers, and some 
delegates were interviewed but the focus was on fulltime paid officials. In all 110 
interviews were conducted between October 1990 and October 1992. By this time the 
unions studied had negotiated - or failed to negotiate - their first round of contracts 
under the Employment Contract Act. 
The situation of each organisation was studied, exploring the small world of each 
union and of the union movement through the eyes of these officials. These decision 
makers and strategisers were seen to be actively engaged with employers, members, 
the state and the wider union movement. The aim was not to interview all the officials 
of each of the selected unions but to gain an understanding of each unions through 
discussions with Officials involved in a variety of positions within it. Some key officials 
were interviewed two or three times over the two year period, to follow closely their 
understanding of events and monitor strategies as they developed. This contributed 
to a layering of information about each union and the union movement from the 
perspective of different union officials. 
Interviews with officials of my selected unions gave rise to a 'snowballing' of issues to 
pursue and further people to interview. I soon learned that the feminist strategies and 
organisational changes within my unions took place within the context of wider feminist 
activism in the Federation of Labour, the public sector unions and, after 1987, in the 
NZ Council of Trade Unions. The processes and strategies about which I was 
gathering information were not adequately explained in isolation, but needed to be 
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analysed in the context of feminist strategies within the wider union movement. This 
snowballing was insidious: there seemed always to be more fascinating and vitally 
interconnected issues to explore and more women I just had to talk to if I was to arrive 
at an adequate understanding of these unions and of the development of feminism 
within the union movement. 
Interviews were supplemented by study of union documents, such as information 
material for members, research and discussion papers, submissions to government 
on proposed legislation changes, and newspapers, journals and leaflets produced by 
the unions. Some of these are specifically referred to in later chapters,. as are papers 
and publications by the NZ Council of Trade Unions. I followed newspaper and 
television coverage of industrial disputes and legislative changes. I studied past and 
concurrent academic analysis of labour relations in New Zealand, as well as research-
ing past legislation and labour history. I attended some membership meetings of my 
selected unions, regularly attended meetings of the Christchurch regional women's 
CTU committee in 1991 and went to the 1991 National Women's CTU biennial 
Conference in Wellington. During the research period I was involved in the campaign 
for employment equity through the Coalition for Equal Value, Equal Pay and from the 
. end of 1991 went on the management committee of the Auckland Working Women's 
Resource Centre. 
The access that unions granted me and the openness with which officials spoke was 
remarkable and greatly appreciated. The difficulty was organising interviews around 
the pressures of their extremely high workloads and continual grievances, disputes 
and crises which sometimes took priority over interview arrangements. Active 
unionists are political people, and despite the differences of position and opinion 
among them, their understanding and analysis of labour relations and its politics 
enabled me to grasp the complexity of the context in which they operated. 
In all, 110 interviews with 86 officials were conducted over the two year period; most 
lasted about one and a half hours. Interview tapes were laboriously transcribed by the 
cheapest and fastest typist available - myself - at a ratio of scholarship grant to labour 
time that threw into serious doubt the value of higher education. Highlighting and 
marginal annotation of the transcripts and other documentation allowed the material 
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to be grouped into topic areas and woven into draft working papers on each union 
which were returned to the unions concerned. These papers were structured to 
explore the relationship of union officials with their members, the employers, the state 
and the rest of the union movement. Interviews conducted on the impact of the 
Employment Contracts Act and the 1992 round of negotiations updated these working 
papers, and work began on rewriting the material for the 'final thesis. The discussion 
of feminist and unionism in Chapter 5 draws on interviews with 18 women and two 
men, as well as documents from the Wellington Working Women's Alliance, Auckland 
Working Women's Council, Auckland Working Women's Resource Centre and NZCTU 
women's committees. Some of those interviewed had been involved in several of 
these groups or had held different positions in one or more unions; all were centrally 
involved in the organisations or structures discussed. 
The process of analysing qualitative material from focused but open ended interviewing 
is labour intensive and extremely slow. The advantage is in the process of learning 
that it allows; the exploration and development of issues, the gathering of other 
people's knowledge and the in-depth analysis they offer of their situation. While 
quantitative survey research has other useful purposes, questionnaires close off the 
possibility of new questions and new knowledge. Decisions about what will be 
relevant knowledge are made before questions are asked. The qualitative approach 
used in this research meant that the selection of what was relevant knowledge 
occurred at all stages of the research. The open, loosely structured research design 
was intended to capture change and responses to change over a period of time. 
Particularly important to documenting change were successive interviews with some 
key informants. 
The topic, flexible design and timing of the research were apposite, in fact fortuitous, 
enabling the recording of important events and changes which could not have been 
predicted at the start of the project. But the amount of change in such a short study 
period, and scale of its consequent impact, was not anticipated. The time scale initially 
determined by what is appropriate to doctoral research, quickly got over taken by 
events. As the Employment Contracts Act was introduced, it became logical to 
conclude the empirical research with the first round of negotiations under the new Act 
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- but it took nine months for the unions I was studying to complete their first round of 
collective contracts. The overthrow of the 100 year old framework of labour relations 
in the middle of the study period dropped into my lap a unique research opportunity 
and added an scientifically convincing before-and-after effect to the project, but quite 
overloaded the capacity of one doctoral thesis. 
This difficulty showed itself at the writing stage. The variety yet interconnectedness of 
the factors affecting each union in similar and different ways made it difficult to exclude 
quantities of detailed information. Reducing the size of the picture by taking a more 
distant and abstracted perspective risked losing the voices of my interviewees who 
were reporting and analysing largely at the level of practical issues and everyday 
politics. Should space be taken up by this discussion of process, which has become 
almost de rigeur in feminist research? When the garden is full of wonderful pumpkins, 
how much soup is too much? How can I waste good food? Should I make less by 
leaving out the onions, the garlic, the yoghurt or the spices? Did I really want to freeze 
the surplus and serve up pumpkin papers for years? 
The Experience 
If the starting point of knowledge is the knowing subject, the subjectivity of the 
researcher must also be acknowledged, not obscured by claims of objectivity (Smith 
1979; Cook & Furnow 1986:6). This understanding recognises that the researcher is 
not only 'inside the whale'(Bell & Encel 1978) but IS part of it, that she and her work 
are located within the same social relations as the subject (Smith 1979: 158-9, 
1987:140-2). 
As a woman, a longtime secretary and a sometime cleaner, I shared some of the 
positions of members of the unions under study. My knowledge of nursing and its 
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politics was second hand, through 'friends and previous study. As a socialist feminist, 
I shared the perspective of many feminist unionists I spoke with. Others spoke from 
an experience I could not share, though located within the same social relations of 
gender. 
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I was also a participant in the social relations of race, but as a Pakeha I was differently 
located from Maori women and Pacific Islands women with whom I spoke. As a 
sociologist I hoped to provide a space for Maori or Pacific Islands women to speak of 
a reality I could only partially know. A disappointment of this study and for Maori and 
Pacific Islands workers - is that there were so few non-Pakeha voices. This was partly 
a consequence of my focus at the decision making level of unions, where few Maori 
or Pacific Islanders are located. The continuing marginalisation of the concerns of 
Maori and Pacific Islands workers indicated in these case studies contrasts with the 
over-representation of Maori and Pacific Islands people among the low paid and 
unemployed. 
Although I came from outside the world of unionism, my own political positioning was 
important to the continuing access I was granted and to the quality of the interviews. 
A good prior understanding of union principles and labour relations legislation was 
fundamental to successful discussion of issues. A particular rapport with many women 
unionists meant they were willing to share their analysis and their concerns with me. 
With others, differences of opinion on feminist or political party issues could be 
expected, yet a basic political sympathy with the importance of collective organisation 
by workers meant unionists, including male unionists, were willing to share their 
analysis and explain their position. This willingness to provide information - time and 
data permitting - was general, even from the one or two who, I suspect, were 
wondering 'what this academic woman was on about'. 
For some, this sharing of perspectives with an outside researcher was part of the 
ongoing general debate and political positioning within the union movement. And in 
this regard another - but not entirely disconnected - point needs discussing. Late in 
the research process, two interviewees mentioned an aspect of unionism of which, as 
an outsider, I was vaguely aware but had not foregrounded in my research. New 
Zealand unionism, they suggested, could not be understood without recognition of the 
centrality of small political parties within the union movement. Just as some feminists 
identified union organisations as offering a powerful means of furthering the interests 
of women, small socialist parties had long seen unions in just that light, as potential 
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sites for the kind of activities idenUfied by Lenin as the role of the working class 
'vanguard'. 
The union movement, particularly in Wellington, has been crosscut with loyalties and 
conflicts which relate to membership of the Socialist Unity Party (SUP), the Workers 
Communist League (WCL)1 and the Labour Party. For some, union strategies can 
be explained in terms of these affiliations, although the significance to unionists of far 
left groups was disproportionate to their influence in New Zealand politics and society 
as whole. As I had realised, some key clerical union officials had been in the WCL 
and some NZCTU officials had longstanding connections with the SUP. Other 
Wellington unionists belonged to a small Marxist-Leninist Organisation (MILO) in the 
early 1980s. However, the SUP dissolved following the disintegration of the USSR and 
the WCL had disbanded about two years before my interviews began, although 
loyalties and social connections remained. I discussed this issue separately with two 
highly respected and influential unionists unconnected with my particular unions2. 
Their comments suggested that the phenomenon of socialist party loyalties and 
antagonisms was strongest in Wellington and of little relevance outside the major 
cities, and that in the union movement 'political labelling was sometimes used as an 
alternative to thinking'. 
My decision, supported by my supervisors, was to continue to focus on the analyses 
union officials offered on labour relations changes, their members' situations and 
appropriate strategies, rather than target their party affiliations. However, differences 
of political analysis were precisely what distinguished the parties of the Left. The SUP 
took a strong and traditionally marxist class position, whereas the WCL had worked 
an equally strong gender and race analysis into their class analysis. However, these 
different orientations are not exclusive to small political groupings. The subjective 
nature of this decision needs to be acknowledged. I myself hold a strong 
gender /race/ class analysis and have not been involved in vanguard parties. Like 
1 Two main, but by no means the only, groupings of revolutionary cadres. 
2 I should mention, however, that one had strong Labour Party connections; the other was 
considering becoming active in the Alliance Party. 
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many feminists, I have been more alienated by the masculinist processes of some 
groups than by their marxist politics. 
For some unionists whom I interviewed the frank sharing of opinion and political 
position was not without risk. Interviewees were usually speaking not just from a 
position within a union hierarchy, but within an employment relationship. Only one 
person declined to be interviewed for this reason, but some ethical issues arose about 
confidentiality. One of these led to a decision not to identify the positions of those 
quoted in the third case study, in order to preserve anonymity. Such issues did not 
arise in unions where views were more homogeneous. 
Generally, quotations from interviews carry attributions which indicate the relation of 
the speaker to the membership of the union: Elected Officer of the union (secretaries, 
presidents, executive members); Staff Official (industrial officers, educators, 
researchers); Organiser (who are in most direct contact with members). The date of 
interview is also given. It should be noted that union secretaries are both 'Elected 
Officers' and on fulltime salaries. Until 1987 they were usually non-elected officials 
appointed by the elected executive of the union, but the Labour Relations Act, 1987 
required that secretaries, who hold the power of day-to-day management and initiative, 
should be democratically elected every five years by the union membership. The first 
elections held under the 1987 Act confirmed most incumbent union secretaries in their 
position. 
Allowing research subjects control over the material generated through this research 
was an area where a gap appeared between feminist research ideals and research 
reality. The literature on the practice of feminist research recognises that sociologist 
and subject are located in a social relation constructed by the research itself, the 
relation of researcher and researched, of knower and known (Smith 1979: 158-9; Cook 
& Furnow 1986; Harding 1987:6). A central principle is the acknowledgement of and 
reduction of hierarchy in this relation by allowing new research questions to arise from 
the interaction between researcher and researched, by seeking feedback and allowing 
the researched to have some control over information about their lives. The research 
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design was chosen to allow the project to be shaped by issues raised in the course 
of research interviews. Issues of feedback and control were more difficult. 
Following interviews, trlree officials exercised differing degrees of control over the 
transcripts of their interviews. Most transcripts were not returned to interviewees, 
since this would not tell them what would be used, or not, or how. The strategy with 
respect to interview material was to develop draft working papers, which assembled 
the material gathered from each union. These were distributed back to heads of 
unions and key informants for feedback or alteration. The reality was that union 
officials have no time, nor mandate, to take on the additional work of commenting on 
research being done by others. By the time the thesis was in draft, however, the final 
version of each case study had been read by one person centrally involved in the 
union studied. Other feedback came through a few oral comments, follow-up 
interviews, the use of a paper or two that I had written, and interest expressed in the 
final outcome of the thesis. People knew what I was doing, had the ability to block my 
work if they wished to, but - so far - are still talking to me. Perhaps that is as much 
as a researcher can hope for. 
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THE MARKET FOR WOMEN'S LABOUR 
Introduction 
The division of labour and allocation of sets of tasks to job categories are the 
mechanisms at the heart of wage differentiation. The division of labour by gender has 
been identified as the key to persistent inequality between the average earnings of 
women and men and different racial groups in paid employment (Walby 1988:1-2). 
Occupational segregation in the labour market is therefore a logical starting point for 
any study of gender or ethnic inequality. Discussion of the labour market is particu-
larly relevant to this study because the concentration of women in particular 
occupations in the labour market is reflected by New Zealand's traditional patterns of 
unionisation. 
The female dominated unions chosen for this study represent occupations which are 
both typical of women's employment and reflect important differences between female 
dominated occupations. The selection of the unions for clerical workers, nurses and 
cleaners is discussed in Chapter 6, as is the gendered nature of these occupations 
and the implications for union organising and bargaining power of gender relations in 
these jobs. 
A growing body of feminist research focuses on the ongoing practices by which jobs 
are gendered and occupational segregation is created or maintained (Cockburn 1983, 
1985,1991; Witz 1986; Milkman 1987; Mark-Lawson 1988; Stanko 1988; Glucksmann 
1990; Leidner 1991). Tile 'outcome or sedimented form' of these active processes of 
occupational closure is the structure of occupational segregation in the labour market 
(Witz 1988:740), which is observable through statistical research. As discussed below, 
labour market analysis may be conducted from a variety of theoretical perspectives but 
recent studies all note features of the labour market which relate to gender and race. 
This chapter looks at different ways of theorising labour markets, and at the way the 
New Zealand labour market is structured by gender and by race. 
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If the most persistent feature of labour markets historically and internationally is 
occupational segregation by gender (Cockburn 1988; Milkman 1987), then the 
gendered labour market is the primary and slowest changing of the contexts in which 
these unions for female dominated occupations must operate. A central argument of 
this thesis is that New Zealand's pattern of wage fixing through occupational awards 
led to unions which reflected women's labour market concentration, and were potential 
sites for feminist activism. 
Theorising the Labour Market 
There are a number of approaches to analysing the labour market and the position of 
women and racial minorities within it. Human capital theory, espoused by free market 
advocates, holds that the gender pay gap is attributable to differences in qualifications 
and years of experience and to women choosing occupations which require lesser 
skills and which penalise them less for intermittent employment patterns. However, 
empirical evidence has not supported these premises, nor has occupational 
segregation declined as women increased their human capital (Walby 1988:15-16; 
MWA 1991a; Murray 1984; Durham, Salmond & Eberly 1989). Differing human capital 
cannot explain the New Zealand gender pay gap (Urban Research 1987:23-4,31-2; 
MWA 1991a:57-58) nor the earnings gap for Maori and Pacific Island workers 
(Brosnan 1985, 1988; NZ Planning Council 1991 :70; Manatu Maori 1991 :43). 
Dual labour market theory focuses on the structure of the labour market, rather than 
on the fortunes of the individual in it (Doering & Priore 1971; Reich, Gordon & Edwards 
1980; Bowie 1983; Peck 1989). It describes the labour market as 'segmented' into 
'primary' market and 'secondary' labour markets. The 'primary' 1 labour market 
comprises secure, well rewarded, fulltime jobs which offer career prospects, often 
through internal promotion in large organisations. The 'secondary' market is 
characterised by low pay, low skill recognition, parttime and casual employment and 
lack of opportunity for advancement. Women are overrepresented in the 'secondary' 
1 Doering and Priore's use of 'primary' and 'secondary' to describe labour market is unrelated to 
a common New Zealand usage of 'primary', 'secondary' and 'tertiary' industries describing agriculture 
and resource extraction, manufacturing, and community and other selVices. 
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labour market (Barron & Norris 1976; Shipley 1982), as are non-whites (Brosnan & 
Wilson 1989; Brosnan, Rea & Wilson 1991). If gender specific markets are postulated, 
women's 'primary' market jobs score low on rewards when compared against the 
male scale (Heath & Britten 1984). Labour market segmentation was picked up on by 
British social stratification theorists to revamp the manual/non-manual divide in their 
occupational hierarchy which was being overtaken by technological change and 
feminist critiques (Garnsey 1978; Delphy 1984; Goldthorpe 1983, 1984; Stanworth 
1984; Heath & Britten 1984; Crompton & Mann 1986). In the late 1980s it translated 
smoothly into a 'New Times' discourse of 'core' and 'periphery' workers (Rustin 1989; 
Neilson 1990; Walsh 1990). 
Dual labour market theory assembles statistical data about levels of reward and terms 
of employment and from that aggregate material constructs a model and categories. 
Such an approach views the problem from an Archimedean point outside the market, 
and discerns patterns which tend to be 'visible only at the statistical level and 
unavailable at the level of the everyday world' (Smith 1991 :164). 
Labour market segmentation is the approach of most New Zealand researchers in the 
labour relations field (e.g. Deeks & Boxall 1989; Easton 1990a) who mention but 
seldom problematise the concentration of women and non-Pakeha in the 'secondary' 
labour market. Susan Shipley (1982) used this theoretical framework to examine the 
employment of women. Work by Peter Brosnan (1985, 1987, 1988) examined 
occupational segregation to explain the lower earnings of Maori and Pacific Island 
workers, working through aggregate statistics, but also suggested processes by which 
this occurred. Recent work by Brosnan, David Rea and Moira Wilson is framed by 
labour market segmentation theory, but does go beyond the descriptive to implicate 
state policy in labour market structuring by gender and race (Brosnan 1988; Brosnan 
& Wilson 1989; Brosnan, Rea & Wilson 1991). 
An alternative body of theory developed by feminists through the 1980s focuses on 
the processes of occupational segregation rather than the categorisation of labour 
market outcomes (Cockburn 1983, 1985, 1991; Witz 1986; Milkman 1987; MarkLawson 
1988; Stanko 1988; Glucksmann 1990; Leidner 1991). This approach starts from 
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women's own experience and investigates the workings of labour market 'from where 
women are' (Smith 1987:106). A woman seeking work recognises that not only her 
particular skills and experience but her particular social characteristics make some 
kinds of employment more readily obtainable than others. Although this may offer two 
or three possibilities, she seldom competes for work outside that range. Most women 
look for work to earn money and most have a realistic view of the kind of difficulties 
they will encounter if they seek or get a job in an occupation for wrlich they may 
acquire the skills or qualifications, but never the expected social characteristics. 
Labour market segregation theory recognises the labour market as neither unitary nor 
dual, but as a cluster of socially constructed sub-markets for different skills and 
different kinds of people, who rarely compete with one another for jobs. Nurses and 
plumbers do not compete. Typists and managers do not apply for the same jobs, 
though both have skills which transfer readily between industries. These submarkets 
are characterised by differences of gender and race. Occupational segregation by sex 
is historically persistent and, although the actual occupations of women and men vary 
between cultures, a clear sexual division of labour is remarkably universal (Cockburn 
1988:31). 
Conventionally, the position of women in the workforce has been considered a 
consequence of their position in the family (Walby 1988:2). Domestic responsibilities 
were held to account for the kind of work women typically do, their discontinuous 
employment and common preference for parttime work and, indirectly, for educational 
choices by girls which lead to lower paying jobs. Research focusing on women's 
employment, however, recognises that women's position in the heterosexual family is 
critically affected by their disadvantaged position in the labour market. The workplace 
and the labour market are crucial sites for the creation and reinforcement of gender 
inequality both at work and at home (Walby 1986). 
Labour market segregation theorists problematise the structuring of the labour market 
by race and gender, as well as class, and identify occupational segregation as the key 
to the gender pay gap (Walby 1988) and the labour market disadvantage of 
non-whites (Phizacklea 1988). Women's employment is concentrated in a narrow 
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range of female-typed occupations, with women from racial minorities in still fewer 
occupations. Occupational closure against women and racial minorities in jobs in 
which skills are recognised and rewarded has been secured through the active prac-
tices of other workers, union policies, and the hiring practices of employers (Cockburn 
1983, 1985; Milkman 1987; Wylie 1984; R. Hill 1989; Robertson 1992). These 
practices have at times been supported by state regulation restricting the employment 
of women in certain occupations or on certain shifts (Coyle 1980; Robertson 1992). 
The segregation of women and men at work is maintained not only at the level of 
broad occupations but is a principle underlying organisation of specific labour 
processes, as tasks are allocated to separate groups of male or female workers. 
Research in factory work shows that gender segregation and the idioms used to 
rationalise the gendering of jobs are more constant than actual content of women's 
and men's jobs (Milkman 1987; Glucksmann 1990; Wylie 1984). Segregation on the 
basis of gender and race and the concentration of women and racial minorities in 
occupations requiring skills which are generally available, non-technical and not 
firm-specific facilitates the devaluing of the skills which are in fact exercised in these 
occupations (Phillips & Taylor 1980; Jensen 1989; Steinberg 1990). 
The outcome is economic disadvantage for women and racial minorities and 
competitive advantage in the labour market for white male workers. The power of 
employment and job allocation lies with employers, whose primary interest is the cost 
of labour. However, employers may have their own views on the appropriate 
employment of women or may anticipate resistance from male workers or their unions 
(Milkman 1987; Robertson 1992). As Elizabeth Garnsey puts it: 
The disadvantages from which the majority of women suffer on the labour 
market are not incidental handicaps but represent important features of the 
organisation of the economy. (Garnsey 1978:238) 
A number of researchers operating within U"lis theoretical framework have explored the 
active practices through which tasks are allocated into jobs, and jobs are 'gendered' 
or allocated racially in particular local or historical contexts (Game & Pringle 1983; 
Cockburn 1983, 1985, 1988, 1991; Witz 1986, 1988, 1990; Milkman 1987; Anderson 
1988; Mark-Lawson 1988; Stanko 1988; Glucksmann 1990; Leidner 1991). These 
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studies explore gender and race relations at work and the processes by which the 
shifting occupational patterns of men, women and different racial groups are created 
and maintained, to the benefit of capitalism and men. Such research is the spade 
work for the socialist feminist theory downstream of Heidi Hartmann's (1979, 1981) 
watershed work, which rejected the theoretical subordination of gender to class or vice 
versa in favour of a dual systems approach to patriarchal and capitalist relations. 
Hartmann's work highlighted the gender division of labour as a crucial point of 
intersection between the practices of gender relations and class relations (Franzway, 
Court & Connell 1989:25) which result in women's disadvantaged position in the 
labour market. Research which uncovers the mutability of 'women's work' and the 
socially constructed nature of skill has supported, and been part of, feminist activism 
through unions and political groups directed at achieving equal employment 
opportunity and pay equity. 
Women in the New Zealand Labour Market 
What, then, is the situation of women in the New Zealand labour market? 
. In 1987 a study was commissioned by the Labour Department which drew together 
information on the labour market position of women with particular reference to pay 
differentials between women and men: the Phase One report of the Equal Pay Study 
(Urban Research 1987). This study was a result of a political campaign by feminists 
for changes to labour relations legislation to allow comparable worth assessments with 
male occupations to provide equal pay for work of equal value. It was followed by 
reports by the Ministry of Women's Affairs on the economic position of women 
generally and of Maori women in particular (Horsfield 1988; Horsfield & Evans 1988). 
The Equal Pay Phase One report discussed the earnings gap between women and 
men in New Zealand, comparing it to gender pay gaps elsewhere, and discussed 
contributory factors. Recommendations for closing the gender pay gap were more 
equal sharing of home responsibilities; reduction of occupational segregation and 
greater access by women to high level positions; and improvement in pay levels for 
female dominated occupations relative to male dominated occupations. 
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The report noted that of the 19 industries in which earnings were lowest, 14 were 
female dominated (Urban Research 1987:20). Comprehensive earnings data by 
occupation and sex were not available at that time. However, the researchers noted 
that since segregation was more marked by occupation than by industry, it showed 
little sign of decline despite a few women moving into unusual occupations (Urban 
Research 1987:18-20). Later research on race, gender and wage flexibility between 
1984 and 1988 confirmed that any narrowing of earnings gaps was coming about 
through occupationally based award bargaining rather than industry based bargaining. 
This reflected the importance of occupation rather than industry in determining relative 
earnings (Brosnan & Harbridge 1989:7). 
The importance of occupation to labour market segregation and lower earnings is 
shown by looking briefly at gender segregation by sector and by industry as well as 
by occupation. Despite the importance to New Zealand's economy of agriculture and 
resource extraction, 60% of all workers - but three-quarters of women - were employed 
in the service sector even before the downturn in manufacturing in the mid 1980s 
(Dept Stats. 1988-89:331). 
Considered by major industry groups, the 1991 Census showed women are over 49% 
of workers in 'wholesale retail trade, restaurants and hotels', 50.5% of 'finances, 
insurances, real estate and business services', and 60.6% of 'community social and 
personal services'. They are the majority of the state sector health and education 
workforce. In other industry categories men predominate, with the male workforce 
more evenly spread across all industry divisions. As a result, a view of the economy 
by industry is one which more closely matches men's experience of work than 
women's. It partially obscures the strongly gendered functioning of the labour market, 
which is more notable in occupational categorisations at even the most aggregate 
level. It also disregards the way women's occupations often span industries. 
During the period in which this research was done, occupational segregation by 
gender was researched by the National Advisory Council on the Employment of 
Women and by the Ministry of Women's Affairs, using data from the 1986 Census 
(NACEW 1990; MWA 1991a). The report of NACEW's three year study of women's 
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employment and policy under the 1984-1990 Labour government laid out graphically 
the segregation of the labour market by gender and by race and women's 
concentration in parttime work. The report by the Ministry of Women's Affairs (1991 a) 
confirmed that there had been little or no change in the degree of occupational 
segregation over the last twenty years. A decrease in the number of strongly 
gender-typed occupational categories was 'swamped' by increasing numbers 
employed in those occupations: 67.4% of women worked in female dominated 
occupations (MWA 1991a:15,16,46). 
Both reports pointed out that the extent of segregation tended to be obscured when 
data on specific jobs was aggregated into general categories. For example, nearly 
two-thirds of those in service work occupations and three-quarters of all clerical 
workers were women, but 82% of general clerks, 84% of bookkeeper/accounts clerks 
and 98% of secretary-typists (MWA 1991a:18-19). 
Occupational data from 1991 Census of Population and Dwellings became available 
only in late 1992, and in 1993 the Ministry of Women's Affairs began to rework its 1991 
analysis2. The 1991 Census best describes the situation during the research period . 
. In 1991 women were 44% of the labour force (Dept Stats March 1991) but the seven 
most common specific jobs (5 digit categorisation) - sales assistant, general clerk, 
secretary, accounts clerk, registered nurse, primary school teacher and cleaner -
employed 31.2% of the female workforce, with 50.5% in 18 specific jobs (see Appendix 
2). More generally categorised, nursing, teaching, cleaning or housekeeping, food 
and personal services, sales, clothes making and clerical work employed nearly 
two-thirds of the female workforce, with one third in various forms of clerical work. 
Many of these are dead-end, insecure, low paid jobs characteristic of the 'secondary' 
labour market (Bowie 1983; Barron & Norris 1976:52-54). In the 'primary' segment of 
the labour market, the two main professions for women, teaching and nursing, are 
2 A revised paper had not been produced at the time of writing, but analysts at the Ministry of 
Women Affairs made working tables available which were analysed for this chapter. 
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rewarded at levels considerably lower than traditionally male professions, such as 
<;loctors, dentists and accountants3• 
These most typical occupations for women show strong connections with women's 
traditional unpaid work in the family. Clerical work is in fact no exception, when its 
servicing role in relation to male dominated occupations is recognised. As Dorothy 
Smith (1979: 164) points out, women's work at the concrete level often facilitates men's 
occupations at more abstract and creative levels of work organisation. Different 
occupational labels may obscure segregation of women into occupations which form 
a division of labour, usually hierarchical, with traditionally male dominated occupations; 
for example, nurse/doctor, secretary/manager; wages clerk/accountant. Within an 
occupational or industry category, vertical segregation by gender suggests that there 
are practices in organisations which restrict women to less senior positions (MWA 
1991a:31-37). 
Changes in categorisation and in the treatment of parttime work make direct 
comparison difficult between 1986 and 1991 Census data (MWA 1991a c.f. 1993). 
Some differences between censes reflect occupational and industry fluctuations rather 
than changes in segregation or occupational concentration. Women's employment 
in manufacturing had shrunk from 1c2.5% to 10.4% of the female workforce, but sales, 
services and clerical work were the areas least affected by recession in terms of 
absolute job numbers. The proportion of the female workforce increased in sales 
(11.7% to 12.3%) while the proportion in clerical work (32% to 31 %) and service work 
(15.5% to 15.2%) decreased slightly, and there were some changes in the order of the 
most common female specific jobs (see Appendix 2). Nearly one third of the female 
workforce continues to be employed in clerical work but women appeared to have 
increased their share of clerical work relative to men (74.4% to 77.1%). These were 
3 To compare total income statistics, at the 1986 Census male fulltime professional and technical 
employees (Le. excluding those in private practice or otherwise self-employed) earned $25,309 
compared to $18,965 for female fulltime professional and technical employees (Dept. Statistics 1986, 
Table 8). Nurses' award rates are noted in Chapter 6. The 1991 Census showed 94,929 men in the 
workforce (employed or otherwise) with an income of over $50,000 a year, but only 15,786 women (Stats 
NZ 1991a:23). Of the Maori workforce 2,610 men and 456 women had an income of over $50,000; 
among Pacific Islanders 426 men and 72 women (Stats NZ 1991 b:1 08, 1991 c:28). 
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changes in relative proportions, rather than any marked change in the overall numbers 
employed in women's typical service work occupations. 
Women's traditional areas of employment like shop work and clerical work continue 
to absorb most new entrants to the labour force (MWA 1991a:46), although not 
enough to slow unemployment growth among young women (Stats NZ 1993c:269). 
However, the number of work hours available to women has been affected by 
employers' demands for greater 'flexibility' and lower labour costs. 
Women are over-represented in parttime work. A third of the female workforce works 
less than 30 hours (Dept Stats 1991a:18). In 1986 women were 78% of the parttime 
workforce (NACEW 1990, 80-83; MWA 1991 a:7-11). A quarter of these were in service 
work, but 42% of Maori women and 50% of Pacific Islands women were parttime 
service workers. Between 1987 and 1991 parttime employment increased, the only 
area of employment to do so. Between 1987 and 1991 women's average weekly 
hours of work shrank from 30.1 in 1987 to 27.9 hours, while men's dropped half an 
hour to 40.2 hours. The number of women parttime workers who wanted additional 
hours more than doubled, while those looking for fulltime work more than tripled (Dept 
. Stats. 1991 a:19, Table 3.13). Interestingly, over this period of high unemployment, the 
proportion of men in parttime work increased from 12% in 1986 to 24.6% in 1991 
(Dept Stats. 1991a:18). 
Over the 1970s New Zealand unions achieved award clauses giving parttime workers 
pro-rata wage rates and conditions (except for some long service leave). This 
contrasts with the British situation where parttime work for less than 16 hours was 
exempted from employment protection laws and some employer levies and deduc-
tions, leading to marked increase in women's parttime employment in the 1980s 
(Beechey 1987; Walby 1986:226-7). In New Zealand there was no financial incentive 
for employers to use parttime rather than fulltime workers. Some awards included a 
weighting on rates for casual employment and consultation with the union on new 
parttime positions. Of the unions studied, two had particular award clauses protecting 
fulltime employment, while the third ensured equal treatment of parttimers. Parttime 
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workers also have equal legal access to personal grievance procedures against 
unjustified dismissal. 
Maori and Pacific Islanders, both women and men, are concentrated in a even smaller 
range of typical occupations than women as a group (Brosnan 1987, 1988). Both 
NACEW's study (1990:67,71) and a report by Manatu Maori (1991) showed the highly 
disproportionate concentrations of both Maori and Pacific Island women in production 
and service work occupations, although 1986 Census data by race were still 
unavailable at the disaggregate levels likely to show the sharpest segregation. In the 
mid 1980s the contraction of manufacturing, in particular the clott-ling industry, affected 
the employment of Maori women, and smaller numbers of Pacific Island women. By 
1987 Maori women were twice as likely to be unemployed as women in general 
(Hors'field & Evans 1998:55), and by 1990 Maori women and men were 21% of the 
unemployed although only 8% of the workforce (Manatu Maori 1991 :23). However, 
a notable number of Maori women are establishing small businesses (Horsfield & 
Evans 1988:36,39; Boswell & Brown 1990). The 1991 Census showed Maori women 
employed in lower concentrations in the female dominated areas of clerical work and 
sales, and more concentrated in service work and production than women as a group. 
Disaggregate data showed these jobs to be in food preparation and service, personal 
care and cleaning, and in sewing, assembling and packing. Pacific Island women 
were in the same service and production areas, but in a still narrower range of typical 
jobs - kitchen hands, nurse aides, cleaners, assemblers and packers (MWA 
1991a:25,26, 1993). 
In contrast, the 1991 Census showed men employed in a much wider range of 
occupations and their concentration in most common jobs is much less marked (MWA 
1993). The seven most common specific jobs for men employed 20% of the male 
workforce, with 50.4% spread across 35 common occupations (see Appendix 2). This 
compares with a third of the female workforce in 8 most common jobs, and half in the 
most common 18 jobs, as mentioned earlier. There were no women at all in 141 
specific job categories, with fewer than 3 in another 
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108 jobs, Only 15 job categories had no men4, As Cockburn (1988:30) puts it, 
women do not defend their occupations so effectively against men as men defend 
theirs against the incursions of women, Historically, some trade unions were the 
vehicle for this defence, adopting early equal pay policies more to protect men's jobs 
from feminisation than to improve the lot of women workers (Robertson 1992; Knowles 
1993; Hill 1993b). 
Occupational segregation and the need for equal employment opportunity became a 
policy issue as a result of the campaign for employment equity. The Labour 
Department mounted a 'Girls Can Do Anything' campaign in the mid 1980s; however, 
the number of women entering apprenticeships in trades other than hairdressing rose 
only from 154 to 309 between 1982 and 1986 (NZCWA 1988:11). The proportion of 
women in administration and management increased from 10% in the 1970s to 22,4% 
in 1991 (Hercus 1983:75; MWA 1993), though this figure obscures the low proportion 
of women at upper levels of management. Women are now half of all medical and law 
students but tend to enter gender specific lower paid specialities in both professions 
and rise more slowly to partnerships, as segregation by gender is perpetuated within 
those occupations (Durham, Salmond & Eberly 1989; Murray 1984). This pattern of 
. vertical segregation is observable in both occupations and industries (MWA 
1991 a:31-37). 
Feminist analysts have argued that the gender pay gap is a consequence of the 
undervaluing of the skills required for the jobs into which women are segregated 
(Walby 1988). This devaluing of skills is linked in mutually reinforcing ways to a wider 
social devaluation of women and racial minorities, Women are specifically hired for 
skills developed through female socialisation, but because such skills are available at 
no cost in the family, they are considered 'natural', or, like human relations skills, 
become invisible when possessed by women (Phillips & Taylor 1980; Steinberg 1990) .. 
To preserve this devaluation of work by women through depressions, wars and 
technological change, different job tasks are 'gendered' through the idioms of 
4 However, analysts at the Ministry of Women's Affairs report some growth in the middle ground of 
mix-gender job categories. 
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femininity and masculinity to maintain segregation (Cockburn 1985, 1991; Milkman 
1987; Mark-Lawson 1988; Glucksmann 1990; Witz 1990). Segregation in both the 
workplace and the labour market ensures that neither the skills nor the wages and 
conditions of men and women are subjected to close scrutiny and comparison. 
Such comparison has been the central strategy of an international campaign for Pay 
Equity (Hyman 1987). This approach sees the element of discrimination in women's 
average lower pay (Wilson 1988:10-13) as operating through a social devaluation and 
lack of recognition of the skills involved in the occupations in which women are 
concentrated. Reassessment of the social worth and the worth to employers of 
women's skills has been a central goal of New Zealand feminist unionists in the 1980s, 
working through unions organising female dominated occupations. The details of this 
struggle are explored in later chapters. 
Women in Occupational Unions 
Structuring by gender and race is a feature of labour markets both in New Zealand 
and elsewhere, with women concentrated in a small range of occupations which differ 
markedly from the occupations of men in which unionism developed historically. 
Women's different experience of work and different locations in the labour market 
mean that they have raised concerns with their union (such as childcare and sexual 
harassment) and may take positions on labour market regulation which differ from 
those of men. The marked occupational division of labour between women and men 
has made possible the development of a feminist perspective and has given rise to a 
feminist politics within the New Zealand union movement and elsewhere (Boston 1980; 
Cockburn 1984; Booth & Rubenstein 1990; Crain 1991). 
The distinctive feature of the New Zealand and Australia labour markets, however, is 
that centralised wage fixing and unions have traditionally been organised on an 
occupational basis. This means that the occupational concentration of women has 
been reflected in their union organisation. The particular form of centralised bargaining 
by occupation allowed unions to organise labour markets, rather than scattered 
members on small worksites. The mechanics of this system are analysed in the next 
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chapter, but from the 1930s occupational awards facilitated the unionisation of 
industrially weak workers, including large numbers of women. 
Women's employment in New Zealand - and particularly that of Maori and Pacific 
Island women - is disproportionately concentrated in the 'secondary' labour market in 
terms of rewards, conditions and job security (Bowie 1983; Urban Research 1987:18: 
Brosnan & Wilson 1989). Of the unions examined for this thesis, the cleaners unions, 
like the Hotel & Hospital Workers unions with whom they amalgamated in 1991, were 
organising an occupation clearly located in the 'secondary' labour market. The clerical 
unions' coverage was restricted through the terms of their main awards to the areas 
of the clerical market where earnings were lowest. As professional organisations the 
nurses unions were also interested in raising reward levels for recognised professional 
skills, but they also represented nurse aides whose pay rates were very low and 
whose skills were informally acquired and under-recognised. 
Improvement of wages and conditions, job security and skill recognition are the classic 
objectives of union organisation and industrial action. The case studies set out in 
Chapters 8 and 9 examine the industrial situation of three typical female dominated 
. occupations, highlighting the constraints on effective industrial action in these 
occupations. Aspects of these particular case studies can be extrapolated to the 
range of typically female occupations, and also to a few low paid male dominated 
occupations. 
In the context of New Zealand's traditional pattern of wage bargaining and 
unionisation, women's labour market concentration has a positive aspect. The next 
chapter explores the way labour relations negotiating was institutionansed at the level 
of occupational labour markets, with union organisation supported through forms of 
compulsory unionism. This meant that unions reflected the social, as well as 
occupational, structuring of the labour market. 
Occupational unionism has meant two important things for New Zealand women. 
Firstly, that unions representing female dominated occl1pations were female dominated 
organisations. Some, but not all, achieved female leadership - a theme which is 
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explored in the case studies. Secondly, the unions for female dominated occupations 
- by New Zealand standards at least - have historically been large organisations 
(Geare, Herd & Howell 1979:9). Although the membership might be fragmented on 
small worksites, union officials could exercise the political power of large membership 
numbers in a variety of arenas. The way these factors underlay feminist activism 
through unions will be explored in future chapters. 
What do Unions Organise? 
In developing theories about union organisation and forms of collective action, Offe 
and Wissenthal (1985) point to the tension between individual and collective interests. 
Their discussion is of particular interest in considering the issues and strategies 
through which feminist unionists sought to make unionism relevant to other women 
members. 
For Offe and Wissenthal (1985:177-78), an 'insuperable individuality' is inherent in 
labour power, in that the labour 'owned' and exchanged in the labour market cannot 
be separated from the worker, her individual interests and her 'life concerns'. She 
enters physically into the workplace and into a personal, hierarchical relation with her 
employer or manager. In both the workplace and the labour market employers are 
backed by the power of more 'liquid', cumulative capital. To balance that power, 
workers must bridge individuality to bargain collectively. Unions provide continuity and 
structure for this, provided that the tensions between individual and collective interests, 
between the needs of particular members and strategies initiated by officials, can be 
resolved through decision making processes which involve a two-way information flow 
between members and leaders (Offe & Wissenthal 1985:193). 
But what is it that union officials organise? Do they organise workers and workplaces, 
as currently emphasised by NZ Council of Trade Union officials? Do they, as Offe and 
Wissenthal (1985: 179) suggest, organise members' interests? Do they help construct 
a coherent set of collective interests arising out of but subordinating individual 
concerns, on which collective action is based. As seen in the case studies, workers 
have interests in legislative changes which mayor may not suit their situation or, for 
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example, in a Court backed set of procedures for dealing with sexual harassment. 
Unions do indeed organise the construction of a range of collective interests, but I 
would argue that the primary purpose of unionism is to organise the labour market 
in which members compete. 
Workers act collectively so that their numbers in a particular labour market increase 
their bargaining power in relation to terms of employment for that occupation, rather 
than undermine it through a downward spiral of individual competition to the detriment 
of all. These terms of employment need not be narrowly conceived. As groups acting 
collectively recognised the way employment and labour markets were structured by 
gender and race relations, as well as class, new issues for negotiation were raised by 
feminist unionists. 
The central and traditional concern that workers should not undercut each other in the 
competition for jobs is fundamental to unionism. This is the reason that organising at 
the level of occupational labour markets for particular skills or kinds of work is of 
primary importance - but these markets mayor may not coincide with industries or 
enterprises. Workers combining at the level of workplaces may exert control over their 
. firm's pay systems or labour processes. However, combining at the level of the 
occupational labour market offers the potential to transform an 'oversupply' of a 
particular kind of labour into collective bargaining power to ensure that market rates 
provide a living wage. 
Unions' ability to organise labour markets for members is framed by legislation on 
labour relations which, explicitly or implicitly, dictates the basis of bargaining with 
employers. This varies rlistorically and from country to country. The policy framework 
is central to the labour market position of women in each country (Rubery 1988) as 
it interacts with logistical and/or strategic factors related to the occupations in which 
women are concentrated. This relationship between labour relations legislation, 
occupational situation and bargaining power is one of the main themes explored in this 
thesis. 
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Within particular legislative frameworks, 'trade' unions were developed in traditionally 
male crafts by limiting competition through control over the acquisition of relevant 
skills, and in essential industries through organising local labour supplied to a limited 
number of employers. In highly casualised occupations, some 'labour' unions 
developed through a 'hiring hall' strategy using closure to control not only market 
rates but the supply and quality of labour. Such tactics were used by US waitresses 
in the 1930s and 1940s, with steady employment dependent on good standing in the 
union rather than a specific employer (Cobble 1991 a&b). Dorothy Cobble (1991 a:432) 
describes how successful union organisation among waitresses ended in the 1940s 
when legislation restricted unions to representation and bargaining on an enterprise 
basis - a change similar to the recent changes to the system of wage bargaining in 
New Zealand which is discussed in the next chapter. 
In New Zealand and Australia the centralised system of bargaining by occupation was 
a state supported form of occupational closure which allowed unions to organise 
market-wide rates and conditions for their members' labour. This thesis argues that 
New Zealand's traditional labour relations system facilitated union organisations which 
reflected the concentration of women in particular occupations and made possible high 
rates of unionisation among women in the 'secondary' labour market. 
The second theme of the thesis is on now this provided an organisational base from 
which feminist unionists set about developing strategies to further what they saw as 
the collective interests of women as members of particular unions. However, as 
feminists they focused on the commonalities of women's experiences and labour 
market situations. The strategies they developed addressed what they saw as the 
wider collective interests of women in a gendered labour market and within a particular 
system of labour relations regulation. Their strategies and the reasons for them are 




The gendering of jobs and occupational segregation are the means by which women 
are disadvantaged in the labour market. Dorothy Cobble (1990:541-2) suggests that 
the separation of women by occupation can provide the autonomy to develop 'female 
perspectives' and leadership, and that organisation based on occupation offers 
potential for mobilising women. This thesis explores the way some female dominated 
occupational unions in New Zealand provided 'political space' for women within the 
union movement in the 1980s. It looks at the way the traditional system of centralised 
negotiation by occupation meant high levels of unionisation among women and a few 
large union organisations with predominantly women members. It was on this base 
that from the mid 1970s feminist unionists set out to make unionism a vehicle for 
collective action by women. The issues they raised and the strategies they developed 
addressed commonalities in the labour market situations of women and in gendered 
employment relations. 
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CONTEXT OF CORPORATIST CHANGE 
Introduction 
The Labour Relations Act 1991 radically changed the pattern of centralised wage 
bargaining first adopted in New Zealand nearly 100 years ago. Over the 1970s and 
1980s a number of legislative changes were already being made to the award system 
which reflected the shifting interests of 'labour', 'capital' and 'the state' (Holt 1986), the 
corporatist partners in the 'historic compromise' of New Zealand's traditional labour 
relations system (Jesson 1987; Simpson 1990). 
As argued in the last chapter, 'labour' is not a single abstract entity but comprises 
women and men at work in very difficult situations in the labour market. This chapter 
looks at the history and mechanisms of the labour relations system with respect to 
how it worked for women. Tensions within the union movement about the traditional 
corporatist trade-off between the right to strike and state arbitration contributed to 
changes in labour relations legislation in the 1980s. Other legislative changes relating 
prinCipally to employment equity, resulted from feminist activism. Changes to the 
traditional labour relations system over the 1970s and 1980s and the Employment 
Contracts Act itself are reviewed to provide background for later detailed examination 
of these changes in relation to unions for three female dominated occupations. 
Changes in the interests, ideology and organisation of capital and the state led to the 
introduction of the Employment Contracts Act, 1991 and the repeal of the Employment 
Equity Act, 1990 by the fourth National government. These changes are examined, 
along with the 'strategic unionism' with which, the NZ Council of Trade Unions 
proposed to balance the influence of the NZ Business Roundtable on government. 
As a starting pOint for discussion, political theories of corporatism (Schmitter & 
Lehmbruch 1979; Lehmbruch & Schmitter 1982; Strinati 1990; Jessop 1979) offer an 
appropriate if highly abstract framework for reviewing the New Zealand experience -
but one which warrants some feminist critique. 
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Theorising Corporatism 
Corporatism was developed as a concept in political theory in the 1970s as part of 
ideal typologies of political representation and pOlitical economy (Jessop 
1979: 186-189). It refers to the institutionalisation of interest representation in exchange 
for state intervention. Corporatist arrangements enable organisations representing 
capital and labour to participate in the 'authoritative' formulation of policy for the 
economy and society as a whole (Wassenberg 1982:95). In return they must submit 
to varying degrees of state regulation, particularly in relation to bargaining between 
organised labour and employers. 
Corporatism has often been seen as a strategy of the state (rather than of capital or 
labour) aimed at 'unity, order, nationalism and success' (Jessop 1979:186), though 
these might equally be goals of state policy in egalitarian Sweden or fascist Italy 
(Regini 1982:109). Discussions which focus on the political management of economic 
and social issues (Lehmbruch 1982:26) have tended to: 
... treat the state as an 8autonomous subject...able to impose its own goals on 
the economic order ... to conflate the growth of state support for private capital 
with state control over private capital and nullif(y) the specificity of the corpor-
atist form of state. (Jessop 1979:189-190, emphasis in original) 
Corporatist theorising provided a framework for comparisons between social 
democracies (Schmitter & Lehmbruch 1979; Lehmbruch & Schmitter 1982). Studies 
were often ahistorical, focused on conformity to a universal model (Rubery 1988:254) 
which could take on a prescriptive, almost Darwinian dimension, with Sweden as the 
most advanced example of corporatist development. 
In this thesis corporatism is seen, not as the amount of state intervention, but as the 
manner in which the state is articulated with the economic order (Jessop 1979:188). 
A political economy view is taken, seeing corporatist patterns as politically and 
historically contingent arrangements resulting from 'the balance of political forces 
mediated through state forms' (Jessop 1979:210). Since political outcomes are never 
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static nor permanent, no particular corporatist arrangement is privileged theoretically. 
Preferences reflect political interests. 
Bob Jessop (1979: 193-6) discusses parliamentarism and corporatism as two distinct 
modes of formal articulation between representation and intervention. Corporatism 
involves representation of members (workers or employers) within public 'corporations' 
(unions or employers associations) constituted around the division of labour, 'fused 
with state intervention through these same corporations to regulate members. Unions 
both represent members' collective bargaining power and bind them to collective 
agreements; they are confining as well as enabling institutions. 
A parallel situation exists within national organisations representing employers (Vowles 
1985; Brosnan, Walsh & Rowe 1985; Taylor & Greenslade 1986; Wanna 1989). The 
pattern of representation and intervention at the heart of corporatism does not 
presuppose the forms of organisation or levels of hierarchy at which corporatist 
interaction is institutionalised. Patterns are historically and culturally specific and 
subject to change, reflecting in the changing interests of capital, labour and the state, 
as well as their differing power and material resources to pursue those interests. 
Arthur Wassenberg's analysis of the way interaction between 'corporations' may be 
institutionalised at different levels of corporatist hierarchies is particularly relevant to 
analysis of the changing situation in New Zealand. Wassenberg considers that 
corporatism, as industrial struggle by other means, is a device which may displace 
inherent conflicts of interest between labour and capital rather than resolve them. 
Interaction between the hierarchically organised organisations of labour and capital 
occurs at the 'micro' level of employees and employer; at the meso level of unions and 
employers, perhaps locally or regionally; and at the 'macro' level of national leaders. 
Apparent resolution - or institutionalised control - at one level may displace 
dissatisfaction or conflict to other levels. In his view of European labour relations: 
As long as the macro stage can be used for acts of symbolic 
polarisation ... (and) micro stages continue to be beset by direct class 
confrontation, the meso level seems to become more and more the appropriate 
place for striking a bargain without too much publicity and without too much 
transparency concerning the exact share o'f responsibilities for the final 
outcome. (Wassenberg 1982:85) 
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Wassenberg is discussing union organisations based on industry rather occupation, 
but this statement could describe the basis of traditional labour relations in New 
Zealand, which are detailed in this chapter. Wage setting for particular occupational 
labour markets was arbitrated between unions and groups of employers, 
institutionalising labour relations at the meso level. Industrial strife over the market 
price for labour became ritualised combat before conciliators or in the Arbitration 
Court. As long as prosperity was shared through annual increases in award rates, 
bargaining at the meso level did not require organisation or action at the 'micro' level 
of the workplace. In Wassenberg's (1982:85) phrase, the memberships of many 
unions remained 'anaethetised'. At the macro level Federation of Labour leaders 
interacted informally with business and political leaders, representing the viewpoint of 
'the unions' (Skinner 1980; Vowles 1985:226), but affiliated unions enjoyed 
considerable autonomy. 
Corporatism was institutionalised at the meso level of unions and groups of employers 
through the Arbitration Court. It was 'a political institution' (Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 
1990:32) in that it was a site for negotiation, conciliation and arbitration between 
representatives of labour and capital, before a panel of Commissioners comprised of 
nominees of labour, capital and the state. It was constituted within a body of law 
recognising the inherent inequality of the 'master-servant' relationship rather than law 
governing civil contracts between presumed equals (Mulgan 1993; Ryan & Walsh 
1993). Though at different times its rulings were considered unsatisfactory by some 
or all three partners in corporatism, they were pragmatic solutions, as much as legal 
ones, aimed at meeting the expectations of unions, employers and governments. 
Changes in the economy led to increased tension between levels of corporatist 
organisation and to reconsideration of whether this corporatist arrangement best 
served the interests of the parties. These shifts and tensions are recounted in the 
following section and through the case studies. Fiscal difficulties, framed within a 
discourse of market liberalism, led to governments aligning state interests with those 
of large capital (Oliver 1989; Goldfinch & Roper 1993; Roper 1993b). Unions found 
it increasingly difficult to negotiate at the meso level, as unemployment grew and state 
supports to bargaining were removed. As the interests of capital became more 
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hegemonic in government policies, national union leaders sought to change the 
balance of interests between the partners in corporatism through political action at the 
macro level: a Compact with the Labour government. 
Following a change of government in November 1990, traditional corporatist 
arrangements at the meso level were almost fully dismantled, affecting union 
organisation. Inability to negotiate collectively at this level has increasingly displaced 
conflict to the micro level of worksite disputes and individual grievances. Individual 
rights at this level have been extended to greater numbers of workers (Boxall 
1991 :292; Walsh 1993:190), while the undermining of collective union rights at the 
meso level has increased wage competition in the labour market. National union 
leaders continue to seek a macro level solution to this attack on union organisation. 
Achieving this, however, requires a displacement of labour relations conflict to parallel 
party political and parliamentary arenas to secure corporatist change through the 
exercise of political power. 
This outlines in the abstract and gender-blind language of corporatist theory the 
shifting political interests and changing labour relations framework in New Zealand. 
It also indicates the importance of that framework in any consideration of the interests 
and strategies of both individual unions and the union movement as a whole. As Pat 
Walsh comments: 
Just as the unequal conflict between labour and capital, and the particular form 
it takes in each society, shape the State's industrial relations pOlicies ... the 
relationship between unions and employers unfolds in the context of the 
institutional structure of the State's industrial relations policies. 
(Walsh 1993: 174) 
However, 'labour' - to take just one of corporatist 'partners' - is not a homogeneous 
abstraction, but comprises men and women at work in different occupations in the 
labour market. What are the effects of such corporatist change on unions organising 
within a labour market segregated by gender? 
Some international comparative work has been done on the position of women in the 
labour market (Ruggie 1984; Rubery 1988) which suggests that it is not just labour 
relations regimes or patterns of corporatism that need to be analysed, but also the 
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way other policies - fiscal, family, welfare or education - affect the labour market. In 
comparing studies of women at work in four countries, Jill Rubery critiques theorists 
who seek a universal model of behaviour applicable over time or between countries. 
One aspect of societies should not be singled out for cross- country 
comparisons, as this would obscure the different ways in which parts of a 
society interrelate ... We need to understand the ways in which the system of 
industrial, labour market and family organisation interrelate and the role of the 
society's political and social values in maintaining these relationships before we 
could expect to make sense of the differences between countries ... 
(Rubery 1988:253) 
Nevertheless, on the basis of studies of the United States, United Kingdom, France 
and Italy, Rubery hypothesises the importance of patterns of regulation of labour 
relations and labour market in explaining the disadvantaged position of women relative 
to men within those countries. 
To understand how job segregation acts to exclude women 'from higher paying 
jobs, one has to know the relevant divisions within the economy between 
'good' and 'bad' employment positions. The form of these divisions is likely to 
be related to the pattern of collective bargaining and labour market regulation. 
(Rubery 1988:257) 
Underlying these studies of women at work and studies of corporatism are 
assumptions about patterns of regulation which reflect the norms of the countries 
examined. Labour organisation originated in Europe as forms of closure around 
traditionally male crafts, which provided the labour for key industries as capitalism 
developed. The regulation of bargaining in these countries is aptly named 'industrial' 
relations, since organised labour has primarily developed within industrial production 
sectors, with more recent organisation among state employees. Varying amounts of 
state regulation of low paid service work in the private sector have occurred as an 
extension of this. The fact that this seldom involves union organisation and 
representation, as well as state control, goes largely unremarked by researchers and 
theorists. Yet this is the core of the 'secondary' labour market in which workers are 
most disadvantaged and in which women and ethnic minorities are concentrated. If 
the labour market outcomes for marginalised social groups are to be changed, the 
norms of labour relations bargaining and state regulation need to be problematised, 
not merely assumed. 
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To take up Wassenberg's argument that corporatism displaces conflict to other levels, 
it may be suggested that successful organisation and representation in industries 
displaces some of the flexibility needs of capitalism into 'unorganisable' sections of the 
labour market. A British example is the way parttime employment for less than 16 
hours is expressly excluded from employment security protections and employer 
liability for various taxes and deductions (Beechey 1987; Walby 1986:226-27). The 
result is a higher proportion of low paid women in parttime employment in Britain than 
in neighbouring countries (Rubery 1988:262-266). Such an argument implicates the 
state and labour, as well as capital, in the maintenance of a 'secondary' labour market. 
In New Zealand and Australia the tradition of unionism was introduced through male 
trades, but labour relations regulation took a different tack. State regulations granted 
unions and their negotiated awards non-competitive coverage of all workers in a 
particular occupation - effectively a form of occupational closure. Organisation and 
representation were assured through forms of compulsory unionism. Although New 
Zealand labour history focuses on a corporatist trade-off between the right to strike 
and state arbitration, the key difference between Australasian systems of labour 
relations regulation and European ones has been mechanisms which facilitated the 
unionisation and regulation of occupational markets, rather than industries. This thesis 
points out ways in which women have benefited from bargaining and union 
organisation which reflected their concentration in the labour market in particular 
occupations. 
In examining the situation and union organisation of women workers, this thesis 
examines patterns of labour market segregation, patterns of unionisation and the 
regulation of labour relations, In exploring the regulation of labour relations, it 
documents the effects on three female dominated occupations of two markedly 
different bargaining regimes witt-lin the context of a single country. Traditionally wage 
rates and conditions of employment were negotiated on the basis of occupational 
labour markets. The new regime has made the enterprise the basis of bargaining. 
Rubery (1988:259) considers that different systems of labour market organisation and 
62 
regulation are the most likely explanation of cross-national differences in levels of male 
and female pay and in rates of change. The effect of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 on the bargaining power of women and on pay differentials is one of one of the 
questions addressed in this thesis. 
Another central question is the effect of particular labour relations regimes on collective 
organisation and forms of collective action by women workers. In the discussion 
which follows of the history and mechanisms of the traditional labour relations system, 
the focus is on the way it supported unionisation and effective bargaining for workers 
in female dominated occupations. Legislation reviewed later in this chapter included 
a series of changes to key features of this system. Later chapters detail of how the 
removal of, first, compulsory unionism, then compulsory arbitration and finally 
occupational awards affected unions organising clerical workers, nurses and cleaners. 
Corporatism through State Arbitration 
Unions were first recognised in New Zealand law by the Trade Union Act of 1978, but 
the foundation of the traditional labour relations system was laid with the Industrial 
Arbitration & Conciliation (IC&A) Act, 1894, covering private sector employment. 
Unions which opted to register under this Act traded their right to strike for state 
conciliation and arbitration of wage negotiations and registered, non-competitive 
coverage of particular occupations. The institutions established for conciliation and 
arbitration were sites of corporatist negotiation, not legal judgement. Until 1973 the 
three-person Arbitration Commission consisted of a nominee each from unions and 
employers and a state appointed judge, to whom union officials and employers' 
representatives presented their respective cases. The arbitrated awards which 
resulted were registered, legally enforceable documents setting wage rates and 
conditions and had blanket coverage of all workers doing the particular work 
described and all employers who engaged such workers. 
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The history of labour relations legislation shows the extension of this option to different 
kinds of workers, and the shifting balance between the right to strike, the right to 
arbitration and forms of compulsory unionism. An understanding of the history and 
mechanisms of the system of occupational awards is important to an assessment of 
the Employment Contracts Act, 1991 which replaced that system. 
The Long Depression of the 1880s and 'sweated' female labour gave rise to the first 
unions for women: the Dunedin Seamstresses in 1889 (Street 1993), followed by 
Domestic Servants Unions in Dunedin and Christchurch, a Waitresses & Female 
Cooks Union in Auckland and in several centres unions for women bootmakers (Roth 
1973:12). In 1890 ship owners set out to break the maritime unions in both New 
Zealand and Australia. Strikes joined by miners, watersiders, transport and other 
unions were defeated when both governments backed employers, because of the 
importance of shipping to agricultural export economies. In 1894 a newly elected 
Parliament including Labour as well as Liberal Members passed the IC&A Act which 
offer arbitration by the state as an alternative to strike action over disputes. The labour 
movement's support for the Act was more than a response to defeat in 1890, as it is 
sometimes described. It was a political strategy following a long period of economic 
depression and industrial weakness (Stone 1963; Holt 1986; Simpson 1987; Walsh & 
Fougere 1987:188). Not all unions initially opted forthis corporatist strategy, preferring 
to retain their right to strike. Over the first three decades of its operation, conciliation 
boards settled most disputes with few cases reaching the Arbitration Court, although 
court decisions established general patterns, including that of relativities between 
occupations (Robertson 1991 :31; Hince 1993:10). 
Initially the Act was restricted to 'industrial' trades. Teachers, nurses and the still small 
public service were also excluded. This meant few women in paid employment had 
access to the Arbitration Court. Without such protection, women suffered more than 
men in the aftermath of the strikes, few of their unions survived, average female wages 
fell and women were the last to benefit when prosperity returned (Roth 1973: 129). For 
women who did have access to conciliation and arbitration - those in factories, hotels 
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and restaurants - awards were popular since they levelled up wages and conditions 
to a uniform standard for their occupation (Robertson 1991 :32). 
In 1900 definitions in the IC&A Act were widened to cover distributive trades, which 
increased its application to the female workforce. In 1908 domestic service, the most 
common employment for women, was expressly excluded on the grounds that they 
were not employed for 'the direct or indirect pecuniary gain of the employer', 
Agricultural workers were also excluded (Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 1990:32). The state 
was declining to intervene in the private sphere of the family or the family farm 
(Franzway, Court & Connell 1989:21 ; Delphy 1984). Small unions covering clerical and 
shop work formed in the main cities but found it difficult to organise members as 
employers orchestrated opposition pOlitically and among some employees, including 
some women (Moynihan 1986:5-9). Few of these occupational unions survived, but 
in the early 1920s 'guilds' operating outside the discourse of unionism, and outside 
Arbitration Court control or protection, were formed among employees in banking and 
insurance, shipping and local authorities. 
This was a period when increasing numbers of women were finding paid employment 
in areas of work which had been male preserves. Stephen Robertson (1991:41) 
shows the variety of ways in which early Arbitration Court rulings and the poliCies of 
unions with regard to women members and equal pay rates were 'systematising, 
structuring and sustaining the segmentation of the labour force which served variously 
the interests of male workers and employers'. In his view, the benefits to women were 
incidental to this key consequence. Some women initially opposed an award setting 
clerical wage rates because it might be used to 'shut the door on them' (Moynihan 
1986:7). Nevertheless, as labour markets expanded and experienced shortages 
during the First World War, women were absorbed into horizontally and vertically 
segregated female dominated occupations. Women did make gains through the 
arbitration system but these were in direct proportion to the level of union organisation 
that women were able to achieve (Street 1993:46). 
65 
The real breakthrough for the unionisation of women came in the labour law reforms 
of 1936, following the Great Depression (Stone 1963:218). By the 1936 Census 
around 20% of weekly wage workers were clerks and shop assistants, with women 
more than 50% of the clerical workforce (Moynihan 1986:10-12). In 1931 both the 
public service and the Arbitration Court cut wages by 10% (Moynihan 1986:8). Relief 
rates for the unemployed were also cut, but women and Maori workers had no right 
to these (Simpson 1990:64). In 1932 the IC&A Act was altered, allowing employers 
to refuse state arbitration on the settlement of awards. The Minister of Finance argued 
that award restrictions militated against unemployment (Simpson 1990:59-60), a view 
also expressed by Business Roundtable spokespeople and Treasury documents in the 
1980s (Myers in NZBRT 1987; NZBRT 1989; Brook 1989:199,284; Myers 1992:13; NZ 
Treasury 1984:240, 1987:278). The removal of compulsory arbitration as an alternative 
to industrial action or lockout allowed employers to cut wage rates without interference 
from the Court and a number of awards collapsed (Stone 1963:216-7; Walsh 
1986: 148-9). 
The new Labour government elected in 1935 restored compulsory arbitration and 
made union membership compulsory by law for workers covered by an award. A 
minimum wage was implemented, together with a mandatory 40 hour, Monday to 
Friday week, outside which penal rates applied. The aim of this was to raise the cost 
of labour outside the standard week so as to spread available work to the unemployed 
(FOL 1938)1. In 1938 the new Federation of Labour took a case to arbitration for a 
Standard Wage based on the cost of living (FOL 1938), on the basis of which 
developed a web of arbitrated occupational relativities. Awards established minimum 
rates for female dominated occupations not previously unionised. Until 1972, however, 
they also institutionalised lower female rates as the corollary of the principle, enshrined 
in the IC&A Amendment Act, 1936, that a man's wage should be sufficient to 'maintain 
1 As shown in Chapters 8 and 9, penal rates compensating for unsociable hours of work became 
an important feature of occupational awards in health care and hospitality. In the recession of the late 
1980s, however, they became a focus of employers' strategies to lower labour costs. 
66 
a wife and three children in a fair and reasonable standard of comfort', whether or not 
they were in fact supporting families (Ou Plessis 1993:211-12). 
Compulsory unionism was the crucial element in the 1936 reforms which facilitated the 
unionisation of women in typically female service occupations. Compulsory unionism 
was a long standing policy of the Labour Party (Simpson 1990:86). Implemented for 
the first time through legislation, it replaced weak and easily circumvented clauses 
which the Arbitration Court had at times allowed in awards requiring preferential hiring 
of suitable union labour where available. Labour's aim, originating in earlier 'Red Fed' 
visions of international socialism (Stone 1963; Olssen 1988), was the registration of 
unions and awards covering the whole of the working class. 
The IC&A Act, 1936 was a corporatist arrangement which balanced the negotiating 
power between unions and employers within a state regulated institution. It can be 
understood as a set of interacting mechanisms which provided state support to 
unions, as well as state control of both unions and employers. From 1936, these 
interacting mechanisms were legal recognition and registration of unions with a 
particular membership coverage; compu Isory state arbitration of negotiations and 
disputes between unions· and employers in accordance with the legislation and a 
growing body of Arbitration Court precedents; and legally enforceable national 
awards with blanket coverage of all described workers and their employers, including 
subsequent parties. The organisation of workers into viable unions was supported by 
making union membership compulsory in occupations for which an award had been 
registered. 
The mechanisms of the IC&A Act were mutually reinforcing. Union registration and 
compulsory membership made unions viable; centralised arbitration ensured unions 
could settle and enforce awards without disruptive (or ineffective) industrial action; 
awards with blanket coverage provided market minimums, protection and stability to 
union members. 
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Under this corporatist arrangement unions as a group had traded their right to strike 
to secure their right to associate and their right to state arbitration of disputes. 
secure legally enforceable, non-competitive coverage of a particular occupation, in 
which workers were obliged to become union members, unions registered under the 
Arbitration Act (rather than the old Trade Union Act 1878). In doing so they submitted 
to Arbitration Court control, and unions with industrial muscle did not always see this 
as to their advantage. Should a union deregister in order to take industrial action, 
however, as the Waihi miners did in 1911 (Street 1993) - or be deregistered by 
government as occurred in the 1951 waterfront strike (Scott 1952), there was a risk 
that a new union with full legal coverage would be registered in its place. Some 
historic strikes - and historic defeats - occurred when the arbitration system was used 
to constrain unions in ways which outweighed its benefits to them (Simpson 
1990:77-79; Street 1993:60-63; Scott 1952). 
The linkage between industrial action, arbitration and compulsory unionism has been 
a central issue in the major disputes through New Zealand's labour history, and at the 
centre of the shifting politics of corporatism. In the prosperous 1960s there were 
illegal strikes by some industrially strong unions and a small minority of unions and 
employers went outside the arbitration system to negotiate 'second tier' documents 
supplementing national awards (Walsh 1993:181). The implementation of National's 
policy commitment to voluntary unionism was forestalled by Federation of Labour 
threats to walk away from the entire arbitration package (Walsh 1986: 156-158). The 
system was generally recognised as supporting industrially weak unions while curbing 
the industrial strength of militant unions (Franks 1987; Walsh & Fougere 1987:188; 
Simpson 1987) which, in the prosperous post-war years, might have benefited from 
operating outside the system. 
Some commentators have seen 'mobilisation' unions as the leading edge of unionism 
whose successes also benefited 'arbitrationist' unions which did not support their 
struggles (Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 1990:101). Arbitrated occupational relativities may 
indirectly reflect industrial muscle, but annual awards rounds have traditionally been 
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led by the largest male dominated occupations, not the most militant, and have always 
been argued on the basis of the cost of living and skill recognition, not ability to 
disrupt. Despite resistance by some unions to arbitration, nearly all unions have 
remained within the arbitration system through its history; those which stepped outside 
the corporatist rules, in 1890, 1891, 1913 and 1951, were soundly defeated by 
employers backed by the full force of the state (Scott 1952; Stone 1963; Bassett 1972; 
Simpson 1990; Street 1993). 
The arbitration system cobbled together unions with disparate industrial strength 
berlind a single corporatist strategy in relation to employers and government. The 
resulting tensions and shifting balances underlie the 'strange ambivalence' of 'the 
unions' towards these mechanisms (McCarthy 1983:6). The situation of different 
unions with regard to compulsory unionism, compulsory arbitration and industrial 
action continues to be central to much of the internal politics of the union movement 
over strategic directions. In Chapters 7, 8 and 9 I explore the reasons behind the 
historic support of large female dominated unions for compulsory arbitration and 
compulsory unionism. This helps explain dissent within the union movement and the 
position of some unions for female dominated occupations in relation to the politics 
of corporatism. 
It was the addition of compulsory unionism to the IC&A Act in 1936 which made 
possible - but by no means automatic (Franks 1987) - the extension of the award 
system to low paid, typically female service occupations. Most had previously been 
unorganised or had found it hard to sustain organisation. Compulsory membership 
ensured unions' 'financial viability. Coverage of workers was coordinated by the new 
Federation of Labour and between 1936 and 1938 union membership, having fallen 
from 103,980 in 1928 to 80,929 in 1936 (Walsh 1986: 148) had doubled to 164,987 by 
August 1937 (F.P. Walsh papers). Two of the unions which are the focus of this study, 
covering clerical workers and cleaners, effectively date from the 1936 reforms, while 
another, for hotel & hospital workers, greatly expanded its membership with the 
introduction of compulsory union membership. 
69 
Although 'cornpulsory unionism' and 'voluntary unionism' are the usual terms, only 
from 1936 to 1961 were employees obliged to belong to a union by law, rather than 
by a clause in an award to which both employers and unions were party. Generally 
this obliged employers to give hiring preference to union labour. Before 1936 the 
Arbitration Court had allowed various versions of this, in recognition of the stated 
objective of the 1894 Act 'to encourage the formation of industrial unions and 
associations'. After 1916 it allowed only weak clauses requiring 'qualified' preference 
where suitable union labour was available. Unions sought 'unqualified' preference 
clauses, which effectively meant employers required their workers to sign up with the 
union on being hired2• In 1961 a National government amended the IC&A to require 
'qualified' or 'unqualified preference' by employers for union labour, as agreed or as 
decided by a membership ballot (Walsh 1983). This situation still placed the onus of 
union recruitment on the employer, rather than on union officials. From the late 1970s 
National focused their opposition to compulsory unionism on such ballots. This 
political pressure, as well as dissatisfaction among some union memberships with the 
level of workplace servicing by officials, led to increases in organising staff, including 
the hiring of more women. This issue is given particular attention in examining the 
clerical workers unions. 
The centralised nature of award negotiation and forms of compulsory membership 
institutionalised the role of unions in a way that involved little participation by members. 
Officials did not need to actively recruit or service members. In the post-war period, 
generations of union members had little understanding of what union officials did for 
their membership fee. This contributed to many members' dissatisfaction with 
compulsory unionism, particularly women members. 
I/What unions have done in this country for years and years is go around their 
members once a year and ask what sort of wage increase do they want. That's 
been the beginning and end of it." (NZI\I U Organiser, January 1991) 
2 The equivalent expression In Britain would be 'post-entry closed shop', 
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The key to the award system, both before and after the 1936 reforms, was that awards 
had 'blanket coverage' of all categories of occupation described in the award. It 
bound all employers hiring such workers, regardless of their participation in award 
negotiations. The basic principle of unionism is that members act collectively to 
protect their economic interests and to avoid undercutting the earnings of others 
through individual competition for jobs. The national award system enabled unions to 
negotiate centrally for an award to protect wage rates across a particular occupational 
market, without the need for industrial strength. Blanket coverage meant that no 
workers - or no employer - could legally undercut minimum rates and conditions. 
Even in occupations where above-award rates became usual in local markets, the 
award placed a national 'safety net' below which wages for that occupation could not 
fall. 
For most unions there were considerable benefits in the arbitration system, but also 
costs. The penalties were state regulation of union organisation and loss of freedom 
to take industrial action (Brosnan & Wilson 1989:2). At different times some employers 
as well as some industrial unions objected to control by the Arbitration Court (Walsh 
1986: 149) despite representation of unions and employers within the Court. At the 
time of the 1951 waterfront strike, employers and the government saw merit in the 
system (Walsh 1986: 149) in that it could be used against 'militant' unions, backed by 
the voting power within the Federation of Labour of large, pro-arbitration union 
memberships (Scott 1952:53). However, the system maintained relative industrial 
peace and, more importantly, national rates of pay which stabilised wage costs across 
the labour market, and were aimed at stabilising the economy in the late 1930s (Walsh 
1986:155; Walsh & Fougere 1987:191; Deeks 1990:107; Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 
1990:31 ). 
The End of the 'Historic Compromise I 
New Zealand's traditional pattern of labour relations, complemented by 'social wage' 
aspects of the welfare state (Du Plessis 1993:211-12), has been described as a 
'historic compromise' between capital, labour and the state developed to stabilise the 
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economy after the downward spiral of Depressions in first the 1880s, then the 1930s 
(Jesson 1989:9,14-21; Simpson 1990). 
Corporatist arrangements in New Zealand have been analysed as a shifting pattern of 
interests and alliances between capital, labour and the state (Holt 1986). The image 
of a dance through time - a three-partnered polka in which first one leads, then 
another, to the melody of current legislation and the changing rhythm of economics 
- is an extremely useful one for grasping the shifting interests and alliances through 
New Zealand's labour relations history. Yet it is also simplistic, since it presents each 
of the partners - capital, labour, the state - as unitary, monolithic entities pursuing a 
coherent set of interests. A more diverse reality appears in the case studies which 
follow. The fragmented nature of 'capital', 'labour' and 'the state' is best revealed in 
politics directed at overcoming that fragmentation. As institutionalised arrangements 
were loosened through the 1970s and 1980s, the organisations of both capital (Vowles 
1985; Brosnan, Walsh & Rowe 1985; Taylor & Greenslade 1986; Wanna 1989) and 
labour (Campbell & Kirk 1983:99; Harvey 1992; Wilson 1989: 1 06) have attempted to 
develop centralised policy and integrate the activities of independent affiliates within 
'corporations', in order to improve negotiation and delivery at the macro level of 
political influence, tripartite talks or the Compact. 
The central purpose of this research is a closer examination of 'labour', one of the 
partners in the dance, to uncover some of the diversity of interests, positions on issues 
and strategies of working women, and the reasons for these. Analyses of media 
coverage of labour relations issues not uncommonly remark on the 'strange 
ambivalence' or contradictory positions of 'the unions' (McCarthy 1983:6; Boxall 
1991 :287), with little recognition of the differing voices which give rise to such apparent 
incoherence. Others report the view of centralised leadership witllout acknowledging 
dissent and divergence within the union movement. This thesis allows some of those 
voices of 'labour' to be heard. 
The changing interests of 'capital' in New Zealand were central to the economic and 
policy changes of the 1980s and to cllanges in labour relations legislation (Easton 
1989; Roper 1993a&b). From 1935, employers supported state policies which 
72 
established a stable domestic market berlind a wall of tariff protections, helping many 
leading New Zealand companies to grow, then diversify (Chapman 1981 :335; Jesson 
1987). The corporatist compromise of national wage awards covering a wide range 
of occupations reflected employers' wish to stabilise competition between employers 
and to limit union wage claims (Deeks 1990:107; Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 1990:31). 
However, by the 1980s employers' views on labour relations varied greatly according 
to the size of enterprise (NZCWU 1990, 1991a&b; McAndrew & Hursthouse 1990, 
1991; Webster 1993:247). The interest of large companies, now fledgling 
multinationals, shifted to favour deregulation of exchange and tariff controls to allow 
their further expansion (Jesson 1987). The accumulation of capital in a domestic 
economy with limited opportunities for profitable expansion also led to pressure to 
privatise potentially profitable public services which had been capitalised and 
developed by the state (NZBRT 1988a, 1992; Danzon & Begg 1991; NZPSA 1989a&b). 
A steady push for neo-liberal poliCies and full labour market deregulation came from 
the NZ Business Roundtable, a lobbying group of New Zealand's largest companies 
formed in 1981 (I\lZBRT 1987, 1988a&b, 1989, 1990; NZBRT/NZEF 1992; Walker 
·1989; Brook 1989, 1990a&b; Danzon & Begg 1991; Myers 1992). From the mid 1980s 
a proliferation of publications, speeches and press releases opened that business 
lobby up to public view. The Business Roundtable represents the 'inner circle' of a 
corporate class fraction centred around finance capital, a self-reproducing oligarchy 
of New Zealand and multinational business interests (Murray 1989; Alexander & 
Murray 1991). As one feminist unionist commented: 
"I doubt if even 1000 years of history will lend romance to the present 
Roundtable, though I expect their class position is the same. King Arthur 
rescued princesses, not working girls." 
Some, though not ali, of these companies are large employers3 with an interest in 
enterprise specific negotiations. In the late 1970s some had been involved in major 
3 In 1991 less than 1 % of business locations had more than 100 workers, although 25.3% of all 
employees worked for such large employers. However, total employment by '100+' employers had de-
clined 19.6% since 1987 (Dept Stats 1991 :20-21). 
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disputes, often about redundancy agreements, with unions whose strength stemmed 
from a strategic position in the economy or infrastructure ~ for example in freezing 
works, at the Kinleith paper mills, or the construction sites of the Think Big' energy 
projects. A 'second tier' of agreements began to develop which supplemented 
occupational awards, mainly in male dominated areas (Urban Research 1987:21; 
Walsh 1993:181). The interests of some major employers were no longer served by 
traditional occupational negotiations, in which the common interests of all employers 
and all employees in a particular labour market were represented. 
However, most New Zealand companies are small. The typical firm employs 6-10 
people, and it is among these and still smaller firms that employment growth is 
occurring4. Their interests on economic policy or labour relations strategy did not 
necessarily coincide with those of companies deploying large local or foreign capital. 
Centralised award bargaining gave wage stability with low transaction costs and 
medium sized and small employers considered the options available under the Labour 
Relations Act, 1987 offered sufficient flexibility (Taskforce on Competitiveness in Easton 
1990b:9; McAndrew & Hursthouse 1990, 1991; Franks 1990). Part of the Business 
Roundtable's politicking in the late 1980s was directed at bringing the NZ Employers 
Federation, its affiliated employer associations and employers themselves into 
agreement with its deregulatory views and tactics (Walsh 1989:156; Herbert 1990). 
The free market view was that greater labour market flexibility was the way to 
economic growth, despite lack of international evidence for this (Easton 1990:9). 
There was evidence, however, that the New Zealand labour market in the 1980s was 
more flexible than in most DECO countries (Walsh 1993:188; Harbridge 1990). 
The political activism of the Business Roundtable was central to the spread of 
neo-liberal economic thinking in New Zealand and to changes in state policy (Easton 
1989:9; Boston 1989:70; Walsh 1989:149; Roper 1993b). Its advocates argued the 
economic superiority of 'free market' forces and private sector management over state 
regulation and state provision of services (Hayek 1935; Friedman & Friedman 1980; 
4 In 1991 overall employment by employers with 10-49, 50-99 and particularly 100+ workers 
decreased, but increased slightly in small firms. Total employment contracted 0.5%, although parttime 
work increased 0.9% (Dept Stats 1991 :20-21). 
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Upton 1987; Walker 1989; Brook 1990a). !\Jeo- liberalism posited society itself as a 
market in which self-interested individuals competed freely to the benefit of all. These 
views had spread from the Chicago School of Economics to university economics 
departments in !\Jew Zealand and elsewhere, to !\Jew Zealand business circles, to 
leaders of Federated Farmers, and to the NZ Treasury (Jesson 1987; Easton 1988; 
NZPSA 1989; Bremer 1993:125). This 'methodological individualism' (Goldfinch & 
Roper 1993:57) underlay the economic and social pOlicies of the late 1980s and early 
1990s, known popularly as 'Rogernomics' and 'Ruthanaesia,5, 
Free market ideology has a spurious equality which is blind to power and exploitation, 
to cooperation and the support of dependents, to gender and race (Hyman 1992; Hill 
1992). The extension of 'economic orthodoxy' (Hyman 1992) to the labour market did 
not recognise the inappropriateness of the commodity auction model (Easton 1987; 
NZPSA 1991). Work cannot be separated from workers, who are unlikely to have 
perfect market knowledge or be fully mobile within the market, who have a limited 
shelf-life and cannot discount their labour below the cost of subsistence for themselves 
and their families. 
Nevertheless, new right liberalism was espoused by key Ministers in the Labour 
government and remained the dominant analytical framework under the 1990 National 
government (Roper & Rudd 1993:xiii), which focused its attention on labour market 're-
form', While neo-liberals advocated a 'devolution' of central government power or a 
'withering of the state' (Upton 1987; Walker 1989), in fact the state continued to set 
the legislative framework within which labour relations are conducted and to provide 
for enforcement of that legislation through the courts. As this study makes clear, 
changes in this framework over the 1980s and especially in 1991 increased the power 
of employers in relation to workers and their unions (Anderson 1991). Capital has set 
the tune to which the state dances, with labour hopping to catch up. How could this 
come about in a liberal democracy with a high level of union membership, and under 
a Labour as well as a National government? 
5 After Labour's Minister of Finance Roger Douglas and National!s Minister of Finance Ruth 
Richardson. 
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Although political critiques and policy analyses have been written which tell us how 
(Jesson 1987, 1989; Easton 1989; Deeks & Perry 1992; Harbridge 1993), some 
additional explanation of why is offered by sociological theory on the complex and 
contested nature of 'the state', and, conversely, of its own changing interests in labour 
relations. 
Change in the Role of the State 
Recent theoretical work sees the state as not automatically capitalist or patriarchal, yet 
not necessarily on the side of the voters who elect its government (Offe 1984; Jessop 
1979:190-193; Franzway, Court & Connell 1989; Watson 1990; Pringle & Watson 
1992). The state is postulated as a historically specific, loosely bounded set of arenas 
for political struggle between groups with different interests and very different power. 
The institutions and legislation which are outcomes of this struggle not only reflect the 
gender inequalities and patriarchal practices of wider society, but construct and 
institutionalise them. The state is 'a social process', but as those processes are 
institutionalised over time the state becomes 'a social force in its own right, not just the 
vehicle of outside interests' (Franzway, Court & Connell 1989:33). 
Several analyses trace policy changes under Labour in terms of struggle and 
contested outcomes (Oliver 1989; Walsh 1989; Wilson 1992). In the accounts which 
are the focus of this study, union officials speak of struggle with the state, within some 
of its arenas and over its institutional forms. These struggles were profoundly affected 
from 1984 onwards by changes to the labour relations legislation which flowed from 
a major change in the dominant discourse about the role of the state in the economy. 
Since colonisation, the state has played a central role in New Zealand's economy as 
it was best able to access the international capital necessary for rapid development. 
From 1935 the 'historic compromise' between capital and labour involved an 
expansion of that role, not only to ensure the conditions for capitalist relations of 
production (Offe 1984:120) but the wider social infrastructure. Under the first Labour 
government (1935-1949), the domestic market was protected through exchange 
controls, tariffs and licensing; the labour market was stabilised through an expansion 
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of arbitrated awards; and the social environment through state provision of a tax 
funded 'social wage' (Chapman 1981 :334-347; Simpson 1990:86; Du Plessis 
1993:211-12). This reflected a liberal democratic view that the state bore a respon-
sibility for social equity and for public service. 
But the welfare state's ability to provide these services, ensuring the political support 
to legitimate its authority, was dependent on revenue generated by a capitalist 
economy (Offe 1984:120). From the 1970s New Zealand's economy began to be 
affected by global recession, European import controls and shifts in the international 
deployment of capital and capitalist production. By the 1980s, a reduction in state 
spending was seen as the necessary solution to large external and internal deficits, by 
both Labour and National governments, as it had been by the United and Coalition 
governments in the Depression of the 1930s (Chapman 1981 :221-223; Simpson 
1990:59-65). Free market economic theory advocating the 'rolling back the state' and 
its tax-subsidised monopolies in the market provided the ideological backdrop for this 
(Kelsey 1993; Upton 1987; Walker 1989; NZPSA 1989a:9; Roper & Rudd 1993). 
Governments attempted to minimise their political liabilities as well as fiscal ones by 
retracting the amorphous boundaries of the state back to its 'core' functions (Harris 
1989:4). Some services were 'corporatised' to be run as businesses, leaving - if 
possible, selling - the rest to the 'romanticised efficacy' of the private sector (Easton 
1989:125). But not even the share market crash of November 1987 slowed 
government enthusiasm for the market model. 
The commercialisation of the welfare state on these lines was the 'policy equivalent of 
a scientific revolution' (Easton 1989:114), which was nevertheless espoused by the 
majority of MPs of both the fourth Labour government and the 1990 National 
government. A strong part in achieving this fundamental policy shift was played by 
Business Roundtable lobbyists and by a web of former and current Roundtable 
members appointed to positions in State Owned Enterprises and to government review 
committees on restructuring the state crUEA 1987:11; Roper 1993b:151; NZ Taskforce 
1988; Gibbs 1988). 
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An even stronger part was played by a neo-liberal lobby within the very heart of the 
state - the Treasury (NZ Treasury 1984, 1987, 1990; Oliver 1989:16-27; Boston 1989; 
Goldfinch & Roper 1993). It was the conjunction of the views of Labour's Minister of 
Finance and the policy advice and financial control of the NZ Treasury which put the 
free market agenda into policy and state practice (Easton 1988:9,124; NZPSA 1989a:7; 
Goldfinch & Roper 1993). A link of ideology - and even language - between NZ 
Business Roundtable and NZ Employers Federation publications can be traced 
through Treasury documents (Jesson 1987; Easton 1989:8-9; Boston 1989), briefings 
to incoming governments (NZ Treasury 1984, 1987, 1990), influencing government 
policy and legislation (Roper 1993; Goldfinch & Roper 1993). 
The full market liberalisation· programme of government, advocated by Treasury and 
Business Roundtable economists, progressed in three stages - two under Labour, one 
under National. The first liberalised New Zealand's interface with the international 
economy while tightening monetary policy to curb inflation (Easton 1987, 1989). As 
overseas investment chasing high New Zealand interest rates kept the floated dollar 
high, the increasingly unprotected rural and manufacturing sectors suffered while the 
finance sector boomed (Jesson 1987; Collins 1989; Bremer 1993:125-6). Internal and 
external deficits remained high and unregulated offshore borrowing by the private 
sector increased. The second stage attacked the deficit and government expenditure 
through state restructuring, including major social policy shifts, budget tightening and 
redundancies. The third stage, directed at increasing New Zealand's international 
competitiveness through deregulation of the labour market and lower wage costs, 
came only after a change of government. 
The fourth Labour government made moves towards labour market deregulation in the 
Labour Relations Act, 1987 which encouraged bargaining flexibility in both the 
contractual form and the content of wage negotiations. However, this was a limited 
response to the Business Roundtable agenda which also gave weight to the concerns 
of unions. In fact, labour market regulation was increased in Labour's second term 
through legislative changes aimed at increasing employment equity for women, Maori 
and Pacific Islands workers. These changes were a response to strong lobbying by 
women inside and outside unions and the Labour Party, but were a growing 
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contradiction with Labour's free market economic policies (Hyman 1988:238; Du 
Plessis 1992; Wilson 1992). Internal party conflict over policy directions was reflected 
in leadership changes before the 1990 election. When Labour lost, radical labour 
market deregulation and the repeal of employment equity legislation was National's 
first task in office. 
The responsibility of the liberal democratic state for social equity is theorised as the 
means by which the state legitimates power over voting citizens (Offe 1984: 135, 156). 
This concept of legitimation provides some explanation for the contradictions under 
Labour and for differences between the two parties when in power. The individualism 
and competition of free market philosophy fit National's traditional electoral 
constituency rather better than Labour's, despite National's rlistory of government 
intervention. The NZCTU's economist attributed the shift to 'more market' policies by 
governments of both parties to decay in the 'social consensus' (Harris 1991 :2), given 
the inability of traditional interventionist policies to continue bridging gaps between 
local and global economies. However, he did not believe that neo-liberalism 
represented a replacement consensus, but rather 
... an opportunist use of the emerging policy vacuum by the libertarians ... No 
replacement, broad-based social vision emerged. (Harris 1991 :2) 
A crucial factor, however, in the espousal by governments of both parties of neo-liberal 
policies is, I believe, the changing interests and position of governments as managers 
of state institutions. Through the case studies 'the state' is met in a number of its 
aspects - as regulator of labour relations and of professions, as arbiter of equity, as 
a service provider and as a major employer. 
What Claus Offe calls the contradictions of the welfare state have been amply 
illustrated by the policy shifts of New Zealand governments through the current 
recession. The supposed neutrality of the state as liberal arbitrator has been 
undermined by its ultimate dependence on the success of capitalism for tax revenue 
(Offe 1984:120) to fund its social services and equity promises. As 'managers' of the 
economy and 'the public good', liberal democratic governments have a stake in the 
corporatist arrangements between capital and labour, whose interests diverge in times 
of recession. Recent governments have been swayed on economic and labour 
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relations issues by the interests of large employers. Their receptiveness to this lobby 
arises from two sources: their dependence on capitalist success for state revenue, and 
their own interests as 'managers' of a complex state 'enterprise' employing a large 
female dominated workforce. The position of both Labour and National governments 
on labour market deregulation and pay equity was far from that of a neutral arbiter. 
Towards the Labour Relations Act, 1987 
By the 1970s, the 'historic compromise' on labour relations began to come under 
pressure from a number of directions. As detailed in Chapter 7 there was 
dissatisfaction among some union members with compulsory unionism, while some 
unions had begun to use illegal industrial action in disputes, rather than arbitration 
(Walsh 1993:181). Differences were also emerging between the interests of 
government and the interests of some employers and unions who sought a loosening 
of control through arbitration. 
The centralised conciliation and arbitration system for wage bargaining provided 
governments with valuable leverage through General Wage Orders by the Court which 
set the level of annual wage rounds. As the institutionalisation of corporatist relations, 
rulings by the Arbitration Court could reflect state interests while, to some degree at 
least, insulating governments from electoral consequences within the political system 
(Walsh 1993:184). In 1968, after a major devaluation when Commonwealth currencies 
were detached from the pound sterling, the Court declared a 'Nil Wage Order'. 
Unions and employers alike objected to what they considered excessive state 
interference and together used the power of their lay representatives on the Court to 
overturn that Order. As a result both the Arbitration Court and government lost 
centralised control of bargaining. Direct government intervention, new wage tribunals 
and tripartite negotiations lacked the old corporatist concensus (Walsh 1993). 
The Industrial Relations Act, 1973, enacted by a new Labour government, introduced 
an option of direct rather than state arbitrated bargaining. The Act restored order but 
: not full control over bargaining outcomes, as previously. This was the first stage in 
loosening, over the next two decades, the historic link between the right to arbitration 
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and the right to strike. A distinction drawn from North American labour legislation 
(Boxall 1991) was made between the Court's responsibility on 'disputes of interest' 
and 'disputes of rights'. 'Disputes of interests' related to the interests of unions or 
employers in the negotiation of an award, and on these the parties could now agree 
to negotiate directly. However, each party had the right to seek 'compulsory 
arbitration' - compulsory for the other party - if settlement was not reached. 'Disputes 
of rights' were about enforcement of awards once agreed and registered, which 
continued to be fully arbitrated by the Court. 'Composite' documents involving more 
than one union were permitted. The composition of the Court was also altered; two 
nominees from unions and employers now sat with three appointees of the state. 
In the early 1970s oil price increases and reduced access to British markets led to a 
tightening of the New Zealand economy (Roper 1993a). Union officials found it more 
difficult to secure a 'share of the cake' from employers, and membership discontent 
with the system increased. In the late 1970s criticism grew, on the one hand, of 
ineffective union negotiators and, on the other, of disruptive strike action by unions 
with strong strategic positions in primary production and the infrastructure (Moynihan 
1986; Walsh 1993:184). The National government (1975-1984) intervened in some 
disputes, legislating to provide itself with the necessary powers to block industrial 
action in 'essential industries', and increasingly dictated the level of wage increase in 
the annual award talks. 
Since the Industrial Relations Act, 1973 allowed some awards to be settled outside the 
arbitration arena, wage levels were less subject to influence by government. However, 
with direct negotiations backed by compulsory arbitration, by the late 1970s and early 
1980s old habits of bargaining around relativities settled into annual award talks with 
similar settlements. The National government implemented incomes policy both 
through informal pressure on the first award being settled and through statutory wage 
freezes. The government found, as in its previous term of office, that statutory income 
policies and direct intervention raised the political profile of labour relations issues 
(Walsh 1993:194). 
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Long opposed philosophically to compulsory unionism (Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 
1990:35), l\Iational attempted in 1978 to capitalise on public debate about compulsory 
unionism and industrial disruption through a pre-election attack on the l\Iorthern 
Clerical Union over balloting for 'unqualified preference' clauses in its awards. In 
February 1984 l\Iational's Industrial Law Reform Act introduced voluntary unionism to 
break the 'tyranny of monopoly union power' (Bolger 1983:25) by making preference 
clauses illegal, and protected employees from undue duress on union membership. 
This was passed despite opposition to the Bill from half the regional sections of the 
I\IZ Employers Federation and from some industry leaders and major companies 
(Brosnan 1983:2-3). 
This period of voluntary unionism lasted 16 months. A Labour government was 
elected in July 1984, but the expected repeal came only in July 1985 and was not a 
simple return to the previous legislative situation. The Union Membership Act restored 
'unqualified preferences' clauses to awards, making membership effectively 
compulsory in the occupations covered. However, clauses had to be confirmed every 
three years by ballots of the membership covered by each document. The onus of 
recruitment was shifted firmly on unions; unqualified preference was defined as 
employees being legally required to join within two weeks of request by a union official. 
Employers were required to supply a list of employees every three months. This 
situation continued under the Labour Relations Act, 1987, which confirmed union's 
access to workplaces and to wage and time records, and obliged employers to allow 
two two-hour 'stopwork' meetings per year in paid time. 
As in earlier ballots on union membership (Holt 1986:59), nearly all groups of union 
members gave majority support to unqualified preference clauses. The argument of 
active members and officials in favour of compulsory unionism, a classic one dating 
back to 1907, was that it shared the costs of negotiation and enforcement among all 
who benefited from the blanket coverage of awards (Holt 1986:59; Walsh 1986: 155). 
In 1990 60% of the workforce were protected by a union-negotiated award although 
only 40% were current financial union members (Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 1990: 1 01 ; 
r Harbridge & Hince 1992:1; Hughes 1993:93). However, by the late 1980s surveys of 
I 
! employers indicated that they were strongly against compulsory union membership in 
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any form (Geare 1989:239). As tl~lis study began in 1990, union officials were 
expecting that legislation making unionism fully voluntary would eventuate under a 
future government of either main party. 
Analysis of the 1983-5 period of voluntary unionism emphasises the importance for 
membership retention of award clauses requiring employers to deduct and forward 
union fees from wages (Harbridge & Webber 1987). Based on official returns to the 
Labour Department and Federation of Labour each December, unions showed a 
overall membership loss of 7.1% between 1983 and 1985. Although a greater impact 
on women workers was predicted, this did not occur. The thirty female dominated 
unions showed an average membership decrease of 7.2%. However, as Harbridge 
& Webber point out, these aggregate figures smoothed over considerable differences 
between unions in both the initial impact of changes to compulsory unionism and 
longer term effects. The examination of particular unions in this study, in both the 
1984-85 period of voluntary unionism and under the Employment Contracts Act, pro-
vides some reasons for differing effects of voluntary unionism. 
. It was the consequences of voluntary arbitration that first attracted my attention to the 
.. clerical unions in 1989. The option of either party to seek arbitration on disputes of 
interest was removed by a legislative amendment in December 1984 under a Labour 
government elected earlier that year. This had little immediate impact on negotiations, 
perhaps because conciliation remained mandatory (Hince 1993:8). In the Labour 
Relations Act, 1987, however, both arbitration and conciliation were made fully 
voluntary in disputes of interest in the private sector. Criteria laid down for the Court 
on voluntary arbitration no longer included traditional relativities between occupations. 
Arbitration remained compulsory only to settle disputes of rights under awards once 
they were negotiated and registered. 
This important change was not part of the Long-Term Reform Committee's 
consultative report in 1984, but appears to have been developed informally by 
Federation of Labour leaders and the Labour government (Walsh 1989: 153-5). 
Compulsory arbitration had been traded off against an increased right to strike granted 
by the 1987 Act. Unions could back their negotiating position with industrial action 
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within 60 days of an award's expiry date. This change was opposed at the time by 
industrially weak unions which had traditionally benefited from the arbitration system. 
In 1989 it led to the collapse of award negotiations for several groups of workers, 
including clerical, tearoom and restaurant, and hotel workers. Around one third of all 
women covered by awards were affected (Coleman 1989). To address this situation 
in September 1990 the Labour government introduced an Amendment providing a 
option of 'final offer' arbitration, the form of arbitration legislated for state sector 
negotiations from 1988 (Roper 1988). 
I But why was it mainly awards covering women which were affected by the shift to 
voluntary arbitration? This study addresses both this question and the differential 
impact of the legislation which followed the Labour Relations Act: the Employment 
Contracts Act, 1991. 
In addition to consolidating changes relating to union membership, arbitration and 
increasing the right to strike, the Labour Relations Act, 1987 also took the first steps 
towards a change in the basis of bargaining. The Act encouraged industry and enter-
prise agreements, rather than occupational awards. The initiative for change, however, 
remained with unions who could ballot members to opt for enterprise bargaining. 
Registered and enforceable 'second tier' agreements topping up basic awards were 
disallowed; the Act stipulated that workers could be covered by only one legally 
enforceable document. Both awards with blanket coverage and signatory-only 
agreements could be negotiated as composites with workers represented by several 
unions. This was a step towards restructuring unions on an industry basis. A new 
requirement for a minimum of 1000 members aimed to encourage small craft unions 
to amalgamate but also forestalled possible fragmentation of unions which might result 
from enterprise based negotiations (Walsh 1993:196). When the Act was amended 
in 1990 to allow 'final offer' arbitration, a concession was made to the employers' 
lobby for bargaining reform by allowing them, not just unions, to initiate ballots for 
enterprise agreements. 
These legislative changes were a partial response to lobbying by the Business 
Roundtable, in whose view they did not go far enough (NZBRT 1987, 1988b, 1989; 
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Roper 1993b). By 1987, the Business Roundtable was seeking a shift to bargaining 
on an enterprise, not industry, basis. Their argument, although on behalf of New 
Zealand's largest and most successful companies, was that decentralised bargaining 
was needed 'to sustain businesses in hard pressed regions and industries' (NZBRT 
1987:6). As will be seen in the case study of clerical unions, this same argument had 
traditionally been used to keep minimum award rates low. But the move to break up 
occupational awards also matched plans being developed by some union leaders to 
restructure unions along industry lines as part of their own corporatist strategy. 
Deregulating the State Sector Labour Market 
The Labour Relations Act, 1987 was followed in 1988 by the State Sector Act which 
brought traditionally separate wage negotiations for the public service under the same 
legal framework as private sector awards, as part of a programme to restructure. 
Fiscal crisis and concerns about managerial efficiency shaped strategic policy 
decisions about restructuring both state management and state sector labour relations 
along private sector lines (Walsh 1991 :115) . 
. The 'first target of free market advocates, inside and outside government, was public 
ownership of state trading departments. The State Owned Enterprises Act, 1986 
began a shift from public to private forms of ownership of state institutions, despite an 
official agenda before 1987 of 'corporatisation' rather than 'privatisation' (Easton 1989; 
NZPSA 1989a&b). By the early 1990s whole sections of state-developed assets had 
passed into private ownership - in forestry, steel production, communications and 
eventually railways. 
Part of the Business Roundtable's claim to business opportunities in areas of state 
'monopoly' was a critique of inefficient bureaucratic management within the state. This 
critique was reflected in reviews of government services, often conducted by 
appointees with a Business Roundtable background (Roper 1993; NZ Taskforce 1988; 
Gibbs 1988). The rise of 'managerialism' as part of the departmental restructuring and 
staff cuts which followed such reviews had profound implications for labour relations. 
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The State Sector Act, 1988 restructured on private sector lines both the management 
of government departments and labour relations. It was central in tightening up the 
Westminster-style public service so as to put market-oriented policy rapidly into 
budget-cutting practice (Walsh 1991, 1992; Hill 1993a). Of the unions studied for this 
thesis, labour relations changes in the state sector crucially affected the NZ Nurses 
Association and sections of Service Workers Union membership. 
The private sector operated within a model of negotiation which recognised inherent 
conflicts of interest between employers and workers in wage negotiations and in 
workplaces. The IC&A Act had been developed within a discourse of class conflict 
and the need for alternatives to industrial action and disruption (Stone 1963; Olssen 
1986; Olssen & Richardson 1986; Simpson 1987; Walsh 1993). The public sector was 
excluded from the corporatist solution of the IC&A Act, and developed its own wage 
setting mechanisms within a discourse of service (Roper 1990:4; Walsh 1991). This 
dated back to 1912 when appointments and promotions, but not salary levels, had 
been removed from direct political control. At that time the small middle class elite of 
educated public servants was more interested in career paths than in wage disputes 
and unionism (Simpson 1993: 135-6). 
For public servants, employment security ensured the input of 'free and frank opinion' 
to Ministers. Within a bureaucratic model of control (Kellow 1985), tightly defined and 
central controlled rules dictated the tasks, authority and limits to discretion of position 
at each level of organisational hierarchies (Walsh 1991 :115). Wage scales and 
conditions covered all levels of the public service, including managers or 'employer' 
negotiators. Although lowest ranking employees belonged to unions which also 
operated in the private sector, all ranks of more middle class occupations were 
represented by voluntary professional associations, principally the Public Service 
Association. The right to strike was considered incompatible with ideals of public 
service. However, despite the attraction of job security, terms of employment resulting 
from such 'soft' industrial relations slipped behind the private sector in the prosperous 
1950s and 1960s. Dissatisfaction led to a Royal Commission and in 1969 the 
implementation of formal conciliation and arbitration on the private sector model. State 
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sector pay rates were linked into the web of relativities between private sector 
occupations, to link them with 'market forces' in a highly regulated private sector. 
State restructuring began with reviews of health, education and pay-fixing in the public 
service - now referred to as the 'state sector' (NZPSA 1988:4; Rodger 1986; Deane 
1989; Gibbs 1988; NZ Taskforce 1988). The State Sector Act, 1988 abandoned the 
bureaucratic model for one which imitated private sector management by introducing 
direct management control and greater managerial prerogative (Walsh 1991 :136), 
aimed at 'breaking down rigidities to increase efficiency' (Rodger 1986:37). State 
managers were removed from coverage by collective negotiations and placed on 
individual, performance based contracts. Professional associations representing 
members in award negotiations were required to register as unions. Occupational 
Determinations (awards) and conditions of employment block-negotiated for the whole 
public service were split up into separate industry/enterprise-style awards for each 
government department or State Owned Enterprise. The Act brought public service 
negotiations under the Labour Relations Act, 1987, abolishing relativities between 
public and private sectors but allowing a similar freedom to strike. In negotiating an 
award, state unions could, however, opt for a 'final offer' form of arbitration on 
negotiations, rather than the right to strike (Geare 1988; Roper 1988). The denigration 
of professionalism and service ideals implicit in this restructuring (Walsh 1992) meant 
that many state unions - particularly those in the female dominated areas of health and 
education - chose to retain the option of industrial action. 
An interesting aspect of this change and of further changes under the Employment 
Contracts Act has been the tension between managerialism and accountability in the 
context of fiscal restraint (Walsh 1992). n'ds is illustrated in the detailed study of the 
NZ Nurses Association. On the one hand, managerial prerogative and individual 
performance were emphasised. There was increasing devolution of employer 
functions - from service-wide bargaining to Departments and units; from Health 
Department to Area Health Board to Crown Health Enterprises. On the other hand, 
the measure of managerial success was performance within ever-tightening budgets. 
Negotiations between 'employers' and unions were closely controlled by the State 
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Services Commission and Cabinet Committees. Governments have continued to keep 
a close eye on the interests of the state in wage bargaining. 
As will be seen in the discussion of the NZ Nurses Association, these changes pushed 
public sector unions into taking a stronger industrial stand. However, the shi'fting line 
between public and private sector had already prompted the 1987 amalgamation of 
public and private sector unions into the NZ Council of Trade Unions. 
Market Equity 
In the mid 1970s feminist unionists began organising with the union movement and 
articulating new interests in relation to labour market regulation. The concerns they 
were raising were not being addressed within narrow definitions of 'industrial matters' 
to be negotiated between unions and employers. They began to take issues into the 
political arena in public campaigns for change, either through separate legislation or 
through change to the legislation regulating award bargaining. During tile 1980s Maori 
unionists also began to organise around their own specific concerns. These were new 
groups seeking a widening of traditional corporatist arrangements so as to allow their 
interests to be represented as part of the interests of 'labour'. 
In the post-war years women in both private and public sectors began to express 
dissatisfaction with lower female rates of pay for the same work, and exclusion from 
'male' career paths in the public service (Corner 1988; Hill 1993b). Since these 
inequalities were being institutionalised by the Arbitration Court and the Public Service 
Commission, women sought political change. One of the first pieces of legislation 
which recognised the specific interests of women at work was the Government Service 
Equal Pay Act, 1960. It was 12 years before equal pay was extended to the private 
sector by the Equal Pay Act, 1972. Both these Acts came as a result of long 
campaigns by women and their unions supported by other women's organisations 
(Moynihan 1986; Corner 1988) and were closely linked to elections in which gov-
ernment changed hands (Hill 1993b). The 1972 Act required that female rates be 
removed from all awards within three years, resulting in a 6% improvement in the 
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gender pay gap between 1973 and 1977 (Hyman 1986:213) while contributing only 3% 
of the 64% inflation over the period (Wilson 1988:13). 
Over Labour's two terms of office in the 1980s there was a growing contradiction 
between economic and labour relations policies which adversely affected women and 
Maori, and progress made on equity issues which benefited them (Hyman 1988:238; 
Kelsey 1990; Du Plessis 1992). However, since policy outcomes result from struggle 
in different arenas of the state, contradiction rather than coherence is to be expected 
(Pringle & Watson 1992:630). 
However, different lobbies in the same area resulted in changes which both benefited 
women and acted against them in the same legislation. Removal of compulsory 
arbitration from the Labour Relations Act, 1987 adversely affected negotiations for 
awards covering large number of low paid women in 1989. Yet it had also added 
sexual harassment and discrimination6 as grounds for personal grievance procedures 
enforceable through the Labour Court. These were included in both awards and later 
employment contracts. Management restructuring in the state sector adversely 
affected the senior ranks of the nursing profession, yet the State Sector Act, 1988 
. required state departments as 'good employers' to establish equal employment 
opportunity programmes to identify and eliminate barriers causing inequality in 
employment. These targeted women, Maori and Pacific Islands people and people 
with disabilities. However, progress has been slowed by continual restructuring. 
In 1990 Labour passed the Employment Equity Act as the result of a five year 
campaign by women in unions and a variety of other women's organisations, as well 
as women in government departments and the Labour Party (Wilson 1992; Woodley 
1993; Hill 1993b). The Equal ~ay_Act, 1972 did not adequately address the fact that 
in general women and men do not do the same work, and that the devaluation of 
women's skills (Phillips & Taylor 1980; Steinberg 1990) contributed to a persisting 
gender pay gap (Walby 1988; Wilson 1988; Hill 1993b). The Employment Equity Act 
6 By reason of colour, race, ethnic or national origins, sex, marital status, religious or ethical belief 
(8.211, LRA, 1987) 
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extended the state sector requirement for equal employment opportunity programmes 
to private sector employers with more than 100 employers. It also established an 
Employment Equity Commission to make independent pay equity assessments 
between female dominated and male dominated occupations, which were then to be 
incorporated into award negotiations. It was estimated that the gender pay gap (20% 
at 1990 average hourly rates) could be narrowed by up to 6% at cost of only 2.5% of 
the total wage bill (Wilson 1988:13). 
Wage fixing through occupational awards provided a direct and effective means of 
delivering pay equity adjustments. Since pay differentials between men and women 
were associated with occupational segregation by gender, wage awards which 
reflected that segregation could redress the problem through the mechanism used to 
create the gender pay gap. Yet no sooner had Labour passed the Employment Equity 
Act aimed at improving women's wage rates than it limited the 1990 round of normal 
wage negotiations to 2% under its Growth Agreement with the NZCTU. 
State intervention to provide employment equity was in direct contradiction to 
neo-liberallobby for labour market deregulation, and the NZ Business Roundtable and 
the· Employers Federation had mounted a strong campaign against the Bill (NZBRT 
1990; Brook 1989:185, 1990b; NZEF 1989a&b; Burton 1989a&b; Du Plessis I\lovitz & 
Jaber 1990) using arguments for a deregulated labour market: 
Ensuring that women or minorities are not disadvantaged in employment...is in 
the end, dependent on how well the market itself functions ... Equality of 
opportunity is likely to be best served in a properly functioning labour market. 
(Brook 1989:185) 
The 'methodological individualism' of neo-liberal economics allowed inequality to be 
reconstructed as freedom by assuming that outcomes reflect merit rather than 
discrimination (see NZ Treasury 1984:240). As the Business Roundtable argued 
against the Employment Equity Bill: 
The experience in the twentieth century of coercive equalitarianism has taught 
us that attempts to manipulate outcomes in the name of equity only serve to 
erode freedom and human dignity and to lead to impoverished economic 
performance. 
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By contrast, a true concern about equity must emphasis individual freedom and 
opportunity ... The Employment Equity Bill with its focus on equalising outcomes 
is utterly at odds with this tradition. (NZBRT 1990:i) 
The Treasury, as purse controller for the state's own employment of large numbers 
of women, had taken up similar themes in its own lobby to government, arguing that 
equity concerns were best met through incomes policy and an efficient labour market 
rather than through legislative intervention (I\lZ Treasury 1987:279, 1990:1 There 
were warnings that legislative intervention for pay equity, like minimum award rates, 
would lead to fewer job opportunities for women (Burton 1989a&b; Brook 1989:203). 
Arguments that labour market deregulation would allow women, Maori and Pacific 
Islands workers and young people to price themselves into a job (Brook 1990:76; NZ 
Treasury 1987:279; Myers 1992:13) suggest an underlying assumption that 
'disadvantaged groups' were inherently worth less than other workers, despite the 
challenge of feminist unionists to compare the specific skills used in particular jobs. 
National's Shadow Minister of Labour, Bill Birch, also joined the lobby against the 
Employment Equity Bill (Birch 1989), as the influence of the Business Roundtable and 
Employers Federation on l\Iational's labour relations policy grew (Walsh & Ryan 
1993:15; Roper & Rudd 1993:viii). ~b~I1-f',latlon91 came to power in 1990, the three 
month old Employment Equity Act was repealed. National saw occupational segrega-
tion rather than the under-payment of skills as the cause of the gender pay gap, but 
any solution was to be voluntary and individualistic. The role of the state was limited 
to encouraging employers to implement equal employment opportunity programmes 
(Working Party on Equity 1991). 
Corporatism as StrategiC Unionism' 
In 1987 the private sector Federation of Labour and the Combined State Unions 
amalgamated to form the NZ Council of Trade Unions. This amalgamation was a 
logical response to the blurring of lines between public and private sectors and the 
proposed merging of traditionally separate bargaining systems which was achieved 
through the Labour Relations Act, 1987 and the State Sector Act, 1988. 
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Earlier Acts had confined private sector unions to negotiating on a limited range of 
'industrial matters', essentially wages and conditions of employment (I\lZCTU 1988b:2; 
Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 1990; Harvey 1992:60; Hince 1993:9). This meant employers 
could refuse to deal with unions in relation to changes in labour processes and new 
technology, as well as sexual harassment and pay equity. In response to union 
pressure, the Labour Relations Act, 1987 included specific procedures for 'new 
matters' to be negotiated. To balance the success of the Business Roundtable with 
government, leaders of the new I\lZCTU also began seek to greater input into 
economic and social policy. They began to express a greater interest in and 
responsibility for economic growth (Campbell & Kirk 1983; Harris 1991, 1993). 
"It really is a debate around whether you seek to distribute what is earned or 
whether you seek to influence what is earned and then in the distribution. We 
never had an ability to influence the size of the pie that goes to the working 
class." (I\lZCTU Official, May 1992) 
The rise of neo-liberal economics in the Labour government was parallelled by a rise 
in importance of economists in the union movement. They broadly accepted the 
orthodox economic analysis of I\lew Zealand's problems, though not the neo-liberal 
solutions (Campbell & Kirk 1983; Harris 1991). 
"Before that, no-one cared about economics, it was just the means of 
production. How to share it out, that's what we were all abouL.Everyone 
thought, economists, economists, and bowed down, 'Four legs good, two legs 
bad.' Economics, it's a mystery. They didn't apply to it the analysis that they 
had." (ex-I\lZCTU Official, May 1992) 
From the mid 1980s industrially strong unions, which had traditionally felt 
disadvantaged by the compromises of the arbitration package, were adversely affected 
by economic policy changes, industry restructuring, redundancies and membership 
losses (Harbridge & Webber 1987:85). I\lZCTU strategies began to emphasise job 
retention, economic growth and influence on government policy, rather than industrial 
action. I\lZCTU officials began to promote a Compact with the Labour government 
which would provide greater consultation and union input into policy matters to 
balance the influence of the Business Roundtable (I\lZCTU 1988b, 1990a; I\lZ Govt 
1989; TUEA 1989). 
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The Compact was a strategy to formalise corporatist negotiation at the macro level in 
a way which would include and bind political leaders. Tripartite talks - a hybrid form 
linking corporatism and parliamentarism (Jessop 1979: 195) had been organised 
intermittently and with limited success since the early 1970s. As Lehmbruch (1982:24) 
observes, forms of corporatism in which contact is restricted to leaders at the top of 
autonomous hierarchies retain the option of a low cost 'exit'. This contrasts with the 
stability of the award system which integrated unions and employers more firmly into 
corporatist negotiations. 
The Compact was never more than bipartite. After the Economic Summit of 1984 the 
Business Roundtable rejected tripartism (NZBRT 1989), since union leaders would use 
it to block economic and state restructuring because of the social impact. However, 
as well as being a corporatist strategy, the Compact was a strategy to realign the 
policies of labour movement and Labour government. 
In the early 1980s a tripartite approach to policy, particularly on prices and incomes, 
was proposed by the 'corporatist tendency' within the Labour caucus and Labour 
Party, but was defeated by Labour's free market Ministers (Oliver 1989:12,37). Some 
'Rogernomics' supporters saw unions as 'political baggage' (Harvey 1992:69) and tried 
to reduce the influence of union affiliates with the Party. However, there remained 
strong links between the union movement and the party. In 1988 a Compact 
committee of political and union representatives was set up to study corporatist 
arrangements elsewhere. As the balance of Cabinet power shifted towards the end 
of Labour's second term, the 'corporatist' tendency of the early 1980s resurfaced in 
economic and electoral strategies (Oliver 1989; Easton 1989:181) as well as in 
strategies proposed by NZCTU leaders. 
"Those ideas got sent through to the CTU through (certain) people ... The political 
connection and policy development in the union movement are inextricably 
linked in my experience," (ex-NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
By the end of Labour's second term the Joint Council of Labour, the formal link 
between the government and the Federation of Labour which had met perhaps twice 
a year, became informal but there were almost weekly meetings between senior 
NZCTU officers and Labour Ministers and staff closely involved in labour relations 
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issues. The NZCTU leadership and formerly militant production sector unions were 
ready to grasp this opportunity for 'a third way' between Muldoon's controlling 
interventionism and Labour's free market experiment, despite dissent among other 
affiliates (NZCTU 1988b&c, 1989b:5, 1990a; Harvey 1992:64-5,72). The case studies 
discussed later in the thesis allow closer examination of this dissent and the different 
positions of unions and feminist unionists in relation to this strategy. 
The Compact was to provide 'consultation and meaningful input' into economic and 
social policy, sector/industry development and consultative arrangements in 
workplaces (NZ Government/NZCTU 1989). The loosely worded document was 
signed by the NZCTU President and the Prime Minister in December 1989, but not en-
dorsed by NZCTU affiliates until the following April at a special conference. The 
policies favoured by NZCTU leaders were aimed at a high growth, high wage, high skill 
economy, with a role for unions in training and technology changes (Douglas 1993; 
Webster 1993:238,249). However, the Compact in action was a Growth Agreement 
which imposed restraint on the 1990/1991 wage round. It was agreed between 
NZCTU leaders and government six weeks before the general election in November 
1990, without prior consultation with the union movement. To meet the Labour 
government's priority of curbing inflation, restraint on wage bargaining was traded 
against an expectation of downward movement in interest and exchange rates. Wage 
increases were to be limited to 2% plus a possible 1 % productivity increase. This 
preg election tactic (NZCTU 1990b; Birch 1990) did not save Labour from defeat. 
National reaped the benefit of the Growth Agreement (Herbert 1990b). However, close 
contact continued between leaders of the NZCTU and Labour in Opposition in the 
development of labour relations policy. 
In the mid 1980s the Australian CTU had set out on a similar path of 'strategic 
unionism' leading to an Accord with government in 1983 also modelled on overseas 
examples (ACTU/TDC 1987; Willis 1985). In proposing the Compact, Labour and the 
NZCTU also drew on corporatist models of considerable historic success from Austria, 
Germany and Scandinavia. These European examples influenced not only the 
Compact but also the NZCTU's proposal to restructure the union movement on 
industry or sector, rather than occupational lines. However, by the late 1980s 
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European corporatism had begun to crack, with slashed welfare in Sweden and state 
sector strikes in Germany in the early 1990s (Ahlen 1988). 
In Australia, the Accord and union restructuring by industry drew criticism from 
sections of the labour movement and from feminists (Ross, Q'Lincoln & Willett 1986; 
Tanner 1989; NZCWA 1989; Windsor 1990; Pringle & Watson 1992:60). Far from 
maintaining living standards, real wages fell considerably under the Accord without the 
promised improvements in the social wage (Windsor 1989: 140; Ross, Q'Lincoln & 
Willett 1986:9-11). Although centralised wage fixing benefited women, their industrially 
weak occupations and trades had gained little from staggered 'second tier' 
efficiency-based bargaining and gender-biased upskilling programmes (Windsor 
1990:144; NZCWA 1989:11-13). Advantages ascribed to industry unionism were 
considered illusory or outweighed by attendant disadvantages, especially to women 
workers (Tanner 1989:3-4). At a broader level the application of overseas models 
were criticised for extracting overseas patterns of bargaining and union organisation 
from their full and historically specific context of state policies and institutional 
arrangements which structured the labour market and women's position in those 
countries (Windsor 1990:142; Watson & Pringle 1990; Rubery 1988:253-5). 
In 1989, however, NZCTU officials were strongly influenced by the 1987 ACTU/TDU 
report, borrowing the phrase 'strategic unionism' for their own Compact strategy. This 
recognised the economic basis of state recognition of unions: 
The modern industrial state ... had to develop and often manage the 
infrastructure ... A role for unions slots into that type of balanced, sovereign 
nation state. (NZCTU 1991 b:3) 
The Compact was a clear strategy to reassert that role and balance the powerful 
influence on government of the NZ Business Roundtable. It forged a close link 
between the union movement and supporters of corporatism within the Labour party 
and government, and as such had support from some women unionists. 
/II think the formation of the CTU was one of the three strategiC things the unions 
have ever done. I think the Compact is one and the Growth agreement is 
another ... a clear assertion of the union movement's right to be a key social 
player./I (Auckland CTU Women's Committee member, PPTA, January 1991) 
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As with other labour relations changes, however, questions arise about how the 
application of such a corporatist strategy would work for women. The case studies 
present different views on this which reflect both the labour market situation of the 
occupations represented and the political analysis of the unions' leaders. 
An integral strand in the NZCTU's Compact strategy was the restructuring of union 
organisation on industry, then sector lines (Harvey 1992:66; NZCTU 1988c, 1989a) 
'because that is how the economy works' (Easton 1990c; Hill 199-lb II). In fact, it ap-
peared to be how unions worked in the countries from which the corporatist models 
were adopted. However, these countries have greatly varying rates of female 
unionisation. As discussed earlier (see page 3), there has been growing criticism of 
union organisational structures in which women are under represented (Milkman 1985; 
Crain 1991; Cobble 1991a&b; ICFTU 1991). 
How would such a change in NZ affect the current organisation of women workers 
and their position in the labour market? The papers of the Labour /NZCTU Compact 
Committee and NZCTU publications reflect no analysis of this, nor of New Zealand's 
own very different arrangements, despite the evidence of research on race, gender 
and wage bargaining discussed in the last chapter (Brosnan & Harbridge 1989). 
The organisational basis of unions representing workers in negotiations was a central 
issue arising in both the strategies of the union movement and in changes already 
made in labour relations legislation. A degree of change was being made under the 
Labour Relations Act towards restructuring bargaining on an industry or - the Business 
Roundtable preference - enterprise basis, but the response of unions was pragmatic. 
Since 1987 only one registered document could cover any groups of workers. Hiving 
off 'second tier' agreements as registered enterprise documents could therefore 
undermine unions' bargaining position on national awards. Membership groups with 
'second tier' arrangements or likely to benefit from separate bargaining were those 
whose industrial strength or strategic position underpinned the negotiating strength of 
the occupation as a whole. Some unions continued 'top up' arrangements on an 
informal 'handshake' basis. Some composite blanket coverage awards for particular 
industries and composite agreements for large enterprises were negotiated where 
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there were clear gains for members (Harbridge 1988: 155). Although the number of 
enterprise or industry agreements - that is, documents binding signatories only without 
the blanket coverage of awards - grew over the 1970s and 1980s, in 1990 92% of the 
unionised private sector workforce was covered by an award or composite award 
(Harbridge 1993:35). New Zealand's largest companies, however, were pushing for 
bargaining structures which were closely aligned with business structures (Boxall 
1990:540), rather than with occupational labour markets. 
The Employment Contracts Act 
By 1987 the National Party had adopted an labour relations policy largely consonant 
with the views of the Business Roundtable. A commitment to voluntary unionism and 
a greater variety of bargaining forms was clearly stated in their 1990 Manifesto (Walsh 
& Ryan 1993:15-16; Roper 1993b:151). The full extent of change - from occupational 
awards to enterprise contracts as the basic form of bargaining - became evident when 
the Employment Contracts Bill was introduced in parliament in December 1990. 
i A link between the labour market and income support policy was recognised by 
it introducing the Employment Contracts Act hand in hand with a Social Security 
Ii 
\ Amendment Act which cut welfare benefits (Conway 1991; Dalziel 1993). A 'youth 
rate' unemployment benefit was introduced for those under 25 and the Basic Wage 
Act was amended to no longer cover those under 20. National was less concerned 
with equity than with economic efficiency through labour market competition and lower 
wage costs. The government appeared to share the neo-liberal view that the 
disadvantaged should be allowed to work for wages below award or statutory 
minimum wage levels so as to price themselves into the labour market (NZBRT 1988b; 
NZ Treasury 1990:279 c.f. Brook 1989:203). 
By the end of the 1980s success by government in controlling inflation was due in part 
to an overall contraction of economic activity, with ever-growing unemployment. After 
significant increases between March 1987 and March 1989, the unemployment rate 
of 7.3% in March 1990 grew to 10.3% by November 1992, excluding those on 
subsidised work schemes. The annualised rate of 'joblessness', which is less rigidly 
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defined, was 10.9% in March 1990, rising to 15.1% in March 1992 (Stats NZ 1992:83). 
Unemployment more than tripled between 1987 and 1991 in Auckland, which had 
previously been less affected than other parts of the country (Dept Statistics 1991 a&b, 
1992). Employers and politicians calling for labour market deregulation has attributed 
unemployment to high wages and rigid systems of bargaining, but by 1989 real wages 
had dropped to 84% of their 1982 level while unemployment and underemployment 
continued to grow (Rosenberg 1992:9). From 1990 to 1991 the fulltime workforce 
shrank 2.3%, and parttime work increased by 0.9% (Harbridge 1991 :321). This is the 
background against which unions began to renegotiate occupational awards under the 
new Employment Contracts Act. 
The central purpose of the Employment Contracts Act, 1991 was to break down the 
system of national wage awards by making the enterprise, rather than the occupation, 
the basis of bargaining. Its objectives of decentralisation and decollectivisation (Hince 
1993: 1 0) were couched in a language of spurious. equality. The Act offers both 
employer and employee the choice of bargaining either individually or collectively, but 
this means something quite different for each party. The employee has the right to 
choose an individual contract or a collective contract with other workmates in that 
enterprise only. They are free to back their collective bargaining position with industrial 
action there is no arbitration option on disputes of interest - but the Act expressly 
excludes legal strike action relating to any employer other than their own. For the 
employer, however, the choice of individual or collective bargaining operates at the 
level of the enterprise. An employer has the right to negotiate with the employees of 
his enterprise only, or may enter into a multi-employer contract with other employers 
who choose, but can not be made, to do so. Employees have two options under the 
Act while - as will be seen from the case studies - in practice employers have three. 
An objective of the old IC&A was to encourage collective organisation among workers 
and collective bargaining. The traditional system can be viewed as one in which the 
state granted rights to unions and workers gained rights through union membership 
(Boxall & Haynes 1992). The Employment Contracts Act, like the free market model, 
focuses on the individual, not collectivities of workers or employers. Awards or 
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collective contracts which are not renewed disaggregate under the Act into 'assumed' 
individual contracts. Collective contracts apply only to signatories, and mayor may 
not include new employees. A contract ruled 'harsh and oppressive' may be annulled 
by the Employment Court, but alternative solutions are not the Court's responsibility. 
With no arbitration available for contract negotiations, the Employment Court is no 
longer a corporatist institution but merely a court of enforcement (Brosnan, Smith & 
Walsh 1990:32). Its role is to 'adjudicate' on legality and breech of contract, not to 
arbitrate between parties on issues of fairness. Although mediators are available in a 
Tribunal of first hearing, mediators and Court adjudicators are state appointees; there 
is no union or employer representation. It is also named individuals, not the union, 
who must personally and publicly give notice of strikes or instigate enforcement 
proceedings, even when a collective contract has been signed. 
"It requires an individual to come in and say I want to take my boss to Court ... an 
individual standing up to their boss in a small workplace, with 250,000 
unemployed outside. They will not front up and ask us to do that, nor do they 
have the resources on their own, earning $7.50-$8.00 an hour." 
(SWU Elected Officer, June 1992) 
. The Act is premised on the Business Roundtable's persistent portrayal of unions, not 
as collectivities of workers, but as third parties in relationships of trust between 
employers and employees (Brook 1989:195, 1990a:76). The first section of the Act 
deals with the issue of choice and freedom of association for the individual employee 
(NZBRT 1987,1989; Brook 1989:198). Where blanket coverage by awards once gave 
union protection beyond the actual membership, now the unions are merely 
'bargaining agents', with areas of legal doubt around access of officials to employees 
and continuity of representation or contract enforcement. A history of centralised 
negotiations, unrepresentative officials and low membership participation led to some 
tension between the interests of individual workers and collective interests as 
constructed by union officials (Offe & Wissenthal 1985), which the employers' lobby 
has exploited. However, as a Service Workers Union official pointed out, members 
corning together in a union need a representative who is not vulnerable to dismissal 
by the employer. It needs to be recognised, however, that financing an independent 
'third party' with industrial expertise requires membership fees from more than one 
work site for cost effectiveness, so it is also 'the union' that needs members. 
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In collective contracts negotiated under the Act, employees have been largely 
continued to be represented by union officials, while a growing number of non-union 
bargaining agents represent employers (Boxall & Haynes 1992:8-11). 
The bureaucratic requirements of the Employment Contracts Act have added to 
unions' workloads. A bargaining authorisation form is needed from each member and 
contracts signed by officials as the bargaining agent must be ratified by a majority vote 
of those covered by the contract. Unions became incorporated societies, with few 
state controls regarding membership democracy and election of officers than previous 
labour legislation. This change required revision and re-registration of union Rules; 
financial systems were needed to calculate tax and GST liability on revenue other than 
subscriptions (including interest earned by NZNA's education trusts, most of which 
originated as bequeaths). 
'The idea was, Bill Birch7 would tie us up on al/ those bureaucratic things and 
then we can't do the work we are supposed to do, can't be effective. /I 
(NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
The individual, rather than collective, rights of workers were, however, increased under 
the Employment Contracts Act by extending access to personal grievance procedures 
to all employees (Boxall 1991 :292; Walsh 1993:188). Legal procedures against 
discrimination and sexual harassment had been added to unjustified dismissal and 
undue duress about union membership in the 1987 Act, but these were accessed 
through unions, and had became one of the attractions of membership. The 
Employment Contracts Act doubled the number of employees with access to personal 
grievance procedures through the Court, but this can be interpreted as an attempt to 
reduce the union 'monopoly' on representation. 
In the first year under the Employment Contracts Act the number of personal 
grievances cases rose by 76% (Roth 1992:391). Six-to-eight month delays in obtaining 
a Court hearing by late 1992 were, however, due more to the general deterioration of 
the employment climate under the Act, and to increased formality and legalism 
(Hughes 1993:92), than to non-union claims. Compensation rather than reinstatement 
7 National's Minister of Labour, 1990-1993. 
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became the Court's primary remedy under the Act (Hughes 1993:105-112). In 
interviews, union officials reported that such long delays meant reinstatement was in 
any case not a practicable solution. Moreover, unless a personal grievance was 
taken, dismissal 'from a job meant a six month stand down from entitlement to the 
unemployment benefit under the Social Security Amendment Act 1991 (Robbie 
1993:viii); if the case was lost, the benefit had to be repaid. 
It was only in late 1992 that the Employment Contracts Act could be said to be fully 
in place. Most unions rolled over their awards for another year just before its 
enactment, making 1992 the first year for negotiations under the new Act for most 
workers. However, the awards for some large female dominated groups of workers, 
such as those in tearooms and restaurants and non-food retail work, had already 
fragmented into - at best - enterprise bargaining. The prime issue for unions in the 
1992 round, and a huge task, was achieving collective contracts for as many members 
as possible. In line witl1 advice from employers' organisations, employers in both 
private and public sectors targetted penal rates8 (Knowles 1992:8) paid for working 
weekends or other 'unsociable' hours outside normal 'clock hours' established in 
different awards. By the end of the study period in late 1992, not all workers formerly 
. covered by awards who wanted collective contracts had achieved them and some 
major public sector contracts were still outstanding (Harbridge & Moulder 1992). 
Examples are detailed in the chapter ahead. 
At the time of enactment it was recognised that the shift from occupational or industry 
awards to enterprise bargaining, with a focus at the individual rather collective level, 
would tilt the balance of bargaining power towards employers (Anderson 1991). Not 
all of the Business Roundtable'S agenda had been implemented, however. While their 
lobby was successful with regard to representation and bargaining, the National 
government rejected changes to the institutional framework (Walsh & Ryan 1993), 
which would complete the shift from a corporatist to a contractualist model (MacFie 
8 In 1936 legislation for an 8 hour day and 40 hour week was aimed at spreading available work 
among the unemployed by raising the cost of working eXisting employees beyond those standard hours 
through penal payments (FOL 1938). 
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1992). Both the Roundtable and Treasury have lobbied against the specialist 
jurisdiction of the labour courts, arguing that employment contracts were no different 
from any other contract between presumed equals and could be enforced through the 
civil courts (Walsh & Ryan 1993:13,21). Bringing labour relations under the civil law 
was one item on its 1980s agenda which the Business Roundtable had not yet 
achieved (NZBRT 1987; Ryan & Walsh 1993). The Business Roundtable and Treasury 
have also made strong submissions favouring the abolition of personal grievance 
procedures, in particular the statutory requirement for 'procedural fairness' in 
dismissals (Hughes 1993:124-126). These lobbies raise issues which are fundamental 
to traditional labour relations principles and the relationship between labour, capital 
and the state. They are of concern to the Human Rights Commission which supports 
the traditional role of the state in balancing the inequality inherent in the 
'master-servant' employment contract (Mulgan 1993). 
Nevertheless, the bargaining power of employers has been further increased within the 
existing institutional framework by interpretations of the Act by the Employment Court 
(Macfie 1992; Hughes 1993). A series of rulings have related to employers' use of 
lockouts, or 'partial lockouts' of particular conditions, to force employees to accept 
neW inferior contracts. Lockouts have always been 'the mirror image' of strikes in New 
Zealand labour law (Macfie 1992:325), but were seldom a practical strategy for most 
employers in the past. Under the traditional award system, they would require a level 
of organisation and discipline among all employers covered by an award which seldom 
developed under centralised bargaining (Macfie 1992:321). Nothing was gained by 
hiring substitute labour, who would also be entitled to award rates and would at once 
become members of the union in dispute. The enterprise basis of bargaining has 
changed this, making it a simple matter for employers to exercise fully or partially their 
inherent power over their own workers - the power not to employ. Unemployed, 
unorganised replacements were likely to be available. 
In 1991 and 1992 National's Minister of Labour gave repeated public assurances that 
employment contracts could not be changed without the agreement of employees 
(Roth 1992: 126). The Employment Court also made repeated statements to this effect 
(Kiely & Caisley 1993:54). However, this has been the effect of employers' use of 
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lockouts, supported by the Court. In judgements to date, the more lockouts have 
involved a fundamental breach of contract - by cutting wages and conditions - the 
more likely they are to be ruled lockouts and therefore legal. As Rebecca Macfie 
comments: 
The manner in which employers can lawfully thrust change on employees when 
negotiations have failed ... create(s) an irreconcilable conflict with the ECA's 
fundamental premise of sanctity of contract. (Macfie 1992:324) 
Rulings on the interpretation of labour law have implications for employers and unions 
beyond those directly involved. Among the unions included in this study, the cleaners 
unions took precedent setting cases to the Court in relation to sub-contracting and 
dismissal and a case involving the Nurses Union tested legal ground on trespass and 
right of union access. Up until late 1992, when this research concluded, it had been 
other unions which had taken test cases in relation to lockouts, but these rulings 
affected resistance to employers' demands in the contract negotiations by all unions 
(Macfie 1992:329). 
In the view of Raymond Harbridge and Kevin Hince, the Employment Contracts Act 
is: 
The first real conservative employer driven offensive to decollectivise industrial 
relations in NZ ... (It) has taken NZ an astonishing distance away from its 
heritage of egalitarianism and from its tradition of protecting the weak in the 
labour market. (Harbridge & Hince 1992:9-10) 
It will be some years before the full effect of the Employment Contracts Act on wages, 
on unions and on the labour market can be properly assessed. The case studies 
detailed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 provide insights into the situation of women workers 
and their union organisations in relation to policy shifts and legislative changes through 
the 1980s and early 1990s under both Labour and National governments which have 
espoused a 'free market' agenda. 
Conclusion 
In exploring the context of corporatism, occupational awards and labour relations 
legislation in which female dominated unions operated in the 1970s and 1980s, this 
chapter has outlined legislative changes relating to equal pay, sexual harassment, 
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equal employment opportunity and pay equity. Because these and other concerns of 
working women were not being addressed within the existing framework for award 
bargaining, feminist unionists took political action to change that framework. These 
equity issues and feminist strategies in relation to them are detailed in the case 
studies. The next chapter considers the wider context of strategies by particular 
unions by exploring the ways feminist unionists organised inside and outside union 
movement to ensure that 'women's interests' were included in the corporatist bar-
gaining of the 1980s. 
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5: FEMINISM MEETS UNIONISM 
Introduction 
From the mid 1970s, women involved in unions began to interweave radical feminist 
theory and activism with a marxist analysis of class and employment relations. Issues 
which arose from tensions between women's public and private lives, their personal 
and political relations, from the gendered nature of women's jobs and labour market 
disadvantage became a major and contested feature of debate within the union 
movement. A specifically feminist unionism developed over the late 1970s and 1980s 
through a series of women-only groups and committees, which were positioned initially 
outside, then increasingly inside the formal structures of unionism. A fine balance 
consciously maintained between credibility with unions and autonomy from unions was 
crucial to the ability of these women to raise feminist issues and change attitudes and 
agendas. 
This chapter looks at how feminist unionists went about raising new issues related 
specifically to women workers as matters for union policy. It focuses not on activities 
within unions but on forms of organisation which transcended particular unions and 
sometimes included women outside the union movement. These organisations 
provided the means for feminist unionists to gather the support of significant numbers 
of women behind particular issues. The aim was the adoption of policy on women's 
issues by the Federation of Labour (FOL). This would make these issues a legitimate 
focus of union work, and ensure the support of the union movement for campaigns 
for legislative change. 
Over the past two decades there has been a series of issues around which feminist 
unionists have organised to improve the situation of women union members. Some 
were first raised in the groups whose organisation is discussed below. Others were 
identified within particular unions - especially unions organising clerical workers and 
retail workers which were led by women. They were then taken to these union 
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women's organisations as the first stage in a political campaign. Referred to loosely 
by unionists interviewed as 'women's issues', the most important have been: 
- Equal pay in the private sector 
The Working Women's Charter 
Parental leave 
Improved availability of high quality childcare 
Sexual harassment at work 
Specific representation for women through standing 
committees 
Equal employment opportunity programmes 
Pay equity. 
These issues and campaigns for legislative change are detailed in the case studies of 
particular unions which follow. In this chapter, the foclJs is on the way feminist 
unionists from a range of unions organised collectively within the trade union 
movement itself to raise issues relevant to women in paid employment. 
'~ lot of the policy that went through the FOL, and subsequently got things like 
the sexual harassment procedures into legislation, came from women in the 
union movement. There is little recognition ... that the union movement is an 
effective organising tool for women ... We achieved a different set of norms." 
(Clerical Workers Union Official, Aug. 1991) 
Inside and Outside the Union Movement 
The new ideas of Women's Liberation were slow to impact on the labour movement. 
One woman active in the Women's Liberation movement commented that in 1975 
there was: 
"No visible women's movement in the union movement then, there certainly was 
outside." (Clerical Workers Union Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
However, challenges were beginning. In 1976 a Public Service Association Research 
Paper on Women in Trade Unions stated: 
Trade unions have long been dominated by men employing male inspired 
tactics, methods and organisational forms for the solution of what were 
regarded as male problems. The growth of the female work force and the new 
needs and demands subsequently created have many implications for trade un-
ions. Many unions have not yet understood and assessed the significance of 
these implications in terms of their union organisation. (NZPSA 1976:8) 
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Although the labour relations reforms of 1936 increased the unionisation of women 
dramatically, membership data by sex was not recorded until very recently. An 
isolated Labour Department survey in 1969 recorded unionisation rates for women and 
men (Geare, Herd & Howells 1979:9), an estimate was made for public services unions 
in 1976 (NZPSA 1976:5) and the NZ Council of Trade Unions surveyed its affiliates in 
1991. Limited though this data is, it indicates that since the 19308 union membership 
among women has consistently parallelled their rate of labour force participation and 
that, contrary to the situation in 1110st countries (ILO 1988; ICFTU 1991), New Zealand 
women have been as well un ionised as men. 
However, they were considerably under-represented in union leadership, and it was 
this that feminist unionists began to question in the mid 1970s. The clerical unions 
submitted a survey of nine Auckland unions to a Select Committee on Discrimination 
against Women, which showed that although 51% of members were women, only 7% 
of executive members, 5% of organisers and 3 delegates to the Trades Council and 
the Federation of Labour conference were women (NZPSA 1976:5-6). The PSA 
estimated its own female membership at around one third, yet only 16% of PSA 
section committee members and 12% of officers and management committee 
. members were women. It noted that: 
Women workers must be won to trade unionism as a way of solving their 
problems although unions are not immune from the pervasive influence of sex 
discrimination. But despite their weaknesses ... unions currently provide one of 
the best weapons for women to fight for their right as both women and 
workers. (NZPSA 1976: 1 0) 
Small numbers of women were active in unions, however, and pursuing issues of 
particular concern to women through unionism was not something new. Through the 
1950s and 1960s some unions representing women and women's committees within 
public sector unions had actively pursued legislative change to achieve equal pay for 
women and men doing the same job (Moynihan 1986; Corner 1988; Hill 1993b). 
Efforts were coordinated through the Council for Equal Pay and Opportunity, which 
worked across unions in public and private sectors and women's community 
organisations. The last years of the campaign to extend equal pay in the public 
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service to the private sector drew on the new energy of Women's Liberation feminists 
(Dann 1985:65-75). 
A feature of the Women's Liberation movement was the development of women-only 
organisations, which allowed women the autonomy to analyse their situation, define 
their own issues and find new ways of working which encouraged women's 
participation in a range of activities. Similar autonomous organisation by women on 
union-related issues was initially opposed by union men as divisive of the working 
class, although the need to remove barriers to women's union participation was 
recognised (Andersen 1975; Geare, Herd & Howells 1979). However, such groups 
provided women with a 'political space' (Milkman 1987:96-7,fn.49) in which they could 
meet to develop their position on new issues, and an organisational base from which 
to raise these issues both inside and outside the union movement. 
Women-only groups focusing on concerns specifically related to women at work 
positioned themselves, at different times and in varying degrees, inside and outside 
the formal structures of the union movement. To discuss feminist ideas and to 
develop new issues in the New Zealand context, feminist unionists needed autonomy 
from male dominated union structures. However, to ensure that issues like sexual 
harassment and pay equity were addressed in union policy required credibility with 
male unionists and that meant being actively part of the union movement. For feminist 
unionists, there was always: 
"That feeling of contradiction between criticising the union movement for being 
anti-women and wanting to stand with the union movement against other 
criticisms. It has always been a tension and still is." 
(Distribution Workers Union Official, Nov.1990) 
In 1975 a group of Wellington socialist women established the Working Women's 
Alliance. It grew to four branches in Wellington and others in Dunedin, Wairarapa, 
Eltham, Wanganui, Palmerston North, New Plymouth, and Hamilton. The Alliance was 
in contact with very similar Women's Unions which blossomed briefly in Auckland and 
Christchurch, and with a Working Women's Centre in Melbourne (Booth & Rubenstein 
1990:124). A Working Women's Convention was organised in 1977, the first national 
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gathering of its kind since the Working Women's Movement of the 1930s. Until 1978 
the Working Women's Alliance published Working Woman, at its height a bimonthly 
8-page newspaper covering topics as diverse as wife battering, wages for housewives, 
O'ffice life, solo mothers, economics, tenants' protection, gay liberation, unions, 
childcare and migrant workers. There was a strong focus on education through 
articles, study kits and house meetings about the role of women, their place in the 
economy and how Parliament, local government, unions and 'the system' worked. 
During the 1976-77 wage freeze the Alliance instigated a highly successful campaign 
against price rises through housewives' boycotts of specified groceries, including 
baked beans, tinned spaghetti and that symbol of the Kiwi good life, chocolate 
biscuits. 
In its newspapers, the Working Women's Alliance defined itself as a union of working 
women including housewives, pursuing equity and social justice through the close 
cooperation of all women. This statement indicates that the Working Women's Alliance 
was premised on an important feminist redefinition of work. The contemporary 
dichotomising of work and leisure, production in the paid workforce and consumerism 
in the family, was rejected in favour of a recognition that all socially useful activity in 
. which women were engaged was work, whether or not it attracted a wage (Hartsock 
1983:303). Papers circulated between branches indicate that socialist women were 
coming together in the Working Women's Alliance to work through their marxism in 
the light of new radical feminist ideas. Although one or two papers gave primary 
weight to class relations and the needs of capitalism, most developed new 
understandings of the way gender relations as well as class relations shaped the 
division of labour between men and women in paid work and at home. 
Also established in Wellington in 1975 was the Working Women's Council which 
campaigned for a Working Women's Charter (Dann 1985:75). This was initially 
proposed at the 1975 United Women's Convention by unionist and Labour MP Sonya 
Davies. State funding for a Working Women's Council was promised, but the 
possibility evaporated when the Labour government lost the 1975 election. However, 
women persisted with the project. The Council was modelled on an Israeli 
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union-sponsored Working Women's Council. Charters of working women's rights 
were promoted for adoption by the Australia and Britain trade union movements in the 
late 1970s (Boston 1980:298-9; Beale 1982:14,100; Walby 1986:212; Ellis 1988:139; 
Booth & Rubenstein 1990: 124-5), but the concept went back to a wide ranging charter 
adopted in Australia in 1946 following establishment of the United !\Jations Committee 
on the Status of Women. The Wellington Working Women's Council developed a 
charter for !\Jew Zealand which was adopted at the 1977 Working Women's 
Convention. It was promoted through Councils which mushroomed around the 
country before being formally brought together in a national organisation. Although 
initiated by union women, the Councils focused on tile wide range of issues itemised 
in the Charter and drew together a variety of different women. 
"That first meeting after the Convention brought together a very mixed group of 
women - a clash of cultures almost. But out of that came the Working Women's 
Council." 
(Auckland WWC member, Post Primary Teachers Assn, April 1992) 
In 1976 a women's sub-committee of the Wellington Trades & Labour Council had 
been formed. There was initially some concern by Federation of Labour leaders about 
a possible conflict of interests with the Working Women's Council. The Council allayed 
this by pointing out that, although it had germinated as an independent group because 
of the lack of empathy that many women felt with unions, its campaign worked in two 
directions. While its specific goal was the adoption of a Charter of women's rights by 
unions, the wider goal was to raise women's awareness and understanding of 
unionism and to increase their union involvement. 
With both a wider constituency and a more specific campaign focus than the Alliance, 
the Working Women's Councils grew. !\Jot only did the Councils include women 
representing a range of women's organisations, they provided a link between private 
sector union women and women promoting the Charter in public service unions. 
Cooperation between the Councils and the Alliance is evidenced by the joint 
production of a leaflet on childcare. As union women put their weight behind the 
Charter, however, the Working Women's Alliance faded. 
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The Working Women's Charter (Appendix) listed 16 issues of specific importance to 
women which the Council wanted adopted into policy by the Federation of Labour, its 
affiliated unions and the political parties. The Charter was also endorsed by a range 
of feminist and women's organisations, which added to the pressure for adoption by 
organisations in which women's voices were marginalised. 
The Charter included equal employment opportunity and equal pay for work of equal 
value, but not sexual harassment at work, which was not articulated as an issue until 
the early 1980s. What made the Charter controversial was Clause 15 which supported 
radical feminist demands for safe, legal abortion, as well as contraception and 
sterilisation. The Working Women's Alliance had initially avoided taking a position on 
abortion, prioritising childcare. They added their support to the rest of the women's 
movement in 1977 following a survey in Porirua 1 which showed 85% of women 
respondents thought abortion should be legal if decided on by a woman and her 
doctor (Politz 1977). 
Outside the union movement, strong opposition to the Charter was led by the Society 
for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC). One high profile opponent of abortion 
. had some years earlier been centrally involved in the campaign for equal pay as a 
clerical union official. SPUC's highly organised and well resourced tactics included the 
politics of confusion: they applied to register an incorporated society using the 
Working Women's Council's own unregistered name. Within the union movement, 
strong opposition to the Charter came from small sections of union memberships, 
usually Catholic, and from particular male unionists, with less marked opposition from 
others who thought some Charter items were outside legitimate union concerns and 
likely to alienate members. In order to gain support for the Charter by unions in which 
men still held most official positions, union women had to demonstrate the support of 
ordinary women members for this feminist agenda. 
1 A light industrial area close to Wellington with a very high Pacific Island population. 
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"We did it the right way, by going back to the members. I remember a guy in 
the FOL saying his members didn't agree with it but a women organiser took 
the Charter out to his members and got 97% acceptance." 
(Federation of Labour Executive member, 
Distribution Workers Union, March 1993) 
The Charter was adopted by the Federation of Labour at its 1980 Conference, with a 
slight dilution of the demands for childcare and reproductive freedom (NZCTU 
1992:178). A report by Conference participants to the Working Women's Council 
described the scene: 
For someone who's never been before, this year's FOL Conference was a bit 
like school assembly - only the room was full of men and smoke and the 
headmistress had mysteriously turned into Jim Knox ... The three years of hard 
work put in by the women from the Working Women's Council were clearly 
seen, not just in the result of the Conference but in the lack of union-supported 
disagreement. Almost without exception the dissenting voices came from 
individuals who opposed Clause 15. (Farr 1980: 1) 
Adoption of the Charter at the highest level of the union movement facilitated its 
adoption by afl:iliated unions; for example in 1981 by the Post Primary Teachers 
Association and Public Service Association, where women were well organised, and 
in 1986 by the female dominated but still male-led Hotel & Hospital Workers 
Federation. Adoption into policy made it possible for women, often isolated in 
male-led unions, to insist that their work on women's issues at the political level or the 
membership level was legitimate union business. 
"One of the arguments was that you couldn't do something unless you had the 
policy. So the idea was to push things through the FOL Conference so that 
unions had to have that policy on the books, then women organisers could 
move .. .Policy at that level was a reference pOint, that said we could do these 
things because a higher body says we have to." 
(Clerical Workers Union Staff Official, Aug. 1991) 
Inside and Outside the Federation of Labour 
In addition to the Charter, the Working Women's Council called for women's 
committees in the national and regional structures of the Federation of Labour. They 
recognised the importance of achieving a space for women actually within the formal 
structures. 
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"One thing we had learned from Working Women's Alliance days was that there 
was a lot of inherent suspicion in the union movement of people from outside. 
You had to be within the bureaucracy structure to actually be accepted, 
and ... with the women's subcommittees we got inside the union movement." 
(Wellington WWA and WWC member, Nov. 1990) 
"It was no good just having the Charter, you had to have power within the FOL 
itself." (Auckland WWC member, Marcil 1992) 
The women's committees were to ensure that the policy issues in the Charter would 
be actively pursued by the union movement in both award negotiations and political 
lobbying. Few unions did in fact take up these issues in award negotiations with 
employers. This was in part because, until 1987, legislation and arbitration precedent 
limited the range of 'industrial matters' for negotiation (Harvey 1992:60), making it easy 
for employers to refuse proposed award clauses on sexual harassment procedures 
or pay equity. This was the experience of the Clerical Workers Unions, first with 
employers, then with the Court, in trying to pursue equal pay for work of equal value 
within the framework of the Equal Pay Act, 1972 and the Industrial Relations Act, 1973. 
It was also because acceptance of policy does not necessarily mean action on policy. 
"The effort around getting the Charter understood and taken up was a 
tremendous tool for getting women together and discussing what we needed 
as working women. .. (but) once you have got it into policy, it is relatively useless 
as a means of organising ... Nobody pays much attention to policy, it just sits 
there and you have to move on." (NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
Following amendment of the Federation of Labour constitution, a national Women's 
Advisory Committee set up regional women's sub-committees. These gathered union 
women together and began the slow building of organisation and structure which 
could succeed in pursuing policy more successfully than the efforts of individuals. 
"Because it was a very powerfully tight organisation, the trade union 
movement...1 don't think we realised until we were actually involved, I thought 
if you just said to officials think more about the award claims that women need, 
make sure they feel comfortable being involved, but it was more than that, it 
was actually union structure that had to change to allow that to happen." 
(Clerical Workers Union Official, Nov. 1990) 
113 
Despite the policy decision, the Women's Advisory Committee had to overcome 
lingering opposition before it could work effectively and in 1981 circulated a paper to 
counter accusations of divisiveness: 
The Women's Advisory Committee is not a separate women's division, but an 
advisory committee which recognises that women unionists have special 
problems because of their position in sOciety .... The Women's Advisory 
Committee does not aim to separate women from men - it aims to do the 
opposite: to encourage the involvement of women in their trade unions and to 
encourage unions to take positive steps to help women ... While working women 
remain oppressed and isolated from the bulk of the trade union movement the 
movement will never be strong. (FOL WAC 1981) 
The Committee had no vote on the Federation of Labour national executive; its role 
was advisory - but subjects appropriate for its advice were contested. 
"That's been one of the biggest battles, this perception that you can't make a 
comment about the economy, it is only if it is about babies." 
(FOL Women's Advisory Committee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, May 1992) 
At the regional level, the women's subcommittees, like the Councils and the Working 
Women's Alliance, provided a space for women to come together, but one which was 
now formally within and recognised by the union movement. They had representation 
- but no vote - 011 the very active District Trades & Labour Councils at a time when 
these still had very few women members representing unions. However, the 
committees at both national and regional levels allowed women greater involvement 
in the decision making of the union movement, not just as individual officials but in a 
way which allowed them to work collectively as women. 
"The women's sub-committee was mostly women who worked for unions ... union 
officials who needed a forum to meet because in their own union the male 
structures were so powerful, they had no support. So they met to strategise to 
do things for women." (Clerical Workers Union Official, Nov. 1990) 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s unions had began to respond to the unpopularity of 
compulsory unionism and pOlitical party positioning on the issue by hiring more 
organisers to service union memberships. Women began to be hired. This was a 
time when women generally were being more assertive and politically active and the 
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number of women on union executives was increasing. Taking on the job of 
organiser, sometimes sole woman organiser in a union, was not always easy. 
"In retrospect, you got highly manipulated by the men. 'We have been doing 
it forever, come on, little one, we will show you how' - if they are being nice to 
you. If they are not being nice to you, they are saying disgusting things behind 
your back and a fair bit of that went on. /I 
(Clerical Workers Union Official, July 1992) 
Activism on women's issues could make an organiser's position difficult. 
'~ lot of the men in decision making positions now used to be union activists, 
so for men it is seen as a way up through the system. But for a woman, you 
are just seen as a stirrer and definitely not to be promoted. /I 
(Clerical Workers Union Official, Aug. 1991) 
When union women got together, they used less formal meeting processes. When 
they shared personal experiences, new issues were raised, such as sexual harassment 
at work and workplace pornography. The adverse reaction of many male unionists 
to these issues was in part a response to the way these topics deviated from a strict 
class-based analysis and classic methods of organising. 
'Then 'equal' meant 'the same', and the same meant being the same as them, 
so our needs were the same too. It had a lot to do with anti-separatism. /I 
(Auckland Women's Subcommittee, 
Clerical Workers Union, July 1992) 
Initially the women's sub-committees had a strong focus on union education, aiming 
to increase women's participation as members and prepare them for union leadership 
by improving their knowledge of union structures and their skills in meeting procedure 
and public speaking. 
"I had been involved in no other organisation that had such rules, such 
structures, such gobbledegook language. II 
(Clerical Workers Union Official, Nov. 1990) 
They needed the understanding and skills to participate in what was going on, to know 
how to move a motion, how to stand up at a Federation of Labour conference of 
300-400 male delegates and handle hecklers who shouted 'Point of Order' and waved 
rule books. 
"In the end it was, do we in fact want to have meetings like that, or is it a load 
of bullshit? But at the beginning it was saying we have got to work these 
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structures to change the structures, and that is how a lot of those changes 
happened in the FOL conferences, because women started to learn." 
(Wellington Women's Subcommittee member, 
Clerical Workers Union, Nov. 1990) 
To break with the image of staunch masculinity that surrounds unionism (Foulkes 
1993a), the women's committees arranged social events and film evenings to attract 
women union members. The Wellington sub-committee started a women's choir and 
held.a 'Compulsory Cabaret' when voluntary unionism was introduced in 1984. Issues 
of interest to women were raised with the full range of local women's groups, 
sometimes through meetings organised by an ad hoc group, such as Women for 
Peace. 
"We got ourselves into trouble because there were a lot of unionists who 
believed we were stepping over the line of union issues." 
(Wellington Women's Sub-Committee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, May 1992) 
In line with radical feminist critiques of process, meetings were informal and open not 
just to specified delegates, but to all interested union women. Agenda items were 
proposed by the meeting participants themselves. 
"Someone gave a report to the Trades Council and we would have to nominate 
someone as convenor, so we would do that to keep them happy, then just run 
it along our own lines out of a box." 
(Wellington Women's Sub-Committee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, Nov. 1990) 
Through the sub-committees, women organised seminars to educate themselves 
about issues being raised overseas like sexual harassment and pay equity. They 
began to develop strategies appropriate to the New Zealand situation and to plan 
campaigns. Through bringing together women from different unions, the 
sub-committees build up networks of women and supportive male unionists through 
which a variety of women's interests could be pursued. 
"The story of the early 1980s was of a group of women who were not very 
powerful in their own unions but were more and more becoming officials ... We 
all had the same radical politics and a very strong sense of solidarity among 
us ... though quite a few of us were involved in marxist organisations with men." 
(Wellington Women's Subcommittee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, Nov. 1990) 
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"The women always worked well as a team, that is why we had it all over the 
men. We got on well and we trusted each other with our backs, if you know 
what I mean." (Auckland Women's Subcommittee member, 
Clerical Workers Union, July 1992) 
As the sub-committees were formal components of the Federation of Labour structure, 
however, tensions began to arise as to who was participating in the women's 
committees and the issues they espoused. One strong attempt to limit the activities 
of the Wellington women's subcommittee arose in the wake of an controversial 
incident in Auckland when feminists tied a well-known left-wing playwright and lecturer 
to a tree for alleged rape and sexual harassment of students (Thompson 1984; 
Women Against Violence 1984; Atmore 1992). The incident caused a deep split of 
opinion in the union movement, largely along gender lines. One of Mervyn 
Thompson's plays was scheduled to open in Wellington, and local women actors 
approached the women's sub-committee and their own NZ Distribution & General 
Workers Union to support a protest. Since sexual harassment was an issue on which 
policy was established, the women's sub-committee put its name to a press release 
calling for a boycott of the play. The District Council, its members split on the issue, 
thought the women's sub-committee should not have taken an unauthorised public 
pOSition. Women on the sub-committee continued their involvement in the boycott but 
did so as part of a group called Women against Violence. 
"It was a real meeting point between radical feminist politics and traditional 
union bureaucracy ... Huge discussions, all sorts of implications ... also to do with 
the right of the women's committees to determine their own policies." 
(Wellington Women's Subcommittee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, Nov. 1990) 
There were variations between regional sub-committees in their persistence over time 
and in positions and tactics on issues, even between the most active Auckland and 
Wellington committees. This was linked to the response on women's issues of each 
District Council. This in turn related to the particular regional configuration of small 
political party allegiance within union leadership at regional and national level. 
The Wellington women's sub-committee was strongly political in its ways of organising. 
The women Ilad a sharp analysis of union movement processes and structures at both 
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national and district levels, since the Federation of Labour was based in Wellington. 
Their small party links were mainly with the Worker's Communist League, which at that 
time had a presence on the Wellington Trades & Labour Council. There were few 
women in the Wellington SUP, whose analysis remained strongly class based. The 
women's committee's tight solidarity and radical opposition led to them being tagged 
'the women's mafia', but their position on issues reflected the socialist feminist analysis 
developed in Working Women's Alliance days. 
"Because we were a tightly knit, radical group of women, we tended to attract 
other women and became a focus for a much wider group of radical feminist 
women in Wellington. .. There was quite a unity between people who came from 
middle class backgrounds or who were working class, or who had more radical 
feminist politics than socialist. We were prepared to make compromises, we 
were prepared to work with men, because we believed in the cause of workers 
as well as of women." (Wellington Women's Sub-committee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, Nov. 1990) 
Extreme reactions from some male unionists may be considered a personalised 
response to the radical feminist challenge to traditional gender relations in the whole 
. society. Women remember abusive labelling which aimed to isolate and marginalise 
the women's committee and its views. 
"Men in the FOL used to call women 'slit arses', it was really disgusting the 
language used ... They used to talk about us as the 'hairy legged lesbians'. 
Really funny, I think there were only about two then. .. They are just rabid, mad 
lesbians who don't know what they are talking about. That was an effective tool 
for lots of male dominated unions." 
(Clerical Workers Union Official, Aug. 1991) 
In Auckland, a few key women in the sub-committee were also on the Trades and 
Labour Council and in the SUP whose members dominate the Council. This 
contributed to a better reception for the issues they raised, but there was also a 
tendency for the Auckland women's sub-committee to avoid confrontation with the 
Council, seeking resources and tacit approval. 
"We were always more proper than the women in Wellington (who were) more 
likely to say, the hell with the rules. We were more acquiescent." 
Auckland Women's Sub-committee member, 
Clerical Workers Union, July 1992) 
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"I was a bit of a pragmatist and I didn't have a highly developed gender analysis 
then. There were some fundamental differences between Wellington and 
Auckland women then, though we would probably all laugh about it now." 
(Auckland Women's Sub-committee member, 
Engineers Union, July 1992) 
The influence in the union movement of small avant garde socialist parties was strong 
in the mid~1980s. By 1990 when this research was done, the Workers Communist 
League and MILO had dissolved and so too had most of the SUP, with just a small 
presence in Wellington. Allegiance or non-allegiance to the Labour Party remained as 
the central party political issue. Through the 1980s, however, 'united front' tactics by 
small parties aimed at discretely directing mass movements contributed to suspicion 
about motives. This added to a protectiveness about unionism among officials, in 
reaction to anti-union attitudes frequently encountered, particular in the media. The 
accusation that feminist union women had 'their own agenda' was common: 
"Paranoia rules, they get nervous if you start raising anything which isn't part of 
the line of the union. Like, why are they doing this, they are trying to take the 
union over. It was always a question of what your motive was, as opposed to 
you just have a commitment to try and change things for women, who are 
nearly half the workforce." (Wellington Women's Sub-committee, 
Distribution Workers Union, Nov. 1990) 
While Wellington women focused on policy and political strategising, Auckland women 
organised and serviced women at their job sites and adhered more closely to a class 
analysis. They were less close to radical feminist women, such as those involved with 
Broadsheet, although connections with Maori and Pacific Islands groups and 
organisations like Corso and the Workers Education Association provided exposure 
to other radical politics. The 'separatist' issue of race was often no easier than that 
of gender. 
"When I suggested we look at ethnicity and gender, the reaction was that, first 
of all I was on a personal crusade - and I was! - and second, that was the time 
of the Pacific Islands 'overstayers'. So I was on the inSide, but I was also a 
danger because of all my relations who would come and take their jobs. II 
(Auckland Women's Sub-committee member, 
Engineers Union, July 1992) 
Auckland feminist unionists did use the policy leverage the women's sub- committee 
gave them within the Federation of Labour. In 1984 they also established the Working 
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Women's Resource Centre as a more autonomous feminist organisational base. This 
provided a means of working across unions with greater independence from formal 
union structures. 
"The Trade Union Centre in the early 1980s was a male bastion, it was really 
difficult... The Resource Centre was really the focal point for women's activities 
and gradually as the CTU women's committee got going, we had two structures 
in Auckland. 1/ (WWRC management committee member, 
Post Primary Teachers Assn, April 1992) 
The Working Women's Resource Centre and its paid organiser were funded by 
donations from unions, membership subscriptions, fund-raising and project grants. 
Its management committee was initially drawn from the women's sub-committee, the 
Working Women's Council and its own membership (later half from the regional CTU 
women's committee and half from an open membership). This meant it could include 
women from state sector unions and from non-union groups. Its establishment was 
supported by the Trades & Labour Council through the provision of very cheap office 
space. This was shared with the Early Childhood Workers Union, first registered in 
1982, which Auckland sub- committee women were centrally involved in establishing. 
The Working Women's Resource Centre continues to provide an important base and 
service for Auckland women. Its focus has varied over time, but its work has included 
seminars, resources, advice and support to women workers; 'upskilling' male 
organisers and encouraging executives to take up women's issues; political work on 
parental leave, sexual harassment, pay equity and other issues, and, more recently, 
providing consultation and mediation on sexual harassment to employers. The variety 
of work meant it became a valuable training ground for a series of paid workers who 
went on to jobs as union organisers or educators. 
The Centre's relationship with male unionists has been managed carefully to ensure 
continuing support, both personal and financial. Making men welcome at social 
events (which may discourage attendance by some local feminists) was jokingly 
described as a fund raising strategy since men spent more at the bar. The strategy 
has been to reduce tensions by limiting women-only organising to seminars and 
120 
campaign meetings wllere it provided essential political space, rather than cultural 
space, for women. 
It was through the women's subcommittees of the Federation of Labour and the 
Working Women's Resource Centre in 1986 that specific representation for women 
and Maori on the executive of the NZ Council of Trade Unions became an important 
issue for the union movement. The women's committees encountered initial difficulty 
getting Federation of Labour policy on sexual harassment at work and getting the 
weight of the union movement behind the new campaign for employment equity. As 
'advisory' committees, they were required to report to, but could not vote on, regional 
and national Councils. Since these bodies remained male dominated, without the right 
to vote 'advice' from the women's committees was easily marginalised. When the 
private sector Federation of Labour and the Combined State Unions began to plan the 
jOint NZ Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU), both women and Maori unionists 
demanded that it provide for local, regional and national standing committees with 
representation and a vote on the council at each level. 
In 1986 a Maori Workers Hui in Rotorua laid down a challenge to the union movement 
to give greater attention to Maori members and to make unionism relevant to Maori. 
Maori unionists joined feminist unionists in a push for specific representation in the 
new NZCTU. Maori women officials of the Clerical Workers Unions provided an 
important link between the activism of feminist unionists and of Maori unionists on this 
issue. 
The argument against standing committee delegates voting on regional or national 
councils drew on ideas about democratic procedures these delegates were not 
elected by the whole membership of any union. There was so little acceptance that 
these women had a mandate from women union members to represent women's 
interests, on both gender specific and general issues, that it was suggested 'as a 
solution' that both men and women delegates to national NZCTU Conferences could 
'democratically' elect women onto the national women's standing committee. 
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At the 1986 Federation of Labour Conference a remit was passed by a very narrow 
margin providing for two standing committees, each with voting delegates on the 
national NZCTU executive. The story of this is told in the case study of the clerical 
workers unions. The vote gained was a hand vote on the NZCTU executive; if a 
membership card vote was demanded, then a standing committee's vote became just 
one among thousands. Nevertheless, it meant a considerable gain in influence on the 
policies and strategies of the union movement. 
In the elections for the three officers of the new NZCTU, support among private sector 
unions for two women candidates for vice president reflected positions on this earlier 
issue. One candidate had long been a central figure in campaigns on women's issues 
within the Federation of Labour, including specific representation in the new structure. 
She had strong support from women in private sector unions but was not seen as a 
desirable candidate by some male leaders. The other candidate, from a non-affiliated 
union, also had good feminist credentials, but was little known among women 
unionists in the private sector. She stood for election as part of a package of 
candidates comprising one from the private sector, one from the public sector, one 
non-affiliated, with one of the three a woman - and was elected to the office of 
vice-president. 
Once the NZCTU was formed, skirmishing shifted from the vote itself to who was 
represented by that vote. 
"It was always, who are you accountable to? You are accountable to your 
union and does your union know you are saying this? .. The constitution was 
quite clear that they were accountable to the women members and not to the 
union itself. That is still a problem." (NZCTU Women's Committee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, May 1992) 
Inside and Outside the Council of Trade Unions 
Standing committees with voting rights on national and regional executives meant 
feminist and Maori unionists had achieved their goal for the specific representation of 
women and Maori union members witrlin the NZCTU structure. Tile question for the 
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next few years was how far this would contribute to the inclusion of the specific 
concerns of those groups in overall union strategising. The new I\lZCTU was, 
however, a very different organisation from the old Federation of Labour. 
While the new NZCTU was being set up in 1987, it was the campaign for employment 
equity which focused the activism of feminist unionists. Female dominated unions with 
a strong interest in pay equity and equal employment opportunity worked both directly 
with other unionists, and with a wide range of other women's groups coordinated 
through the Campaign for Equal Value Equal Pay (CEVEP) (Woodley 1993; Hill 
1993b). CEVEP drew together the political power of women inside and outside the 
union movement in an autonomous organisation established outside union structures. 
When I began research on unions in 1989, the campaign was at its height with draft 
legislation before Parliament. In 1990 I\lZCTU women officials worked on the final 
stages of lobbying on the Bill and unions lodging pay equity claims under the Act met 
in a NZCTU working group. A somewhat similar pattern is described in the case study 
of nurses unions, with the wide coalition-based work of CHEC giving way to NZCTU 
coordinated efficiency studies. 
As with the women's committees that preceded them, there was variation in the way 
the different regional CTU women's committees were functioning by 1990. The 
Christchurch CTU women's committee served largely as an information exchange, 
organising some social events. It tended to have a turnover of members gaining 
expertise and contacts, rather than a steady membership using it as a campaign base. 
In Auckland the CTU women's committee was an active base for feminist unionists, 
with some women union leaders preferring to attend that rather than the regional CTU 
itself. In most other regions, women's committees were less active or had petered 
out. In Invercarglll, since women from female dominated unions were most active on 
the regional CTU, some meetings became women's committee meetings with just a 
change of agenda. There was a similar overlap of regular attenders at women's 
committee and regional CTU committee meetings in Dunedin. Dunedin had a tradition 
of Federation of Labour forums open to all comers and all subjects, which continued 
under the regional CTU, despite agendas sent from Wellington. 
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By late 1990 the Wellington CTU women's committee was not operating at all. 
Reasons given for this were various. After ten years of activism some of the women 
who had been most active in the Federation of Labour were exhausted; some were 
no longer employed in unions. Others, however, were now union secretaries, with 
high workloads, responsibility and political involvement in the mainstream structure of 
the NZCTU. Women officials worked together on employment equity, either directly 
or in the NZCTU working group, and were involved in the independent, broader 
campaign organisation, CEVEP. Since NZCTU officers and the offices of many 
national unions are based in Wellington, national union politics tended to displace 
involvement at the regional level. However, trlis had not occurred under the 
Federation of Labour. Some interviewees suggested that disagreement with NZCTU 
methods and strategies were affecting women's willingness to put effort into the 
structures that they had done so much to gain, and that there was disillusion with the 
institutionalisation of the women's structure itself. 
"Just part of the NZCTU's arm, that's what the women's structure has become. II 
(NZCTU Women's Committee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, May 1992) 
The point that some women formerly active on Federation of Labour women's 
committees were now union secretaries was undoubtedly important. The standing 
committees had been achieved over a period when women were being elected to 
higher positions in unions. In the view of NZCTU women officers, the essential training 
ground for women and organising base for women's issues which the regional 
women's committees had provided was no longer as necessary. This was indicated 
by the rise in women's participation from 10% at the 1981 Federation of Labour 
Conference which passed the Charter to 35% at the 1991 NZCTU Conference 
(Foulkes 1993a:1). NZCTU women officials felt that, as the original goals of the 
SUb-committees were achieved, women union leaders saw regional women's 
committees as just another part of the load. In the view.of NZCTU women officials the 
marginalisation of women union officials was no longer a central issue. 
"I think it was true 10 years ago and five years ago, but it is not my experience 
of what is happening today. I look around the national executive of the NZCTU 
and it is usually a third women, sometimes more. II 
(NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
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This included the standing committee representatives, however, and was still well. 
below the proportion of women union members, around half the total members of 
NZCTU affiliates (Sarr 1992, 1993). In the view of the feminist unionists who had 
pushed for full voting rights, the purpose of standing committees was not to provide 
a training ground for women leaders. It was to ensure that the concerns of women 
and of Maori and their specific perspectives on all issues were given a place in 
strategising and decision making by the union movement. 
The tensions which NZCTU women officials pointed to the 1990s, emerging in both the 
women's committees and the NZCTU itself, were those inherent in an organisation 
which now spans public and private sector, working class and middle class 
occupations. Although much less sanguine about gender equality in the union 
movement, feminist unionists who had campaigned for the women's committees 
shared this view. 
"When we got the structure we expected some power with it, and what's , 
happened is that along the way the radical feminist content of the people who 
are seeking power has got diluted with other women who have got other 
political ambitions, aims and see things differently. II 
(Distribution Workers Union Official, Nov. 1990) 
Although women were being formally represented at higher levels of the union 
movement, the 'women's interests' to be pursued at that level now had to be 
constructed across a wider range of different labour market positions. The presence 
of women from large state sector unions meant major differences between the NZCTU 
women's committees and women's committees in the old Federation of Labour, in 
both issues prioritised and ways of working. For women representing, for example, 
shop assistants and kitchen hands, the confident but bureaucratic style of women from 
public sector unions highlighted differences of class rather than solidarity on gender 
issues. Their concerns seemed based on an experience of work as permanent and 
well paid, with little direct understanding of the vulnerability, casualisation and shrinking 
work hours of low paid women. In early 1991 with the Employment Contracts Bill 
before Parliament: 
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"80me of the education people were talking about things that might possibly 
happen in the future and wouldn't it be dreadful if - my god, these things are 
already happening to women now and these people don't even know." 
(NZCTU Women's Committee member, 
Service Workers Federation, May 1992) 
The differing impact of labour market deregulation on women in public sector unions 
and private sector unions has continued to give rise to serious differences of 
perspective and priority among members of the NZCTU Women's Committee. 
However, accounts of the initial disruption to the familiar clique formed by feminist 
unionists in private sector unionism exhibit a degree of class prejudice, of wrlich the 
public sector union women were quite aware. 
III remember that first conference meeting ... We had the mentality that we were 
sitting there in dirty overalls and they had just come out of the hairdressing 
salon, just took one look .. .! think more of our lot were in the passage smoking 
than actually in there listening." 
(Otago CTU Women's Committee, April 1991) 
Although such initial reactions were overcome, a change in style and focus was 
evident at the second biennial NZCTU National Women's Conference in March 1991. 
Participants were union office holders and organisers, with a very few delegates. 
Anticipating the financial impact of the Employment Contracts Act, some unions had 
limited participants from outside Wellington. Keynote speakers, mainly from the public 
sector, addressed the history of working women in New Zealand, the successes of the 
past decade, and the impending Bill. Workshops on particular issues gave some 
space to those likely to be most affected. As was later pointed out at a national 
women's committee meeting, what was missing from the Conference was the past 
critique, or any serious assessment, of women's progress in structures and policy 
making in the union movement itself. 
The Combined State Unions (CSU) had been a much looser organisation than the 
Federation of Labour, originating as a Coordinating Committee, and had not been a 
site for gender politics. Women's issues tended to be organised across the state 
unions through ad hoc committees or organisations formally outside union structures, 
such as the early Council for Equal Pay & Opportunity formed by the National Council 
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of Women and the Public Service Association (PSA), or to be organised within 
individual large unions. The PSA had a history of women's committees campaigning 
for equal treatment; the Post Primary Teachers Association (PPTA) was strongly 
feminist; the I\JZ Nurses Association (NZNA) was a traditionally women-led 
organisation; other state unions were establishing women's committees. Until the 
early 1980s there was no regional organisation across state unions, and no women's 
committee or specific representation for women before the NZCTU was established. 
Cooperation and liaison between public sector unions was ad hoc and depended on 
personal relationships. However, women in public sector unions worked on sexual 
harassment, parental leave, pay eqUity and equal employment opportunity and other 
issues being taken up by women's sub-committees in the Federation of Labour. In 
the planning of the NZCTU, women from the PPTA, PSA and NZ Nurses Association 
worked through the CSU to help achieve the standing committees for women and 
Maori workers in the new structure. 
This background of separate organising on women's issues and more formal work 
methods in many public service occupations meant that, to union women from the 
private sector, women from the state sector seemed more tied to the rules of their own 
union and very slow to act on issues. 
':4 lot of loyalty to their own union even though it was male dominated 
(whereas) our primary loyalty would be with women across boundaries rather 
than to our own union organisation if we were in a male dominated one. II 
(Wellington Women's Sub-Committee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, Nov. 1990) 
lilt was like you had to talk about it for two years before you actually started 
campaigning ... With us ... you did it first and asked questions later, unofficially that 
was sort of how we operated. II 
(Clerical Workers Union Official, Nov. 1990) 
These comments suggest considerable autonomy and activism was possible in the 
cross-union women's committees of the Federation of Labour. They also suggest that 
different ways of working developed in private and public unions under separate labour 
relations systems. The private sector union movement was built around organising 
primarily working class occupations and drew - from ideology more frequently than 
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from fact - on images of struggle. The public sector unions, on the other hand, 
covered women's professions in health and education and, until the State Sector Act 
1988, represented all except the highest ranking state employees. They drew on 
ideologies of service and professionalism. Despite the changed labour relations 
environment, public sector unionists' ways of working reflect occupational back-
grounds and slower negotiating skills developed under bureaucratic forms of control 
(Walsh 1991). 
But the activities of women in private sector unions, too, were being bureaucratised 
as a result of the very success of their strategies during the 1970s and 1980s to raise 
women's participation in the formal policy making structures of the union movement. 
This process had tended to institutionalise women's activism while issues relevant to 
women's areas of employment like pay equity, questioning "I:lexibility' or the relevance 
of productivity measures continued to be side-lined rather than mainstreamed. 
"The problem now is that we are inside the structure and even more heavily part 
of the whole politics of the union movement... There is a real contradiction in 
being inside the NZCTU and being influenced and to some extent dominated 
by the line and wanting to do something independent." 
(Distribution Workers Union Official, Nov. 1990) 
While concerns relating to women's employment are on the official NZCTU agenda, 
they continue often to be added as a late item. The initial draft of the 1991 Charter of 
Workers and Union Rights (NZCTU 1991 a) mentioned neither the Working Women's 
Charter it was modelled on nor the Treaty of Waitangi. In early 1992 a NZCTU draft 
policy paper on labour relations did not mention pay equity until the I\lZCTU women's 
committee pointed out the omission. In affiliated unions, some organisers report 
increasing difficulty ensuring support for the specific concerns of women, Maori or 
Pacific Islands members. In response to financial constraints which followed the 
implementation of the Employment Contracts Act, many union leaders prioritised 
'basic' organising while considering the concerns of women, Maori and Pacific Islands 
workers as 'extra costs' - that is, a luxury, rather than a necessity in the context of 
voluntary unionism. 
"You al/ just pay lipservice to the arguments we put up seven years ago about 
the reasons for women's committees and women's participation as of 
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right. .. Unless you have an pro-women image that is projecting to our members 
who are predominantly women, and we try to get more participation, they will 
just go back to thinking, oh they are just an old boys' network. /I 
(Distribution Workers Union Official, May 1992) 
The progress of Maori committees within the NZCTU has been more patchy and 
sporadic than the women's committees. Specific organisation of Pacific Islands 
workers has been limited to a few affiliated unions with high Pacific Islands 
membership who have convened committees and fono. The NZCTU Maori Runanga 
sees its role as to offer policy directions to the movement and to encourage the 
formation of runanga in affiliate unions. By mid 1992 these had formed in the Service 
Workers Union, the Public Service Association, the Post Primary Teachers Association 
and Northern Distribution Workers Union, with only the last committing funds on a 
regular rather than ad hoc basis. Following its 1991 Conference, the Timber Workers 
D a male dominated union with a large Maori membership - employed a Maori official 
to establish a runanga. In mid 1992, as the effects of the Employment Contracts Act 
became clear, he was made redundant as part of cutbacks, restructuring and 
amalgamation into the Woodworkers Union of Aotearoa. An example of rapid recent 
progress, however, was the well-funded NZ Education Institute which established 
Maori structures following its 1991 Conference; officers with specific responsibility for 
Maori were employed and there was a strong Maori presence on the executive. With 
most unions, however: 
liThe problem is always priorities and resources. It is always commitment to 
Maori things that are not prioritised and do not get the resources./I 
(NZCTU Maori Runanga member, June 1992) 
The Runanga also experienced bureaucratic constraints as public service and private 
sector unions came together in the NZCTU, The PSA, for example, endorsed and 
funded only one delegate to local or national Runanga, though more unionists attend 
'just as themselves', The Runanga operated under a Maori kawa of meetings and hui 
open to all Maori. 
"We ignore (bureaucratic constraints). Local committees embrace everyone, 
totally open. That includes Unemployed Workers Union members or any Maori 
who wants to bring something to the runanga. /I 
(NZCTU Runanga member, June 1992) 
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However, travel expenses for Maori kaumatua attending the 1991 hui were disputed 
by NZCTU officials, who saw them as non-union members rather than as the elders 
whose presence is indispensable at any hui. 
As at the 1986 hui and the first NZCTU hui in 1989, Maori unionists at the 1991 hui 
challenged the movement to demonstrate its commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi 
and to Maori workers. Frustration led to the formation of a separate Maori union, Te 
Ropu . Kaimahi Maori. This was not seen by hui participants as a split, but was 
supported as a strategy by some, while others choose to continue working within the 
NZCTU and its affiliated unions to raise issues of importance to Maori members. 
"The people on the Runanga just obdurately go on pressing their point, which 
is what their job is, they represent the opinion that they are supposed to 
represent. They don't embrace. NZCTU policy. It just sends the NZCTU totally 
spare." (ex-NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
Although a separate Maori union was first suggested in 1986, the independent 
formation of Te Ropu Kaimahi Maori was facilitated by the Employment Contracts Act 
which made union representation 'contestable'. It was established in recognition of 
the position of Maori in the labour market and the likely consequences of the new Act. 
Jf enterprise based bargaining led trade unions to focus on 'core memberships' on 
larger, organisable worksites, as suggested by NZCTU leaders, a large proportion of 
the Maori workforce was likely to lose representation. But Ropu's take was not just 
to be a bargaining agent, but to see the Treaty of Waitangi was honoured, to assert 
tino rangatiratanga and to free Maori from oppression (Jackson 1992). 
"We won't confine ourselves to issues of the workplace, though we will cover 
those as well and do it better. We are equally concerned to be involved with 
our people in the struggle for liberation outside the workplace." 
(Te Ropu Kaimahi Maori Official, Aug. 1991) 
Te Ropu's membership rule reflects this aim and the traditional kawa of Maori 
gatherings. It is open to all occupations, to all Maori including kaumatua, to nOll-Maori 
who support its aims, and to all workers whether or not currently employed. The high 
level of unemployment among Maori means that disputes and grievances on which 
help and representation is needed are as likely to be with the Department of Social 
Welfare as with employers. A membership which includes workers while they are 
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unemployed also overcomes a contradiction of unionism becoming increasing 
important under the Employment Contracts Act. At a time when wage rates in the 
labour market are most vulnerable to pressure, collective organisation and union 
revenue are being eroded by membership losses - and the members being lost are 
those likely to undercut the wage rates of others in their efforts to secure work. 
Unemployment and membership losses were already affecting both the 'finances and 
the strategies of private sector unions by the mid 1980s. When the Federation of 
Labour and CSU amalgamated into the NZCTU, the rather chaotic work practices of 
FOL officials were radically changed to a very formal style of management and 
processes for accountability that, in the view of some, took on a life of their own, both 
in the NZCTU's own office and in its coordinating of the union movement. 
uYou can meet at this level and at that level and pass resolutions up and down 
and around the system but you never break out...the workers become 
completely irrelevant... Because there was little structure in the FOL, serving the 
structure's own interests was never a factor." 
(ex-NZCTU OffiCial, May 1992) 
It was this bureaucratic tightening of a labour movement (and a union women's 
movement) which would ensure a corporatist institution which could haggle for gains 
at the macro level of national politics and be sure of delivering as promised (Oliver 
1989:41) under the Compact and its first practical implementation, the Growth 
Agreement. When the Labour government was defeated in the 1990 election, the 
importance of organisational control gave way to organisational survival as 
membership losses cut into the revenue base of unions and NZCTU alike. 
Unemployment had already reduced NZCTU's income since its establishment in 1987. 
By 1990 some unions were complaining about high capitation fees to support NZCTU 
strategies which were less than popular with their members: some threats to disaffiliate 
did later eventuate. Anticipating further membership losses following the Employment 
Contracts Act the organisation of the NZCTU was restructured in March 1991. Costs 
were trimmed by reducing the number of regional Councils, closing all regional offices 
and laying off regional coordinators. This decision about how limited resources were 
best deployed was made by the leadership without consultation of regions, and some 
131 
unionists saw it as consolidating hierarchical power in Wellington. Representation on 
regional and national executives of the NZCTU and on national standing committees 
was also limited and changed. Unions with the largest membership - or for the 
national women's committee, the largest female membership - had a seat by right, with 
other places filled to represent smaller unions. This selection by size did not, however, 
necessarily reflect unions' degree of interest or active involvement. 
/lOne of the reasons the regional structure was disbanded was because it was 
too hard to control from the centre. You got these good energetic people going 
around organising campaigns and things that NZCTU officials didn't feel they 
had proper control over./I (ex-NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
The term 'affiliate driven' became a feature of NZCTU language in relation to this 
reorganisation. This did not, however, mean a union movement with policies and 
strategies derived from the grassroots. The Compact and Growth Agreement, 
whatever their merits, were strategies proposed by national NZCTU officials and the 
Labour Party, not the members or delegates of unions. Rather it was a return to 
earlier concern by union leadership to confine activism within the union movement to 
'legitimate' issues and strategies. Delegates to national women's and Maori standing 
committees were to present the official position of their own union, as decided by 
executives which might be male dominated or entirely Pakeha. Delegates to the 
NZCTU women's committee were no longer to put forward the position on women's 
issues of their regional women's committee, their union women's committee or their 
own knowledge of women's experiences in the occupations they represent. 
/llf you bring up something that doesn't toe the company line it is as though you 
have farted. Everything seems to be regimented and planned. They say, can't 
talk about that, it's not on the agenda - it's that sort of mentality. The decisions 
are made before you get there. /I 
(Otago CTU Women's Committee member, April 1991) 
By early 1992 the Employment Contracts Act had impacted heavily on the unionisatiol1 
and bargaining power of women in low paid clerical work, tearooms and restaurants 
and small shops, but this was not the focus of attention in the NZCTU national 
women's committee. 
/lIt is important for us to be there even though at times it seems our voice isn't 
heard ... Workplace training and skills, very interesting but...1 get quite angry that 
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I am spending whole days up in Wellington wading through stuff that has 
absolutely no relevance to what's going on." 
(NZCTU Women's Committee member, 
Service Workers Union, May 1992) 
Nor were regional CTU women's committees now an effective base for campaigning 
on women's issues. 
"Well, you can't really because you have to take everything back to your 
union." (Auckland CTU Women's Committee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, May 1992) 
'Affiliate driven' procedures limit the ability of standing committees to raise new issues 
of importance to women, Maori or Pacific Islands workers unless they are already fully 
espoused by unions in which these members may be a minority or otherwise 
marginalised. Whereas formerly: 
"It you were having difficulty getting your union to take up a particular issue, you 
could still get together with people, strategise and get that issue on the table 
at a Conference. Then that allows you to go back to your affiliate and say, this 
is coming up, we need to have a policy." 
(NZCTU Women's Committee member, 
Distribution Workers Union, May 1992) 
Remits to biennial Conferences, the supreme authority of the NZCTU, may come from 
affiliated unions but not from standing committees. This was questioned by the 
Auckland CTU women's committee, but the issue could only be raised at the 1992 
conference courtesy of the COMPASS Union. The national NZCTU Women's 
Committee was unable to support the remit, having not yet fully discussed it on the 
basis of positions taken by the affiliate unions its members represented. However, the 
NZCTU Runanga spoke out strongly on the issue at the Conference - with the result 
that the Runanga, but not the national NZCTU women's committee, won the right to 
present remits directly to Conference. 
This situation of diminishing autonomy for standing committees led some Wellington 
union women once again to organise in a form tllat allowed them greater autonomy. 
After the repeal of the Employment Equity Act there was little to bring union women 
together, as efforts to negotiate under the Employment Contracts Act absorbed the 
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energy and resources of unions. However, Wellington women felt that unions were 
no longer providing resources for women or prioritising their issues. In early 1992 
Wellington union women established a Working Women's Resource Centre, at the 
Exchange & Resource Centre of the Unemployed Workers movement rather than on 
premises shared with unions. Like Auckland women they felt the need for an 
organisational base from which they could work for women, which allowed them the 
autonomy to identify and pursue their own interests in their own way. 
"There was a feeling that it wasn't worth setting something up that would not be 
run the way the women involved wanted it to ... We want to work with unions, we 
don't want to be captured by them./I 
(Wellington WWRC Management Committee member, May 1992) 
Successful fundraising events were held, working parties formed on various issues and 
there was a renewal of enthusiasm and energy. Support from the Auckland Working 
Women's Resource Centre was, however, slightly ambivalent. Some management 
committee members feared the presence of a Wellington Working Women's Resource 
Centre might erode already shrinking financial support for the Auckland Centre from 
national unions with offices in Wellington. 
Although pOlitical spaces for women within NZCTU structures were losing autonomy 
and changing, the number of women's committees in unions was growing. 
Participants at the 1991 NZCTU National Women's Conference reported more unions 
with high female memberships were establishing women's committees on the model 
of the NZCTU or appointing Women's Officers on the model of the Clerical Workers 
and Distribution Workers Unions. These and some other highly female dominated 
unions led by women, such as those for nurses, considered that specific 
representation was not necessary for them since women's issues were already seen 
as mainstream issues. However, for no union (other than Te Ropu Kaimahi Maori) can 
this be said of Maori or Pacific Islands concerns. 
As the case studies in later chapters indicate, support for specific representation for 
women and for the women's issues identified at the beginning of this chapter varies 
considerably even between unions with large female memberships. Generally, the 
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union movement has accepted that organising separate women's groups - once 
considered so radical - can be an effective means of encouraging women's 
participation. 
"I think there is an understanding of the need for women to have a separate 
voice within the unions, the problem is whose voice that is. Is it a feminist 
voice criticising the union structure? Is it a women's voice,making their con-
tribution, getting more experience, getting more involved. Those two roles are 
quite different." (Distribution Workers Union Official, May 1992) 
Where 'women's voices' might speak of particular problems arising from their situation 
and their experience of work, a 'feminist voice' might add to that an analysis informed 
by feminist theory of the way those problems and positions were constructed through 
gender relations operating in the workplace and the labour market - and a similar 
analysis of the way the union was or was not responding. As in the case of the 
Service Workers Union in this study, the 'women's voice' may be more acceptable in 
male-led union organisations. Some of the feminist unionists interviewed saw the need 
for unions to listen to both. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, some women union leaders were discussing a growing 
contradiction between the needs of women members who were beginning to become 
involved in their union and of women with long years of experience in the union 
movement. Women who had risen from the membership to organiser, perhaps to 
union president or secretary, had considerable expertise in labour relations, a highly 
developed feminist analysis connected to international debates, and a strong critique 
o'f process and structure. Their need was often for a space to strategise and to work 
at a political level. However, encouraging 'plain and purl,2 members to become 
involved would mean bring onto women's committees or executives women who were 
unfamiliar both with unionism and with its history of sexual politics. This situation 
required a return to a focus on mutual support and education. 
"We have not been able to seriously strategise about what we want to do 
because there are women on that committee who do not have an 
2 A term taken from knitting used by Wellington feminist unionists as an alternative to 'rank and file' 
for referring to female dominated memberships, in rejection of the pervasive military imagery of unionism 
(Deek & Boxall, 1989:11,15). 
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understanding about how the union is structured, let along what is wrong with 
that. If we ignore them they will turn quite anti-feminist and anti the women's 
structure." (Distribution Workers Union Official, May 1992) 
This is the kind gap in perception between leaders and members that Offe & 
Wissenthal (1985: 198) refer to in their discussion of the need for 'dialogical 
communication'. In this case it relates to constructing collective 'women's interests' 
across differences in the interests and perceptions of 'purl and plain' members and 
experienced women who have risen to leadership positions. 
As this chapter has outlined, feminist unionists' critique of union structures developed 
over a number of years of working within unions, organising to have the Working 
Women's Chapter adopted into policy and actively pursued by the union movement. 
As part of that experience, separate committees for women within the I\lZCTU were 
a practical, if not perfect, strategy which allowed women to articulate and organise 
around collective interests. By 1990 not all such committees were an appropriate 
starting point for women becoming involved in their union. 
Union education was an important early focus of the women's sub-committees and 
some female dominated unions - and indeed of the Working Women's Council. From 
1986 the Trade Union Education Authority, initiated by the Labour government, took 
up much of that role. In 1992 the Authority, its subsidies to union-based educators 
and Paid Education Leave were abolished by the National government, and union 
education became entirely the responsibility of individual unions coordinated by an 
NZCTU committee. 
In late 1990, anticipating both this reversal and voluntary unionism under National, the 
Women's Officers of the NZ Clerical Workers Union and the Distribution Workers 
Union in Wellington planned to develop local women's groups at the most grassroots 
level of membership, with tile groups themselves to decide their own concerns and 
activities. 
"Because you need to make unions more accessible to women in 
general ... There is this belief that the ordinary shop assistant would not want to 
come to a women's seminar because they would see it as a feminist thing, too 
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political or whatever. That has never happened in al/ the time I have been 
involved. Women love it. 1/ 
(Distribution Workers Union Official, May 1992) 
However, progress in this direction was overtaken by the adverse on these 
unions of the Employment Contracts Act, 1991. In many areas of the market for 
women's labour, the goal of 'making unions relevant to women' slipped back 60 years 
to trying to make unionism for women possible. 
liThe Act has had a real effect on our ability to carry on with the things that we 
have identified which are important (to) increasing the participation of women/l 
(Distribution Workers Union Official, May 1992) 
At the time the Employment Contracts Act was being passed, the NZCTU surveyed 
its affiliated unions about women members and their representation in elected and paid 
union positions. 
Internationally, union membership is associated with better wage rates and conditions, 
and higher female unionisation rates are associated with smaller gender pay gaps 
(Curtin 1991:4; Sarr 1992:3). Women have generally been less unionised than men 
but, as highly unionised male-dominated industries contract and female dominated 
state sectors are organised, women are now the majority of new recruits (ILO 1988:4; 
ICFTU 1991 :42). In New Zealand, however, in the post war years women's rate of 
unionisation, relative to their workforce participation, appears to have matched that of 
men (Geare, Herd & Howell 1979:9-10; Sarr 1992, 1993). 
Taking into account the strongly male character of unions outside the NZCTU, the 
1991 survey confirmed the findings of the 1969 survey mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter (Geare, Herd & Howell 1979:9). Women, who were 44% of the workforce 
in 1991 (Dept Stats 1991b), made up 48% of NZCTU's total membership and 53% of 
its membership in the private sector (Sarr 1992). 
The survey also measured women's participation in union leadership, which had been 
so appallingly low in the mid 1970s (NZPSA 1976; Geare, Herd & Howell 1979). Their 
representation was highest at the level of union presidents and this appeared to be 
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improving rapidly: in 1988 women were being elected president by unions with 75% 
or more female membership, by 1991 they were being elected to this position by 
unions with 50% or more. Representation was good among industrial and research 
staff (S1%) although representation rates of women members generally fell 
progressively among union executives, union conference partiCipants and union 
delegates. 
"Those statistics were an absolute stunner to me, it was not the picture that we 
have all carried. Now that picture may become true again as a result of the 
Employment Contracts Act. /I (NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
International comparison indicates that women officials prioritise 'women's issues' 
more than their male counterparts (Curtin 1991 :9-11). As shown by this chapter and 
by the case studies which follow, concerns about sexual harassment, representation 
of women and Maori members, pay equity and equal employment opportunity have 
been taken up by women rising to leadership positions in female dominated unions. 
The 1991 survey showed women least well represented among union secretaries, the 
position of longest tenure and greatest practical power. It still required more than 75% 
female membership before a woman secretary was likely - but by no means assured. 
Only 8 out of 21 general secretaries were women, representing 26% of union 
members. 
"Go around and see who are the secretaries and assistant secretaries in any 
unions, by a huge rate they are males. A point we have talked about a lot as 
women. .. The membership say it as well, they are not slow in telling you we 
would really like a woman./I (Hotel & Hospital Workers Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
The survey showed that unions with less than 86% female membership had now 
specific structures or specific activities for women members (Sarr 1992). My own 
assessment of New Zealand unions would be that 86% female membership is about 
the point of 'critical mass' at which female dominated unions are achieving women 
leaders. 
This NZCTU survey on the representation of women in the union movement indicated 
that, while there was not yet equal representation, nor yet equal power, there had 
been remarkable change over a decade and a half. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of feminist unionists from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s was to make 
unions more relevant to women members by raising the priority given to concerns like 
childcare, parental leave, sexual harassment, equal employment opportunity and pay 
equity. This was done by bringing women together in the union movement using a 
series of women-only organisational bases. 
These women's groups were tactically positioned variously inside or outside the formal 
structures of individual unions and/or the union movement. The collective political 
strength such groups gathered was aimed at changing union policy at all levels to 
include the concerns of women workers alongside those of men. Such policy change 
was directed at bringing the collective power of the whole union movement behind 
issues of importance to women workers, as well as encouraging women to be more 
active in their unions. 
The earliest groups, the Working Women's Alliance and the Working Women's 
Council, developed a socialist feminist analysis of the position of working women and 
a Working Women's Charter of rights. The adoption of the Charter into Federation of 
Labour policy led to active regional and national women's committees. Working 
closely with Maori unionists, feminist unionists ensured that standing committees with 
voting rights were included in the NZCTU which brought public and private sector 
unions together. Greater differences between women's positions in labour market and 
greater bureaucratic control meant less autonomy and opportunity for activism witl-lin 
these NZCTU committees. As a result, new autonomous political spaces have been 
established, by Maori in an independent union, Te Ropu Kaimahi Maori, and by 
Wellington feminist unionists through a Wellington Working Women's Resources 
Centre, modelled on a similar Working Women's Resource Centre in Auckland. 
This chapter discusses the context of gender politics in the union movement over the 
last 20 years. As women gained experience, through activism in women-only groups 
and as organisers, tlley began to stand for positions of union leadership. During the 
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1980s some occupational unions with very high proportions of women members were 
for the first time led by women, who gave priority to campaigns on 'women's issues'. 
These unions themselves provided a political organising space for feminist unionists. 
The work of feminist unionists contributed to significant changes benefiting women in 
paid employment - equal pay, the Charter, parental leave, sexual harassment 
grievance procedures, specific representation in unions, equal employment 
opportunity, pay equity - at the same time as the traditional system of protection and 
negotiation which underpinned the unionisation of women was being eroded, then 
overturned. 
"Important things were achieved. However, because of the economic crisis 
they are the kind of things that may disappear. II 
(Clerical Workers Union Official, Aug. 1991) 
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CHAPTER 6: SELECTING THE CASE STUDIES 
introduction 
This chapter explains the selection of the occupations and unions studied. It 
considers the gendered nature of each occupation and the way gendered employment 
relations intersect with the gender division of labour in each of these areas of work. 
The last section of the chapter sets out the themes which run through each of the 
case studies in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
Selecting Unions for Study 
Through studying unions for three typical but contrasting occupations for women, this 
thesis looks at the way the collective bargaining power of workers very differently 
positioned in the labour market has been affected by changes to labour relations 
legislation, and in particular by the Employment Contracts Act 1991. The case studies 
also explore the extent to which - and the reasons why - these unions participated in 
feminist unionist activism of the 1980s, which aimed at making not just unionism, but 
the labour relations system itself, more relevant to the situation of women members. 
Of the occupations in which women are concentrated, clerical work, nursing and 
cleaning were chosen as work typically done by women which also illustrated 
differences between types of 'women's work'. All are forms of service work, which is 
typical of women's employment both in !\Jew Zealand and internationally, and is less 
frequently studied than the primary production and production sectors in which men 
predominate (Cobble 1991 a:419; Roper 1984; Dickens 1989:1; Street 1993:vii-xii; MWA 
1993). In 1990 the female membership of the occupational unions covering clerical 
work, nursing and cleaning together totalled around 70,000 women. 
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Initial selection was based on what can only be described as a good general 
knowledge and some personal experience of these occupations, but little knowledge 
of the unions which organised them. Of common female dominated occupations, the 
selected three needed to illustrate the contrasts between women's occupations, 
including contrasts with regard to educational requirements, social status, and average 
earnings. Nursing is one of the two main professions in which women are 
concentrated; in 1991 nearly a third of all female professionals were registered nurses 
(MWA 1993; Statistics NZ 1993c:270). Clerical work was an obvious choice because 
it is the work of around a third of the total female workforce. Cleaning was chosen as 
a largely parttime and often casual service occupation, which at the 1991 Census was 
the seventh most common job for women (Appendix 2). 
There is a marked contrast in the earnings potential of each occupation. In 1990 a 
first year staff nurse received a base rate of $24,511 per annum ($471/wk; $11.80/hr) 
rising in stages to $31,111 per annum ($598/wk; $14.95/hr) (NZNA 1990b). In private 
hospitals a staff nurse earned $463 a week ($11.50/hr) and a hospital aide $308 
($7.70/hr) (NZNU 1990b). Penal rates were paid for weekends, public holidays and 
daily overtime. The award minimum rate for standard grade clerical work was $346.96 
a week ($8.65/hr; $18,000) for the first year with a particular employer (NZCWU 
1990b). The hourly rate for cleaners was $8.40 ($336.40/wk). Large numbers of 
Cleaners & Caretakers Union cleaners worked a 15 hour week, earning $126 (NZC&C 
1990). In March 1990 the average ordinary time wage was women was $11.17 an 
hour and $397.31 a week (with men averaging $13.73/hr and 512/wk and an overall 
average of $12.64/hr or $461 /wk) (Dept Statistics, 1990b). 
As detailed in first case study, the clerical unions' coverage was restricted to the lower 
paid end of the clerical labour market by a salary bar and by higher market rates 
operating in the urban centres of the North Island. This gave them a higher proportion 
of women members than among clerical workers in general. It also means this study 
presents a different view of clerical workers from past research which has often been 
on male clerks (e.g. Lockwood 1958; Perry 1981) or female clerical workers in 
relatively large organisations and/or clerical 'industries' such as banking, insurance or 
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public service (e.g. Braverman 1974; Crompton & Jones 1984; Tyrrell 1989; 
Couchman 1990) where samples of sufficient size for research are more easily found. 
Labour market segregation by race was also a consideration in selection. It was 
known that large numbers of Pacific Islands women are employed in cleaning work, 
and that Maori and Pacific Islands women were concentrated at lower levels of nursing 
work. 
Another concern was to study unions with predominantly female members which 
differed with respect to leadership by men or women. Research done outside New 
Zealand indicates that women officials prioritise issues of specific concern to women 
members, but that women seldom head union organisations (Curtin 1991; Crain 1991). 
In these case studies, all unions were female dominated at the membership level. The 
clerical workers and nurses' unions were led by women, while the cleaners' unions 
(and all other unions in the initial Service Workers Union amalgamation) were headed 
by male secretaries. 
From this flowed consideration of engagement with union campaigns relating to 
. women, such as employment equity. The clerical unions were prominent in the 
campaign for pay equity at the time of selection. Nursing has traditionally been a 
strongly women-led profession, but the NZ Nurses Association's involvement in 
specifically women's issues, rather than nursing issues, was not well known to the 
researcher. Nor was it known what the Cleaners & Caretakers Unions' position was, 
although in 1989 two secretaries were older men well known for their public expression 
of staunchly traditional union views. 
Trlis selection of unions does mean that the focus is on private sector unions 
organising collectively within the Federation of Labour. It underreports the many 
feminist unionists active on issues like equal employment opportunity and parental 
leave in, for example, the Public Service Association, Post Primary Teachers 
Association and Bank Officers Union. 
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The selection does, however, provide useful insights into not only the similarities and 
difference between unions with predominantly female members, but also into how and 
why unions were differently affected by the Employment Contracts Act, 1991 - a 
change which was not anticipated when this research was first conceived. 
Clerical Work, Nursing and Cleaning as Gendered Jobs 
Clerical work, nursing and cleaning were selected not only as occupations statistically 
typical of women's concentration in the labour market, they were also typical in that 
they are all occupations which strongly reflect both the content of women's traditional 
work in the heterosexual family and its gender relations. 
As Cynthia Cockburn (1985: 169) argues, occupations themselves come to be 
gendered and are part of the process of gendering people. Research and writing 
about the experience of working as a nurse, a secretary or general clerk, and a 
cleaner frequently highlights the way each of these occupations is framed within a 
discourse defining the 'good woman', her attributes and responsibilities. Since 
acceptable femininity (and masculinity) is never certain but must continually be 
achieved (Butler 1990:145), this discourse has subtle affects on the way many women 
union members approach employment relations. 
Of the three, cleaning has attracted the least feminist analysis, but women in Hazel 
Barnes' (1981:1,48) study saw their evening and night cleaning work as a solution to 
conflict between the traditional role of fulltime wife and mother and their need to earn. 
Women's concentration in cleaning also mirrors the gender division of domestic 
labour, of ancient origins but also of present practice. Unpaid domestic labour 
became the subject of major debate as marxists grappled with feminist insights (Kalu-
zynska 1980; Baxter 1990), the contentious question being who benefited: capitalist 
employers, male partners or both? There was no disagreement about who did the 
work: women. Recent international time use surveys on unpaid labour (Scott 1986:68; 
Ironmonger & Son ius 1987; Richardson 1989; MWA 1991 b) and qualitative research 
on nuclear family household arrangements (Habgood 1992) show that, despite the 
best efforts of feminists, women's domestic workload is little affected by workforce 
partiCipation and that, of women's traditional tasks, childcare, cooking and dish 
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washing are more likely to be picked up by caring partners than basic cleaning 
(Ironmonger & Sonius 1987:26 table; MWA 1991b). 
When cleaning is paid, more men are attracted to the task. This is particularly the 
case, in the view of union organisers, as unemployment rises. However, the unpaid 
nature of domestic cleaning and its performance almost exclusively by women under-
lies the low social status and low wages of people who do cleaning as paid work. 
Gender - and race - are factors in the devaluation of cleaning work, and in the 
availability of women for short hours and casual employment. Cleaning is gendered 
work in that it is very much at the intersection of women's traditional responsibilities 
in the home and marginalisation in the labour market. Although essential, cleaning 
work is most visible when it is not done, and this invisibility contributes to the low value 
placed on it. 
Cleaning is night work done by fairies - usually brown female ones. As magic it should 
be free, just as it is at home. The concept of cleaning by magic, not effort or skill, is 
frequently used to market cleaning products to women's wishful thinking, through 
advertisements with such fictional features as magic wands, white tornadoes, or 
special effects sparkles and flashes. Such images, together with products named 'Mr 
(sic) Muscle' or 'Mr Sheen', male laboratory experts or laundromat assistants, are both 
product and reaffirmation of the view that no real effort is involved in cleaning work. 
It would all be done in a flash, should a man take a hand in it - though this product 
makes real expertise unnecessary. The work of cleaners, paid and unpaid, is 
devalued by such images, in ways which contribute to low social status and industrial 
weakness. 
Of occupations typically seen as suitable for women, nursing, along with teaching, 
offers women professional status and middle class rewards. It is both a 'suitable' 
choice for a girl in terms of conventional gender roles, and one which offers some 
career prospects. Part of its suitability, and what attracts many women, is the chance 
it offers to be of service to others. The continuing image of the 'ideal nurse' was 
based on a particular Victorian ideal of middle class femininity embodying usefulness, 
not helplessness, equating the 'good nurse' with the 'good woman' (Garmarnikov 
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1978:115). Both this ideal and the opening up of a career for women were central to 
the work of Florence Nightingale who founded nursing as a profession in Britain: 
I would far rather than establish a religious order, open a career highly paid. 
My principle has always been - that we should give the best training we could 
to any woman, of any class. of any sect, 'paid' or unpaid. who had the requisite 
qualifications, moral intellectual and physical. for the vocation of a Nurse. 
(Nightingale in Garmarnikov 1978: 112) 
From the sixteenth century medical men began to achieve professional closure around 
certain health care specialisations, excluding women (Witz 1986, 1988, 1990; Game 
& Pringle 1983). Nursing developed as a servicing role appropriate to females in 
relation to this male medical profession. A gendered division of labour was 
established between curing which claimed a scientific basis, and caring, which was not 
only natural to women - and therefore to nurses - but their familial duty. Strongly 
gendered ideals of service and duty account for the slow rise of nursing as a 
profession able to claim status, improved work conditions and market rewards 
(Strachan 1991:148-9). 
The equation in nursing's traditional ideology between the 'good nurse' and the 'good 
woman' has, however, been the subject of a widespread critique within modern 
nursing (Salvage 1985:1-18; Mackey 1989:151-7). The influence of feminism on and 
within nursing has prompted attempts to change nurses' 'ministeringangel' image and 
to assert tile professional autonomy of nurses witrlin the gendered medical division of 
labour. The link between dedicated service to others, conservative gender relations 
and subservient relations with doctors was referred to in interviews for this study as 
'the Florence Nightingale syndrome'. However, both feminist nurses and those with 
more conventional views on gender relations come together in regarding nursing as 
a profession for women. As discussed in the case study, this link between gender and 
profession can serve as the base for a strong collective identity among nurses. 
As companies and clerical workloads expanded from the turn of the century, 
successive areas of routine office work became 'feminised' (Crompton 1988; Anderson 
1988; Couchman 1990; Brown 1993), rather than 'proletarianised', since the life 
chances of male clerks did not significantly deteriorate (Braverman 1974; Crompton 
& Jones 1984:37). The separation of conception and execution in office work was 
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accelerated by innovations in office machinery, but the strongly gendered recasting of 
work organisation to protect men's status and rewards began when women were first 
drawn into clerical employment as low cost labour (Anderson 1988; Nolan 1992). The 
costs of clerical expansion were contained not only by low female rates but also by 
short term employment. While men demanded seniority increase and career 
advancement, the gender relations of the period meant women could be required to 
leave on marriage (Crompton & Jones 1984:21; Anderson 1988; Couchman 1990; 
Brown 1993). 
Census information shows a 'dramatic overall increase and a significant ferninisation' 
in the New Zealand clerical workforce between 1891 and 1936, as young single 
women moved into jobs as typists and stenographers, then as general clerks, and 
then during the First World War, into work as cashiers and bookkeepers (Brown 
1993:27-36). 
Despite men's initial fears, evident in heated debate around women's ability to bear the 
strain and responsibility of office work (Brown 1993:45-56), the employment of women 
had little real impact on male employment, pay or status, because male and female 
occupations were kept quite distinct. Both men's and women's clerical employment 
expanded steadily during and after both world wars and the Depression (Nolan 
1992:76-81; Brown 1993:27-36). After 1945 it was married women who further 
expanded the clerical workforce (Smith 1982; Crompton 1988:126), but the 'glass ceil-
ing' above the typewriter was firmly in place. Developments in office technology have 
continued to incorporate the values and expectations of an already functioning and 
accepted division of labour based on gender segregation (Morgall 1986:129; Morgall 
& Vedel 1985; Game & Pringle 1983). 
Initial tensions over the 'feminisation' of clerical work were resolved through 
discriminatory hiring practices by employers and segregation into male and female 
clerical occupations. This outcome patterned later state educational programmes (Valli 
1986; Walby 1986:186; Nolan 1992; Brown 1993). Melanie Nolan (1992:68) argues 
that the feminisation of routine clerical work in Australia in fact bene'fited male white 
collar workers, as it was men who were streamed into the higher administrative, 
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professional and managerial positions created as companies and clerical work 
expanded. A similar trend in New Zealand is verified by Census figures (Brown 
1993:27-36; MWA 1991 b, 1993). The segregated organisation of office work continues 
to draw heavily on traditional gender roles and stereotypes. Linda Valli and Rosemary 
Pringle identify roles as office 'mother' 'daughter' or 'hostess' which are assigned to 
secretaries and other women clerical workers (Valli 1986:69-73; Pringle 1988). The 
central dynamic in the gender division of labour is one of women servicing men. As 
Dorothy Smith expresses it more abstractly, 'women mediate for men the relation 
between the conceptual mode of action' - the decision-making power monopolised by 
men - 'and the actual concrete forms on which it depends' (Smith 1979:168). 
Gendered Employment Relations 
The social relations of gender which are built into the nature and content of 8women's 
employment cannot be overlooked in the task of organising or representing these 
women industrially. Not only is the labour market as a whole structured by gender, 
the occupations covered by unions in this study present three different examples of 
women's work structured by a particular gender division of labour which, directly or 
indirectly, is a feature of the employment relation. Gender relations intersect with 
employment relations. In each case, the complex dynamics of this affect the individual 
and collective power of women to bargain with their employers. 
The division of labour between nurses and doctors is most familiar. Union members' 
strong identity as nurses, on which both professionalisation and industrial strategies 
build, is constructed within this gendered division of labour (Salvage 1985). A familial 
pattern of interaction between doctor, nurse and dependent patient has been 
established (Garmarnikov 1978) which draws on wider gender relations, despite 
nurses' assertion of professional autonomy over their own labour process. However, 
the employment relation of most nurses no longer coincides directly with this division 
of labour, and it is their employment relations that have given New Zealand nurses 
most difficulty in recent years. The majority of nurses are employed by the state. Until 
the management changes described in Chapter 8, nurses' work and relations with 
doctors were managed by senior nurses, while the terms of their employment were 
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settled with distant public service negotiators. In most of the private sector too, 
medical and employment relationships are usually distinct. Generally speaking, only 
practice nurses are in a similar position to most clerical workers; that is, working in a 
close and hierarchical division of labour with a doctor, still typically male, who is also 
their employer. 
Nevertheless, the 'client' relation with patients creates a three-way dynamic in tile 
employment relations which crucially affects bargaining strength. Nurses work for their 
employers the Health Department, hospital owner or GP but provide nursing 
services to dependent patients, a distinction somewhat blurred by nursing ideology. 
Rejection of the role of 'handmaiden to the doctor' has tended to reinforce dedication 
to patients as the basis of nurses' professional identity. Professional ideals of service 
which focus on the nurse-patient relationship underpin a strong nursing identity, but 
can undermine nurses' industrial strength by inhibiting action which may have negative 
implications for patients. 
Clerical workers, like nurses, perform service work, rather than production work. 
However, in private sector clerical work both the work and the servicing is for the 
. person, typically male, who hired the clerical worker, typically female. Not surprisingly, 
1991 Census categories showed roughly similar numbers of male 'managers' and 
female 'secretaries'. Manager/secretary and accountant/wages or general clerk 
continue to form typical gender divisions of labour in the office. Paul Couchman's 
(1990) work on the history of feminisation in state sector clerical work focuses on the 
way hierarchical relations of gender were built into bureaucratic systems of control. 
I would argue more strongly that gender relations themselves directly constitute a form 
of managerial control. Most private sector offices in New Zealand are small (Dept 
Statistics 1991 c:20-21), with personal rather than bureaucratised forms of control. 
Work is both allocated and supervised within a close hierarchy of gender relations. 
That is, the employment relation, job descriptions with a high personal servicing 
content and traditional gender relations together construct the highly personalised 
interactions in small New Zealand offices. Gender socialisation and established 
practices of gender relations directly undermine women's bargaining position in their 
employment relation. 
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Despite low pay, short hours, and very low status, the employment relation for women 
i,n cleaning work is much more clear cut. A gender division of labour in the care of 
premises exists between cleaners and caretakers - both covered by the union studied 
here. Although caretakers sometimes have a supervisory role, such a hierarchy is 
quite shallow and it does not coincide with the employment relationship. Although 
most employers are men and most cleaners women, physical separation and isolated 
work situations depersonalise these employment relations. This view is reinforced, 
rather than crosscut, by race differences between many commercial contractors and 
cleaners in New Zealand's two largest cities. Employers are seldom present when 
cleaning is done, nor are clients or other groups of on-site workers with other 
interests. As the source of revenue, the client is a third party who can be used as a 
lever against the employer, rather than as a moral constraint on the employee, as in 
nursing. 
Whether or not the employment relation coincides with the gender division of labour 
structuring these occupations, the employment relation itself is usually - although not 
always - gendered. The majority of members in each union group are women whose 
employment, earnings and conditions of work are predominantly in the control of men. 
Gender socialisation and gendered social practices intersect with the power imbalance 
inherent in the employment relationship to structure labour relations negotiations. 
The way the social relations of gender intersect with employment relations has 
relevance for the debate on managerial control which arose from Braverman's work. 
Littler (1991 :71) suggests that an aspect of control relationships is their legitimation by 
'general cultural norms', citing the widespread acceptance of property rights. I would 
argue that just as that gender relations delimit women's jobs (Cockburn 1988; 
Franzway, Court & Connell 1989:26), hierarchical relations of gender and patriarchal 
practices of control are an important aspect of managerial control in the employment 
of women, although the particulars of those practices will vary between occupations 
and, indeed, employers. In the segregated labour market the class relations of 
women's employment are structured by the patriarchal relations of gender, which are 
themselves reconstructed daily in active employment practices at work (Walby 1986). 
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Recognition by feminist union officials of the way gender identity and gender relations 
affect both the situation and decisions of individual members and collective bargaining 
strength is at the heart of what this thesis terms 'feminist strategies'. Feminist 
unionists in these unions focused on the fact that the majority of their members were 
not just workers but were specifically women workers. They took up issues arising 
from the gendered nature of the occupation and the employment relation, as well 
those arising from gender segregation in the labour market and the devaluation of 
women's skills in that market. They organised in ways derived as much from the 
women's movement as from unionism. These strategies are detailed in the case stud-
ies, then drawn together in the concluding chapters. 
In the course of this research it became clear that examining feminist strategies within 
three discrete case studies of female dominated unions would not adequately describe 
what was in fact occurring. Even in women-led unions covering female dominated 
occupations, these strategies were not being adopted and pursued in isolation, but as 
part of feminist strategies and gender politics within the union movement as a whole. 
For feminist unionists trying to establish the legitimacy of women's issues within their 
unions, wider politics and organisation across unions was vital. 
The case studies need to be set in the context of the account of feminism in the union 
movement provided in the last chapter. This account overlaps and connects with the 
union case studies. It sets the framework within which officials in the unions which are 
the focus of this study strategised, organised and lobbied. 
What's Interesting About the Case Studies 
The case studies which follow are accounts of the situation and strategies of unions 
organising clerical work, nursing and cleaning, as seen through the eyes of central 
decision makers and strategisers. These case studies explore similarities and dif-
ferences between the organising situations of each union, and between what are 
identified as the collective interests of the unions and the strategies adopted in 
pursuing those interests. Collective interests and strategies are established through 
the decision making processes of each union - by elected or paid officials, elected 
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union executives, and by meetings of union members and delegates. The strategies 
adopted re'flect both the material situation of the occupational workforce and the differ-
ing social analyses held by key decision makers with regard to gender and class 
relations. 
Threading through the case studies are a series of issues on which these unions - and 
feminist unionists - have taken positions. Although the positions and strategies 
adopted by feminist unionists exhibit strong commonalities, these 'interests' are not 
the same for all women workers but reflect differing concrete situations in a changing 
environment. Compulsory unionism, for example, was not an issue for nurses in 
public hospitals, but had underpinned the unionisation of private sector nurses and the 
two other occupations studied. Although autonomous organisation for women is 
important, not all unions need to implement speci'fic representation to acrlieve this. 
Similar interests and the 'discursive marginality' which women have in common 
(Pringle & Watson 1992:68) made possible alliances between feminist unionists and 
female dominated unions on issues like the Working Women's Charter, sexual 
harassment and employment equity. In relation to legislative changes to award 
bargaining or in relation to NZCTU strategies, differences of organising situation and 
industrial leverage make effective organisation around a coherent set of 'women's 
interests' difficult despite the gendered implications of corporatist changes and some 
similarities in the positions of these unions. 
The central issues arising from changes to the labour relations, on which the positions 
of these female dominated unions have both commonalities and differences, are 
voluntary unionism, access to arbitration and industrial action, and the overturning 
of the traditional award system of centralised bargaining by the Employment 
Contracts Act. Also important in the accounts are similarities with respect to the 
impact of 'strategic unionism' (ACTU /TDC 1987) recommended by NZCTU leaders for 
the movement as a whole - particularly the restructuring of occupational unions by 
industry or sector, the Compact and Growth Agreement with the Labour government 
(NZCTU 1988b, 1989a, 1990a; Harvey 1992; NZ Govt/ NZCTU 1989; Moore 1990). 
These issues thread through the case studies, yet each account is a complex whole 
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which presents its own themes of interest and its own insights into the labour market 
situation of a particular group of women and into union strategies. 
Also examined is the extent to which of each group of unions has women in 
leadership positions and the way in which the needs of their predominantly female 
membership are defined and addressed. The extent of engagement with issues like 
sexual harassment, employment equity and the specific representation of women, 
Maori and Pacific Islands members is also addressed. 
Within the case studies, there are two main areas of focus. The first is the connection 
between what may be called situational factors affecting the bargaining power of 
each workforce and the strategies adopted in response to this by each union. The 
second is an exploration of the degree to which these unions utilise femi nist analyses 
and strategies to pursue goals specifically related to women. Consideration is also 
given to union organisational structures which facilitate the adoption of such strate-
gies. 
Through the accounts, large issues and small details reoccur in different forms and at 
different angles. The commonalities and differences underlying these accounts raise 
questions about the legislative framework, union strategies and organisational forms 
which will enable unionists to best respond to the way the members they represent are 
positioned in a labour market structured by race and gender. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE CLERICAL WORKERS UNIONS 
Introduction 
This case study examines the effect of voluntary unionism, voluntary arbitration and 
enterprise bargaining on the union organisation of clerical workers. With national 
awards removed by the Employment Contracts Act, 1991 the logistics of negotiating 
enterprise contracts on behalf of the extremely scattered clerical workforce undermined 
union viability. At the end of 1991 the NZ Clerical Workers Union, covering members 
from Wanganui to Dunedin, was dissolved under the auspices of the NZCTU. In June 
1992, the Northern and Southland unions amalgamated into the Service Workers 
Union to ensure organisational survival and provide a some measure of national 
representation for clerical workers. 
The story of NZCWU's collapse is told here. Both the early and most recent history 
of the clerical unions demonstrate the importance of state supports to collective 
bargaining for low paid scattered workers. 
This case study also enlarges on the story of feminist unionism outlined in Chapter 5. 
With membersrlips more than 85% female, the clerical unions were among the first to 
achieve leadership by women in the early 1980s, as feminist activism spread to the 
union movement in which women were already members. Women officials of the 
clerical unions began to strategise around issues of specific concern to women at 
work. Their effects to raise women's involvement in unionism and their campaigns to 
make unionism and the labour relations system more relevant to women are an strong 
feature of this first case study. 
Origins of the Clerical Workers Unions 
When this research began in 1989, there were five regional clerical workers unions 
affiliated to a national NZ Clerical Workers Association. The Association played a 
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centralised role in negotiations and political lobbying had grown during the 1980s, but 
tensions between the regions about autonomy and costs in the face of impending 
voluntary unionism led to it disbanding at the end of 1989. The Otago, 
Canterbury/Westland and Central unions amalgamated to form the NZ Clerical 
Workers Union (NZCWU). An equally large Northern Clerical Union, in 1991 renamed 
- and referred to here as - COMPASS, covered from Taupo to Kaitaia, and the very 
small Southland Clerical Union continued virtually unchanged through its history. 
The clerical unions have frequently been referred to by historians and other unionists 
as mere 'creatures of legislation', as 'paper unions' (Roth 1973:74; Franks 1987:199). 
This was partly because of the clear importance of the introduction of compulsory 
unionism and reestablishment of compulsory arbitration in the initial ullionisation of 
clerical work and other industrially weak occupations for women. Attempts were made 
to organise office workers in the main cities between 1909 and 1919. However, when 
the first Labour government introduced its labour reforms in 1936, only the Canterbury 
union with a tiny membership was still ill existence (Moynihan 1986:6; Franks 1990). 
The addition of compulsory unionism to the IC&A package that both took the personal 
risk out of union membership for isolated workers and made unions for scattered 
. workers financially viable. 
The denigration of the clerical workers unions as 'paper unions' was also because the 
card votes of their large but passive membership had provided the power behind a 
controversial Federatioll of Labour leader of 1840s and 1950s, Fintan Patrick Walsh 
(Scott 1952; Bassett 1972; Moynihan 1986:21,51). This is a view that focuses on the 
effects, rather than causes, of industrial conservatism among clerical workers. 
The early history of the clerical unions (Franks 1986, 1987, 1990; forthcoming) reveals 
a very active struggle to organise on an occupational basis to negotiate awards. 
"There was nothing automatic about the 1936 legislation. It had to be gone out 
and done, and it was hard work. There were real challenges to trade unionism 
and to the clerical workers in particular." (NZCWU Staff Official, May 1992) 
Despite legislation, there is some doubt whether the first Labour government expected 
unionisatioll to be taken up by clerical workers as well as 'industrial' workers. The 
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Minister of Labour spoke of 'fixing wages by statute, with special reference to domestic 
and female office employees, who are unlikely to organisell (Franks 1987:200). 
However, newspaper articles in the 1930s show great dissatisfaction among clerical 
workers with low wage rates, long hours and unpaid overtime (Moynihan 1986:8-9; 
Franks 1986, 1990). Unionisation on the basis of an occupational award was not only 
more usual than industry bargaining at the time, but was the form preferred by most 
clerical workers as reflecting occupational identity as well as market. Some were 
reluctant to associate themselves with a union movement seen as working class. In 
the view of the labour historian researching this period: 
"There was a conservatism there that meant they would get together as clerical 
workers but not necessarily together with other kinds of workers. II 
(Franks, May 1992) 
The organisation of regional clerical unions was facilitated by the inclusion of union 
employees under the registered membership rule of the clerical unions (Moynihan 
1986:10). This aspect of membership facilitated some questionable political 
manoeuvring Moynihan 1986: 15), but the presence of energetic officials from the Trade 
and Labour Councils meant the rapid organisation of a large clerical workforce with 
little experience of unionism. Enough initial support was needed to register an union, 
and to negotiate under the new labour laws. The first awards produced results, 
doubling the pay of some clerks, and the 'compulsory' membership applications 
flooded in. 
The interpretation and application of legislation was actively contested between 
different kinds of clerical workers, between unionists and the more conservative, 
between clerical workers and employers who sought to ensure the registration of 
small, controllable 'industry' clerical unions. The central issue was one of occupational 
or industrial unionism; whether clerical workers had the wish or the right to organise 
on the basis of the kind of work they did, rather than the kind of work their employing 
firm did. 
The mixed coverage of tile clerical labour market by some industry as well as 
occupational unions was the pragmatic outcome of this struggle for effective unionism. 
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Coverage of the full workforce by unions was coordinated by the FOl, but power of 
registration lay with the state (FOl 1938). Existing guilds in the clerical industries of 
insurance and banking were registered as unions (amalgamating to form FINSEC in 
1990). A separate northern union for local body officers also originates from a guild 
formed at this time. Clerical workers in the strongly unionised freezing works and 
railways were registered separately, as was a guild in the shipping industry. Other 
industry unions contesting coverage with the occupational union for clerical workers 
were considered to be 'bosses' unions'. This was clearly the case with large stock 
and station agents, who lobbied strongly against the legislation (Roth 1973; Moynihan 
1986: 13-15) . 
Any doubts about what kind of organisation would be effective in improving rates and 
conditions for most clerical workers were quickly dispelled by the actions of 
employers. Employers tried to discourage employees from joining the new 
occupational clerical unions, and counter-organised their own. Since registration 
would bring legal recognition of coverage by the union, with whom employers would 
have to negotiate an award, employer-sponsored groups challenged the validity of 
occupational clerical workers unions in the courts under the definition of the term 
'industrial' in the IC&A Act. Amending legislation in September 1937 clarified the 
government's intention. Employers obstructed negotiations and in 1938 were behind 
an attempt by some senior clerks to gain control of the Auckland union executive, 
defeated when over 1000 members rallied in support (Moynihan 1986:21). There was 
a very similar coup attempt on the Canterbury executive around the same time 
(Franks, forthcoming). 
Peter Frank's historical research on the active involvement of clerical workers as they 
defended their new unions against employer infiltration and influence refutes the 
simplistic 'creature of legislation' view. Compulsory unionism and other aspects of the 
IC&A Act provided the framework within which the unionisation of the clerical 
workforce was possible, but by no means inevitable. 
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Labour Market 
The membership coverage of NZ clerical workers unions was determined by its 
registration under the IC&A and later Acts, and by the occupational descriptions and 
exemption rates contained in its main awards. This coverage was disproportionately 
at the feminised bottom end of the market for clerical work. 
The clerical unions' main awards (but not more recent industry or enterprise 
documents) contained a wage rate above which clerical workers were exempted from 
compulsory union membership and excluded 'from coverage by union negotiated 
awards. This dates back to the early struggle for effective unions against employer 
influence. The exemption rate effectively marked the borderline between management 
and clerical workers (Anderson 1988:3), rapidly becoming a vertical segregation by 
gender in the office division of labour. The exemption rate appears to have been insti-
gated by employers (Moynihan 1986:16), to keep their key, higher ranking clerical 
employees deunionised. However, it was agreeable to the unions since, by effectively 
excluding from membership those earning over a certain amount, it blocked any effort 
by management-identified senior clerks to take over union executives - as was indeed 
attempted in the unions' 'first years. 
Over the history of the unions, however, employer resistance and wage inflation 
squeezed down the exemption rate, restricting union coverage to the lower reaches 
of the labour market and effectively deunionising many clerical workers. Although any 
clerical worker could join the union, the awards on wrlich the union was based 
covered only those earning between the minimum rate and the exemption rate 
contained in each award. The exemption rate in the NZ Clerical Award, the main 
award covering 60% of the mernbership, was $20,669 in 1988 and $22,463 in 1991. 
As officials knew from their inspection of wage books, this was well below the market 
rates paid for skilled and experienced staff in the urban centres of the North Island. 
"It was there to keep us small and fragmented. It was very hard to organise 
clerical workers to fight for something technical like that and we could never 
break through it." (COMPASS Staff Official, Feb. 1991) 
"We keep losing people out the top, they ooze out through the exemption 
figure," (COMPASS Organiser, Feb.1991) 
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This concentrated union coverage at the bottom of the labour market and accounts 
for women being a higher proportion of members of the clerical workers unions than 
they are of all clerical workers, as shown by occupational statistics. Around one third 
of NZ women are employed in clerical occupations, making up 75% of all clerical 
workers in 1986 (Dept Stats 1986; NACEW, 1990). However, in 1990, with some 
regional variation, 88% of clerical union members were women. Within broad clerical 
occupational categories, men and women are likely to be employed in different specific 
occupations, strongly differentiated by gender (NACEW 1990:64), with women 
concentrated in those which are lower paid and therefore more likely to be below the 
exemption rate and under union award coverage. 
These differences become clear in examining the composition of the membership itself. 
Male members were less likely than women to be covered by the main clerical award. 
They were more likely to be covered by the clerical unions' industry awards for legal 
o'ffices, local bodies, or the airlines (with higher or no exemption rate), or to be in 
lower level computing or accounting jobs. Their membership came often at the 
beginning of a career path which would take them out of routine clerical work and 
above the exemption rate. 
Women members were heavily concentrated in clerical jobs requiring keyboard skills, 
at the bottom of office rlierarchies which included both member and non-member 
clerical workers. Women union members - and non-members - were often in sole 
charge jobs or on small worksites with only one or two other clerical workers with a 
range of duties; such small firms were likely to pay rates on, or closer to, the award. 
The membership of the clerical unions also showed geographic variations, which gave 
rise to regional differences between union stances, and to variation in the impact of 
voluntary unionism in 1984 and the later Employment Contracts Act. Census figures 
for 1986 showed one third of all clerical workers located in Auckland, one third in 
Wellington, with the rest spread around the country (Tyrrell 1989:17). But in these two 
cities local market conditions meant higher rates were commonly paid for clerical skills 
while employers kept national rates low. Outside the major cities, the minimum rate 
contained in the NZ Clerical Award was likely to be the paid rate. In the central urban 
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areas, often only junior staff on lowest pay would be covered by the award and 
obliged to pay a union fee. This meant that the membership was unexpectedly thin 
in downtown Auckland and Wellington, just where logistical concentration would 
otherwise have been most expected. 
The further south, the more the award, and therefore the union, was regarded as 
relevant by clerical workers. Paradoxically, what unions have traditionally been able 
to deliver had become most relevant in the more conservative areas of the country. 
In Invercargill: 
"The argument is for regional rates and my argument is we already have them. 
They are paid on the award here. The further north you go the better it is. 
Some people here on the general award have been working for 15 years, sole 
charge in an office, and are only getting $18,000, the top of grade 3. I think 
that is appalling." (Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
"There is a perception down here that any person connected with the union is 
an activist, an SUP member or, at the very worst, votes Labour!" 
(Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
There are also important regional differences in the nature of industry, the proportion 
of corporate head office, commercial or 'blue collar' clerical workers, and worksite 
concentration. Trlis was shown in a comparative analysis of regional memberships 
conducted in November 1987. For historical reasons, South Island clerical unions 
covered most local body and area health board clerical workers, under awards without 
exemption figures; a higher proportion of Trustbank employees; fewer airport staff than 
Auckland. These regional differences led to tensions between regions on strategies 
and concerns, which reflected local position and local attitudes, and to regional 
variation in the impact of the ECA. There are also regional differences in successful 
organising tactics. 
"We do things differently, what works for our (Dunedin) members will not 
necessarily work in Christchurch or Wellington and vice versa ... a champagne 
breakfast in Wellington was quite successful, but we thought you have got to be 
joking!" (NZCWU Organiser, April 1991) 
A point of membership coverage of particular fascination and strategic relevance is the 
clerical workers unions' representation of union organisers and union clerical staff. 
From the late 1970s, unions expanded their numbers of union organisers and support 
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staff - many of them women - who became members of the clerical unions, some 
rising to elected positions. At the time of study, two of NZCWU's executive committee 
were union members by virtue of their employment with the Labourer's Union in dif-
ferent cities. On amalgamation with SWU in June 1993, COMPASS also had two 
executive members who were union employees. The presence at meetings and on 
executives of these members whose jobs gave them expertise in industrial issues and 
the concerns of women at work was an important factor in the radicalisation and 
growing feminism of the clerical union through the 1980s. 
"No doubt about it, if they get up and speak rationally and lucidly ... because they 
are professionals they put a different side, and clerical workers listen." 
(COMPASS Staff Official, June 1992) 
This coverage of clerical workers included coverage of the clerical unions' own 
employees, both organisers and support staff. Under a ruling of the Registrar of 
Unions, these staff members were entitled to stand for office. Organisers in particular 
were well known to members and likely to be voted for. However, although 
experienced clerical organisers had been elected into office as paid secretaries, they 
were discouraged from standing for voluntary positions as executive members. 
"You could have the ludicrous situation where they would be their own 
employers and direct the secretary who is supposed to be in charge of 
them." (COMPASS Staff Official, June 1992) 
The clerical unions' coverage of union staff meant they frequently intervened in the 
employment affairs of other unions, on behalf of staff who were their members. This 
has contributed to the tensions between the clerical unions and other unions in the 
movement. The sting in this tale comes in the clerical unions' coverage of their own 
employees, when difficulties arise between union management and staff as it did in 
NZCWU in 1991. Details of this dispute are discussed below. Like other committed 
unionists, clerical officials too can have difficulty recognising the unfairness of their own 
practices: 
"What they say and how they are as bosses is a different story." 
(COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
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Membership Characteristics 
In 1989 membership of unions in the Clerical Workers Association totalled around 
35,000. With some regional variation, 88% were women, an estimated 80% in fulltime 
employment. In interviews, many clerical union officials expressed a strong 
consciousness of their representation of a membership who not only were predomi-
nately women,but women working in strongly gendered occupations. 
The occupations in which women are employed in the clerical workforce were created 
and continue to be reproduced within a gender division of office labour that is both 
horizontally segregated and hierarchically organised by gender. Researchers as well 
as unionists point out the strong parallels between gender relations in offices and in 
the traditional family, with women cast in a servicing role as 'office wife', 'office daugh-
ter' or 'sexy hostess' (Valli 1986; Pringle 1988). Clerical union officials saw a clear 
connection between women's social subordination and the requirements of office jobs. 
"The clerical industry keeps women in the social position that they are already 
in, handmaidens to their employers." 
(Central CWU Staff Official, Aug. 1991) 
Recognition of the gendered nature of women's clerical jobs and its effect on 
bargaining power underlies the NZ Clerical Workers Association's profile of its 'typical 
clerical worker', developed to explain to policy makers the vulnerability of women in 




She works with one other clerical worker in close association with her 
male employer; 
She brings to her employment a loyalty and obedience which reflects a 
social stereotype of the 'ideal woman' as helpful and accommodating. 
She provides support services for management. She must exercise tact 
and discretion to maintain a comfortable working relationship which is 
much closer than that between an employer and, for example, factory 
workers. 
Because clerical workers are indirect rather than directly productive, 
they are not generally seen as important contributors to industry. 
Each of these facts mean that the 'typical clerical worker' is very vulnerable to 
any pressure exerted on her by her employer." 
(NZCWA, 1987:7; 1986:2; 1988:4) 
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lVIembership of the clerical unions remained fairly stable over the 1980s1• In the 
experience of clerical union officials, until the late 1980s technology change in office 
work had tended to increase productivity, information and paper, and to shift workers 
between kinds of clerical job and different employers rather than reduce the overall 
numbers of the clerical workforce. Since clerical workers are employed in all industries 
and all sectors, membership was less affected by the industry contractions and 
expansions of the mid-1980s. Contraction in manufacturing in the mid-1980s was 
balanced by a boom in finance and some growth in the service sector; even 
bankruptcies generate clerical work. 
The clerical workforce and clerical union membership numbers were relatively stable 
through the 1980s, but the clerical workers themselves are highly mobile. With few 
firms offering career paths to clerical workers, they seek advancement and variety 
largely through job change (Anderson 1988:19; Tyrrell:51 ,58-9, 82). For example, 
there was a 50% membership turnover in the Northern region in 1990. 
From 1989, however, the job market for clerical work tightened (Dept. Statistics, March 
1989:8; Sept8), even in Auckland, making this career strategy more difficult. Officials 
attributed this, and a slight drop in membership numbers by early 1991, to deflation 
of the economy overall. Some clerical job losses may be attributable to technology 
at this time in that clerical tasks began increasingly to be written into software used by 
sales and bank workers, blurring traditional lines between occupations (Austrin 1992). 
This is difficult to assess, since relative buoyancy in these other female dominated 
occupational markets is more clearly connected to changes in industry economics 
flowing from the lifting of monetary and import controls in the mid 1980s (Collins 
1989:196). 
Clerical work is an important source of fulltime earnings for women. An October 1990 
survey of COMPASS membership showed 65% worked 30 hours or more; only 14% 
1 Union membership figures are not exact because of job turnover and the information gap due to 
the three monthly basis of listings supplied by employers until the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
Officials cited various figures: total membership list numbers, financial members only, or the official 
required Fulltime EqUivalents, usually obtained by dividing revenue by the fulltime membership fee. 
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worked less than 20 hours. That is, while many members may work hours to match 
the school day, most work hours to match the standard business day. Clerical work 
is patterned by business hours and monthly business cycles. Few have been affected 
by the recent fragmentation and casualisation of employment in other 'women's work' 
occupations to cover peak times and extended hours of opening. 
COMPASS's survey measured what its women organisers already knew about their 
membership and the relationship between women's home and work lives. Of the 
sample, a third were under 30, half 30-40 years. A third were single, two thirds 
married or partnered, 41 % had school or pre-school children. Membership re-flects 
women's work/life cycle, with membership numbers peaking in the age groups before 
and after the childbearing/pre-school years. 
In clerical union awards and agreements, parttime and fulltime workers were treated 
equally. Parttimers could be vulnerable as their need for employment was sometimes 
taken less seriously. 
"You wouldn't think of cutting a fulltimer's wage by two hours but they cut a 
parttimers' because it is it is only parttime anyway ... their jobs aren't seen as 
being so valuable." (CWA Staff Official, Aug, 1989) 
"We have always tried to maintain equal rights for parttime and fulltime as well 
as pro rata money, but they definitely get discriminated against when it comes 
to redundancies. They are always the first to get picked off. It is easier to trim 
them and shove things on to fulltimers, squeeze a bit more out of a fulltime job 
instead." (COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
However, in the late 1980s employer pressure mounted in negotiations for greater 
'flexibility' of clerical hours. In many small offices, women had long been paid a 
'salary' without overtime or precise hours, and this was increasing. 
"The push is away from penal rates, clock hours. You are not dedicated, not 
trying hard enough, don't have the right attitude if you don't stay late and work 
through your lunch hour." (COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
In 1989, with arbitration no longer available, the clerical unions were unable to settle 
their two largest awards for over a year. The point at issue was award clause 13 
which protected fulltime clerical jobs by ensuring a fulitime income for all those 
employed over 30 hours a week. Union officials saw the attack on this clause as a 
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means of squeezing the hours of fulltime workers, as a first step towards the 
fragmentation of work already achieved in other women's occupations. 
Surprisingly, following eventual settlement of the award without this clause, officials did 
not attempt to monitor change in members' hours of work. A change by NZCWU in 
May 1991 to a stepped membership fee system might have allowed such monitoring. 
For Canterbury, the previous two-stage fee suggested a very slight increase from 
January 1990 to January 1991 in half-time employment, but a much greater loss of 
fulltime members attributable to a deflating economy. From May 1991, however, there 
was a marked increase in members working both under 10 hours and 20-30 hours, 
thought to indicate the first effects of the Employment Contracts Act on clerical 
employment. 
Clerical work is largely a Pakeha women's occupation, with relatively smaller 
proportions of the Maori and Paci'fic Island female labour forces employed in clerical 
work (Brosnan 1987:92; NACEW 1990:67,71; Larner 1990:25; Dept. Statistics 
1991 :55). A 1989 attempt to include a question on ethnicity on recruitment forms drew 
an adverse reaction from members. The best data comes from the 1990 survey 
. conducted by COMPASS, the union with highest Pacific Island and Maori population 
base. This random sample was 88% Pakeha, 5% Pacific Island and 4% Maori. 
Those few Maori women working in a largely Pakeha office environment may choose 
to de-emphasise their taha Maori, particularly in regions of relatively low Maori 
population and less radical Maori politics. As a Southland organiser commented: 
"Very few in the membership or, as I say, they don't acknowledge it...ln that 
area we have been more accepting (than up North), we are just all part of one 
group." (Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
Northern officials' view of most Pakeha members' attitude was a little more cynical 
about silence. 
"If you start talking about racism issues, a lot of the membership don't want to 
know, because they are not racist." (COMPASS Staff Official, Feb. 1991) 
Northern organisers suggested that their Maori members were often more willing to 
take responsibility at tile collective level. 
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"They will be the most active, the most reliable ... 1f there are ten people you are 
meeting with and one Maori woman, she will end up being the 
delegate ... working in groups, that collective thing, it is a very Maori thing." 
(COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
Individual Maori have held very influential positions in the clerical unions. In the 
mid-1980s a Maori secretary and two Maori members of the Executive Council of the 
NZ Clerical Workers Association were a strong link between the groups of women 
unionists and Maori unionists pushing for representation of women and Maori in trade 
union structures. Such representative structures were not developed within the clerical 
unions themselves. Maori members were encouraged by NZCWU to become involved 
the NZCTU structures and at the time of study, a clerical union member was 
prominent on the National Maori Runanga. However, apart from the issue of specific 
representation in NZCTU structures: 
"None of the clerical unions have been particularly good with their support to 
Maori or Pacific Island issues .. .It's starting to evolve now, but I don't think a lot 
of Maori groups, Pacific Island groups have much faith in the Trade Union 
movement." (COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
For Northern organisers, issues of race have related less to the membership itself than 
to the previous secretary, a Maori man with a high media profile through the 1980s as 
an advocate of Maori Sovereignty. 
"It was dimension of working for the Auckland union, I can tell you, because 
you had to defend him for his politics all the time. It's a great excuse not to join 
the union. I would say, do you mean you would deny yourself all these 
protections just because you don't like Sid (l8eYM~tA'8S Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
Because of the strongly gendered nature of clerical work, issues of class identity are 
not clear cut. In party political terms, clerical workers span the spectrum and the 
clerical unions had always stood back from political party or class identification. 
"I wouldn't dare presume that we should be supporting any party or telling my 
members to ... 1 would say a good proportion of National supporters." 
(Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
"Some clearly identify as workers, others like the idea that they are a cut above 
the workers on the factory floor." (CWA Staff Official, Aug. 1989) 
The lack of class consciousness that officials reported among many of their members 
reflects not only popular understandings of office workers' status but the tendency for 
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social scientists to define of women's class by reference to their husband or father's 
occupation. Although initially the feminisation of clerical work provided respectable 
work for the daughters of the middle classes, it soon also opened up opportunities for 
girls from working class families (Anderson 1988:8; Nolan 1992:86), calling into 
question the manual/non-manual distinction to demarcate class (Garnsey 1978:233; 
Stanworth 1984:164). As white (or pink) collar workers who must dress nicely 
(NZCWA 1987:23) and work closely with management, clerical workers are often 
categorised as middle class, despite low wages, lack of job control and the 
subservience often required of them. Many clerical union members have no workplace 
contact with clearly working class occupations. Officials reported that clerical workers 
in industry were often seen as 'the boss's friend' by members of blue collar unions 
and sometimes did identify with management rather than fellow workers. However, 
with traditional relativities to core male trades removed in the Labour Relations Act, 
1987, general clerical rates slipped almost to the level of the agricultural labourers 
award, a bare bones award with minimal benefits and conditions. This contradiction 
between position and consciousness is the target of the strong education strategy 
pursued by the clerical unions. 
"I always say, okay, you've got the status, but are they paying you for it? The 
wages are pitiful." (Central CWU Staff Official, Aug. 1991) 
"It's not hard to see clerical workers as an oppressed group, self-oppressed as 
well ... (but) they haven't got a handle, a way into it. They're not able to see 
themselves as part of a union because they still see unions as male, they are 
not working class because they work alongside the boss." 
(NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
Working in a sole charge position or with only one or two other clerical workers gives 
a clerical worker little chance to share problems and develop collective ways of 
understanding her situation. This reinforces the ideology of individualism in the 
dominant Pakeha liberal culture. Officials reported that members often saw union 
membership as protective insurance rather than as a basis for collective action. 
"They just see themselves as individuals and struggling away with a nice or a 
nasty boss .... l've got a nice boss so I don't need to join. I've got a nasty boss 
so I'd better join, but better not tell him and I don't want the union to turn 
up ... but just in case he does something to me, then they'll get him. There's not 
the solidarity feeling and that is what we are trying to change." 
(NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
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Unionism: Compulsory or Voluntary? 
Despite the historic importance of compulsory unionism in the formation of viable 
clerical unions, members' attitudes towards it have varied. Some actively opposed 
compulsory unionism but union ballots always showed majority support. From the late 
1970s the clerical unions were at the centre of political manoeuvring around the issue. 
In 1990, membership ballots confirmed unqualified preference clauses in all clerical 
union documents except that for legal officers. The 1987 legislation obliged clerical 
workers to join the union within two weeks of being actually asked by a union official, 
rather by their employer on engagement, as formerly. For a union organising an 
extremely scattered and mobile workforce, however, this shift in the onus for 
recruitment made an important difference to union penetration of the workforce. 
The clerical unions had two experiences of voluntary unionism. From November 1978 
until March 1979 the unqualified preference clauses in two main awards were lost, as 
a result of preelection political opportunism by National. In the late 1970s industrial 
action to achieve redundancy agreements in key industries attracted adverse publicity. 
Over the 1970s more organisers were employed to provide a better field service, but 
industrial work on equal pay, new technology and redundancies also took up in-
creasing amounts of officials' time (Moynihan 1986:85). In Northern's region in 1978, 
membership dissatisfaction focused on increased fees, lack of accounting information 
and inadequate servicing (fees were increased to improve this), but a small group also 
objected to the unions' endorsement of the Working Women's Charter with its support 
for abortion. A disgruntled group of members from the Waikato were inspired by the 
'Strike Free' movement to organise a large open meeting in the Auckland Town Hall. 
This called for a special meeting of the membership which voted for a $10 refund of 
fees, consultation with members on fee setting, and a full ballot on the unquali'fied 
preference clause (Moynihan 1986:89-90). 
Under a 1976 amendment to the Industrial Relations Act, a ballot could be called for 
by the Minister of Labour and carried out by the Register of Unions from membership 
lists to be provided by the union. The Minister of Labour gave notice of this intention, 
and passed legislation to remove unqualified preference clauses from awards by Order 
168 
in Council if lists were not received within two months, and for membership ballots of 
all unions within three years. A proposal by the clerical unions to waive a ministerial 
postal ballot in favour of ballots at 42 stopwork meetings around the country was 
turned down by Cabinet. Approval for an Order in Council making clerical unions 
voluntary was given while the last lists from Auckland were on the plane to Wellington. 
All this occurred with full publicity in the run up to National's reelection in 1978. 
Voluntary unionism had historically been part of National's platform, despite past 
pragmatism when in office (Moynihan 1986:39). 
The election over, postal ballots of the NZ Clerical Award (the general award) and 
Licensed Hotel Clerical Award were conducted by the Registrar of Unions while the 
clerical unions launched a campaign and a round of stopwork meetings around their 
award settlement. A 1976 survey of members commissioned by the Clerical Workers 
Association had indicated that 68% would vote for union membership to be VOluntary, 
with higher support from women members and from Aucklanders (Moynihan 1986:92). 
In the 1979 ballot the unqualified preference clause in the general award was 
supported, in Auckland by 56%, Wellington 57%, Canterbury 66%, Otago 70% and 
Southland 72%. This reflected the importance outside the major cities of the North 
. Island of award minimum rates to the wages actually paid. Among members covered 
by the Licensed Hotels Clerical Award support for a qualified preference clause was 
considerably higher, and in later ballots of members covered by the remaining 
documents, support was three to one (Moynihan 1986:94). These results reflect the 
varying relevance of award rates in regional markets for clerical labour and, as 
discussed in the next section, differences in the logistics of servicing groups of 
membership covered by the various awards and agreements. 
These events had profound effects on the unions' strategies with regard to members 
from the end of the 1970s, particularly in Auckland. A series of regional daytime 
stopwork meetings replaced the twice annually Auckland evening meetings; organiser 
numbers were increased; the secretary was replaced by the industrial manager and 
the appointment confirmed by membership vote; changes on the executive gave it a 
younger and more varied composition; and the membership voted for a $10 fee 
increase as the union was sinking into debt. In all the regions, more organisers began 
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to be hired, who organised more membership meetings and began routine worksite 
visiting. This contrasted with a previous focus on centralised negotiations, with officials 
giving little attention to members or workplace problems. 
In more general terms, opposition to compulsory unionism in the 1970s among the 
members of one of the unions most reliant on the package of state supports to 
unionism led to new strategies in the 1980s. The 1976 survey had shown lower 
support for unionism among women members and in areas where higher paying local 
markets for clerical work had develop, making the award less relevant. From this 
officials recognised the need to educate members about unionism and the labour 
relations system among members, and that, in particular, unionism had to be made 
more relevant to the clerici3.1 union's majority of women members. 
In February 1984 National's Industrial Law Reform Act banned unqualified preference 
and union fee deduction clauses in award documents and removed officials' right of 
entry to workplaces. This period of voluntary unionism lasted 16 months, as the 
Labour Government did not pass amending legislation until July 1985, a year after its 
election. 
Because of the scattered nature of the clerical workforce, the clerical unions were 
hardest hit. From 48,941 members in December 1983 the Clerical Workers 
Associations' total membership dropped to 37,514 in December 1984 (Dept. Labour 
1984), through resignations, lapse of financial membership and job turnover. The 
impact varied regionally, with the greatest loss, over 45%, in the Northern region, 
where award minimums were of least relevance and where the late 1970s campaign 
against compulsory unionism had been strongest. Though Wellington's membership 
dropped 4%, Canterbury lost no members in 1984; by December 1985 both showed 
increases over their 1983 membership, although Wellington dropped 2000 members 
the following year. However, Northern's membership was still down 26% in December 
1985 (Harbridge & Webber 1987). The difficulty was at the point of recruitment, in a 
highly mobile workforce. Of 1200 Northern members approached between February 
and May 1984, only 119 joined. 
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"They didn't want to join the union and had been dying for the day when they 
could leave it." (Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Labour's 1985 legislation restored unqualified preference clauses in awards, but ballots 
of the membership were required to ensure their continuation. The clerical unions 
were the first to conduct their ballots in October 1985. Given 16 months of voluntary 
unionism and the three monthly basis of employee listings, the membership would not 
have contained many reluctant members at this point. About quarter of the 
membership voted at 112 meetings, with 80% support for the compulsory membership 
clause. The Northern Legal Employees award, acquired in 1987 through amalga-
mation and covering lawyers as well as clerical workers, was one of the very few in the 
country to become voluntary after a ballot of members. 
This high support for the clause - or low opposition - can be attributed to long debate 
on the issue and to the effect of voluntary unionism on unions within the 'framework 
of national awards. Ballots were not only a demonstration of support for compulsory 
unionism but a vote by committed union members against 'free riders'. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, the blanket coverage of awards protected the labour market for clerical 
work to the benefit of all, but under voluntary unionism awards would continue protect 
those who no longer contributed to union costs. 
This aspect was important to the clerical unions and other unions covering scattered, 
mobile workforces because of the gap between award coverage and union 
membersrlip, particularly since the legal requirement to join now followed a personal 
request by a union official rather than the fact of employment, as formerly. This 
change in the form of compulsory unionism meant the logistics of the clerical 
workforce began to affect union penetration. In addition the award rate was slipping 
against inflation and core trade rates, even before occupational relativities were 
abolished by the 1987 Act. Members were 'oozing out' above an exemption rate set 
too low for local markets in Wellington and Auckland. These factors combined to 
reduced the Association's membership from an official 45,079 in December 1985 (Dept 
Labour 1985) to around 35,000 in 1989 when research on this union began. 
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The 1985 legislation, and the later Labour Relations Act, 1987, put the onus of 
recruitment 'firmly onto union officials or new members themselves. Membership was 
only legally compulsory within 14 days of request by a union official. Three monthly 
listings from employers and the logistics of the scattered clerical workforce meant a 
gap between award protection and union membership continued despite the 
restoration of unqualified preference clauses. Unqualified preference had been voted 
into the document to which employers were party and legally bound, and union 
membership was therefore still a condition of employment - although never expressed 
as such by employers. 
"They are more likely to say, 'We are not a very union place here.' Which 
means, I might have to put your name on a list but don't you go calling 
them. /I (Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Unions again had right of entry to the workplace, but any cooperation beyond 
three-monthly employee listings was at the discretion of the employer. Larger clerical 
employers usually agreed to deduct union fees and include a union recruitment form 
in their first-day-at-work package. In the 1986 award talks, the clerical unions were 
offered the option of union fee deduction clause in the general award or paid stopwork 
meetings. They chose paid stopwork meetings but these were introduced anyway by 
the· Labour Relations Act the following year. Union fee deduction was an important 
issue for unions with scattered, high turnover memberships. It could contribute to 
organisational stability (Offe & WissenthaI1985:216-7) by facilitating fee collection but 
this advantage was offset by possible vulnerability: employers had been known to 
discontinue deductions during disputes, to starve unions financially. On the other 
hand, a employer's willingness to deduct implied an acceptance of unionism and less 
personal risk to active members. 
COMPASS' 1990 survey showed that for 52% of members who responded recruitment 
had been at the instigation of their employer; only 17% had initiated their own union 
membership. By February 1991, over half COMPASS' employers were deducting fees. 
Of those with four or more clerical workers covered - offices visited regularly by 
organisers - more than two-thirds deducted fees; of those with 1-3 clerical members 
two-thirds did not. These members paid on monthly, quarterly, six monthly or annual 
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invoice. About 10% of members preferred their union membership to be kept 
confidential from their employer. 
The 1984-5 period of voluntary unionism drew a number of responses from the clerical 
unions. More organisers were employed, schedules were developed for regular visits 
and recruiting all worksites with four or more clerical workers. While awards gave 
blanket coverage of all clerical employees, the clerical unions' tried to limit services 
and help to members only and to enforce the legal requirement to join once 
requested, threatening and occasionally taking court action. Putting pressure on 
potential members was not a part of the job that organisers were comfortable with or 
felt was productive for unionism. 
"People hate things being compulsory, it would be better to have it voluntary 
and fight to get members ... when you balance the cost of chasing people up 
against what we are getting". (NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
"We have said here, we would prefer voluntary, people who want to be 
members. I think voluntary unionism would work if what the union managed to 
negotiate only went to the members." (Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
This ambivalence towards enforcing compulsory unionism was expressed by officials 
. who nonetheless recognised its historical and continuing importance in organising 
clerical workers. However, support for compulsory unionism as a strategy was waning 
in union movement as a whole, as unions with more readily organised workforces 
advocated a more active unionism and as the National Party used a focus on 
compulsory unionism to foster anti-union attitudes to its political advantage. 
In fact, the clerical unions already had voluntary members. Clerical workers earning 
above the exemption rate in awards had the right join the union voluntarily. In 1990 
COMPASS, the region experiencing the greatest gap between award rates and local 
market rates, had over 1000 voluntary members. Some preferred to keep this 
voluntary membership confidential from their employer, lest it sour relations with 
employers. In Southland: 
"One of our executive members, her employer actually suggested to her that it 
might be a good idea if she wasn't a member of the union, since they were 
paying her $200 a year above the award. 11 
(Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
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COMPASS' membership survey was conducted just before the 1990 election which 
Labour was expected to lose. A return to voluntary unionism was highly likely, but the 
extent of change under the Employment Contracts not yet known. COMPASS covered 
the Northern region in which the clerical awards had least relevance because of the 
low exemption rate and high rates obtainable in the Auckland market for clerical work. 
Compulsory unionism was given by 72% of respondents as the reason they joined the 
union, yet 69% gave protection of job as their current reason for belonging. 
Compulsory membership was favoured by 51% and only 13% wanted it voluntary; a 
third opted for a neutral 'don't know/not sure'. More than half said they were quite 
likely or very likely to retain membersrlip if it were voluntary. Those least likely to 
remain members were under 20, parttime, on slightly lower income, would prefer a 
no-fee-user-pays system, were National supporters and/or came from Tauranga. 
The survey also asked about preference for occupational or industry unionism. 
Forty-seven percent of members wanted a separate occupational union; only 14% 
would opt for an industry based union. Non-members - likely to be less sympathetic 
to unionism - were even more strongly in favour; 54% would prefer an occupational 
rather than industry based organisation. In the experience of organisers, while a few 
politically conservative clerical workers are anti-union, for many members reluctance 
to join is more for material than ideological reasons. 
'The way people are introduced to being a member of the union is usually that 
there is this union bill. 1/ (Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
"/t'S a money thing really, they just don't want to part out.. .Some say they don't 
see the benefits, but there is an awful lot of people come to us who have 
avoided membership but when they have been dismissed they can find the 
union really quickly." (NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
Under the Labour Relations Act, personal grievance procedures could only be 
accessed through unions, and cases could be challenged if membership was dubious. 
It was also against unions' interests to take up cases for non-members, unless the 
case happened to have wider legal relevance for the membership. 
"We get a lot of people saying, look, I've been fired, can I join? .. .Its like trying 
to say to an insurance company, I've pranged my car, will you insure me?" 
(COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
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"We are selling the union membership on the benefits. /t's like an insurance -
we cannot assist you if you are not a member. In fact the award means nothing 
without membership, while it still covers you, who is going to police it?1i 
(NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
Given the unpopularity of compulsion and the isolation and conservatism of many 
members, a 'unionism as insurance' approach to recruitment was often more attractive 
to new members than a 'union solidarity' approach. For these reasons, and with 
voluntary unionism likely to eventuate under a future government of either Party, in 
1990 the clerical unions began - in varying degree - to strategise about how best to 
'market services' to members. 
The issue of compulsory or voluntary union membership presented the clerical unions 
with a dilemma. It was the introduction of compulsory membership that supported the 
unionisation of clerical workers in 1936. Even fifty years later, compulsory membership 
gave union officials the right to negotiate protections across the whole of the clerical 
labour market, not just its well organised or union-conscious sections. Ballots in 
favour of compulsory membership showed that the active membership recognised its 
importance, and the need for all those who benefit from union negotiations to share 
the costs through membership. At the level of the individual too, compulsion by law 
depersonalises union membership which can itself be seen as confrontational in the 
close relations of small offices. 
lilt's a/ways presented to us as 'we are all one big happy family', Just like any 
big happy family, the dynamics are really quite peculiar." (Roth 1986:45) 
It was not uncommon for clerical workers to contact the union and ask an organiser 
to 'accidentally' drop by and 'make' them join. Since unions had the right to inspect 
employers' wage and time books, routine - or ostensibly routine visits could uncover 
under-payments and other infringements of the award. 
"When unionism became compulsory again, a lot of people - they used to 
before and they stiff do now - asked us to come and visit them and tell them to 
join Ii (NZCWU Organiser, Oct.1990) 
"Just happen to be in the area, just happen to pop in, just happen to take up 
a problem that just happens to be happeningJ;.NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
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On the other hand, the aspect of compulsion alienated many from unionism, while 
making the union responsible for and to a proportion of reluctant and conservative 
members. It did, however, bring the political weight of large membership numbers 
behind the strategies of the clerical unions' leaders. This was as relevant to the 
feminist strategies of the 1980s, as to those of 1951, when clerical union votes were 
used in the Federation of Labour to back the arbitration system and the government 
against the watersiders (Scott 1952:51). 
No simple equation should be made, however, between union passivity and political 
conservatism. Historically, conservative members in the clerical unions have shown 
themselves very capable of activism and organisation. At the time of the 'Strike Free' 
campaign the group of members who became active on the issue of fees and 
compulsory union membership were conservative in party political terms and included 
Catholics actively opposed to abortion, which was an item in the Working Women's 
Charter promoted by the clerical workers unions. Their activism, described earlier, 
caused the unions severe difficulties, although in the long term it contributed to 
Northern's improved democracy and membership servicing. A few members opposed 
the endorsement of the Working Women's Charter with its clause supporting abortion. 
Some Pakeha women members expressed strong disapproval of Maori Nationalist 
activism by a clerical secretary. On long-standing and publicly debated issues, 
passive membership behaviour must be taken as tacit support for leadership positions, 
despite concerns about low participation or methods of balloting. Given the many 
barriers to women's union involvement (Beale 1982; Griffin & Benson 1984, 1989), 
relatively low levels of membership activism cannot be read as conservatism on widely 
publicised women's issues, although forms of compulsory unionism did contribute to 
the large membership numbers that gave women officials' initiatives their political 
weight. 
If compulsory unionism was not an unalloyed blessing for unions, nor was voluntary 
unionism entirely unproblematic for employers. The organisation of wage levels 
through awards with blanket coverage was part of the corporatist package of order 
and stability. It meant that the outcomes of collective bargaining and arbitration 
regulated the whole workforce, not just union members (Strinati 1991 :240). When 
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National pOliticians presented the bill proposing voluntary unionism at an Employers 
Federation seminar in 1983, they met unexpected hostility from a number of large 
companies. These employers saw it as a time-wasting disruption to harmonious 
labour relations, imposed upon them by the state for reasons of political expediency 
(Brosnan 1983:2). By the late 1980s, however, employer opinion appeared to be more 
united behind the views expressed in NZ Business Roundtable publications (NZBRT 
1987, 1988b, 1989; Brook 1989, 1990a) which favoured sidestepping unions to 
individualise the relation between employer and employee, though enterprise contracts 
and a choice of bargaining agent. 
Through the 1980s, ideological shifts in Labour's thinking, the preference of powerful 
industrial unions for a more militant, less state controlled unionism and the clerical 
unions' own difficulties and ambivalence on the subject, meant that clerical union 
officials were not expecting, nor lobbying for, a continuation of compulsory unionism 
much beyond the 1990 election Linder either government. Like other unions for 
industrially weak occupations, they were, however, braced for its loss to have 
considerable impact on their organisation's size and resources . 
. Negotiating with Employers 
The labour market for clerical work spans industries and economic sectors. In 1987 
when the NZCTU first proposed restructuring union coverage and bargaining by 
industry rather than by occupation, the NZ Clerical Workers Association commissioned 
research in key regional areas on the distribution of members by one digit NZ 
Standard Industrial Classifications. Twenty percent were in manufacturing; 24% in 
wholesale/retail/hotels; 21% in finance; 25% in local government. 
In award negotiations the very large numbers of firms employing clerical workers were 
represented by the NZ Employers Federation, with representatives of largest 
employers present at the negotiating table. Because of the cross-industry nature of 
clerical work, several of these large employers also negotiated major awards for other 
low paid female occupations, in retailing and hotel and restaurant work which also 
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employed large numbers of clerical workers. From the mid-1980s they had been 
pushing for increased flexibility in hours of work and casual employment. 
Considerable flexibility of reward and flexibility of movement between industries was 
already available under the clerical awards. Negotiations set minimum wage rates and 
conditions across the whole labour market for clerical work, without, in fact, limiting the 
development of higher local market rates or higher individual reward. After direct 
bargaining was allowed in 1973, the clerical unions began to negotiate more industry 
and enterprise documents, as well as a rash of small one-off second tier agreements 
before 1987. 
Employer organisations argued for industry or enterprise negotiations on the grounds 
that they allowed more flexibility than broad based awards. This argument is 
somewhat unconvincing in the case of clerical awards providing the barest market 
minimums. Industry documents for clerical workers have been more closely tailored 
to the needs of a particular industry or firm and its employees, and might reasonably 
be considered to offer less-flexibility to employers than the broad market protections 
of the general awards, which employers might or might not supplement with local 
market rates or other informal arrangements. 
The clerical unions' original award and most important document was the NZ Clerical 
Award, covering 27,000 clerical workers (Coleman 1989:3). Despite industry and 
enterprise agreements negotiated over the 1980s, 60% of the clerical unions' 
membership were covered by this award in 1990. Like most private sector 
documents, and state sector awards since 1988, rates and conditions were stated 
minimums. The clerical unions' position was that it should give a fair remuneration and 
a living wage. Large urban-based employers dominating negotiations argued that it 
should be a minimum any small rural business could afford and refused to negotiate 
a rate closer to their own market reality. 
"Because that (award minimum rate) is the only legal obligation, they can then 
pay $50 a week to someone for having blue eyes, or being a good girl, or 
shutting up about organising against the boss ... (whatever) the boss calls good 
work performance./I (Northern Staff Official, Roth 1986:50) 
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In 1986 this general award was estimated to give blanket coverage to 30,000 clerical 
workers, 90% of them women (NZCWA 1986:1). Until the Labour Government revised 
the Minimum Wage Act to a realistic level, this award had set a minimum below which 
payment of clerical workers could not fall, whether or not they were union members. 
Of the clerical unions' documents, this was the one with the greatest gap between 
actual and 'potential' members, estimated at around 50% of all clerical workers 
covered by the award. The award protected those scattered or casualised clerical 
workers who were least likely to be unionised. Whether or not employers were directly 
involved in the negotiations, were members of the Employers Federation, or were even 
in business at the time, they were legally considered parties to the award if they 
engaged employees in the described clerical categories. 
The NZ Clerical Award was a bare bones document. It set rates for five grades of 
described clerical work, with service increments and youth rates for those aged under 
20. Grade three was regarded as the standard rate. A 'slave' clause set work hours 
as those normal to the industry or otherwise a standard 37·1/2 hours. It set overtime 
rates, confirmed public holidays and the Holidays Act, long service holidays after 15 
years, 5 days cumulative sick or domestic leave, ensured that travel expenses incurred 
. for work were reimbursed, and laid out personal grievance definitions and rights to 
stopwork meetings as in the Labour Relations Act 1987. 
The only 'frill' in a very plain document was Clause 13: Casual Workers and Part-time 
Workers. This gave a 20% loading for casual employment of less than one week. It 
ensured pro rata rates for part-time workers and it entitled any clerical worker 
employed more than 30 hours to be paid a fulltime wage, unless she had made written 
statement on appointment that she was unavailable for fulltime work. This cause was 
designed to protect the fulltime jobs of the majority of clerical workers from the 
increasingly parttime employment and casualisation occurring in other female 
dominated occupations. It was intended to discourage employers from cutting costs 
and clerical workers' earnings by squeezing hours and raiSing 'productivity' by 
intensifying workloads. 
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It was this clause that came under employer attack in the 1989 award round, leading 
to a 'Project 13' campaign and industrial action by clerical workers. Without recourse 
to arbitration, it was 14 months before the award was settled at 4% and the loss of 
clause 13 for new employees. Two months later the 1990 award was settled with 
comparative ease at 4.5% and agreement to the possibility of a working week 
comprising four 10-hour days. In December 1991 the award was renewed at 2% and 
the reduction of the casual loading from 20% to 10%. This was the last wage round 
under the Labour Relations Act 1987 and ensured that the award continued until 
February 1992, nine months after Employment Contracts Act became law. It was 
already clear in December 1991 that employers would not continue to negotiate 
collectively under the new law. 
By 1990 NZCWU was involved in negotiating 55 documents with employers; l\lortl1ern 
also had over 50 and Southern around 40. For historical reasons, not all clerical 
documents were national, nor private sector. The largest are discussed below in 
approximate order of their importance in the total membership, to convey briefly the 
situation of each prior to the ECA. 
The Educational Authorities Clerical Award was the second largest national 
clerical document. Coverage of school secretaries and clerical workers in other 
educational institutions appear historically to have come under coverage of the clerical 
unions because of the professional or class perceptions of educational and state 
unions. The first award for primary schools was granted by the Arbitration Court in 
1969 with secondary schools and technical institutes included in 1972. University 
clerical staff were covered by the clerical unions until 1983 when they were recognised 
as state servants. Clerical unions covered school secretaries but not high school 
principal secretaries or executive officers who are with the PSA. 
"I was there right from the beginning, the rate of wages was appalling ... With the 
help of the union we had to go the Arbitration Court to even get 
acknowledgement that we existed." (Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
Although united by their state employer, school secretaries are a fragmented 
workforce. Most work parttime, and are not employed during school holidays. As 
stable employees, averaging eight and a half years in the job, they become supportive 
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union members, with a high degree of self-organisation and involvement in the 
preparation of their award claims. One official, who had come to office through long 
union involvement as a school secretary, considered that their industrial weakness was 
not organisational, but their loyalty and dedication to their schools. 
In the early 1970s its members were against taking industrial action, since the 
Arbitration Court recognised linkage between this award and state salary levels. 
Efforts focused on improving conditions. In 1987 this was the first clerical award for 
which tangihanga leave was achieved. However, after 1988 with changes in both state 
negotiating and in education policy, members' attitudes on industrial action changed, 
and they were active in demonstrations against the Employment Contracts Bill. 
Labour's 'Tomorrow's Schools' policy made individual Boards of Trustees the 
day-to-day employers of school secretaries, paying wages from their Operations Grant, 
but award negotiation remained centralised. From 1989 the award for school 
secretaries was negotiated on a composite basis with the teachers' unions. In the last 
wage round under the Labour Relations Act, for the first time the State Services 
Commission, not the Education Department, was the negotiator. Settlement was 
reached only with final offer arbitration. 
"They were not aware of the work that school secretaries do, they haven't any 
conception. .. they are the linchpin of the whole establishment, the school could 
fall apart without them, because they know everything." 
(Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
'Tomorrow's Schools' greatly intensified the secretary's workload, with increased 
parent contact and a role in 'selling' the school. Servicing the Board of Trustees 
meant more correspondence, more report writing and meeting preparation. Boards 
became responsible for school finances, with monthly accounts, purchasing and 
payments often done by secretaries, who had to establish new computer systems. 
Financial work flowed into unpaid hours during school holidays. Since secretaries' 
wages were paid from the school's Operations Grant - that is, bulk funded - extra 
hours or extra clerical assistance competed with books, cleaning and toilet paper. 
"Schools secretaries customarily do hours and hours of unpaid work, though 
we suggest to them that that is hiding the problem." 
(NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
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In 1990 NZCWU researched members' workload intensification, presenting a report 
to the Principals' Taskforce responsible for implementing Tomorrow's 
NZCWU recommended that primary schools secretaries be paid during school 
holidays; comparable wages rates to secondary school secretaries; and a move from 
operational bulk funding to separate salaries funding. 
"AII our consultations have reinforced the union's belief that the 'fairy at the 
bottom of the garden' approach to school administration must be abandoned. 
This is the approach of concentrating on how to deal with things without 
thinking about who can and will deal with them. II (NZCWU 1990a: 1) 
As Trustbanks spread through the South and North Islands, the Trustee Savi 
Bank Clerical Award has developed in importance. Most of the 'finance sector boom 
of the 1980s has been in trading banks and insurance companies historically excluded 
from clerical union coverage and organised along 'industry' lines by unions now 
amalgamated into FINSEC. Coverage of local savings banks and building societies 
was acquired by clerical unions because they were not initially regarded as real banks. 
As ownership of some of these was acquired by trading banks, however, registered 
areas of union coverage became less clear cut. In 1989-90 FINSEC contested the 
legality of COMPASS' coverage of ASB staff before the Labour Court. Taking 
advantage of this discord between unions, the ASB did not renewing its document with 
either, and staff were effectively deunionised. Once the Employment Contracts Act 
was passed, staff were placed on individual contracts. 
In 1991 the Trustbank award contained an exemption rate of $28,568 to distinguish 
clerical staff from bankers or accountants, a distinction increasingly blurred by rapid 
technological change (Austrin 1992). In tile 1991 wage round, Saturday shifts were 
agreed to, at reasonable penal rates and with the right to decline to work. In 
exchange an increase from 5 to 10 days sick leave was gained. 
The Trustbanks are a large, stable, well organised membership group which officials 
expected would provide a stable base to carry the clerical unions through the 
transition to voluntary unionism. Worksites are well organised with established 
delegate structures and regular meetings of delegates from different branches. 
182 
Organisers visit regularly and employers are generally cooperative. The last NZCWU 
President was a Christchurch Trustbank employee. 
Law practitioners offices were covered by three regional awards, New Zealand, 
Taranaki and Northern, covering all positions from basic clerical to legal executive. 
The Northern Legal Employees award included lawyers and was registered as a 
separate union until the Labour Relations Act, 1987 stipulated a minimum membership 
of 1000. Following amalgamation with Northern Clerical, this award was one of the 
very few in the country to be made voluntary after a ballot of the members under the 
Labour Relations Act. 
"Supposedly a potential membership of 3000, but we never had more than 900. 
After the vote we still had over 700, it was quite funny. They would say at 
meetings, I will stay, I just resent being forced to be a member. The ones that 
pulled out tended to be the lawyers." (COMPASS Staff Official, Feb. 1991) 
Air NewZealand clerical staff, based mainly in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, 
were first covered by a national award in 1968 containing equal pay provisions. An 
Clerical Workers Association decision not to take industrial action proposed by 
Auckland Air New Zealand staff, but insufficiently supported by staff in other regions, 
was one factor in ending the Association in 1989. Following part-ownership by 
Brierley's, agreement to consult unions before staff changes or redundancies was 
repeatedly ignored. In March 1991 Air New Zealand attempted to extend the hours 
of work and reduce fulltime positions. However, members understand their industry 
and the extent of flexibility that the company would want in future. Delegates also 
understand the effects of such changes in conditions in already casualised industries 
such as retailing, hotels and restaurants and how this might apply to Air New Zealand 
clerical staff after the ECA. In April Air New Zealand clerical workers used the 
industrial strength their strategic position in the infrastructure gives them to renew their 
award without c/awbacks. 
'tp.ir NZ people have been battered fairly heavily over the last 12 months so they 
do appreCiate the union. There was a time a few years ago when I don't think 
any of them would have signed up with US,II 
(COMPASS Staff Official, Feb. 1991) 
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There was also a smaller award with Ansett, with whom Air New Zealand is now in 
competition. Ansett successfully headhunted many of its staff from Air New Zealand 
on establishing itself in New Zealand. 
Until two years ago, the clerical unions' second largest award was for clerical workers 
in licensed hotels, ranging from large tourist hotel chains to small pubs and clubs 
without accommodation. Non-licensed hotels had a separate award. In 1989 the 
clerical unions were unable to settle this and the NZ Clerical Award for over a year. 
The Hotel & Hospital Worker's Union was similarly unable to settle its Licensed Hotels 
and Tearooms & Restaurants awards. The same major employers were pusrling for 
claw backs on conditions, particularly hours of work, and testing their new strength 
under the Labour Relations Act 1987, which had removed unions' access to arbitration 
on disputes of interest. In the eventual settlement, both unions' hotel coverage was 
split up and renegotiated with separate employer groups: for licensed premises, for 
major accommodation hotels and an voluntary enterprise agreement with Hancocks 
(brewery owned hotels and restaurants). In the 1990 round the Hancocks agreement 
included the option of a 4-day week of 10 hours per day, which the company reports 
was being taken up by a significant number of employees. 
The South Island clerical unions have some coverage of local government 
employees, who in the North Island are entirely covered by the Northern Association 
of Local Government Officers (NALGO). Coverage of ranks, regions or particular local 
authority was shared out for long forgotten historical reasons between the clerical 
unions and the Southern Local Government Officers Union. As in the state sector 
before 1988, the Southland and Otago unions covered all clerical and administration 
staff up to top ranks such as the Borough Engineer or Town Clerk, making union 
membership safe and labour relations generally amicable. In Canterbury only the 
lower ranks were covered, with higher ranks covered by SLGOU. There were regional 
clerical awards for District Councils, Regional Councils, Power Boards, and Hospital 
Boards; local awards for the Christchurch and Timaru City Council, and the 
Christchurch Transport Board. By 1991 the names of some documents were not 
keeping up with local government restructuring. 
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The Totalisator Agency Board has rlistorically been a large employer of clerical 
workers. A separate award was first negotiated in 1952, and now covers a medium 
sized industrial group reduced through technology advances in office machinery and 
computerised betting. Because of the sporadic nature of horse races and betting, 
once computerisation speeded its clerical process, job losses and increased 
casualisation were impossible to halt. The unions' aim has been to keep the 
scattered, largely casual workforce unionised and protected in the work they do. In 
1989 this was one of the clerical awards that remained unsettled. 
The Medical Practitioners have had a separate award for medical receptionists since 
1970. It is negotiated by the NZ Medical Association on behalf of the GPs or group 
practice employers. Medical receptionists are usually sole charge workers in close 
office relations that can be extremely difficult. NZCWU surveyed 1,500 receptionists 
for details of their work in preparing a pay equity claim in 1990. Undervalued human 
relations skills are important in this job, and 'flexibility' already covers everything 'from 
urine testing to 'cleaning the fish tank'. 
In 1989 while the NZ Clerical Award remained unsettled, doctors too baulked on the 
settlement of this award for some time, as did veterinary surgeons. 
The clerical unions representation of both clerical workers and organisers who work 
for other trade unions has particular importance for Wellington where many unions 
have national offices. 
Two national documents covered private sector telephonists, the Answer Services 
Holdings Agreement and the Taxi-Telephonists Award. The clerical unions were 
allowing a small award for car rental firms to lapse after three years' non-renewal 
because its negotiated rates had fallen below the NZ Clerical Award. However, this 
was hastily renewed in December 1990 when it was recognised that the NZ Clerical 
Award would be endangered by the Employment Contracts Act. 
"The employers have now turned up saying they want an agreement and see 
no difficulty with going the Grade III rate - it has to do with undercutting." 
(COMPASS Staff Official, Feb. 1991) 
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Under the Labour Relations Act, 1987, the number of composite documents being 
negotiated in partnership with other unions increased, as did enterprise specific 
agreements. Some of these were for quite small community organisations such as 
Women's Refuge, CORSO, the Workers Education Assn. Industry and enterprise 
based negotiation by the clerical unions was already increasing before the 
fragmentation of occupational awards into single employer contracts under the 
Employment Contracts Act, 1991. 
Before the Employment Contract Act became law, the clerical unions' main awards 
were renewed, with a 2% wage increase and a reduction in the loading for casual 
work. So too were its industry based documents. Both employers and unions waited 
to see the detail of the final Act, and to let others take the lead in the new negotiating 
environment. Because of the proportion of the membership covered by the largest 
awards which, as was already known, employers would not choose to renegotiate as 
multi-employer contracts, real difficulties for the clerical unions could be expected from 
around February 1992 as documents expired. 
Differing Views among Clerical Employers 
Although the Labour Relations Act guaranteed union access to members and to wage 
and time books, in practice access depended on maintaining smooth relations with 
employers on hundreds of worksites. Organisers spoke of rude and arrogant 
behaviour by some employers to members and organisers. 
"The door was flung open, and I mean flung, 'Ten minutes is up!~ and they all 
go, not even a goodbye. I said, hey, sit back down, how can you let him treat 
you like that?" (NZCWU Staff Official, Oct. 1990) 
In 1990 NZCWU visited employers with a view to ensuring access and cooperation 
after voluntary unionism. 
"We don't have industrial muscle, and members don't identify with it, so we 
have to use other means, more cooperative... You need that basic 
understanding that the interests of employers and employees are in conflict, but 
you don't have to use it all the time. On the other hand, you can't get too close 
to employers, can't lose touch with members' interests." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, Oct. 1990) 
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Government restructuring and redundancies in the mid-1980s greatly reduced the 
Labour Department's capacity to inspect and enforce conditions. This, coupled with 
a greater interest in recruiting and servicing members, increased the clerical unions' 
policing role. From the early 1980s, redundancies became an enlarged area of 
industrial work. As industries contracted, four or five clerical workers would be among 
each major group of workers laid off. Some clerical union members in large industrial 
plants or in local bodies were covered by redundancy agreements. However, most 
clerical documents, like most other awards, provided no compensation payments for 
satisfactory employees made redundant. Clerical workers were also affected by 
increasing numbers of small business bankruptcies. Officials' representation of 
members involved resisting or reducing the layoffs where possible, ensuring .full 
payment of wages and holiday pay and getting what extra compensation they could. 
Infringements of award rates and conditions have always been a major part of 
organisers' workloads. In the year to March 1990, most of the Central union's case 
work related to wages, conditions or dismissals, with twice as many unjustified 
dismissals as in 1989. An officer was specifically employed to inspect wages and 
hours books, and to recruit new employees paid below the exemption rate. It was 
. estimated that three extra recruitments a week would pay for this position. In the year 
to March 1990 $1 ,400,000 was recovered for members in under-payments, regradings, 
settlements, redundancies, and compensation for unjustified dismissals. In the year 
to March 1988 more than $4 million had been recovered by the combined unions of 
the Clerical Workers Association, compared with $250,000 for 1978, the first year 
recoveries were recorded. 
Court enforcement of registered awards gave clerical unions the means to redress 
these infringements of award rights. The clerical unions had lobbied for sexual 
harassment and discrimination to be added to unjustified dismissal and duress about 
union membership as grounds for personal grievance in the 1987 Act. Since personal 
grievance procedures were accessed through unions, this increased the attraction of 
membership for clerical workers, both covered by and exempted from awards. Most 
award infringements and minor grievances were sorted out by organisers, however, 
without recourse to mediation or the Court. To some degree, this relied on the 
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establishment of a reputation with employers for legal expertise. This was a strategy 
which the clerical unions, particularly Christchurch, developed as an alternative to 
industrial strength. 
"Employers appreciate that we can and will take things to the Court, that we 
don't do it lightly and when we do we generally win. We are capable of doing 
it and it will cost them ... We were the union that all the other unions came to and 
said how do you do this in court ... We knew our stuff." 
(NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
In the year preceding the Employment Contracts Act, NZCWU researched the attitudes 
of employers of clerical workers to labour relations reform, and found clear differences 
between the views of large, medium sized and small companies (NZCWU 1990b, 
1991a). 
The survey showed that some large clerical employers were NZ Business Roundtable 
members but were not necessarily united behind the Business Roundtable's 
philosophy. They enthusiastically supported replacement of 'restrictive' work practices 
with 'flexibility'. Despite public neutrality, they tended to be against unions and for 
labour market reform. However, the forms of bargaining they favoured covered a wide 
range. While they were divided over the extent of change, they agreed that change 
should be gradual. 
The survey showed that medium sized clerical employers were active in NZ Employers 
Federation, but disliked the influence and free market ideology of the Business 
Roundtable. They were less dedicated to 'flexibility' and opposed wage cutting as a 
solution to economic depression. They recognised the need for unions and tended 
to be covered by national awards. One employer in a very competitive industry said 
awards allowed them to control one important area of costs. Another said: 
"Why get rid of a system which has delivered wage increases at half the rate of 
inflation for the last three years?" (NZCWU 1991a:3) 
To supplement the market minimums of the award, they preferred their own informal 
in-house arrangement to formal enterprise agreements: 
We already have a house agreement here but we (senior management) decide 
it! (NZCWU 1990b:1) 
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Small companies were shown by the survey to be inactive in the Employers Federation 
but supportive of it. These employers were usually covered by the main clerical 
awards and considered flexible work practices and enterprise agreements undesirable 
or dangerous in practice. They were natural or positive towards union and did not 
regard them, or bargaining reform, as an important factor in running their businesses. 
The survey showed general support for phasing out national occupational awards but 
little for rapid and radical deregulation. Awards were recognised as cost effective for 
employers and, as one employer pointed out, had delivered wage increases at half the 
rate of inflation over the past three years. Another suggested that there were better 
ways of making profits than screwing wages down, which did not help keep good 
staff. The overall view on bargaining reform was that formal enterprise and workplace 
agreements were appropriate for big employers but not for the majority of New 
Zealand firms which were medium sized or small (NZCWU 1990b, 1991a). 
This analysis matches that of McAndrew & Hursthouse (1990, 1991) on southern 
employers, which refuted employers' associations' claims that unions and the award 
system placed significant constraints on small and medium sized firms, or that they 
were demanding labour relations reforms. 
Regional business differences mean different employer attitudes. In the south, while 
recession has affected business with redundancies and bankruptcies, many old 
paternal firms remain. In Invercargill business changes are more likely to be 
bankruptcies than new enterprises. This contrasts with the boom and bust of 
Wellington and Auckland. This is reflected in regional differences in annual 
membership turnover: 50% in Auckland as opposed to a guesstimate of 30% in 
Christchurch. 
"Our membership is in so many small businesses, I think something like 30% 
are going to the wall every year." (COMPASS Staff Official, Feb. 1991) 
Auckland has also been the centre of acquisitions, mergers and rationalisations, to the 
point where members may be uncertain of current ownership. Following exchange 
deregulation in 1984 and developing Closer Economic Relations with Australia, many 
of Auckland head offices are in reality branch offices. 
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"Chop up and redistribute and chop and sell a bit off, relocate, add that on, you 
can't keep up with it. The amount of decisions that are made outside the 
country, even the local management are fairly powerless. /I 
(COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
Differences in attitude by size of company arose from the ability of large companies 
to dominate not only labour markets, but product markets. Labour negotiations which 
cover all employers helped stabilise small businesses by reducing competition on the 
basis of labour costs. Centralised bargaining reduced personalised conflict in small 
workplace, and established baselines for informal variation. The transaction costs of 
industrial negotiations to the individual employer were minimalised. This accounted 
for the preference expressed by many smaller employers for some form of collective 
multi-employer union-negotiated document. However, large companies dominated the 
collective strategies pursued by employers' associations (Herbert 1990; Roper 1993b. 
In the view of the clerical unions: 
liThe Employment Contracts Act will create a hell of a competition between 
employers. They want deregulation (to cut wage rates) but they don't want to 
have to worry about what the guy in the factory next door is offering, if it is 
going to draw the labour out of his place and into somewhere else ... and the 
time they spend on negotiations, it means money to them. /I 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, March 1991) 
Logistics of Organising 
The 1980s was a period of marked concentration of business ownership but, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, employment growth has been most marked in small firms, 
particularly in financial and community services. These are likely to have one or two 
clerical workers and may have no other unionis2ed workers on site. Real estate 
agents are a example of this kind of firm. While sizable numbers of clerical workers 
are employed by large firms, they were more likely to be paid at rates above the 
exemption rate. 
For clerical unions, this meant that the extremely scattered distribution of their 
members and potential members was little changed by the concentration of capital in 
New Zealand during the 1980s. The logistical implications of research on membership 
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distribution conducted in 1989, and shown below, continue to be valid ~ and extremely 
important under a regime of enterprise based bargaining. 
Members covered by the NZ Clerical Award averaged per worksite. A third of 
members worked with fewer than three other clerical workers; half of these were in 
sole charge positions. members were on 80% of the worksites covered by 
union negotiations, and logistically were unlikely to receive a routine visit from a union 
organiser. Only a quarter of the membership were on the 3% of worksites with more 
than 20 clerical workers. 
To take a regional example, Auckland has a high concentration of large firms and 
corporate head offices. Yet in February 1991 3,442 of COMPASS's 7,826 listed 
employers had fewer than four clerical workers. 35% of its 13,828 paid up members 
were employed by large firms with 50 or more clerical members. The difficult 
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area of coverage was the 20% in offices with 3 or fewer clerical workers and a further 
19% of with between 4 and 10. 
These are analyses of union members, not potential members who came under the 
blanket coverage of awards. An analysis of actual and potential members together 
would show an even more scattered workforce, since the most isolated workers are 
those least likely to be visited and recruited by union officials. With the above logistics, 
job turnover, company fluctuations and three monthly returns of employee listings, 
unionisation of those covered by the main clerical award was estimated at only half of 
potential. This main award covered 60% of total paid-up clerical union membership: 
half of these had no members of other unions employed at the same workplace. 
Clerical members who worked alongside other unionised workers, often in larger 
companies, were often a minority among employees. For this reason, it should be 
noted, industry or workplace based bargaining or union organisation was unlikely to 
provide more effective representation for clerical workers than membership of an 
occupational union (Hill 1991b). 
Given the isolation of many members from other clerical workers, the 'double burden' 
of many women, and the constraints of their close relations with their employers, it 
suited many clerical workers, as well as small employers, to have labour relations 
matters settled at a distance by third parties. 
'~ lot of times it is actually said about specific issues, 'Well, I pay you to do that, 
you go off and represent me." (COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
However, the lack of involvement by members that usually goes with such a insurance 
orientation meant that representation by the unions to the employers was seldom 
supported by the active backing of the large clerical membership. Employers knew 
this, and it contributed to their relative bargaining strength. 
These factors not only placed constraints on industrial action, but on unionism itself. 
Union membership or 'getting the union in', rather than the particular problem, may 
be perceived as introducing conflict into the employment relationship. Since clerical 
work involves working closely with management or employers, smooth relations 
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become very important. Routine visiting may be less welcomed by members on small 
worksites where employment relations can become highly personalised. 
'~/ways women's role to smooth, the least powerful, the ones that make the 
working relationship possible, even as subordinates ... They don't want the 
conflict and the aggro that close." (CWA Staff Official, Aug. 1990) 
"They don't want to see you on the job, it embarrasses them. They worry about 
what the boss will think." (COMPASS Staff Official, Feb. 1991) 
Small worksites and personalised office relations also acted against classic union 
tactics of workplace organisation through the election of delegates. In the workplaces 
of larger employers, such as the Trustbanks, airlines, larger retail and manufacturing 
firms, hospitals and local government offices, clerical delegates were elected and acted 
as a conduit between union office and members. 
"Ideally each site should have a delegate who is so educated and organised 
that they can take up the majority of problems that happen on that site, look 
after people. There'll be a health and safety delegate as well and the two of 
them work together." (NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
This 'ideal' situation was less appropriate for the majority of members. Where there 
are just two or three clerical workers, an overtly union role can increase vulnerability; 
delegates lack the power and support of representing larger numbers of workmates. 
There may be few opportunities to gain experience in union matters. For these 
reasons, and because of job mobility, the clerical unions had few delegates relative to 
their size of membership, despite their emphasis on union education from the late 
1970s. Another reason was the unwillingness of members to take on such an overtly 
union role at work, since it can increase their vulnerability. 
"They do not want to be targetted, and they would be. So we call them office 
contacts. My personal view is that unions shouldn't be using delegates the way 
they do, training them to do the union's job. I think it is an unfair 
expectation." (Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
"Because people were fearful of the word delegate, they would be a contact 
person. A delegate in the clerical union does nothing more than be a 
mailbox." (Central Staff Official, Aug. 1991) 
Clerical union organisers aimed to visit regularly all sites with four clerical members or 
more. This contrasts with, for example, the Engineers Union who aimed to visit all 
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sites with or more members. Small sites were visited on request. This policy 
means organisers reached around 30% of sites and 70% of members. 
"Our first priority is organising worksites so that people know they've got union 
backing and how to use it." (NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
The logistics of servicing such a highly fragmented workforce meant the unions relied 
more on footwork than on delegates. Since the late 1970s, the clerical unions aimed 
at a ratio of organisers to members of 1: 1 000. It meant higher organising costs than 
for most other unions, and less of the membership dollar expended directly on 
member services. More organiser time was spent on individual rather than collective 
problems. Communication costs were higher, and contact and identification with the 
union likely to be lower than for many members of other unions. Conversely I 
members' direct contact and identification with their employers was naturally likely to 
be higher with most other unions. All this meant low participation and extremely low 
meeting turnouts by members. 
The logistics of organising such a fragmented workforce, and the vulnerability that 
isolated members may feel with regard to active unionism are the reasons clerical 
unions have relied on institutional rather than industrial means of providing protection 
to clerical workers, including non-members. 
Indus·trial Action or Arbitration? 
The industrial weakness of the clerical unions, despite their membership size, arises 
from the fragmented nature of the membership and the consequent vulnerability of 
isolated woman workers; from the gendered nature of most clerical occupations and 
expectations of loyalty and service; and from the nature of clerical work itself. The 
withdrawal of clerical labour is less effective than many other strikes. The result is 
likely to be, not loss of production or sales, but simply delay in completing the work 
of the monthly business cycle. The work piles up until the strikers' return, with 
perhaps the greatest injury being to co-workers who must wait for their wages. 
"There are very few clerical positions where they have the power to grind 
something to a halt." (NZCWU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
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One group for whom industrial action could be effective was Air New Zealand clerical 
staff. In 1991 they successfully used weekend strike action to renew their award, 
despite an interim injunction when employers contested strike legality. Up to 85% 
supported a strike vote binding on all branches to break an impasse in negotiations 
over hours of work and the use of casual workers. 
However, even the least likely, hardest to organise section of clerical union 
membership has taken industrial action. In 1985, clerical workers held their first ever 
national strike, in support of the NZ Clerical Award. 
The Labour government elected in July 1984 lifted National's wage freeze for the 
following wage round. Unions could test direct collective bargaining under the 1973 
Act, backed by conciliation and arbitration procedures, but without the heavy 
government direction of the award round experienced under the previous National 
governmene. The industrially strong unions made up their losses against inflation, 
and achieved increases well worth striking for. The clerical workers were determined 
to get their share, particularly since, despite Equal Pay adjustments a decade 
previously, the standard clerical rate had again been pushed well below the average 
male wage. 
The initial claim was for 35% plus a $20 visual display unit allowance; a larger increase 
in the junior rate; 10 days sick pay; a health and safety clause; and a sexual 
harassment clause. In conciliation the wage claim was dropped to 20%, plus an addi-
tional 5% to bring clerical wage rates up to the level of traditionally comparable male 
dominated trades. This additional claim was supported by arguments for equal pay 
for work of equal value. A pay equity component had also featured in the previous 
year's claim and been rejected. These were the first moves in what became the 
campaign for pay equity. The employers' best offer was 11.5% with no other changes, 
although other unions' awards were settling at increases of around 16.5%. 
2 In the private sector at least, but see Chapter 8 with regard to continuing offstage government 
direction of the state's own wage negotiations with NZNA. 
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Clerical workers suddenly discovered their industrial muscles. Christchurch filled the 
Town Hall, not just the usual small room at the Trade Union Centre. 
"One guy stood up and said, I move that the Clerical Union go on strike 
for two weeks, just about brought the Christchurch Town Hall down." 
(CWA Elected Officer, Oct. 1991) 
In the North, members had had input into the claims through a previous round of 
stopwork meetings. Organisers gave delegates, executive members and as many 
available clerical workers as possible a crash course on the award and sent them out 
on 'saturation visiting' of worksites, the largest first. They also targetted employers 
involved in the award talks. 2000 people attended a general stopwork meeting, then 
took the afternoon off to march up Queen st. The main national action was a strike 
for two-and-a-half days around Waitangi weekend. Some worksites decided on 
intermittent action to disrupt workflows or a longer period of stoppage. One of these 
was the 42 clerical workers at General Foods, one of the large employers represented 
at the award negotiations. 
"It was really inspirational for those of us who had been involved in the union 
for a few years. I never really quite believed that this would happen, even 
though we worked for it .. .lt was a positive fight to achieve benefits that were 
real and tangible ... so they were prepared to go to bat for those." 
(COMPASS Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
The outcome was a 15.5% increase in the standard clerical wage rate, with a 38% 
improvement in junior rates. 
Legislative changes under Labour in December 1984 and May 1987 removed unions' 
right to arbitration on disputes of interest - that is, on unsettled award negotiations -
in return for the right to back negotiations with industrial action. However, arbitration 
was the 'lincrlpin of the system' that traditionally protected scattered, industrially weak 
workers (Walsh 1989:155). 
"We were the only union that argued against it at the 1984 conference of the 
FOL. They said to us if you got out of your offices and off your backsides you 
wouldn't have a problem." (Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
By 1989 the implications of voluntary arbitration had sunk into the collective 
consciousness of employers' organisations. If they could see no advantage to 
themselves in settling, only unions with industrial muscle could make them. That year 
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the General Clerical Award, the Licensed Hotels Clerical Award, and the Hotel & 
Hospital Unions' Licensed Hotels and Tearooms & Restaurants awards, covering 
70,000 mainly women workers (Coleman 1989:3), were among 25 awards that 
remained unsettled as a result of employer intransigence (Harbridge 1990:243). It was 
part of the campaign for a deregulated labour market that large employers had been 
waging since the late 1970s. 
''They have flexibility in clerical and services already but they want the ultimate 
flexibility of no awards, basically - so they are attacking the soft spots. II 
(CWA Staff Official, Aug. 1990) 
"I was told by someone in a power position. .. they were trying to teach the union 
movement a lesson, and unfortunately the poor old weak clerical workers union 
got caught in that. It wasn't really directed at us. II 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
Initially employers offered a 3% raise (against a general 4% in the wage round) in 
return for dropping Clause 13 which protected fulltime earnings. After some 
negotiation they withdrew even this offer and refused to negotiate further on renewing 
the award. Under the Labour Relations Act an unrenewed award would continue to 
apply, but would lapse completely after another two wage rounds with devastating 
effect on the union concerned. 
Clerical officials saw the clawback of Clause 13 as the thin end of the casualisation 
wedge and decided to stand and fight. A large campaign was mounted to carry the 
issues to both members and public, with information material, car stickers, street stalls 
and use of the media, in a effort to rally members to support their award. In January 
1989 the unions voted two to one to strike for three days around Waitangi weekend. 
There was disagreement within the Clerical Workers Association in making this 
decision. Some secretaries insisted that it was a fundamental issue, while others 
recognised that the fight just was not there among their members, especially in 
Dunedin and Invercargill. 
''There was only 1% in it as well as Clause 13. The clause didn't affect them, 
because they weren't part-timers, or because they were part-timers already. 
They couldn't see the point in losing money for 1%." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
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'People couldn't come to grips with it, and I can understand that...if you get into 
a clause of an award that they have no concept of." 
(CWA Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
Despite the vote in favour, the strike was not well supported. The third day was called 
off as discussions were resumed. In contrast to the 1985 action, this was a defensive 
action for little gain. By 1989 Labour's economic and monetary policies had hit the 
rural areas that supported strike action in 1985. In the North the fight was confined 
to Auckland where unemployment was relatively low, but action in urban areas was 
defused by clerical workers above the exemption rate who could pick up the work of 
strikers. The strike exposed the union's weakness to the employers. Eventually, they 
settled at 4%, with Clause 13 retained for only those already employed - effectively 
what employers had offered a year previously. 
"There was a hell of a lot of members' money went into that ... 14 months those 
people missed out, they could have had that increase ... The battle wasn't worth 
it and we knew the battle wasn't there, that was the whole problem." 
(Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
"The whole thing quite frankly was a debacle." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
In 1985, to the surprise of employers and contrary to trade union myths about 'paper 
unions', clerical workers had demonstrated that they could and would take large scale 
industrial action. However, because of the scattered and more vulnerable nature of 
the clerical workforce, members would only take such action when they perceived the 
issue as important and when they saw the potential collective gains as worth the 
potential personal risks. In 1989 this was not the case. Membership commitment to 
what officials saw as a vital issue was misjudged. Clerical workers' first concern was 
for their jobs. 
'J!\s long as unemployment is rising, it makes our position that much weaker." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, March 1991) 
"The problem is assuming what the members want without asking the members 
what they really do want." (Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
These awards remained unsettled in 1989 because the option of court arbitration on 
disputes of interest in negotiations was no longer available to unions. The 100 year 
alternative to industrial action had been removed. 
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"The government is pushing this whole philosophy that conflict is a much better 
way of settling something than arbitration, but when you have groups of one or 
two workers ... They won't provide any form of arbitration because it's 
interference in this sacred market place. II (COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
Members were forced to choose between jeopardising their personal employment 
relations and possibly their jobs through striking, or accepting the employers' 
non-negotiable position. By the time of the strike, this position was no longer about 
Cause 13 but whether they would continue the award itself. The 1989 award break-
downs enabled employers to demonstrate their strength under the Labour Relations 
Act and paved the way for further labour market deregulation under the Employment 
Contracts Act, 1991. 
The clerical unions and other industrially weak unions began to lobby for some form 
of arbitrated back-up for negotiations, and also for 'binding decisions' in the 
Employment Equity Bill before Parliament. In September 1990 an Amendment to the 
Labour Relations Act added a high-risk 'final offer' form, similar to that in the State 
Sector Act, in which the arbitrator opted for one claim or the other with no 
compromise solution possible (Roper 1988; Geare 1988). This was designed to 
encourage compromise and settlement on much the same principle as nuclear 
deterrence encourages peace. The cost of even this remedy was another concession 
to the employers' lobby: employers gained the right to initiate a ballot of their 
employees on negotiating an enterprise agreement outside awards. 
The 1989 award breakdowns demonstrated clearly the importance to low paid women 
workers of state supports to the bargaining power of industrially weak unions, and the 
effects that further labour market regulation would have on women workers. That the 
major awards concerned were for female dominated occupations was no coincidence, 
but reflected women's concentration in occupations which were logistically fragmented, 
industrially weak and consequently unable to improve wage rates through industrial 
action. 
The limitations of industrial action were recognised by officials representing 
occupations such as clerical work. It was this recognition that had led the clerical 
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unions to develop their expertise in court work. However, as women became more 
actively involved in the decision making structures of the clerical unions during the 
1980s, they began to develop new strategies to counter women's labour market 
disadvantage. These aimed at the revaluation in wage negotiations of women's work 
skills. 
The Feminisation of the Clerical Unions 
Since the 1930s clerical work in New Zealand has been female dominated (Brown 
1993), but this dominance was not reflected in the executives and officers of the 
clerical unions before the 1980s (Moynihan 1986). 
Women began to be hired as clerical union organisers as part of the move to service 
members and to democratise unions in response to dissatisfaction about compulsory 
unionism among members who seldom saw a union official. In part, lack of servicing 
was due to new issues involving centralised negotiation, SUCll as equal pay, but the 
unions had developed a very legalistic foclJs and expertise. The unions had employed 
few organisers and communication about the work of the union or members' rights 
waS extremely limited. A . member had to identify her own award infringement or 
problem and seek out the union. By the end of the 1970s dissatisfaction began to 
force change in the clerical unions, as in other unions. The election and appointment 
of union omcials who reflected membership composition was identified as central to 
more democratic participation by members. 
"We do try to have women organisers so that women are dealing with other 
women." (NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
In the Central region in the late 1970s feminist women began to be rlired and to 
ensure the hiring of other young women like themselves, who had a quite different 
approach to organising. As they saw it, the union had to be taken to the members, 
not just through area meetings in work hours, but by visiting workplaces. 
"I got problems from the people I worked with, this guy didn't like the fact that 
I went out looking for work. He said, this is ridiculous, you are just making the 
job more than it should be. It meant he couldn't just sit around and 
pontificate." (Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
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As discussed in Chapter 5, these feminist women had recognised that unions had 
organisational power which could be used to improve the situation of women. 
IIWe were a group of feminists who cared deeply about women, who had been 
frustrated with the opportunities for working with working women involuntary 
non-workplace settings and had seen that the most fruitful way was to work 
within the trade unions ... so there was a group of us that came into the Clerical 
Workers Union with precisely that aim. /I 
(Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Some were women with a socialist commitment who were beginning to develop a 
more feminist understanding of women as workers through groups like the Working 
Women's Alliance. One woman looked back with some irony at earlier male-defined 
theoretical positions: 
'Those of us who came in with a clear marxist-leninist perspective knew that 
clerical workers weren't where the revolution was at! But because our primary 
commitment was to women we knew that what happened to women in the 
economy underpinned what happened anywhere else. 11 
(Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Although general meetings of the membership have ultimate authority, unions are 
essentially run by secretaries and regular meetings of the elected executive. Feminist 
unionists who become involved in the clerical unions in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
recall that executive members, secretaries and organisers at that time were nearly all 
men, seldom with backgrounds in occupations or firms that were typical of the 
membership. Male clerks from local government and from other award groups with 
unrestricted coverage of ranks featured strongly on clerical union executives, perhaps 
as part of their overall career development. 
liMy opinion is that at that time the men were there because it added status to 
the position of another job," (NZCWA Elected Officer, Aug. 1991 
By the mid 1980s the male dominance on clerical union executives had been reversed 
in all regions. Both beyond and within the union movement changes were occurring 
in women's expectations and assertiveness. Women who stood for office were voted 
in by female dominated memberships and, as officers of the unions, they encouraged 
and recruited other women behind them. In conservative Southland, in 1984 the local 
executive was all male, with a woman secretary. By the time of study, with another 
woman secretary, all executive members are women except for a local body clerk who 
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has been president nearly nine years. Similar changes had occurred earlier in the 
North. 
"When I started here in 1973 there was one female organiser, two male 
organisers, al/ the management was male - five management and three 
indians ... Most of the executive was male ... We had a female officer manager, but 
interesting that when she replaced the industrial secretary, the job didn't need 
a car after that." (COMPASS Staff Officer, Feb. 1991) 
This was a situation which incoming feminists set about to reverse in each region. 
"I didn't have a clue, but it had to be run better than it was, more than trips 
away for the boys ... 1 was the second woman on the executive ... (then in 1983) 
the first woman president ever, so I made a statement to the newspaper that 
women would run their own union. II 
(Canterbury/Marlborough CWU Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
At the time of this study the proportion of men elected or employed by the clerical 
unions was about proportionate to the male membership. Just as in the 1920s certain 
clerical jobs had rapidly become women's jobs, the feminisation of the clerical unions 
advanced quite quickly. In one astute view, this is not just because the women move 
in, but because the men move out, shifting their attention to other arenas or career 
directions, or seeking employment with unions for male dominated unions. 
'~s women move into those decisions making bodies in the union, men start not 
to be interested . .it doesn't have the same status. This isn1t power, so men move 
on." (Central CWU Staff Officer, Aug. 1991) 
In 1990 COMPASS had a woman secretary, one male on its management triumvirate, 
and four males out of 15 organisers, plus a legal officer. NZCWU had one male 
secretary, three male organisers out of 19, and a male researcher. Tiny Southland 
had all female staff, but a male president. In 1989 the NZCA Women's Rights Officer 
mentioned a positive hiring policy with regard to women. However, a male secretary 
was elected in Canterbury at this time and patterns of appointment observed over the 
study period did not altogether match such a policy. 
Feminist unionists who were clerical union organisers and officers in the early 1980s 
acknowledge that it was mainly educated women who were initially employed. It was, 
however, recognised that they did not sufficiently represent the membership, and there 
was a push to get women with an ordinary clerical work background, and to 
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encourage active delegates to apply for union positions, both as organisers and as 
unpaid executive members. They reported some difficulty in finding willing members 
to stand for executive posts who were women, who represented the range of clerical 
work, and who had both a union consciousness and industrial experience. This 
accounts for a presence on clerical union executives of clerical staff working for other 
unions. 
An early recognition by women in the Central union was that if more women were to 
be encouraged into senior union positions, the job needed to be tailored to fit the lives 
of women with domestic responsibilities, rather than of men with domestic servicing. 
To this end, the traditional hierarchy headed by one person was reorganised to spread 
workload and power between two officials. From the mid 1 9S0s, the Central union had 
a women's rights secretary as well as an industrial secretary. From 19S4 the central 
negotiating and lobbying role of the NZ Clerical Workers Association had increased 
with the appointment of a fulltime secretary. The appointment of an assistant secretary 
with specific responsibility for women's rights, together with the Central women's rights 
officer, gave the clerical unions the specialised and centralised capacity that allowed 
the clerical unions to initiate and lead major campaigns on issues of sexual 
harassment and pay equity. In 19S9 the Association also had a women's standing 
committee in 19S9, but many officials felt that women's issues were - and Maori issues 
should be - mainstream union issues which did not require specific representation. 
The Central clerical union's power sharing structure was adopted by NZCWU on 
amalgamation with Canterbury/Westland and Otago, so that in 1990 there were 
Industrial Secretaries based in Wellington and in Christchurch, a Christchurch 
Administration secretary and a Wellington Women' Rights Secretary, all with equal 
power and responsibilities. The Women's Rights Secretary was responsible for 
women's issues, education, and identifying and supporting the specific needs of 
women members. She was responsible for the pay equity claims j:iled under the 1990 
Employment Equity Act. NZCWU's rules provided for women's committees at local 
level, although in 1991 they still existed only on paper, with a commitment for funding. 
These were envisaged as being local social and support groups which bring scattered 
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women clerical workers together. The groups were to be organised how women saw 
'fit, with support from organisers. 
"However they want to do it, if it is going to mean that it involves members, that 
they are getting support and encouragement from each other and that we can 
get feedback and involvement from them in other areas. If it doesn't go against 
existing union policy, they can formulate their policy by themselves, they can 
do what they like." (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
COIVIPASS's management structure was more traditional. In 1990 the 'management 
team' consisted of a woman secretary, a male assistant secretary and a woman 
administration officer. This shared management power and responsibility a little, but 
was felt by organisers to represent a greater divide between management and other 
staff, with less sharing of information and strategising than under the previous 
secretary's more informal style. On structures for specific representation, COIVIPASS's 
pOSition is that women's issues should not be marginalised in separate committees 
with little power. But without specific responsibility being given to an officer or 
organiser, in fact little research, information or political work on specially women's 
issues was being done. With the dissolution of the Association at the end of 1989, 
great deal of expertise on women's issues was lost. 
"There isn't the ability to do that sort of lobbying because there is nobody whose 
specific job it is. There is a lot of commitment from organisers but it is not 
given recognition as being a real part of your job." 
(COIVIPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
As women came to dominate organisational hierarchies and executives, the clerical 
unions became not only feminised, but feminist. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
clerical unions were one of the large female dominated unions that achieved women 
leaders and provided political space for women within the union movement. As 
women's issues were prioritised in both policy and structures, the specialised capacity 
provided by centrally located Women's Rights officers meant the clerical unions played 
a central part in the campaign for pay equity. This campaign was directed at 
benefiting all working women, as well as offering concrete benefits to clerical members 
specifically. The need to make the trade union movement relevant to women workers 
was recognised by clerical union officials as of particular importance to their own 85% 
female membersl~lip. Achieving sexual harassment procedures and pay equity 
legislation would deliver concrete benefits to women clerical members, but also, more 
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generally, it would help make union membership relevant to women in the face of 
impending voluntary unionism. 
"We will attract women to the organised labour movement and maintain their 
interest so long as we are addressing the issues of great importance to 
them." (COMPASS Staff Officer in Roth, 1986:52) 
Two important strategies in achieving this were an emphasis on trade union education 
for women members, and the political campaign style of organising around specific 
women's issues. 
Union Education 
Highly centralised wage negotiation did not require active participation by union 
members; nor did it give them an understanding of the issues or difficulties of 
negotiation. The focus was on rates and conditions in particular labour markets, with 
areas of negotiation defined narrowly by Acts and Arbitration Courts; outcomes of the 
deals made centrally were implemented by employers. 
"The vast majority of people did not understand what an award was or where 
it came from ... The boss would say, Well dear, I've decided to give you a rise' 
when the increase had been negotiated by the Federation of Labour or the 
Combined State Unions. Nobody ever explained that." 
(COMPASS Staff Officer in Roth, 1986:50) 
Unions' centralised role tended to remove them from the workplace and from 
involvement in the issues and problems of members' daily work experience. Although 
the tightening of the economy and the loosening of the traditional IC&A package from 
1973 meant that demonstrated membership support was increasingly needed to back 
negotiations with employers, New Zealand had inadvertently raised a generation of 
union members who knew nothing about unionism and had little sympathy with it. 
'J!\ lot of people don't understand what unions do ... Every award is negotiated by 
both parties, not just the unions, it's by the employers on the other side, but 
they don't realise that." (Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
Lack of information and lack of training were identified as serious handicaps to union 
participation by both men and women (Geare, Herd & Howells 1979:36). The gap 
which widened between union officials and their memberships in the late 1970s 
needed to bridged by greater participation and much better communication. 
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For the strongly female dominated clerical unions, making the unions more democratic 
meant somehow getting women members involved. Prior to the introduction of two 
annual two-hour stopwork meetings in the main clerical awards in 1977, less than 1% 
of Northern membership, for example, had participated in union votes. Even after the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 granted two paid stopwork meetings for all unions: 
"The number of people who turned up didn't increase drastically, because they 
still didn't have the time to get off the job. Whether they were going to be paid 
or not wasn't the point." (COMPASS Officer, Aug. 1991) 
"In the history of our members, they are not great voters. They just think, it is 
in pretty good hands, I won't go." (NZCWU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
"What we needed to do was say we were going to have a 50% fee increase and 
affiliate to the Socialist Unity Party, then they would all come!" . 
(COMPASS Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
In the mid 1980s Federation of Labour leaders shared a view long held by unions in 
industry that unions had become dependent clients of the arbitration system and they 
wished to see unions more reliant on their own bargaining abilities (Walsh 1989:155). 
However, the clerical unions had been shown by the 'Strike Free' campaign and the 
bid for voluntary unionism by a section of their own members that for them and other 
female dominated workforces the problem to be tackled before mobilisation was the 
lack of interest in and understanding of unionism among women members. Attempts 
to improve what Offe & Wissenthal (1985) call 'dialogical communication' between 
scattered members and central decision makers began with an increase in organisers, 
local membership meetings in the late 1970s (Moynihan 1986:89,96) and the beginning 
of union education in the early 1980s. 
Reasons for low participation and lack of interest by women in unions have been 
identified, both in New Zealand and elsewhere ((Geare, Herd & Howells 1979; Beale 
1982; Griffin & Benson 1989), as arising in three areas: physical barriers, such as 
timing of meetings, family responsibilities or lack of childcare; job related barriers, such 
as hours of work or employer attitudes; and also personal alienation from trade 
unionism. Union-related barriers included lack of encouragement and recognition of 
women members, lack of information and training, and the 'alien' culture (Geare, Herd 
& Howells 1979:14); what has been termed the 'secret language' of unionism, and the 
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'intricacies of parliamentary procedure (which) baffle and frustrate many women' 
(Griffin & Benson 1989:87). 
As women were hired into the clerical unions as organisers, they prioritised 
encouraging the participation of women members. It was women organisers who 
began using educational techniques and organising education seminars, long before 
the establishment of the Trade Union Education Authority. 
"Education was a women's thing, women did education. It didn't happen in the 
male unions." (Central CWU Staff Officer, Aug. 1991) 
Initially, there were two aims: firstly, to develop the skills of women already involved 
in their unions, and secondly, to raise the consciousness of other women members 
about unionism and also about their own experiences as working women. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, some of the first seminars were organised through the 
Working Women's Alliance in Wellington and the Auckland Working Women's 
Resource Centre, rather by specific unions. Clerical union officials were centrally 
involved in these organisations. As women clerical members were becoming involved 
as organisers or officials, and later as secretaries, they needed the skills to understand 
and participate in what was going on, to know how to move a motion at a meeting, 
how to put the clerical unions' position at Federation of Labour conferences of 300-400 
male delegates, how to handle hecklers who shouted 'Point of Order' and waved rule 
books. 
"In the end it was, do we in fact want to have meetings like that, or is it a load 
of bullshit? But at the beginning it was saying we have got to work these 
structures to change the structures and that is how a lot of those changes hap-
pened in the Federation of Labour conferences, because women started to 
learn." (Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Educational seminars were also used to develop and adapt to the New Zealand labour 
relations system concepts being raised by feminist unionists in other countries, before 
taking them out to members. The clerical unions were one of the first female domi-
nated union organisations in which women achieved positions of decision making 
power. It was often clerical Llnion officials who put Lip policy remits at Federation of 
Labour conferences which had been campaigned for through the series of women's 
organisations discussed earlier - the Alliance, the Working Women's Council, the 
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Federation of Labour women's sub-committees, the NZCTU women's and Maori 
standing committees - which could not themselves present remits. 
Education was a way of reaching members, of interesting them in unionism through 
issues which were relevance to them as working women. Issues such as sexual 
harassment and pay equity were taken up in seminars, along with education on more 
traditional aspects of unionism and labour relations. Education grew in importance as 
a strategy as women officials began to grow in numbers in the clerical unions and 
other female dominated unions. 
"The feminists in the unions were pushing for education because we saw that 
it was the only way to organise for women, it was the only way you had access 
and it was the only way that you could raise the issues at the membership 
level." (Central CWU Staff Official, Aug. 1991) 
Much of the content of basic union education seminars was feminist consciousness 
raising and assertiveness training, of use not only to members in their own work 
situations but to encourage greater participation by women in the union. 
"Consciousness raising was a fundamental organising tool for unionists. If you 
wanted to change things, you had to talk to people about other ways of 
perceiving the world." (Central CWU Staff Official, Aug. 1991) 
"It was always recognised that education is the major part of organising .. .It was 
not just the cream on the cake." (NZCWU Elected Officer, March 1991) 
The clerical unions initially bore the full costs of their education programmes and 
reimbursed lost wages of participants in education seminars. However, trade union 
education began to be taken up as a combined response of both the Labour Party 
and the union movement to the long campaign for voluntary unionism by National. 
Direct bargaining with employers in harder economic times required a more active and 
knowledgeable membership, with better workplace organisation where possible. 
Union education and delegate training began to receive attention 'from the whole union 
movement with the establishment of the Trade Union Education Authority and paid 
education leave in 1986. 
"The important thing was Paid Education Leave, a minimum of three days a year 
which employers have to give to let someone come and listen ... legitimating 
union training, it was okay to go and do this, you are entitled to it." 
(Central CWU Staff Official, Aug. 1991) 
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TUEA subsidies for educators employed by unions allowed TUEA's own general 
programmes to be supplemented with seminars directed at particular industries or 
occupations. Seminars on legislative changes and workplace health and safety could 
be tailored to the specific interests of clerical workers. Some of the education work 
taken up by TUEA was directed specifically to women. However, since the approach 
taken was very different from traditional union organising, women's seminars 
organised by TUEA, the clerical unions and some other female dominated unions were 
seen as silly, irrelevant or threatening by some unionists. 
"I have found that the concept of education is a threat to male structures within 
the unions. God help us if these women go along to a seminar and find how 
to get on the executive and then roll us!" 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
For feminist unionists in the clerical unions, trade union education for members was 
more than teaching union structures and procedures to delegates. Worksite 
organisation through delegates or 'contacts' was, in any case, ineffective for small 
scattered worksites. Women needed the knowledge and skills to tackle their own 
workplace issues and to become more assertive about their rights, both througrl basic 
union education and consciousness raising designed specifically for members 
specifically as women workers. 
"Getting 20 or so women together in a place like Hawera for a day to talk about 
problems of chi/dcare, to talk about sexual harassment, to talk about the fact 
that they do two jobs, and to say it's okay to talk about those things. 
(Central CWU Staff Official, Aug. 1991) 
"There is no point expecting someone to hold a banner on a picket if they can't 
even challenge who makes the tea at home." 
(NZCWU Staff Official, Oct. 1990) 
Discussion among women of their personal situation at work developed understanding 
about why women are treated the way they are in offices, and led on to greater 
assertiveness in dealing with problems and greater interest in unionism. 
"Seeing women who have learned something that has probably always been 
apparent, but had never quite clicked, and from there they have gone on to the 
next step and the next step." (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
"Workers have some really exciting life experiences that never get properly 
discussed but when these become part of our learning ... (They) found a lot of 
209 
strength within the group to start them thinking about dOing some battle with the 
rest of the world. That was really very exciting, just to watch that growth." 
(COMPASS Staff Official, Roth, 1986:44,46) 
Education on specific issues played an important role in getting women members 
behind the public campaigns of the clerical unions on issues like repetitive strain injury, 
sexual harassment and employment equity, as did increased written communication 
to members. Information pamphlets on specific issues and the Association's 
newspaper Paper Clip explained legislation changes, award issues, health and safety 
issues or a particular campaign. 
"Members don't always want to go to meetings but they do want to know what's 
going on, to know what they get for their money." 
(NZCWU Organiser, Sept. 1990) 
In the clerical unions, and other unions where feminists had gained prominence or 
dominance, topics for union seminars included assertiveness and dealing with stress. 
Assertiveness training was seen as a means of helping women to improve their own 
conditions of work and to deal with workplace dissatisfaction while still small, since 
minor problems were otten about poor communication between employer and 
employee. As an educational technique, an initial focus on health issues at the 
personal level, such as Repetitive Strain Injury or stress, could lead to discussion of 
change at both the personal and collective levels. 
"How to get what you want, how to say that you need a chair. It's all 
assertiveness, knowing what RSI is no good to you if you've not got the guts to 
go to the boss and say, look, I've got a twinge." 
(NZCWU Staff Official, Oct. 1990) 
"It covers what stress is, keeping our bodies healthy, stress interrupters, but the 
afternoon is about stress at work, it's about doing something, it is about making 
change and it is actually strategising." (I\lZCWU Staff Official, Oct. 1990) 
Seminar components on these topics in general or delegate training seminars led to 
interest in more specialised sessions and word of mouth recommendation to other 
members. At the end of such a seminar there were otten two or three women in 
difficult work situations who needed more, and NZCWU educators began to suggest 
they form support groups, for the opportunity to discuss problems with others outside 
the particular workplace but with a direct understanding of clerical work problems. 
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Not only did education seminars bring isolated women workers in contact with each 
other and with the union, they gave the clerical unions' educators a full day with 
members. It provided an opportunity to spend time with members in a relaxed 
non-work environment and get in-depth feedback about what members think and what 
they want from the union. 
Of the clerical unions, it was Central, then the amalgamated NZCWU, that gave 
greatest priority to education. Southland had too small a membership to bear the cost 
of a specialist educator. COMPASS had one educator, based in Hamilton rather than 
its main centre of population; in 1991 it appeared to be retreating from raising member 
awareness of political issues and moving towards a strategy of 'marketing' the union. 
NZCWU employed three educators, based in Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin, 
and saw education as an integral part of organising. 
"We see it as a dual role. While it is important our industry organisers 
appreciate the role of education in the union it is also important that our 
educators are in contact with our industrial people, aware of what is going on 
industrially ... They are working in parallel and it is crucial that they work 
together." (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
For one early union educator who later became an organiser, organising was simply 
a more active facet of member education. 
'~s education officer I saw my role as looking at the kinds of problems that 
were occurring and grouping them together for collective consideration. As 
organiser I see one job as having one particular problem so we work to resolve 
this while building union consciousness." 
(COMPASS Staff Official, Roth, 1986:49) 
Education was an important strategy in raising the collective union consciousness of 
women clerical members, in particular, not only to avert membership losses should 
unionism be made voluntary, but as part of the more general goal of raising women's 
partiCipation, boH'1 in industrial action and in the union as an organisation. The clerical 
unions were one of the first unions to take up union education, but officials recognised 
that it was a strategy for change in the long term. 
'Very much a long term strategy, the way to educate members, to politicise 
members and involve them in the union which would make it a democratic 
organisation." (Central CWU Staff Official, Aug. 1991) 
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The Political Power of Numbers 
If education was the long term strategy for involving members, the short term one, 
though closely connected, was the public campaign. Over the 1980s the clerical 
unions mounted campaigns to generate public attention and debate on issues of 
concern, particularly ones relevant to working women. Their initial source of strength 
was their large membership number, which provided political influence in a number of 
arenas. 
The largely occupational basis of awards and unions, combined with compulsory union 
membership and women's concentration in clerical work, made the NZ Clerical 
Workers Association the third largest union organisation in the private sector when this 
study began3. Its political power was used with considerable effect in the 1980s to 
raise issues for working women both within the trade union movement and in the wider 
political arena. 
"If you chose to have power, it was at that level, because you were the third 
largest union in New Zealand and your votes could sway any decision. When 
the Clerical Union spoke everybody sat up ... Back then within the Federation of 
Labour, you carried a hell of a punch. /I 
(NZCWA Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
Public campaigns around particular issues were a strategy to involve the clerical 
unions' large membership more actively and also gathered the support of members 
and officials of other female dominated occupations. Working through the Federation 
of labour women's subcommittees, debate would be stimulated, and the combined 
votes of female dominated unions could establish an issue as policy and bring the 
weight of the whole union movement behind it, in negotiations with employers or 
politicians. Working wider than the union movement, a campaign could mount public 
pressure to bear on issue. Links could be made with other women's organisations in 
the wider community, gathering in the political strength of women's voting power 
behind legislative change. 
3 In 1986. the last year official membership returns. expressed in Full Time Equivalents, were 
required by the Labour Dept. the combined Hotel & Hospital Unions numbered 46,450; the Engineers 
Union, 45,000; the Clerical Workers Unions 42,000. 
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In laying out public campaigns as a strategy in this theoretical fashion, from an issue 
of union concern to final Act of Parliament, it must be recognised that each possible 
stage was a political outcome, for which the support of others might or might not be 
enlisted. Not all issues of importance to the clerical unions were of direct relevance 
to other workers or other women; not all achieved the support of the union movement 
as a whole. 
The issues on which the clerical unions had most success with campaign tactics were 
issues of concern to all working women. Issues which addressed the gendered nature 
O'f jobs or gender segregation in the labour market at the political level attracted wider 
support than just the membership of the clerical unions. Sexual harassment and pay 
equity attracted the interest of the full range of women's community and political 
organisations. 
"Pay Equity is an injustice that covers life, it isn't just related to a particular 
document or a particular industry. /t's a social thing that women have been 
unjustly paid for years and years .. .If it issocial injustice, then you must organise 
socially, and that takes on board your membership as well." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
As a strategy for furthering union interests, public media-oriented campaigns went 
outside both face-to-face employment relations and the institutional frameworks for 
multi-employer/workforce bargaining. They were directed in varying degree and with 
varying effect at a number of audiences. 
Public campaigning could be used to pressure employers directly as part of industrial 
action backing award negotiations, as is shown in the two case studies which follow. 
Bad pUblicity or a picket can be very effective to pressure one employer, particularly 
a large one with a high public reputation. In the Project 13 campaign, employers who 
had withdrawn from award negotiations were targetted. The campaign took the issue 
to the public - including clerical union members - but this had limited effect on 
thousands of small employers who could not be individually targetted for attention. 
Campaign tactics were more effective with politicians, since they were sensitive to 
public opinion. Political style campaigns affected employers indirectly when they 
resulted in legislation or regulation which bound employers to conditions that had not 
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been attainable in direct negotiation. This was the clerical unions' strategy with pay 
equity. 
"We have had to find other ways of organising. The whole pay equity thing is 
organised as a political campaign ... because of the difficulties ... You have to use 
the established media and must organise in a political sense rather than an 
industrial sense, deliberate political organisation." 
(CWA Staff Official, Aug. 1989) 
But the clerical unions' campaigns were not just a strategy in themselves, they were 
part of their education strategy. They were directed at raising the issues, concepts 
and proposed solutions with 'the public'. The public not only included employers and 
politicians but others who might be influential in policy-making, such as political party 
members, journalists and civil servants. Also important was the fact that 'the public' 
is 52% women and, since one third of the female workforce do some form of clerical 
work, including the clerical unions' own membership. With 35,000 scattered members 
to bring up to date and in behind an issue - and to demonstrate to those members 
that the clerical unions was active on their behalf - the clerical unions found the media 
a indirect but useful tool for educational purposes. 
"We have taken the issues to the public because that is where our members 
are, that is where we get our audier{Cffititral CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
An important stage in each of the clerical unions' campaigns was getting the weight 
of the union movement behind the issue. 
The Clerical Unions in the Union Movement 
Within the Federation of Labour, and later the NZCTU, the clerical unions have 
frequently been a dissenting voice and a voice for change. The nature of their 
membership, their position in the labour market and their workforce logistics meant 
that they did not always see their interests as best served by strategies and 
philosophies of the union movement which tended to reflect the ideological dominance 
of traditional male trades and the manufacturing sector. However, their membership 
size and the support of other unions, particularly those representing large female 
workforces, enabled their position to prevail on some issues, while not on others. 
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Other unions' reception of their position was coloured by a number of background 
factors. Union memories are long: in the 1950s and 1960s clerical voting power had 
been used by a Federation of Labour leader to achieve personal power and in 1951 
to assist the government defeat more independent and militant unions (Scott 1952). 
!\Jew Zealand history had type-caste the clerical unions as a conservative power 
dangerous to militant unionism and class struggle long before their recent feminist 
deviationism. 
At the level of workplace cooperation, there have often been perceived differences of 
class, or simply snobbery, by clerical members which have resulted in very 
unsupportive behaviour towards other occupational groups. In some disputes it has 
been important just to hold the clerical workers neutral, and given the vulnerability of 
their personal work situation, that has often been as much as they could do. 
"There is a whole history of clerical workers not joining with other workers in 
struggle and not being prepared to have their morning tea with other 
workers ... that elitism and status consciousness, and in return a total 
misunderstanding of the vulnerability of their position working as closely as they 
do with the employer." (Central CWU Elected Officer, 11 !\Jov. 1990) 
Lack of solidarity and snobbery has not been in just one direction. Further up the 
class/status hierarchy of occupations, members of professional unions have refused 
to share tearooms with clerical workers. Further down it, because of gender antag-
onisms and cultural myths about class4 (Phillips 1987: 15-18), clerical workers are 
sometimes seen as 'inauthentic workers' (Cockburn 1985: 185-189), undeserving of 
support by 'real' workers when clerical workers themselves take action. 
"The workers perceive that because the person is in the office, they are the 
bosses' friend. Very difficult to get support from those people." 
(Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
In one well-remembered dispute in 1986, clerical workers on a major Wellington 
industrial site took action to claim the bonus received by all their co-workers, including 
the gardener and the cleaners, in this case all men. The women would have needed 
a 49% pay increase to bring them up to the level of the trade groups on site. The 
4 Reinforced by a few sociological ones - see critiques by Health & Britten (1984) and Stanworth 
(1984) of the relevance of the manual-non-manual divide as an indicator of women's social class. 
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women struck and picketed, but it took two weeks before the withdrawal of clerical 
yvork began to effect production. Co-workers offered them no solidarity, seeing the 
dispute as holding up their own settlement. 
"Initially they were just disparaged, but when their action really started to bite, 
they were called bitches and sluts and whores and told to get back to fucking 
work by male workers on site. An official of another union came out with 
management and harangued them on the picket line." 
(Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
The settlement of this dispute included a very low exemption rate which was used to 
slowly deunionise clerical staff. In the later negotiation of a composite enterprise 
agreement in 1990, the clerical union was told it was welcome to join if claims for the 
bonus and pay equity were dropped: that is, other unions and their members were not 
prepared to fight for the women' claims. Then without further notification, remaining 
clerical members were raised above the exemption rate and the composite went 
ahead, without clerical union representation or any collective coverage of the clerical 
staff. 
While organisers can cite other such instances, generally cooperation has been 
improved by working together on redundancies and composite agreements in recent 
years. This has made unions much more aware of each other's positions at a 
practical level. 
Difficult relations between the clerical unions and the rest of the movement are also 
due to the fact that the clerical unions represent the unions' own employees. Unions 
are employers of organisers and a relatively large staff of clerical workers. In the 
clerical unions' experience, organisations with a strong mission of service or 
commitment to a cause often have unrealistic expectations of dedication by 
employees. Union management's own strong commitment to unionism which can 
make it difficult possible to recognise themselves as bad employers, when in the name 
of the cause or the membership - or just through poor management practices - they 
push things too far. 
"They don't expect to be challenged because they are unionists." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, July 1991) 
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Their employees, on the other hand, are very aware of union principles and their rights 
as workers, and do not hesitate to call in their own union. This means that relations 
between clerical union officials and other officials have sometimes become quite 
antagonistic, in ways that flowed over into other areas of inter-union cooperation. 
"We have been known in the past around town amongst other unions as the 
Hysterical Workers Union." (COMPASS Staff Official, Feb. 1991) 
Nor were clerical union officials' relations with other officials on day-to-day worksite 
issues enhanced by their leadership of feminist positions within broad trade union 
politics. Through the clerical unions, as well as through separate groups like the 
women's sub-committees, feminist issues spread to other unions, since their women 
organisers and support staff were clerical union members, attending meetings at which 
such issues were discussed. When clerical union officials or the Women's Advisory 
Committee raised new policy issues at Federation of Labour conferences, the 
personalised responses of unionist men indicated that they perceived the women, as 
much as the issues, a threatening to their own position. 
"Some of the males were saying 'There's too many women with balls at this 
conference'. Because the women were actually saying things, saying what they 
didn't like and the men 'What's this? Lesbians!' Anything to categorise them 
because they actually spoke better, had something to say. They had 
researched their stuff and made sense. II 
(NZCWU Organiser (male), Nov. 1990) 
Tensions between the clerical union and other unions arose about differences on 
policy directions for the union movement. The clerical unions' position reflected, firstly, 
its organising position and reliance on state supports to union negotiating, such as 
arbitration, and secondly, its raising of new issues of importance to women members, 
such as childcare and sexual harassment, which were frequently seen as of marginal 
importance by powerful unions representing male dominated occupations. 
"These concepts ... are not necessarily picked up or held very close to the heart 
by a lot of male trade unionists, and that's still half our battle. While that doesn't 
seem as apparent now, I think it is still there ... They insist that on their 
experience this is what's right for workers. But our experience is just the 
opposite./I (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Policy struggles occurred over issues raised and remits presented at conferences by 
the clerical unions, the Distribution Workers Union and other women unionists. In 
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1980, the clerical unions were strong proponents of the Working Women's Charter, 
which included support for contraception, sterilisation and abortion. From the late 
1970s they had recognised the problem of sexual harassment at work. At the 1984 
conference they put forward a remit seeking Federation of Labour policy opposing the 
display of pornographic pictures in the workplace (Coleman 1988). The level of 
understanding among male unionists of women's experience of working life and sexual 
harassment was such that the Secretary of the Engineers Union, representing a 
sizable female membership, defended offensive pin-ups as one of the 'last pleasures 
for aging males'. 
A major area of tension between Federation of Labour affiliates was the issue of 
specific representation for women and Maori in structures planned for the new NZCTU 
wrlich would combine private sector and public sector unions. The clerical unions 
played a central role in obtaining standing committees with representation and a vote 
on the NZCTU national executive, in order to raise new policy issues more effectively 
than had been possible with the purely advisory Women's Sub-committee of the 
Federation of Labour. It was through the clerical unions that the women's lobby and 
Maori lobby within the trade union movement were linked, though the presence of the 
three Maori members on the Association's Executive Council. 
"It was a great coalition to work in, it had some dynamic people. I think both 
of us were lucky in that we had each other, for support, for confirmation, we 
could bounce ideas and strategies off each other." 
(COMPASS Officer, Aug. 1991) 
This close linkage came into play when it became clear that opposition was building 
at the 1986 Federation of Labour conference. It was quickly decided to present 
together the papers on a women's structure and a Maori structure at a point in the 
conference where standing orders and 'in committee' status were suspended to allow 
Maori tikanga to prevail. This not only prevented heckling and 'points of order' from 
interrupting the presentation, but ensured that full media coverage was given - also of 
any opposition stances. 
"There was a shattering silence ... They never realised the working together than 
had been going on behind the scenes to be able to present those papers like 
that." (CWA Elected Officer, Aug 1991) 
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The motions for both structures were passed narrowly, on a membership card vote, 
not a show of hands. It was carried by the weight of membership numbers of the 
large female dominated unions the clerical unions, the Distribution Workers and the 
Hotel & Hospital Workers Federation - and without the opposing votes of the 
Engineers Union, whose secretary had forgotten his membership cards. 
"It wasn't meant to show more strength than them, it was to identify that in the 
trade union movement there are women, there are Maori. 1/ 
(CWA Elected Officer, Aug 1991) 
In the mid-1980s the clerical unions launched the pay equity campaign, after both 
employers and the Arbitration Court refused to consider the comparable worth of 
different jobs typically done by women and by men. This campaign was taken up by 
unions led by women, but received limited support as a strategy from male unionists 
and from the Federation of Labour. Claims for pay equity in 1990 were coordinated 
by a group under the auspices of the NZCTU, and women officials of the NZCTU put 
in a great deal of behind-the-scenes work in the drafting stages of the Employment 
Equity Act. But in the view of clerical union officials, the NZCTU leadership did not 
throw the weight of the union movement behind the issue in the way it might have. 
Despite a 1989 slogan of 'Jobs, Stability, Equality', the NZCTU's strategic unionism did 
not prioritise, or even seem to include, the revaluing of women's work as an social 
equity issue. In the view of a woman official of another union who was involved in 
developing the NZCTU's Compact with the Labour government: 
"It didn't fit into their economic strategy. They saw pay equity as just another 
wage claim." (April, 1992) 
Conversely, the strategies initiated by the Federation of Labour and NZCTU and 
adopted by the union movement have been opposed or reluctantly supported by the 
clerical unions, because they have not suited the interests and labour market position 
of clerical members. The clerical unions' position in regard to the dominant strategies 
of the union movement are discussed a little later. 
Equity: Throwing with the Weight of the 
The clerical unions' size, as the third largest private sector union organisation, gave 
them political weight not only in the union movement, but in the wider political arena. 
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They were a relatively independent. and often dissenting, voice within a trade union 
movement whose leadership (but necessarily not membership) generally supported 
Labour. They represented a very large number of women voters whose political 
allegiance could not be taken for granted. The industrial strength they lacked for 
logistical reasons of workforce fragmentation was compensated by political strength. 
If employers could not be persuaded directly or through arbitration to consider clerical 
workers' claims in negotiations, they could be required to by legislation, achieved by 
political means. 
A pOlitical route allowed the clerical unions to pursue their goals by utilising their 
strengths and skills to overcome their weaknesses. They had long been active in the 
politics of government policy formation and legislation on labour relations. Expertise 
developed pursuing disputes through the arbitration court was useful in the proactive 
stages of lobbying and input into proposed legislation. Their very skills as 'middle 
class' clerical workers were suited to such a strategy. 
"We have done it that way because that is what we are good at doing, far better 
lobbyists, submission writers - well, we are clerical workers!" 
(NZCWU Organiser, Nov. 19910 
If their lobby was not always successful, this was because they were not the only, nor 
the most powerful lobbyists with interests to be protected. 
The political route taken by the clerical unions went outside the existing labour 
relations framework - itself a political outcome limiting negotiation to a narrow range 
of concerns - two decades before the NZCTU itself sought to widen the scope of 
discussion through the Compact (Harvey 1992:61). In seeking state legislation to bind 
employers on new issues like pay equity, sexual harassment, parental leave and equal 
employment opportunity, however, feminist unionists stepped well outside the frame 
of reference of unions and the pOlitical left. They were using a strategy of utilising 
state power which had brought women considerable success on rights issues in the 
1970s (Z. Eisenstein, 1981; Franzway 1989:29). Trlis political route was equally suc-
cessful in addressing the particular employment concerns of women in the 1970s and 
1980s. It used the political system to get the changes, but the labour relations system, 
with its labour market wide awards, to deliver them to large numbers of women. 
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I refer to this as a political route, as well as a strategy, to convey the idea that change 
in state policy and legislation is the interim goal. The objective, indirectly acrlieved, 
was change by employers in the way they treat or value their women workers. 
Liberal feminists have sought changes in the operation of the state as direct goals: 
recognition of women's citizenship, welfare rights and equality before the law (Z. 
Eisenstein 1981). The clerical unions sought to use the power of the state indirectly, 
by bringing it to bear on the capitalist system and negotiations between unions and 
employers. They lobbied for change in the legislative framework for award bargaining, 
within which the clerical unions had been blocked on certain issues. Hester Eisenstein 
(1986) has called this strategy for change 'feminist judo: throwing with the weight of 
the state'. In the 1984 award round the clerical unions were unable to negotiate a 
procedure on sexual harassment into their awards. Nor would employers 
countenance a percentage rise in 1984 or 1985 to bring clerical rates back up to the 
core trades rates, although 1985 was the year women clerical workers took large scale 
industrial action in support of their award claims. 
Because liberal democratic governments require votes and political support to 
legitimate their authority (Offe 1984:135), they are responsive to public pressure in a 
. way tl1at employers are not. The women's movement and a discernible 'women's 
vote', particularly in the 1984 election, were important political forces, active both inside 
and outside the Labour Party and Labour government (Wilson 1992; Vowles & Aimer 
1990:178), and to a lesser extent in the National party. The issues of sexual 
harassment and pay equity were new, progressive concepts which captured public 
and political attention, pushed by the broad campaign methods and media expertise 
used by Women's Liberation in the 1970s. In such fresh and newsworthy issues, 
where policy and opposition had not yet been consolidated, liberal politicians saw 
votes and a chance to redeem liberal reputations, damaged by free market economic 
policies strategy which contradicted Labour's traditional political platform (Ou Plessis 
Novitz 1991). That is, when a regime no longer delivers according to its own estab-
lished standards, its legitimacy is most in need of reinforcement (Offe 1984:268), and 
employment equity provided just the right election year issue. A similar route to 
pursue the long sought 10 days sick and domestic leave for the general clerical award 
would have lacked the required political glamour. 
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Clerical union officials wrote submissions and lobbied government on a variety of 
issues of importance to their members. Much lobbying related to changes in the 
traditional labour relations framework which would impact the clerical unions -
voluntary unionism, the loss of compulsory arbitration and the Employment Contracts 
Bill (e.g. NZCWA 1989; I\lC&LEARWU 1991; NZCWU 1991b; NZNSCWU 1990). Other 
issues on which officials lobbied were of importance both to the great majority of 
clerical union members but also to other working women - childcare, parental leave, 
health and safety issues, sexual harassment, equal employment opportunity and pay 
equity. The issues highlighted below are those on which the clerical unions initiated 
campaigns which resulted in specific legislation: the Equal Pay Act 1972; personal 
grievance procedures again sexual harassment at work in the Labour Relations Act, 
1987 and also the Employment Contracts Act, 1991; and the Employment Equity Act 
1990. 
Equal pay for women is a long standing issue in New Zealand. It was first called for 
in 1896 by the suffragists who formed the National Council of Women (TUEA 1988). 
It was raised in the clerical unions' first award claims in 1937, but initially reflected the 
concern of male officials to resisting the feminisation of men's clerical positions. 
Separate scales for typists and stenographers, already typed as women's work, soon 
fell behind the general rates (Moynihan 1986:16). During World War II, a few women 
in engineering and driving trams were paid men's rates, but the equal pay claims of 
tile clerical unions and PSA women after the war were rejected, ostensibly as part of 
an 'economic stabilisation' wage freeze, when the men came home (Moynihan 
1986:27-18; Corner 1988:26). 
Female membership of the clerical unions rose to 85% during the war, falling 
afterwards but rising again in the 1950s and 1960s as more married women joined the 
workforce. From 1942 male officials were committed to equal pay for women and men 
as a strategy for improving wage rates for the majority of members (Moynihan 
1986:27-28). A 1949 equal pay claim was rejected by employers and the Court as 
contrary to the principle of the 'Family Wage' for men in IC&A Amendment Act, 1936. 
However, relativity between the male clerical rate and rates for carpenters and 
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plumbers was recognised, and successive claims narrowed the gender pay gap from 
62% of the male rate to 70% in 1960. 
Women in the public service began campaigning against unequal pay and 
discriminatory career paths in the post-war years, and in 1960 achieved legislation for 
equal pay in the state sector by 1963 (Corner 1988). The clerical unions tried again 
in their 1964 and 1966 claims but were met with a 'wall of silence' (Moynihan 1986:71) 
from employers, arbitrators and the Federation of Labour which rejected a policy on 
equal pay. In 1969 the Australian Arbitration Commission granted equal pay and a bill 
was introduced in Britain, so the I\lew Zealand campaign was stepped up. 
In the late 1960s the Auckland clerical union began to use new methods to raise its 
profile with women members and in the media. It held monthly lunch meetings with 
entertainment, organised a social club and travel concessions. It was through this 
social! political activity aimed at women members that equal pay was promoted. A 
meeting was convened at which the Council for Equal Pay and Opportunity was 
formed, which coordinated a national campaign involving women's organisations, 
unions and political parties. This culminated in a Commission of Enquiry into the 
. implementation of Equal Pay, with a clerical union secretary as the Federation of 
Labour nominee. The Equal Pay Act was passed by National in just before the 1972 
election, won by Labour which required the Act to be fully implemented by April 1977. 
This was the first campaign of its kind - using innovative, attention-getting techniques 
to raise the issue among women, making full use of public media, and working 
together with women's groups across the community, as well as in the union move-
ment. It was a public campaign for legislation, using political power to change the 
framework for arbitrated negotiation between unions and employers to the benefit of 
women. The employers' response was to mitigate the Act's effects through a close 
scrutiny of productivity, skills and other aspects of clerical work and the negotiation 
of narrowly defined range of grades to replace the standard male adult rate. By 1982 
48% of men but only 33% of women were earning rates above Grade III (NZCWA 
1986:46). Men doing similar clerical work to women are also more likely to be paid 
above the exemption rate, taking them outside the award. 
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Over the 1970s the Equal Pay Act had been successful in narrowing the gap between 
women's and men's earnings by 10%, but not in closing it (see graph), since most 
women and men were employed in different jobs for which pay differences were quite 
legal. In 1985 feminist unionists from the Central Clerical Union brought a new 
strategy back from union women in Atlstralia: equal pay for work of equal value 
through comparable worth assessments. lVIanagement techniques of job assessment 
would compare jobs typically done by women with those typically done by men. This 
was initially raised in direct negotiations with employers. In 1985 after the wage freeze 
the clerical unions claimed an initial 35% in award talks, to bring rates up against 
inflation and to close the gap between the Grade III rate and the average male wage. 
In support, they launched a new campaign to 'Value Office Workers'. The pay equity 
aspect of the claim was rejected by employers, despite otherwise successful industrial 
action. 
In 1986 the clerical unions again claimed for equal pay in their award and this time 
took the matter to the Arbitration Court. They argued that the clerical Grade III had 
become a 'depressed female rate', having fallen back to almost the same ratio to 
carpenters' wages as the female clerical rate had been in 1973 (NZCWA 1988:6). 
They claimed a 'nominal male rate' for work of equal value under Section 3(1 )(b) of 
the 1972 Equal Pay Act which states that for 'work which is exclusively or 
predominantly performed by female employees, the rate of remuneration that would 
be paid to male employees' should apply. The Court declined jurisdiction. The Act 
had no review mechanism after full implementation and was considered by employers 
and by the Court to be a one-off exercise which had already delivered equal pay in 
awards negotiated in the mid-1970s. 
The clerical unions had deliberately taken their claim to arbitration to push the Court 
for a clear decision on work of equal value. 
"We expected to lose. What we aimed to do was to demonstrate publicly that 
the Act is of no practical use any more." (lVIoynihan 1986: 1 06) 
The 1972 Equal Pay Act had been unsuccessful in closing the pay gap because it did 
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Figure 1. Average Ordinary Time Hourly earnings: Private Sector, 1974-85. 
NZ Clerical Workers, Submission to the Arbitration Court on Equal Pay 
and the Equal Pay Act 1972, February, 1986. 
(NZCWA 1986: 48) 
interpretation, it could not allow comparisons of jobs not done by both women and 
men. In a labour market strongly segregated by gerlder, equal pay legislation had no 
relevance for the majority of jobs. A fresh campaign was mounted to get legislation 
that would facilitate comparisons between male and female dominated occupations. 
Allowing for 'human capital' factors in the gender pay gap such as qualifications and 
continuous experience, the government Working Group on Equal Employment 
Opportunities & Equal Pay estimated that effective legislation could raise women's 
average weekly wages against men's by another 6%, for only a 2.25% increase in the 
total wage bill (Wilson 1988:13). 
It was the clerical unions that initiated pay equity as an issue in New Zealand, but once 
again it was organised through a wide public campaign that included other unions with 
large female memberships, women's organisations, individuals and the old CEPO. In 
April 1986 a seminar on Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value at Victoria university -
complemented by a Women's Liberation style demonstration outside - called on the 
government to review equal pay legislation to incorporate the principle of equal pay 
for work of equal value (Hyman 1986). A public meeting in May established a new 
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generation group, the Coalition for Equal Value Equal Pay, to coordinate the 
campaign. 
"Pay Equity was our issue basically, we took it on. .. (but) No use having a 
support group for the Clerical Union who was having a strategy for equal pay, 
you had to have a whole organisation that included individual women and the 
women's movement...to widen our appeal, get more people involved and more 
energy." (Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Clerical union officials were centrally involved in this campaign which was also a way 
of taking the issue to their own members. Their own union education seminars and 
a flood of information on the new concept of comparable worth drew clerical union 
members in behind the campaign. 
"We have run seminars throughout the country. It is a concept our membership 
have grasped and understand." (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
The public campaign drew on tactics and skills developed through the 1970s by the 
Women's Liberation movement. Leaflets, articles, cartoons, street theatre, overseas 
guests, public meetings, concerts, stalls, stunts and demonstrations and high profile 
media coverage were supported by a downstream industry of stalls, car stickers, 
badges, tee-shirts and tea-towels, directed at the general public. 
"Got to put some of the political issues in front of people because if you don't, 
no one else Will." (COMPASS Staff Official, Feb. 1991) 
The campaign for pay equity and equal employment opportunity through the 1980s 
was very much the practical politics in a local .context of an international feminist 
analysis being developed simultaneously, and outlined earlier. It sought legislation 
which would tackle the gender pay gap by addressing both the undervaluing of 
women's skills and their segregation into a limited range of gendered jobs (Walby 
1988). 
It was logically unions representing low paid, scattered, mobile, strongly female 
dominated workforces of women that championed pay equity: the clerical unions and 
women-led Distribution Workers Unions covering shop assistants unions. By the same 
logic, the Bank Officers Union which strongly promoted equal employment opportunity 
covered an occupational area that had relatively recently become female dominated 
(making equal pay claims effective) employed in organisations large enough to provide 
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career paths. An particular interest in equal employment opportunity by share by 
unions - or women's sections of unions - covering the large organisations of the state. 
The Labour government responded by commissioning a study of the issues in three 
phases (Hyman 1986:237). The first considered the factors involved in women's 
position in the New Zealand labour market (Urban Research 1987). A government 
Working Party then made recommendations for legislation based on experiences of 
legislation elsewhere (Wilson 1988). The third phase, after the eventual passage of the 
Act, was the development of a comparable worth methodology suitable for New 
Zealand (Dept. Labour /SSC 1991). CEVEP and its component groups made 
submissions on the report of the Working Party (Wilson 1988) and the resulting 
Employment Equity Bill. 
'The concept and the campaign to get it was relatively short when we think of 
other historical events ... /t's pretty amazing and I think it is indicative of the 
commitment that women in the movement have had to achieving it, and also to 
the need for it." (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
From overseas and New Zealand experience, there was a clear understanding by 
women campaigners of what was required and what would make legislation effective . 
. It should cover both pay equity and equal employment opportunity. It should be 
separate lrom other labour law - and therefore less easily changed or traded away 
against other considerations. Pay equity legislation should allow both class and 
individual actions. It should provide independent expertise through a new state 
agency - not a new market niche for high-priced lawyers and consultants. In view of 
the difficulty settling awards in 1989 without access to arbitration, it should include a 
means of making decisions binding on employer. Given the perSistence of the gender 
pay gap, the legislative should allow continuing review of the situation. But clerical 
union officials were optimistic about the effectiveness of such legislation in the context 
of New Zealand's system of centralised wage fixing. The award system would allow 
equity adjustments to be delivered into the purses of very large numbers of New 
Zealand women. 
However, women and their unions were not the only lobbyists. Employers and their 
associations were also more organised and experienced by the late 1980s than in 
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1972 and the business lobby already had a firm hold on the ear of the fourth Labour 
government. To its stream of publications calling for labour market deregulation, the 
NZ Business Roundtable and NZ Employers Federation had added arguments, often 
by women authors, that legislative intervention in the market would reduce employment 
for women and etrmic minorities, rather than provide equity (NZEF 1989; Burton 1989; 
Smith 1989; Brook 1989:185; 1990b). 
Early drafts of the Employment Equity Bill largely followed the recommendations of the 
Wilson report. Lobbying on the bill was intense, however, and between the second 
and third readings considerable compromises were built into the Act. After a equity 
claim for a particular job was brought against two male comparators and the 
comparable worth carefully assessed by the independent Employment Equity 
Commission, wage adjustments would not automatic result, but had to be negotiated 
with employers in the next award round. The phasing in of the resulting amount was 
also a matter for negotiation. Even after underpayment had been established, women 
were expected to wait for justice. Review was allowable after five years, but only on 
new matters: once again a one-off adjustment was thought sufficient to resolve a 
persisting social problem. 
However, the legislation was greeted as a great achievement by women, and clerical 
union officials in particular were determined to make it work. 
"We were really pleased to have achieved most of the goals that we set 
ourselves several years ago. The introduction of that Act meant that what we 
had all been saying and campaigning for had all been achievable reality ... The 
concept had been accepted that there had to be some redress of the 
wrongs." (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
In addition to delivering concrete wage benefits, pay equity was seen by clerical union 
officials as an important focal point for organising and mobilising women members. 
With the high profile campaign and seminars for clerical workers throughout the coun-
try, it was felt to be a concept that the membership had grasped and supported. 
"Hopefully pay equity will have some positive spinoffs in the way that we 
organise, recruit and retain members under voluntary unionism ... one of the 
services we provide our members ... And in another way - that they will value a) 
their own work and b) themselves ... stand up for themselves and recognise their 
own worth." (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
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The clerical unions and other private sector unions with dominant female memberships 
raced to prepare their first claims before the 1990 election, lest a National government 
say there was no demand. Ten claims were filed with the Employment Equity 
Commission as soon as it opened, including one by the clerical unions. To ensure 
initial success, first claims had to be for small, precisely definable groups which could 
be clearly shown as undervalued in comparison to the male occupations chosen. 
Most male comparators were from the public sector, where precise information on 
actual rates and conditions were most easily obtained (Hill 1991a). 
The clerical unions' first thought was for grossly undervalued school secretaries. 
However, these members were reluctant to combine a pay equity claim with 
negotiations on a possible amalgamation with public sector education unions. A claim 
was therefore made for medical receptionists, a group which officials felt needed 
bringing up both industrially and in its relationship to the union. They were compared 
with university caretakers and hospital electrical workers, earning over $100 a week 
more, plus allowances. This fitted nicely with the Nurses Union's claim for practice 
nurses. It would give the Commission double mileage out of expertise on private 
medical practice. Isolated practice nurses and receptionists could also support each 
other. 
"We chose those groups independently of each other ... To end up in the same 
spot is rather indicative of where women are placed within the health sector." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
In researching suitable male comparators for the claim, NZCWU's Women's Rights 
Secretary expressed amazement at the little extras the male trades had accumulated 
on top of base rates. These not only added Lip in the wage packet, they gave 
something to trade in lean times. This contrasted with the bare bones of most indus-
trial documents for female dominant occupations, especially the NZ Clerical Award. 
"The boot allowance, the piece of dirt on the boot allowance, it's 
incredible ... They can go to the table and give away the spot on the boot 
allowance for an extra day's sick leave and make a big thing out of it. Whereas 
what have we got? Absolutely nothing, we are on the basic now. /I 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
The National government's first action on taking power at the end of 1990 was to 
repeal the Employment Equity Act. The Equal Pay Act 1972 and the equal opportunity 
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provisions in the State Services Act 1988 remained in place. They allowed the work 
being done on a methodology for comparable worth by the new Employment Equity 
Commission to be completed by the Dept of Labour and 'made available to employers 
and employees so that they can use it as a tool during the normal wage bargaining 
process.,5 
In May 1991 National removed the legislative framework of the 'normal wage 
bargaining process', in which the clerical unions had always been refused equal pay 
for women. It was replaced by the Employment Contracts Act, which limited 
employees to a choice of individual or collective enterprise contracts. Awards with 
blanket coverage of a particular section of the labour market, which had provided 
market protections and which would have provided a vehicle for the delivery of equity 
assessments, were now abolished. 
In deference to women's voting power, their demonstrated support for employment 
equity, and the concern of their own women MPs, National appointed a Working Party 
on Equity in Employment to prepare yet another report, under terms of reference 
focused exclusively on equal employment opportunity. This approach was consistent 
with the individualism of the Employment Contracts Act and less costly to employers. 
An Opposition Bill seeing to secure equal employment opportunity programmes for 
large private sector employers into law, although on a voluntary basis, languished in 
a select committee. An Equal Opportunity Trust was established which funded suitable 
projects, with around 10% of the previous government's budgetary commitment. 
We do not believe that it is possible to impose these provisions on employers 
and employees. Rather, we aim to impress upon employers, as those 
responsible for protecting workers' interests while providing employment 
opportunities, the importance of taking these matters into account. 6 
The clerical unions did not feel the battle was over by any means. 
"There is quite a level of public awareness around pay equity and equal 
employment opportunity, we should try to capitalise on that knowledge ... The first 
5 Letter to CEVEP member from Jenny Shipley, Minister of Women's Affairs, 27 February 1991. 
6 Minister of Women's Affairs, letter to CEVEP, May 1991. 
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thing National got rid of, it must have posed quite a threat to them, so we figure 
there is a few miles of campaign left in it yet. /I 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Sexual Harassment at Work 
In the early to mid 1980s, between the equal pay campaign and the employment 
equity campaign, the clerical unions were centrally involved in raising another 
important issue for women: protection against sexual harassment at work. While 
employment equity addressed inequality at the level of the labour market, this 
addressed women's daily experience of work at a very personal level. 
The sexual harassment campaign was one of the great successes of feminist politics 
in I\lew Zealand. In less than ten years, the behaviour was analysed, the concept 
named, an educational campaign mounted, policy pushed through the Federation of 
Labour and the political system, and specific personal grievance procedures to deal 
with sexual harassment included in the Labour Relations Act 1987 and in most awards. 
It was continued in the Employment Contracts Act which expanded access to personal 
grievance procedures to all employees, not just union members. Sexual harassment 
at work was also covered by the Human Rights Act, 1986. The behaviour continues7 , 
but it is now widely understood to be unacceptable and against the rights of working 
women. And under both Acts it is the legal responsibility of employers to resolve 
problems of sexual harassment of their female employees. 
Until the late 1970s what can now be named as sexual harassment at work was 
defined exclusively from the harasser's viewpoint (Wise & Stanley 1987:3-6), with the 
sexuality often ascribed to the woman. It was the secretary who was sexy or coy; or 
a good sport; or was 'sleeping her way to the top'. He was paying her a compliment; 
displaying healthy heterosexuality; taking a 'fatherly' interest. Women supposedly liked 
7 The Human Rights Commission reported an 87% increase in inquiries to 382 in the year to June 
1992, with formal complaints up from 26 to 61. Sexual harassment complaints made up 42% of all 
complaints pursued by the Commission. This recent increase in the Commission's workload may 
represent a shift in where complaints are taken, as women workers have been decollectivised, as well 
as more difficult employment relations. Of complaints to unions, after an initial spate in the late 1980s, 
only a handful each year go through the full personal grievance procedure to reach the Labour Court, 
now the Employment Tribunal. 
231 
it; knew how to deal with it; or changed jobs. By the early 1980s, changing jobs was 
no longer an easy solution for New Zealand women. 
Sexual harassment as a concept disrupted such constructions of gender power at 
work as simply sexuality, although as recently as the mid 1980s, a liberal view of 
'inappropriate sexuality' at work considered it 'sex-role overflow' (Gutek 1986), while 
research on secretarial work and power made sexuality its major focus (Pringle 1988). 
Radical feminism often continues to define sexual harassment at work as sexuality, but 
seen as part of an phallocentric perception that women exist to supply sexual services 
to all men in all places at all times. 
The stronger view behind women's demands for union and legal protections is that 'it 
is only tangentially related to matters of sexuality' (Wize & Stanley 1987:91); it is 
. harassment, part of 'normal' behaviour between the sexes, and by no means restricted 
to the workplace. At work, however, as well as a means of asserting power and 
extracting sexual benefits, sexual harassment in its milder forms serves to keep women 
out of certain spaces and out of the competition for men's jobs. Concerns about 
sexual harassment accompanied women's entry into clerical early this century 
(Anderson 1988:22; Brown 1993), reflecting both young women's actual vulnerability 
and resistance by male clerks to the feminisation of their occupations. It continues to 
be one the tactics used to jobs 'gendered' and the labour market segregated (Stanko 
1988). 
Sexual harassment at work was named as an issue by United States and British 
feminists (MacKinnon 1979; Wise & Stanley 1987:211) and raised by New Zealand 
unions as women began to organise together as women and as feminist women 
moved into positions as officials. The clerical unions, particularly Central as the most 
actively feminist, were crucially involved in educational and political campaigns to 
establish policy against sexual harassment by the Federation of Labour and by 
government. A Distribution Workers official recalls first meeting the issue through her 
membership of the Central union as a union employee. 
"I remember very well the meeting at the Clerical Workers Union when we first 
started discussing sexual harassment. Someone started talking about it, there 
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would have been a group of eight or nine and everyone in the room had had 
the same experience." (Central CWU member, DWU, Nov.1990) 
Clerical officials worked with feminist unionists from other unions through the women's 
sub-committees of the Federation of Labour, and put up the remit that passed 
protection from sexual harassment into Federation of Labour policy in 1983. The cleri-
cal unions attempted to negotiate sexual harassment procedures into the general 
awards from 1984. In 1985 they got only an end note the NZ Clerical Award to the 
effect that sexual harassment was unacceptable. However, they were successful in 
their Licensed Hotels clerical award - the first in the private sector - and in the school 
secretaries' award in gaining a clause that it was 'totally unacceptable' and that 
employers would take steps to resolve the problem. This was extended to their other 
awards in 1986. Some clauses on sexual harassment were achieved in some other 
awards for female dominated occupations. Officials of these unions, the clerical union 
worked with the women's sub-committees and the Auckland Working Women's 
Resource centre to have sexual harassment procedures included in Labour's planned 
labour relations legislation. 
Although there has been some doubt whether the confrontational framework of the 
Labour Court is appropriate to these matters (Hicks 1988) and there has been some 
concern among union women about recent judgements, it was only through the 1987 
Act that a full definition and procedures for dealing with sexual harassment were 
included in awards. The clerical unions lobbied for inclusion of sexual harassment 
procedures in the 1987 legislation to gain full recognition for it as an industrial and 
workplace issue. They saw protection through Human Rights legislation as insufficient 
because of long delays and because of the individual basis of complaint. Third party 
referral by the union could help defuse such crises in personal relations and protect 
a member against risk to her employment (Coleman 1988). 
The Act included sexual harassment as one of four specific grounds for personal 
grievance procedures, including a definition, now repeated in most industrial 
documents, broad enough to satisfy any feminist: 
... behaviour which is unwelcome or offensive ... and which is either repeated or 
of ... a significant nature. (LRA 1987) 
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"Members were happy with that, it was a great victory to get that included in a 
lot of awards, because it affects a lot of women. Surprising how much of it 
goes on." (NZCWU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
By 1991 the clerical unions reported a falling off in reports of sexual harassment arising 
in their organising work, although they recognised that reduced clerical job availability 
over the last year or two may mean fewer complaints. 
'Very seldom do they get to the personal grievance stage. There seems to be 
more awareness of what's right and wrong, what's aI/owed and what isn't. The 
campaign to get good sexual harassment clauses in documents was part of a 
campaign of educating people about what's okay and what isn't." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Problems have continued to arise, however, from inadequate understandings of rights 
and procedures for dismissal by employers acting in support of women harassed by 
co-workers, and from inadequate understandings of sexual harassment itself apparent 
in some tribunal decisions (Coleman 1988; Employment Tribunal 1992). 
Although the first efforts to negotiate award clauses on sexual harassment met 
resistance from employers, the campaign for public awareness of the issue and 
legislation to provide labour Court procedures met success remarkably quickly. In 
1992 the Working Women's Resource Centre in Auckland was marketing its educating 
and mediating services on sexual harassment to large Auckland employers. This 
contrasts with the organised opposition of the Business Roundtable, Employers 
Federation and Treasury to the pay equity campaign. For one feminist unionist 
involved in both campaigns the reason for this difference was clear: 
"More dol/ars involved. We are talking money here!" 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
The Compact and the Clerical Unions 
Within the Federation of labour the clerical unions were a voice for change on 
women's issues and a frequently dissenting voice on other issues. As has been seen 
in relation to arbitration, the strategies of leaders of the union movement tended to 
reflect the labour market position and ideological dominance of traditional male trades 
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and the manufacturing sector. They were not always appropriate to the very different 
situation of clerical workers. 
Increasing unemployment had undermined the potential of the right to strike gained 
in the 1987 Act. Job retention, productivity and economic growth were prioritised by 
union leaders who had once advocated militancy. In Labour's second term, cuts to 
state spending were making inroads into the 'social wage' of education and health 
services, while legislative changes made wage negotiations more difficult for both 
public and private sector unions. The NZCTU's 'strategic unionism' of Compact and 
Growth Agreement was a corporatist strategy aimed at regaining input into govern-
ment policy. 
In late 1988, when the idea of a Compact was first floated, the Clerical Workers 
Association's president and women's rights secretary spent two weeks in Australia to 
assess the Australian Accord. Tiley found it had not measured up to its promise, par-
ticularly for industrially weak workers. On the basis of their findings, they raised 
questions about the New Zealand government's motivation and whether it would 
adhere to its side of the bargain. In their view, the process of any Compact should 
be participatory, to maintain active involvement of members in unionism. There should 
be a clearly identifiable women's agenda, with legislation for pay equity enacted prior 
to entering any Compact, to ensure it would not become an item of trade (NZCWA 
1989). Neither participation nor women workers were prioritised in the Compact and 
Growth agreement which developed - although pay equity was indeed maintained as 
a quite separate issue. 
Some unionists saw the Compact as collaboration (TUAC 1989; Harvey 1992:72). 
Clerical union officials saw it as naive. 
"Suddenly we are being more conciliatory towards the arguments that have 
been put up against us since time immemorial. But what has changed? How 
are we more responsible for our country's economy than ten 10 years ago. Six 
or seven years ago you never would have dreamt they'd be saying it." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Like many other unionists, clerical union officials opposed the top down process by 
which the Compact and Growth Agreement were introduced by NZCTU leadership 
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(Trotter 1989; Harvey 1992:70). Both had clearly been decided between NZCTU 
officials and government MPs before affiliated unions were asked to vote on the 
matter, and affiliates were to decide before their membership could vote on it. The 
process was publicly undemocratic and a reversal of the grassroots-to- national-policy 
way the new organisation had been theorised. It particularly angered union organisers 
trying to increase the democratic participation of members in their own union, whose 
daily contact with potential members involved assuring them that unions had changed. 
The Growth Agreement just six weeks before the 1990 election was generally seen as 
a last ditch attempt to save Labour. 
"For some reason the CTU seems to think that the working people of New 
Zealand are still behind the Labour Party ... People really hated what they were 
dOing. II (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
The clerical unions had voted against the Compact. Because of the cross section of 
political party preference among the membership, the clerical unions had never been 
affiliated to the Labour Party and took a neutral stance in party terms. The Compact 
seemed to support a Labour government that had inflicted major damage on clerical 
workers through the removal of compulsory arbitration and other 'reforms'. The 
clerical unions could not see any reason for a change in the relation of the union 
movement with government. Some individual organisers joined an opposition group 
forming within the trade union movement to argue the case against the Compact as 
both strategy and process, circulating critiques of the Compact and of similar deals 
from Britain, Sweden and Australia (TUAC 1989 and collected union papers; Ross, 
O'Lincoln & Willett 1986). 
Nor did clerical officials thank the NZCTU for the Growth Agreement restricting them 
to an award claim of 2%, plus a possible 1 % for 'productivity'. Over the past three 
years, NZ Clerical Award rates had slipped against inflation and major awards for male 
dominated trades and officials were preparing to negotiate on that basis, as well as 
preparing pay equity claims. Productivity claims seemed more appropriate to the 
shrinking productive sector than to service work. Before Harry Bravermann turned his 
attention to clerical work, marxists had disparaged it as 'unproductive' labour, a view 
which lingers in some union circles. As a concept in economics, productivity is the 
ratio of output over wage costs. It is a concept not easily applied to clerical work, 
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even in production sector business; not indeed to any servicing work, despite efforts 
by officials to construct arguments on this basis. In fact, it cut across the clerical 
unions' strategy which was based on achieving a revaluation of their members' work 
skills through comparable worth assessments with typically male work, as noted in tile 
clerical unions' magazine. 
This narrow concept of productivity is no use to us and antagonistic to pay 
equity. (Paper Clip, Oct 1990) 
The clerical unions also voted against the Growth Agreement, as did the Canterbury 
Stores Union, Northern Distribution Union and NZ Distribution & General Workers, 
covering low paid stores and retail workers. So too did the Post Office Union, which 
had just been offered 10% by Telecom employers. However, the clerical unions went 
along with the majority decision of NZCTU affiliates. 
"Our announcement that we were not in favour of the Growth Agreement came 
as no surprise to them, but it was simply maintaining our policy of trying to look 
after our membership." (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
We didn't vote against it because we oppose deals as such, but because it's 
a bad deal. (Paper Clip, Oct 1990) 
Even before this opposition to the Compact and Growth Agreement, the relationship 
between the clerical unions and NZCTU leadership had been somewhat strained. The 
NZCTU had mediated in the settlement over the NZ Clerical Award over Clause 13, 
and had initially without consultation put up a position to which clerical union officials 
were totally opposed. This was that the clerical award should become a 'slave' 
document, that is, overridden by the dominant union document on siteS. The rates, 
conditions and hours in the general award, basic as they are, would then only apply 
where they were less advantageous to members than those of other workers. 
"I don't think it was unintentional either. It was in line with industry 
bargaining." (NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
8 This was already the case on the clerical awards clause regarding standard commercial hours of 
work, which were 37-1/2, but could be overridden by the standard hours of work in other documents 
covering the site, such as the 40 hours standard in most factories. 
Occupational or Industrial Unionism? 
Harvey identifies three strands in the NZCTU's 'strategic unionism': greater input into 
macro-economic and social policy; restructuring of awards to reflect an industry rather 
than occupations base and allow more flexibility in content; and a similar restructuring 
of the union movement itself (Harvey 1992:65-66). The last two were felt by clerical 
union officials as a direct threat - to the clerical unions as organisations, and to clerical 
workers as a self-identified group competing in a particular labour market and 
represented in the union movement. 
This acceptance of labour market 'inflexibility' as a problem attributable to occupational 
unionism can be sourced to pressure for change by employers' organisations in two 
areas. Firstly, traditional relativities between occupational groups had been developed 
by the Arbitration Court as a means of stabilising labour costs and ensuring a 
reasonable standard of living. From the early 1980s employers argued that relativities 
were impeding the movement of labour between contracting and expanding industries 
through maintaining wages at levels which no longer matched profitability, making 
those industries uncompetitive (NZBRT 1988b; NZ Treasury 1987:278). This view led 
to relativity between occupations and between public and private sector being dropped 
from arbitration criteria under the 1987 and 1988 Acts. 
Secondly, strict demarcation between trades had historically been an important means 
of establishing control over and recognition of skills in industry; new tasks included 
within a job category were a means of gaining an increase in the wage rate. Industrial 
employers saw demarcation between occupations as an impediment to change in 
technology and in work organisation (NZBRT 1989) and the development of the 
'flexible, multi-skilled worker needed in 'New Times' (Neilson 1990; Walsh 1990). 
A regrouping of unions to encourage bargaining by industry would allow a free 
movement of labour between industries, as greater benefits could be negotiated for 
workers in expanding industries. Industry unionism was seen by influential unionists 
as a means of building unity, size and industrial strength within one industry to try and 
control, or at least have greater input, into the strategies of that industry (NZCTU 
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1988c:3). Current patterns of unionisation did not always cover 'grey areas' arising 
from changes in the labour process in some industries and from ownership shifts in 
others (NZCTU 1988c:8-10). Small craft unions, encouraged by the Labour Relations 
Act's requirement for a minimum membership of 1000, began to amalgamate along 
industry lines. 
In its plan for reorganisation of the union movement along industry, then sector lines 
(NZCTU 1988c; 1989a), the NZCTU broadly accepted the arguments of employers and 
economists. These arguments were, however, largely irrelevant to the kinds of jobs 
in which most women are employed (Hill 1992b), and most particularly irrelevant to the 
situation of clerical union members. 
Clerical workers are a mobile workforce with transferable skills of use in all industries. 
Since few firms offer a clerical career path, clerical workers seek experience and wage 
improvements through changing jobs, taking maximum advantage of the labour market 
for their skills in times of high employment (Anderson 1988:19)9. Flexibility of flow 
between industries as industry fortunes and job numbers changed was evident in 
steady clerical union membership numbers through most of the 1980s, despite sector 
. fluctuations. 
With three-quarters of New Zealand women concentrated in eight most common 
occupational areas (Dept Labour 1988), the occupational unions covering most of the 
female workforce were already large. As the third biggest private sector union, size 
of union organisation was not the reason for the clerical unions' industrial weakness. 
Nor was workplace inflexibility a charge reasonably levelled at their members, nor 
members of most other low paid female dominated occupations. Low industrial 
strength and low skill recognition are associated with lower control over job 
boundaries and demarcation than industrially strong unions may be able to command. 
A high proportion of clerical union members were in 'general' office jobs in small firms. 
Female socialisation and the gender relations in offices meant many women members 
9 Jacqueline Tyrrell's (1993:51,58-9,82) research on large Auckland finance sector firms (largely 
outside COMPASS' coverage) concluded that even these offered no internal career paths for clerical 
workers, who relied for advancement on the external market for clerical labour. 
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obligingly performed a range of non-clerical tasks as requested, from supplementary 
cleaning to choosing the boss's wife's birthday present. Perhaps the most regular 
demarcation skirmishing is around who makes the coffee, an issue of considerable 
symbolic importance in office relations, on which women workers continue to lose 
(Pringle 1988). 
The clerical unions frequently refer to a clerical 'industry', but it is perhaps more useful 
to see it as a clerical labour market. An occupational union protects workers and 
negotiates minimum rates and conditions right across the labour market in which 
clerical workers compete against each other. Reducing competition and undercutting 
between workers on basic wages and conditions is the raison d'etre of unionism. 
Arguments put forward against formalising 'second tier' bargaining into enterprise 
agreements under the 1987 Labour Relations Act (Harbridge 1988) were equally valid 
with regard to reorganising the unionisation of the clerical labour market along industry 
lines. While it might formalise better market rates for the few, it would diminish the 
negotiating strength of the clerical workforce asa whole and labour market protections 
for the majority. 
Clerical workers are recognising their participation in a particular labour market, as well 
as the tasks they perform, when they identify with their occupation rather than their 
industry of the moment. That occupational identity was demonstrated in 1936 when 
clerical workers acted to unionise their occupation, resisting employers' preference for 
industry unions. Again in 1990, COMPASS's membership survey showed more than 
three times as many respondents preferred occupational union organisation to indus-
try-based organisation being debated at the time. Non-members - with less sympathy 
for unionism - showed even greater preference for occupational organisation. 
Collective identity as clerical workers was historically the basis for what collective 
action was possible against the odds of their organising logistics. Collective identity 
as women workers was the base for more recent strategies for raising the union 
consciousness of clerical members. The importance of identity as a base was also 
emphasised by clerical union officials in Australia, where similar restructuring was 
proposed by the ACTU (Tanner 1988). Reorganisation of the union representation of 
clerical workers along industry lines would not only fragment clerical workers' ability 
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to bargain rates across the whole market for their labour, it would fragment their sense 
of collective identity on which a more active unionism was being built. 
Clerical officials' main argument against industry unionism was that it would hive off 
membership groups with some degree of industrial strength while providing no place 
for around 50% of members in clerical-only employment which did not fit the industry 
concept. 
liThe strategy that says to them all go and join the Engineers or the Dairy 
Workers or whatever .. .is no strategy at al/ for a clerical worker in a legal firm, 
or a real estate agent, or a computer bureau, or all those places where there 
are no other kind of workers on site." 
(Central CWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
The 1987 Labour Relations Act encouraged a move towards industry unions by 
allowing composite bargaining by several unions of either awards with blanket 
coverage or agreements between specified industry or enterprise parties. Clerical 
officials were happy to participate in these on behalf of their members; for example 
school secretaries. Composites allowed a united position with regard to employers 
while continuing representation by unions which understood members' occupational 
situation and particular concerns. 
':A composite agreement with three or four unions with one or just a couple of 
employers takes weeks, thrashing out the common things, get the common 
base document then negotiating what is going to be given up. /I 
(NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1999) 
Clerical union officials saw a difficulty in their members being absorbed into an industry 
union, because it would not provide speci'fic representation of the interests and 
experiences of clerical workers, who would always be the minority in discussions. 
Past experience of attitudes of other occupations and their unions towards clerical 
workers and women's issues suggested that their concerns might be considered less 
important and more negotiable. 
"We could see our people becoming poor relations of the major unions on the 
sites. /I (NZCWU Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
"The tendency is for minority groups to be subordinated, itls just a fact of life. 
When the minority is also women, then you have a double subordination. 
Women will not hold positions within the union, they will not be in a position to 
make their voices heard in what they want. /I (CWA Staff Official, Aug. 1989) 
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"I was talking to a shop steward, he said oh, we willloak after them fine. I said, 
if you are on a worksite with 20 clerical workers and 200 engineers and the 
employers say they will destroy the clerical workers' allowances but give you 
yours, what are you going to do? Put it to the vote, he said. 200 male 
engineers who can see a pay rise and 20 female clericals who get a decrease. 
You know what he said? Well, it's pin money anyway for them. It 
(Central CWU Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
In the view of clerical union officials, the concept of industry unionism was already out 
of date,. for two reasons. Firstly, the largest and most influential New Zealand 
companies and multi-nationals had diversified across particular industries. Industry 
unionism would be vulnerable to industry expansions or contractions and economic 
shifts which some companies were now large enough to precipitate. 
"These big companies like Fletcher Challenge spread their operation without 
logic of area of product other than profit... There is no industry identification 
within management... (But) unions are wanting to put all their eggs in one 
basket. You can only take the boss on in that one industry and when your 
industry starts to crap out your whole union's down the tube. 1/ 
(CWA Staff Official, Aug. 1989) 
In such a context cross-industry labour market based organisation may offer better 
protection. 
Secondly, the premise of industry organisation was that size was strength and would 
result in economies of scale. Leaving aside the fact that industry unionism proposed 
to reduce the clerical unions' size, this assumption was also becoming problematic. 
While amalgamations were reducing the number of unions over the late 1980s, the 
number of actual documents being negotiated and serviced had grown (Harbridge 
1990), as industry and enterprise documents and composite negotiations proliferated 
as part of 'bargaining reform'. 
In Strategies for Change the NZCTU (1989a) took the logic of industry unionism a 
stage further, proposing 14 sector unions to cover the whole economy. This would 
more readily encompass sma", new or unique businesses, new occupations arising 
from new technology or work reorganisation, and to some degree company diversi-
fication. This sector plan was based on industry statistical categories, not 
occupational ones - that is, it reflected markets for products and employers' 
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organisation rather than markets for different kinds of labour (H ill 1991 b). The plan did 
not find immediate favour with the union movement since it redistributed several 
existing union organisations through different sectors and sliced up the awards 
protecting a number of cross-industry occupations. In particular, the plan clearly had 
no place for the clerical unions. 
I\JZCTU officials pOinted out that four of the 14 proposed sectors - education, health, 
entertainment/services and retail - would have a majority of female members and that 
adequate structural provision for women's concerns could be negotiated as a 
condition of transfer. However, the international evidence is that it is women union 
officials who prioritise the specific concerns of women members and that women 
continue to be under-represented in the leadership of such industry based unions and 
union federations elsewhere (Milkman 1985; Crain 1991; Curtin 1991; Trebilcock 
1991 :412; ICFTU 1991). In l\Jew Zealand, only organisations with very high 
proportions of women members have achieved women in the key position of union 
secretary but I\JZCTU's female dominated sector unions were unlikely to have more 
than two-thirds women members. 
It was, however, enterprise bargaining, not industry or sector unions, that was on the 
agenda of the Business Roundtable (NZBRT 1987). The 1987 Labour Relations Act 
left the initiative for changes to bargaining structure with the unions. The 1990 Amend-
ment restoring a form of arbitration gave employers the right to initiate employee 
ballots for enterprise negotiations. However, this was rapidly overtaken by a change 
of government. National encouraged enterprise bargaining by the simple expedient 
of legislating away all other possibilities for employees. 
The debate around the I\JZCTU's proposal for industry, then sector unionism, and the 
effects of the loss of arbitration on award negotiations for clerical workers, meant that 
the effects of the Employment Contracts Bill on the organisation of clerical workers 
were well understood and eminently predictable. 
"The end result of all this is the destruction of the Clerical Workers Union and 
with it goes the national award ... protection for thousands and thousands of 
clerical workers. And that is a cost that they are prepared to bear because it 
doesn't really affect them." (Central CWU Staff Official, Aug. 1991) 
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The NZCTU led demonstrations against the Bill, but its president spoke out publicly 
C?gainst a general strike before this was voted on by union memberships. Once the 
Act was passed, NZCTU leadership rapidly adapted to the new workplace focus of 
negotiation, and to a view of the national award system as an historical anomaly, 
rather than a historic achievement in unionising and protecting low paid workers 
(NZCTU 1991b). 
The Impact of the Employment Contracts Act 
The Employment Contracts offered employers - but not employees or unions - the 
possibility of negotiating a multi-employer contract to replace the award. However, 
without blanket coverage, a multi-employer contract would require organisation of 
thousands of employers to cover the clerical market. Despite ambivalent employer 
attitudes to bargaining reform uncovered by clerical union research (NZCWU 1990b, 
1991a), the policy of their negotiating body, the Employers Federation, was firmly in 
line with the Business Roundtable view (Herbert 1990a). When the Employment 
Contracts Act was passed in May 1991 it was already clear that on expiry in early 1992 
clerical awards would fragment into enterprise and individual contracts. 
The loss of multi-employer negotiating destroyed the clerical unions' ability to organise 
minimum protections for the clerical labour market. Now only members themselves 
could be organised, into collective contracts on a worksite by worksite basis. While 
all unions were stretched by the negotiating requirements of the Act, none were faced 
with logistical problems on the scale of clerical unions. 
"How do we manage to maintain involvement in the negotiation of all those 
contracts? We have got thousands of employers and we simply won't be able 
to, physically we won't be able to get around them all." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, July 1991) 
The effect that the Employment Contracts Act would have on clerical bargaining was 
demonstrated immediately in another area of women's employment where talks had 
broken down in 1989. The Tearooms and Restaurants Award had not been 
renegotiated and became invalid when the Act became law on 15 May 1991. Very few 
collective contracts had been negotiated for the high turnover, widely scattered 
244 
workforce in tearooms and restaurants, so that new employees were having to accept 
the lower terms and conditions that employers offer. 
With similar workforce logistics, many clerical union members found themselves in the 
same similar position when the NZ Clerical Award expired in February 1992, with little 
power to negotiate on either a collective or an individual basis. COMPASS began 
organising collective contracts as best it could, worksite by worksite, starting with the 
largest, then moving on to those with 1 O~20 clerical members. With penal rates a 
central item on the Employers Federation's agenda for 1992, a flat rate for every day 
of the week was being demanded in clerical contracts, even by companies whose staff 
never worked weekends. For TAB clerical workers, penal rates were important but to 
secure a contract they had to be traded against an increased base rate. This cost 
workers an estimated 18% loss in average earnings, with much high losses for 
parttime workers employed for weekends only. With penal rates gone, Sunday racing 
was immediately announced. 
Other large employers of clerical workers were offering collective contracts that 
reduced existing terms of employment. 
'~n attack on hours and on penal rates, those are the two areas, especially with 
large employers. It is a moot paint whether that is more palatable than not 
getting a collective contract at aI/ in some cases." 
(COMPASS Organiser, June 1991) 
If clerical workers were offered a disadvantageous collective contract, they could opt, 
under Clause 19 of the Act, to retain existing rates and conditions on an 'assumed' 
individual contracts, with nothing negotiated and usually nothing in writing. This would 
mean, however, there was no collective contract for new employees to join. 
"All they'll do is give them a standard form, fill in the gaps, there are your 
wages, your hours and that's your job. And they have made it very clear they 
want to make the unions irrelevant." (NZCWU Elected Officer, July 1991) 
When larger employers were negotiating collective contracts, sometimes on a 
composite basis with more than one union, COMPASS found that they dealt with their 
clerical workers last, rather than as an integral part of the workforce with clerical 
concerns backed by combined negotiating strength. Often employers preferred to 
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keep just clerical workers on individual contracts. A few large employers were 
negotiating not one collective contract for the whole company, or one per occupation, 
but one document per management costing section, which fragmented clerical 
workers even within their own company. 
On some worksites, some members would have preferred a collective contract but 
workmates had already signed individual contracts, meaning the union could do little 
for them. If all members then resigned, later union access to that workplace became 
problematic under the new law10. On the other hand, on one well organised 
work site, clerical union officials restrained staunch members from ostracising 'free 
loading' workmates. Under the 1991 Act law, the union was no longer obliged to 
represent all comers and could quite legally cancel membership or exclude from next 
year's negotiations anyone who acted against the collective. Union offiCials, however, 
saw this as ultimately self-defeating for building future collective solidarity. 
"So we tend to do some of the employer's work in smoothing things over, which 
is ironic but true./1 (COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
In some respects, the clerical unions were one of the few unions which already had 
experience of this kind of environment. They were used to servicing non-compulsory 
members not covered by an award and negotiating a range of documents in addition 
to their large traditional awards. 
"We had a whole myriad of documents to negotiate, the main ones without the 
one-offs11 here and there .... Our bread and butter and the way we had survived 
had been doing what most unions are now facing. /I 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
COMPASS, for example, had over 1000 members above the exemption rate in 1990 
and in 1991 contemplated expansion in this direction. With an eye to voluntary 
unionism, both Auckland and Wellington clerical unions had set up legal sections 
10 This was the issue at Pak-n-Save, Morningside, Auckland, where Distribution Workers maintained 
a picket for over six months. 
11 From the mid 1980s, as well an increase in industry clerical documents, officials negotiated and 
registered a number of second tier or enterprise documents for small numbers of members, which 
generally continued in force without annual renewal. 
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catering for above-award and non-un ionised clients with individual negotiations or 
personal grievances. 
"We are used to working with people with damn-all rights, though the Labour 
Relations Act gave the union a few more rights to work with. II 
(COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
The difficulty for unions of both 'user pays' problem solving and acting as a 
'bargaining agent' for individual contracts is costs in relation to revenue. Membership 
of most unions is around $3-$4 a week; lawyers acting as bargaining agents charge 
out at around $1 an hour. Not only are the philosophy, politics and negotiation of 
unions based on collectivism, so too are their finances. With voluntary unionism under 
the traditional labour relations framework, unions' financial viability would have 
depended on the number of members they could attract and the costs of servicing 
and representing them. 
Under the Employment Contracts Act, with no possibility of multi-employer 
negotiations, financial viability depended on the number of employers with whom the 
unions had to negotiate on behalf of the workforce it represented. The distribution and 
logistics of the clerical workforce put the unions in the position of being unable to 
. negotiate contracts on behalf of a very large proportion of their membership. Only 
very limited back-up services could now be offered to these members. Because of 
publicity and education work during the campaign against the Bill, this was a limitation 
of which members were quite aware. 
Because of the conservatism of some office workers and the vulnerability of others on 
scattered worksites, clerical union officials expected membership losses under any 
labour relations system which made unionism voluntary. With more organisers, regular 
workplace visits, better communication and a high public profile on issues of interest 
to members, they had hoped to lose fewer members than under the last brief period 
of voluntary unionism . 
. "You would have to be stupid not to appreCiate that you were going to sustain 
loses initially. There were people that no matter what you did were not going 
to be union members." (NZCWU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
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Although awards and agreements were still in force, clerical union membership began 
to drop drastically in the first few months under the Employment Contracts Act. This 
came in the form of both letters of resignation and loss of three monthly returns from 
deductions by employers. Recruitment was also made more difficult as employers 
were no longer required to supply employment information. Some members on six 
monthly or yearly invoicing had become unfinancial in anticipation of legislative 
changes under National, and this increased. 
"It's the problem of the large bill you don't really have to pay, if voluntary 
unionism is immanent." (NZCWU Staff Official, Dec. 1991) 
These membership losses varied between regions because of regional differences in 
industrial coverage of large, well organised worksites or scattered members vulnerable 
to employer pressure. The likelihood of award rates being the rates paid, or of higher 
market rates in the urban centres also affect attitudes to membership. As discussed 
earlier, in some North Island central city offices only junior staff were under the 
exemption rate. 
There were also differences in membership losses between areas of NZCWU 
coverage, which can be explained in a variety of ways. Besides having a more 
geographically compact membership than Wellington, Canterbury covered more 
Trustbanks, more airport staff and local authority clerical workers on larger more easily 
organised sites, and more members were paid closer to the award rate than in more 
commercial central Wellington. As at 2 August 1991, 90% of Christchurch's fees were 
being deducted and most of their non-deducting members received six monthly 
accounts. Of 8,081 members, 451 had resigned and 632 members on accounts were 
unfinancial. In Wellington where only 72% of members were on deductions, 887 
resignations were received and 2358 members on accounts were unfinancial out of 
10,588 members. Some unfinancial membership would be normal change in labour 
market participation, but most was as a result of the Employment Contracts Act. 
Membership by account rather than by employer deduction may indicate an already 
less than union-friendly workplace. 
"Deductions are pretty good, it's people on accounts. They just throw them in 
the rubbish tin ... Most people we are losing were under the clerical award and 
they are aware there is not much we can do for them." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, April 1992) 
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By 2 August 1991, within the NZCWU regional coverage, Wellington had lost 1,500 
more members than Canterbury - a point which contributed to regional tension in 
subsequent decision making. When losses steadied by about September-October 
1991, Wellington nonetheless had more members than Canterbury and Otago 
together, and still equalled the reported size of the formerly larger Wellington 
membership of the Engineers Union (Reid 1992:4). The clerical unions were by no 
means the only unions to suffer considerable membership losses as national awards 
lapsed. 
In all, the membership loss was over 50% for NZCWU. Northern also lost 45% in all, 
mostly in the same initial period. 
"You got the first rush, then a steady flow and then it got down to a trickle. 
Certainly we took a huge dive, as did other unions .. .But in the main I didn't see 
from the figures that there were any great surprises from what we projected." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
It would be logical to expect that losses would be greatest on small worksites which 
union officials were now clearly less able to service. In fact, size appears not to be a 
clear cut indication of levels of deunionisation. In late 1991 Officials reported that 
members on large worksites were generally staying or leaving as a group, but only 
rarely were they joining another union. Some new members were being gained 
among formerly exempt employees, who now sought the greater negotiating strength 
of a workplace collective. Many members on small worksites are retaining 
membership, even without a collective contract, perhaps because of greater 
vulnerability in the present climate. In April 1992, COMPASS still had around 60% of 
its membership in workplaces where there were three or less members. 
Membership figures give no clear cut answer about reasons for membership losses. 
With the workload pressure of negotiating under the Employment Contracts Act, there 
has been no research on clerical workers' own reasons for retaining union 
membership or allowing it to lapse. 
The situation was more complex under the Employment Contracts Act than it would 
have been with a simple change to voluntary unionism, and considerably different from 
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the 1984-85 period of voluntary unionism. Since then trade union education and the 
clerical unions' own activities and campaigns had been directed at improving 
awareness of the work of unions. Since 1988-89 the labour market for clerical work 
had tightened, publicity about the Employment Contracts Act had made people aware 
of their lack of collective protection, there was no longer the blanket coverage of basic 
award protections for non-members to fall back on, and there were many employment 
horror stories circulating. While many clerical workers took the long awaited 
opportunity to leave the union, the 'insurance mentality' of many isolated members had 
no doubt been strengthened. 
Under the Employment Contracts Act, employers were no longer required by law to 
supply information on employees to unions or to deduct union fees, so the mechanics 
of membership had become more difficult. Recruitment was not simply a matter of 
visiting workplaces and asking people to sign up on a voluntary basis. While the 
employment environment made the need for membership greater, the change to 
enterprise-only bargaining reduced the unions' capacity to deliver. 
"We have got to be able to say, if you join we will start working towards 
negotiating your contract. Once you do that you have hours and hours of work 
and meetings preparing it, a lot of nighttime and weekend meetings. II 
(COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
The workload of negotiations was compounded by the bureaucratic requirements of 
signed bargaining authorities, additional to membership, and ratification of the final 
contract. 
"You could spend three weeks negotiating a contract for two people. Two or 
twenty takes the same time to negotiate. 1I (COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
The extreme fragmentation of membership covered by the old award made union 
involvement in the negotiation of individual or collective contracts for thousands of 
small offices under the Employment Contracts Act impossible. Although the union 
could offer ali members a suggested standard contract form and later enforcement, 
the logistics of organising, discussed earlier, meant that only on larger worksites would 
experienced union officials be able to represent members in negotiations. 
liThe reality is we are not going to be able to - we never really have been 
effective organising ones and twos ... We are there if they need us, make sure 
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they have the advice they need, and if they have a problem, come in and 
enforce it." (NZCWU Elected Officer, July 1991) 
Internal Tensions 
Difficulties and differences in deciding a response to the impact of the Employment 
Contracts Act on NZCTU were heightened by tensions internal to the organisation over 
management, rather than membership. Some of the differences of position between 
secretaries and executive members about strategic directions, detailed in the next 
section, were in many ways a continuation of older regional tensions which led to the 
break up of the NZ Clerical Workers Association, and of disagreements of the organi-
sational form best suited to overcome such regional differences. 
"There is going to be this everlasting argument about who started it, who 
destroyed the Clerical Association and who didn't want it to work, who made 
sure it didn't, etc." (COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
The Association was a federal structure, funded by affiliate capitation. Its two original 
functions were the negotiation of national awards and to provide a less direct, and 
therefore more secure, basis for affiliation to the Federation of Labour. From the mid 
. 1980s the Association developed a much stronger political role in response to changes 
in labour relations legislation and in leading campaigns on women's issues. The 
additional capacity of a Wellington office and fulltime secretary from 1984, Women's 
Rights Officer from 1986, research officer and support staff in fact made such a 
political strategies possible. 
A national conference of regional officers and delegates was the highest authority of 
the Association, but effective decision making power was in the hands of an Executive 
Council, comprising two officers elected by the conference and the six regional and 
Association secretaries. The addition of two more Association officers in the late 
1980s made the proportion of fulltime paid secretaries to elected, voluntary officers the 
reverse of that on the executives of the affiliated unions. Increasingly, national policy 
was something fought out between secretaries at Association level. Although their 
decisions did not automatically bind local executives, the tail now wagged the dog -
provided the secretaries could agree on the direction the tail should wag. 
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"They were getting carried away in various areas and forgetting that we were 
their employers. The National Secretary was trying to tell us what we should 
do." (Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
Disagreements centred on four issues: taking national industrial action; Association 
costs in the face of voluntary unionism; the best means of resource rationalisation 
through amalgamation; and the priority given to women's issues and Maori issues. 
"Saying the Association wasn't working means that people weren't getting their 
own way." (COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
In 1989, Auckland Air New Zealand clerical workers voted to take industrial action. 
With insufficient membership support at other airports and unwilling to show further 
industrial weakness after the Clause 13 debacle, the Executive Council voted against 
national action. Auckland Air New Zealand members were furious at effective action 
being blocked by union bureaucrats and, through their strong presence on the local 
clerical executive, passed an 'enabling' motion to disaffiliate 12. The intention seems 
to have been to force change within the Association rather than actually leave. 
If a National government was elected in 1990, officials expected large membership and 
financial losses resulting from voluntary unionism. It was recognised that greater 
efforts to recruit and service scattered members would be crucial to union survival as 
well as a heavy drain on revenue. Some administrative facilities were being duplicated 
in Association and affiliated union offices. Ever-increasing capitation was required to 
finance the Association office, and its political lobbying and campaigns on women's 
issues weighed less with some secretaries than ensuring sufficient organisers to recruit 
voluntary union members. 
Amalgamation was seen as a means of rationalising resources, but opinions differed 
as to the best direction for amalgamation: into one national clerical union, or regionally 
with another similarly situated union, which could rationalise day to day organising in 
local firms and reflect regional differences. A number of possibilities were explored at 
12 Clerical union constitutions required that major membership decisions to go to two rounds of 
usually biannual membership meetings, a process which could be considerably speeded by resolutions 
which 'enabled' the executive to make a decision on a particular point should the need arise. 
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this stage, but none eventuated. Other unions were now fully aware of the logistical 
difficulties of organising the clerical workforce. 
"Nobody wanted us basically, we were not seen as an attractive proposition at 
al/." (COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
The fourth area of difficulty was less openly fought out and is raised here much more 
tentatively. In a number of accounts reference was made to attitudes or perceived 
attitudes of sexism and racism. The main push for women's issues had always come 
from the strong feminists in Wellington. Both the Association and the Central union 
had women's officers; in 19a9 the Association established a permanent Women's 
Committee. While all unions recognised the importance of women's issues to their 
female memberships, more conservative areas, or more conservative officials, did not 
necessarily give high priority to such issues. 
The Northem region's Maori secretary increasingly prioritised Maori issues. The 
clerical unions' Maori and women officials had been key players in securing specific 
representation for women and Maori in the NZCTU. While Central favoured Maori and 
Women's representational structures for the clerical unions themselves, Northern 
considered this tokenism and implemented the Treaty of Waitangi directly through its 
hiring policies. By the mid-19aOs, the Association's President (and Canterbury 
President) and Vice President (and Northern executive member) were both extremely 
politically active Maori women. This gave the executive council three Maori out of 
eight members. 
"That was qUite delightful because you had a mover and a shaker, whereas 
before you could move something and never get discussion on it. II 
(CWA Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
While a lobby for Maori issues in no way affected award negotiations and members' 
rates or services, it did strongly influence policy and the clerical unions' inter-union 
stance. With the dissolution of the Association, this powerful influence at the national 
political level was gone, as were the positions at national level of those Maori elected 
members. In fact, the Canterbury office went so far as to write to the NZCTU 
disassociating itself and clerical workers from statements made on behalf of Maori 
workers by its own ex-President. 
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"1 wondered how much of it (dissolution) was racist. Oeep in my heart I felt it 
was, because people realised then that things Maori could actually be moved 
through the Association." (CWA Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
Amalgamation into a national union was under discussion, particularly among the 
South Island unions, when Northern passed its enabling resolution, threatening 
disaffiliation. Instead the Central, Canterbury/Westland and Otago unions went rapidly 
ahead with amalgamation into the NZCWU. 
"When you make a decision to amalgamate you have got to do it fairly fast, had 
it all tidied up by 1 August (1990)." (NZCWU Elected Or-ficer, April 1991) 
This action dissolving the Association seems to have come as a shock to Northern. 
In one view, the NZCWU was a first step towards one national union, but this was 
unlikely to eventuate. Northern was known not to be interested in a national structure 
which would give them less, not more, regional autonomy, and did not accept that it 
would bring greater efficiency. It had the numbers to stand on its own and 
considerable assets with which to face voluntary unionism. 
"Selfishly but understandably there was concern that the assets that had been 
built up would be frittered away by people who had really played no part to 
building them up ... to build an organisation in Wellington." 
(COMPASS Officer, Aug. 1991) 
Nor did Southland join in the NZCWU. Although not against amalgamation, this was 
going too far too fast. In amalgamating, Otago lost its position of secretary to 
Christchurch. In both Otago and Southland there was resistance to decisions affecting 
local people being made yet again in Wellington. 
"There are times when I don't see the need for amalgamation when everyone 
is working well together. There is a fault, when you amalgamate you 
centralise ... Frankly, I think they concentrated too much on the administration 
side instead of the organising side." (Southland Elected Officer, April 1991) 
Officials of the new NZCWU thought there were disadvantages in being too small. 
"ff you stay too small you go back to what we were years ago, didn't have 
education officers, didn't have research people ... and the organisers had to do 
all those jobs. Its impossible to do it well." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
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Another view was that the move from the federated form of the Association to full 
amalgamation was driven not by the clerical unions' own needs for more effective 
organisation, but from an ideology within the trade union movement that 'bigger was 
better'. This related to the corporatist thinking behind the NZCTU's agenda for sector 
unions. 
"The reasoning behind the amalgamation was CTU manipulated and some of 
our brightest academic people in the clerical unions bought it...So destructive 
to do away with the Association and have nothing to coordinate across the 
country." (CWA Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
The clerical unions already had access to specialised skills under the Association 
structure. The difficulty was to find a form which provided efficient sharing of 
resources and effective joint decision making while allowing for regional differences 
and respecting regional autonomy. The growth of the centralised role of the 
Association, although politically effective, led to a tussle over control wilicrl broke the 
loose federal bonds. Experienced and valuable staff were lost and redundancy 
payments totalled $215,000. Although the three unions continued to cooperate and 
to work on national award negotiations, the single political voice on legislative or trade 
union matters was gone. However, exactly similar regional tensions, inflexibility and 
power plays continued within the amalgamated NZCWU, contributing to similar 
destruction. 
During 1991, while old awards and agreements still continued in force, a great deal of 
the energy of the NZCWU's secretaries was spent in internal discord over problems 
of management style and disciplinary action against staff members in Dunedin and 
Canterbury. At the heart of the problem was the fact that the clerical unions' coverage 
of union employees meant they also represented their own employees. 
The dispute arose initially from disciplinary action by the male Industrial Secretary 
against two Dunedin organisers after they had been charged by police for writing 
graffiti on the wall of a local employer who publicly supported the Employment 
Contracts Bill. The senior organiser was eventually dismissed. Such off-duty actions 
are not unheard of among unionists, but this secretary saw it as bringing the union 
into disrepute, although names were suppressed and conviction was by no means 
255 
certain. When two Canterbury organisers called a stopwork to discuss the matter and 
were forbidden to do so by the secretary, the dispute escalated; personal grievance 
procedures were instigated against final warnings. A similar meeting of clerical union 
organisers in Wellington had been acceptable to Wellington secretaries, who made 
efforts to contain escalation of the Christchurch dispute. 
Each of regional clerical unions had a registered staff agreement with its own 
employees. In early 1991 a NZCWU management staffing committee, comprising 
officers representing the former Otago, Christchurch/Westland and Wellington unions, 
was still negotiating the details of an amalgamated staff agreement. This committee 
confirmed the secretary's disciplinary action by a majority vote. Personal grievances 
against the final warnings were taken to the full executive and the union's position was 
confirmed, again by majority vote rather than unanimously. The secretary cited in the 
personal grievance against unwarranted warnings was involved in each level of union 
decision making about the dispute. Because the union's conciliation procedure 
allowed no appeal to independent arbitration, the two Canterbury organisers eventually 
took the case to the Labour Court and the dispute became public. They lost. Quite 
apart from the ruling, this move to the public arena was highly controversial among 
unionists, seen as a matter of industrial principle by some and by others as damaging 
to an already beleaguered union movement. 
The dispute also generated tension between the Wellington and Canterbury 
secretaries. Efforts by the Wellington secretaries to resolve the dispute, and 
unfavourable evidence given by them in the adversarial setting of the Court, were 
seen as interference and disloyalty by the Christchurch secretaries. The 'right to 
manage' underlay subsequent proposals for a regionally looser, more hierarchical 
structure for the NZCWU. 
liThe Wellington union wants to get completely involved in the local running of 
our union. When we had this court case they came down and actually gave 
evidence against us." (NZCWU Elected Officer, April 1992) 
Following NZCWU's membership losses in the first few months under the Employment 
Contracts Act, proposals were made for retrenchment, staff reductions and 
restructuring. The four~secretary structure which shared decision making power was 
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now criticised as top heavy and extravagant. A downgrading of the Administration 
Secretary and Women's Secretary jobs was agreed, leaving one industrial secretary 
in Christchurch and one in Wellington. This streamlined, more hierarchical structure 
also involved a degree of separation to allow more regional autonomy on management 
and finances. This was argued for on the basis of greater membership losses in 
Wellington than in Christchurch. 
These proposals put forward by the Canterbury Industrial Secretary were difficult to 
counter in the face of revenue losses which clearly required retrenchment and staff 
redundancies. Secretaries dedicated to the survival of the union felt unable to argue 
for their own jobs to be retained on the basis of feminist principles of collective 
decision making and flatter hierarchies. However, they saw clearly the advantages of 
the plan for the greater regional management control sought by the male Canterbury 
industrial secretary. 
In late 1991 an executive meeting agreed to the cutbacks and restructuring in 
principle. NZCWU's auditors assessed the situation of the union under proposed staff 
cutbacks and restructuring and considered that with lower membership numbers the 
organisation still financially viable, with certain important provisos of reorganisation. 
The Demise of the NZ Clerical Workers Union: 
(Did it ju mp or was it pushed?) 
The impact that the Employment Contracts Act would have on the clerical unions was 
fully appreciated by NZCTU leaders. As membership losses began, a July 1991 letter 
from the NZCTU Secretary proposed a 'managed distribution' of NZCWU members 
to other unions. This was in line with the plan of NZCTU officials to reorganise the 
union movement on an industry of sector basis (NZCTU 1989a; Harvey 1992:66). The 
letter laid out where union coverage of NZCWU's membership groups should go - with 
the notable omission of unions' own organisers and support staff. 
Some of the suggestions seemed of doubtful logic to clerical officials. South Island 
local authority clerical staff were to join the union of a smaller number of Local Body 
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Officers. Airport clerical staff were to join the Engineers Union although they 
outnumbered Engineers' members at most airports. 
"Where is the sense in carving up the clerical union to put us in a union that is 
smaller than ours?" (NZCWU Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
Although the larger well organised industry groups could clearly be well taken care of 
under the plan, there was little to suggest that smaller, scattered industry groups, or 
the 50% of the NZ Clerical Award members who had no other unions on site, would 
be in fact be better organised or their interests better represented by other unions. 
The 'managed distribution' would not solve the logistical problem of organising and 
negotiating under the Employment Contracts Act which was likely to deunionise a 
large proportion of the clerical membership. 
"To me the important thing is to keep as many of our members as possible 
unionised. If the CTU plan is right and carving up does that, then I will go 
down that track but I don't believe it will." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, April 1992) 
In September 1991, membership and revenue losses were reported at a round of 
membership meetings. An enabling motion was then put forward, and agreed by most 
of the September membership meetings, allowing the executive 13 explore· the 
NZCTU's proposition further. 
It was at a September meeting of the executive that the details of NZCWU 
restructuring to facilitate retrenchment and greater regional autonomy were to be 
worked out, following agreement in principle at the previous meeting. It was at this 
meeting, however, that top officials of the NZCTU presented themselves to facilitate 
their own proposal, for the disbanding of the union and the 'managed distribution' of 
its members to industry unions. The decision to disband the union was very much at 
the instigation of NZCTU officials, strongly facilitated by the Canterbury industrial 
secretary who was in constant contact by phone and fax during this period. In the 
view of one executive member: 
13 Comprising a president, two vice-presidents and nine district representatives, and the four 
secretaries. Although since the 1987 Act all were elected positions, secretaries had fulltime paid 
positions while others were ordinary clerical workers acting voluntarily. 
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"The whole blueprint was signed, sealed and delivered, practically. /t's like a 
kick in the teeth." (Dominion Sunday Times, 1.12.91) 
The executive was split on the difficult decision. Some executive members, unsure 
that membership numbers had stabilised, felt that dissolving the union before it slid 
into massive debt was the only responsible course. Negotiations with other unions 
should commence for proper representation and smooth transition of members while 
this was still possible and deunionisation could be minimised. For others, the 
'managed distribution' itself was irresponsible since it would mean deunionisation, 
particularly of members formerly covered by the NZ Clerical Award, many of whom 
could not be easily reassigned. In a vice president's view, the decision 'had been 
steamrollered through by union secretaries in conjunction with the CTU, and was not 
in the best interest of members' (Dominion Sunday Times, 1.12.91). 
However, the executive decided by majority vote for dissolution and the NZCTU 
proposal. While most recognised the decision as necessary, some continue to have 
doubts, and certainly regrets. 
"Had we perhaps not rushed or gone with the knee jerk reaction as much as 
we did and sat it out for longer, things might well be different now. I still think 
there was a place for a clerical union or some organisation that serviced 
members in that area." (NZCWU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
Ironically, because of membership dissatisfaction with leadership about the 
Employment Contracts Act, at a previous round of meetings the membership had 
'enabled' the executive to withdraw from the NZCTU, should they so decide. 
"It never got to that, but it had come up several times at quarterly meetings, a 
lot of our members knew we were sidelined and didn't see the relevance of 
being affiliated when it cost us so much. .. it came up time after time." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
It is also to be noted that, in the auditor's financial assessment and in the later 
wind-up, one of NZCWU's creditors was the NZCTU, to whom it owed $34,000 in 
levies. The administration secretary had not transferred this in view of the NZCWU's 
financial situation and doubt about continuing affiliation. 
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The winding up of the union and the manner in which union's own employees were 
dismissed was a subject on which a great deal of distress was expressed in the last 
interviews with NZCTU officials. Some staff openly disagreed with the decision to 
dissolve the union and management-staff tensions about the recent dispute led to staff 
being treated with extreme distrust in the winding up process, despite their 
demonstrated willingness to make personal sacrifices for the union. It was at this point 
that some Wellington staff first approached another union in the same building, the 
Manufacturing & Construction Union, for advice and the independent representation 
that was not provided by the clerical unions' staff agreement. 
One of the auditors' provisos with regard to the union's financial viability related to 
redundancy. As is usual practice, the auditors balanced liability for possible 
redundancy payments against the organisation's assets. Staff were asked to vote to 
drop redundancy payments from their staff agreement to assist the future viability of 
the union. On principle, Wellington staff voted against this, but on the understanding 
that they would agree with the majority decision which was in favour. Despite this and 
the auditors' assessment of organisational viability with a reduced membership, the 
decision to disband was made. In the final wind-up, Wellington staff in fact acted to 
ensure that staff of all regions were treated equally, in the face of an attempt by 
management to deny redundancy entitlement to those who had earlier signed waivers 
in order to help avert dissolution. 
The actual dismissal of staff attracted adverse media publicity, particularly in 
Wellington. Two days before Christmas staff in Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin 
were called to synchronised meetings at which they expected to be given notice of 
redundancy effective at the end of January. Instead, they were told by the Industrial 
Secretaries to hand over car keys, clear out desks and leave immediately, ostensibly 
on the instruction of the auditors. Since final payment cheques included neither wages 
in lieu of notice nor redundancy, as management prioritised payments to trade 
creditors, Wellington organisers retained the cars until early January. In this wrangle, 
the Manufacturing & Construction Union which was advocating for Wellington staff and 
management called on the mediation of NZCTU officials, who as trade creditors at this 
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point waived their capitation levies. Redundancies entitlements and payments took 
several months to be resolved. 
Response and media attention was less strong in Christchurch and Dunedin as word 
about the purpose of the meeting had leaked to some staff; organisers no longer had 
possession of cars and some had already resigned or moved to other unions. The 
shock was greatest to clerical staff. 
As with earlier union management decisions about disciplining staff, the union's 
representative structure spread decision making power between Christchurch and 
Wellington offices, between four secretaries and, with respect to final decision making, 
between executive members spread across half the length of the country. In decisions 
where the best course of action was not easy or clear cut, the balance of opinion 
between decision makers shifted as the situation and the debate developed. The 
decision to dissolve was unusual in that it involved strong input from leaders of the 
NZCTU; that is, the wider politics of the union movement and labour-capital positioning 
were brought into the internal decision making processes of the NZCWU. At no point 
were union management arid executive opinions undivided, but majority decisions 
. were reached, as in all organisations, by a essentially political process mediated by 
personalities. 
Despite earlier differences of position, the three women secretaries all spoke in later 
interviews of misinformation, misrepresentation and secretiveness on the part of the 
Canterbury industrial secretary 14, much of which only became apparent after the 
dissolution of the union. This distorted communication and undermined trust between 
staff in Wellington and Canterbury about who was supporting who or what, or where 
and how decisions were being made. 
14 This secretary departed on 11 January for a short term with an Australian insurance union. Other 
officials later learned that the travel arrangements had been made six months previously and that he then 
took up a three month NZCTU study grant to Britain. 
"He had his agenda, we had other concerns and the CTU was able to push their plan through." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
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While acknowledging the expertise and helpfulness of NZCTU officials in winding up 
the organisation and reallocating union responsibility for its industry mernbersl~lip 
groups, NZCWU secretaries interviewed later saw the NZCTU's role as by no means 
benign. It was all part of the long standing plan of CTU leadership for reorganisation 
of the union movement into industry, then sector, unions. 
"The ulterior motive was still there, it was very apparent to me .. . After the 
introduction of the Labour Relations Act the CTU plan evolved ... We were saying 
we still reject your idea, these women still need (occupational) coverage, be-
cause they are women, and because the sort of work they do is important. So 
we were sidelined right from there." (I\JZCWU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
With bargaining restructured on an enterprise basis and the shift toward a more ad 
hoc version of sector unionism authorised in principle by a Special Affiliates 
Conference in April 1991, the clerical unions no longer fitted the mould. Since NZCTU 
officials considered that some clerical 'industry' groups such as the Trustbanks and 
school secretaries would shift to sector unions, in their view: 
"There wasn't a core membership that could form the foundation of that, that 
could stand alone and resource itself." (NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
A still less benign aspect of this restructuring along industry lines, in the view of the 
women secretaries, was that it was promoted largely by unionists who in the past had 
opposed clerical officials on feminist issues raised in the Federation of Labour. In 
particular, they had opposed the specific representation of women and Maori in the 
formation of the CTU structures. 
"Industry unionism, carving up the clerical unions into industry bits, has been 
on the agenda since 1987. They never liked all those feminists in the 
clerical." (NCWU Elected Officer, April 1992) 
The disappearance from the movement of prickly feminists with unorthodox tactics 
may be a personal side-benefit for some old-style unionists, but the dismantling of the 
I\JZCWU seems unnecessary to have achieved this. Membership losses under the 
Employment Contracts Act would have ensured that surviving and viable clerical 
unions would no longer had the voting power to back their dissenting views, inside or 
outside the union movement. 
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The Employment Contracts Act disarmed not just the power of the clerical unions but 
of most of the private sector feminist opposition to mainstream union strategies, and 
of opposition from similarly placed, low paid male dominated unions such as the 
Labourers' Union. A shift in balance was demonstrated at the July 1992 NZCTU 
conference when arbitration on disputes of interest was dropped from policy on a 
future labour relations system. A remit on arbitration was narrowly defeated on a 
membership card vote, an outcome which reflected membership losses from the 
Employment Contracts Act and the dissolution of the NZCWU. The NZCTU has 
chosen an labour relations direction which reflects the position of its financial 
members, rather than its potential members, unemployed workers or the working class 
as a whole. 
Carving Up the NZCWU 
Following the decision of the I\lZCWU executive, the initial 'enabling' resolution on 
NZCTU's proposal to redistribute the membership among other unions was followed 
up with a mail ballot of members to confirmed the executive's position. The ballot form 
was accompanied by a six page leaflet explaining how the 'managed distribution' 
would work. This was written by the NZCTU, with supporting statements from 
NZCWU's president and two secretaries. It took its starting point from the 1989 plan 
for sector unionism, rather than the various awards and agreements covering the 
members concerned. 
This was followed by the two rounds of membership meetings constitutionally required 
to vote on disbanding the union. They were publicised merely in the public notice 
columns of newspapers, not through membership or delegate mailouts. Around 10% 
of the membership participated in these votes. The first meeting was in December; 
the second was in the second week of February, by which time members were voting 
on a fait accompli. 
The NZCTU gave considerable helpful assistance in the winding up of the union and 
in the 'managed distribution' of members. From records which were not as up to date 
as had been believed, letters were sent to members suggesting what union they 
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should now join and information on members was passed to those unions. Fully 
occupied with negotiations under the Employment Contracts Act and membership 
losses for their existing coverage, other unions were not swift to take up the 
opportunity to recruit clerical workers, particularly those on smaller worksites. 
Ironically, the clerical unions' arguments about the reality of their organising situation 
seems to have been now clearly understood by organisers of other unions, if not by 
policy makers. 
By June 1992 responsibility for negotiating on behalf of NZCWU's industrial groups 
had been transferred to other unions. FINSEC, who had tried to acquire ASB 
coverage in 1991, were keen to pick up the Trustbanks. Both NZCWU and COMPASS 
had been strongly against this in the past, as it would affect the clerical unions' 
financial viability and their ability to service their more scattered membership groups. 
"Because if we don't cover the ones and twos, nobody else is going to. If you 
remove that bulk revenue from us, then yoL{~A3:~JJOJgiMtYsmr,dd:uttmt1992) 
FINSEC was much less interested in NZCTU's suggestion of taxi-telephonists and 
rental car clerical workers. In the last days of winding up NZCWU the Administration 
Secretary referred a Datacom clerical member on to Finsec, only to be phoned back 
because Finsec 'had not yet decided if it was worthwhile' to organise a workplace with 
only 9 members. 
"They don't want the rump 15, they just want the ones where they can do a 
delegate structure like they do in the other banks. 'Oh yes, we might look at 
them later, we are not interested at this nQ~Mf8)H.tJ Elected Officer, Aug. 1991) 
"The large ones worksites, yes, everyone was thinking it would be wonderful to 
pick up their own flagging memberships." (COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
At the airports, only Ansett members voted to join the Engineers Union. National 
coverage of Air New Zealand and Mt Cook has remained with a clerical union, 
COMPASS. Regions south of Taupo are to receive routine servicing by the SWU, 
which COMPASS is now joining. The SWU also picked up negotiating national 
15 A reference to a public remark by an NZCTU officer about the workers being most affected by 
the Employment Contracts Act being 'the unorganisable rump' of the union movement (see Chapter 10). 
This was mentioned by feminist unionists in several interviews for the case studies. 
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enterprise contracts for the TAB and clerical workers in licensed hotels. It is 
attempting to negotiate on behalf of answering services, taxi telephonists and rental 
cars, but in most cases only regional contracts are acceptable to employers. Clerical 
workers now part of SWU, including those in hotels, will be part of the COMPASS 
division of SWU until members decide otherwise. 
Medical receptionists are being covered by NZNU, who have been able to negotiate 
a multi-employer contract with GPs for practice nurses but not for receptionists. 
Clerical workers in hospitals moved to PSA. The Distribution Workers have included 
clerical workers in retail enterprise contracts where possible; some have preferred to 
go to COMPASS. Although already involved in composite negotiations, clerical union 
members in schools had rejected amalgamation as a section within an Education 
Sector Union proposed in 1991. Now NZEI picked up negotiation for school secre-
taries in NZCWU's region, and a few months later they were joined by school 
secretaries in the remaining regions. Canterbury /Otago local authority clerical 
members were reluctant to follow the NZCTU direction to join the Local Body Officers 
Union. They were very conscious it meant joining the union of their managers, who 
in 1990 had kept them at a 2% wage increase while giving themselves 10%. Some 
Canterbury clerical members were reluctant to have their negotiations passed to the 
SWU which there comprised only the Cleaners & Caretakers. Now the Employment 
Contracts Act offers employees choice and freedom of association, it is clerical 
workers themselves who decide whether they will move to another union and which 
it will be, or if each individual will be a union member at all. 
"Pure ideology is what's wrong with it as far as we are concerned. It looks fine 
on paper but it doesn't serve the interests of women workers to get lumped in 
with an industry if in fact that's not where they identify." 
(COMPASS Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
At September 1992 it was still unclear how well the 'managed distribution' of NZCWU 
members had been implemented in terms of actual numbers recruited and contracts 
negotiated. Little data collection and research was being done, either by the 
government (Harbridge & Moulder 1992) or by individual unions now overstretched 
and under-resourced with the impact of the Employment Contracts Act. The transfer 
of the well organised industry groups on large worksites or working for single national 
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employers appears to have been relatively smooth. A few NZCWU organisers have 
been part of the successful transfer to another union. Others have found jobs, 
temporary or permanent, with other unions independently of the NZCTU plan. 
That a clerical worksite 'fitted a particular industry category did not ensure tl1at the 
relevant union would be able to negotiate a collective contract for them, with or without 
other workers. With the fragmentation of awards into enterprise negotiations, all 
unions were having great difficulty achieving successful simultaneous negotiations for 
all their worksites, and it was logically the larger, already organised worksites or 
employees of large national companies that received priority. 
"Some unions may well be good agents for our clerical workers, some unions 
that are female dominated anyway - I am thinking of the retail awards - that may 
mirror our concerns and our policies. But that doesn't mean they will be able 
to negotiate or progress our members' wages and conditions any better." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Nor had the NZCTU proposal a solution for the bulk of the clerical membership 
formerly covered by the old NZ Clerical Award who work in small workplaces which 
do not fit readily with the memberships of existing industry unions. Unofficial data on 
collective contracts collected by the Industrial Relations Centre at Victoria University 
(Harbridge & Moulder 1992) suggests that these clerical workers are likely to be 
among the 300,000 estimated employees who had dropped from coverage by 
collective negotiations by May 1992. This was the area of greatest membership loss 
by the two remaining clerical unions, who were struggling to negotiate contracts 
work site by worksite. Although COMPASS and Southland have negotiated collective 
contracts for some larger worksites formerly under the NZ Clerical Award, they have 
had very little success negotiating national enterprise contracts which would include 
NZCWU's area. 
The bulk of the membership formerly covered the NZ Clerical Award in I\lZCWU's 
region have dropped from union membership, not necessarily voluntarily but through 
the combination of the Employment Contracts Act and the dissolution of the union in 
their area. The minority view of the I\lZCWU executive that disbanding would lead to 
massive deunionisation appears to be correct. 
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The best that is available to these clerical workers is the possibility, as amalgamation 
goes ahead, of national coverage by the SWU on behalf of their COMPASS division 
in the northern region. SWU was the union most willing to absorb NZCWU's smaller 
industry groups of membership, with one notable exception. 
"The SWU were keen to pick up bits but they definitely didn't want the union 
staff. In fact, nobody wanted them. II (NZCWU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
An offer to cover union organisers and any other unionised clerical workers did come 
from the Manufacturing & Construction Workers Union (M&C). At the time of 
dissolution, clerical union staff were under pressure about redundancy waivers and 
holiday pay, but also by what was required of them in their job at that time. Clerical 
organisers approached the M&C for an external person to represent them: 
"They found that their membership of the union which was a/so their employer 
left them in an impossible position. They were being told to go out and 
promote the breakup of the clerical union. They didn't agree with it but if they 
went out and said something different they could be liable for dismissal." 
(M&C Elected Officer, May 1992) 
Organisers and clerical staff of other unions also made informal approaches to join, 
should the NZCWU which covered them be dissolved. At May 1992 about 50 union 
organisers and clerical staff had joined. 
In Palmerston North, two women organisers upset at the disbanding of the NZCWU 
set up an Administration & General Workers Union in Palmerston North. Established 
with 80 members, it had 120 by February 1992, and around 200 by early 1993. Its 
members were mainly women, mainly in legal offices and in manufacturing, many of 
whom had been excluded from the collective contract negotiated at their workplace. 
This union offered to join the SW2U along with COMPASS and SOUTHLAND in mid 
1992, but appeared to be regarded as competition - perhaps because the connection 
of its former NZCWU organisers with M&C. Another NZCWU organiser set up 'Top 
of the South' from the remnants of the Nelson clerical union which had amalgamated 
with Central in the mid 1980s. These two unions amalgamated in late 1992, becoming 
part of the M&C. The Nelson clerical organiser acts as local agent for other M&C 
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sections, while in Palmerston North two male organisers, one parttime, jointly cover 
by M&C and Administration & General members. The women organisers had, like a 
number of other clerical union officials, found employment with public sector unions. 
"The PSA has benefited greatly from the collapse of the NZCWU. /I 
(PSA Official, Jan. 1993) 
M&C's offer to represent union employees was extended to any clerical worker who 
wished to join, without infringing on COMPASS' or Southland's regions. The 
Palmerston North union joined in late 1991. M&C's exception to territorial respect was 
an offer to cover all SWU union staff: as COMPASS was about to amalgamate into the 
SWU, SWU staff in the Northern region would otherwise be represented industrially by 
their own employer. 
This solution to the gap in the 'managed distribution' plan did not meet NZCTU 
approval, as M&C was not an affiliated union - in fact, it had been strongly opposed 
to NZCTU strategies. M&C resulted from a 1988 amalgamation of 11 organisations 
including Shipwrights, Moulders, Coachworkers, Boilermakers, Pulp & Paper and 
Optical Technicians. The historic reputation of some of these craft unions for dissent 
and militancy is formidable. 
"We are not a friendly union, we don't care whose toes we stand on. /I 
(M&C Elected Officer, May 1992) 
It might reasonably be thought that their 'culture' would not match that of ordinary 
clerical workers. However, that is not true of all sections of the union. The 
coachmakers at one stage had around 30% women members and have adopted 
policies on women's rights, including pay equity, abortion and no pornography in the 
workplace. 
/II suppose others have been critical of it in the past about its chauvinistic 
attitudes, the boilermakers ... Personally I hope it will have a radicalising effect 
on our union./I (M&C Elected Officer, May 1992) 
Because of strong craft identities, the M&C operates under a very loose structure of 
autonomous occupational groups, 'a sort of federation structure but within one union.' 
Policy and structure are decided collectively and unanimously, but each occupational 
group runs its own industrial affairs, and, given a certain size of membership, also 
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controls its own revenue and expenditure - unlike the proposed COMPASS division 
within SWU, discussed below. As a matter of principle, M&C officials are paid at the 
same rate as a Mitsubishi tradesperson: around 60% of the 'top of the range' salaries 
paid to Engineers Union organisers, the union of general coverage for manufacturing 
and construction industries. 
COMPASS and Southland continue to represent trade union staff in their areas and 
will work with M&C on composite contracts. Some other union staff, mainly in the 
state sector, are, on NZCTU officials' suggestion, now represented by the Post Office 
Union. 
liThe NZCTU don't like (the situation) at all, but they only have themselves to 
blame because they would refer nobody to us, right through this whole 
debacle. II (COMPASS Staff Official, June 1992) 
JOining the Service Workers' One Big Union,16 
The collapse of the NZCWU came as a shock to the other two clerical unions. They 
knew about NZCWU's membership losses and were suffering similar losses 
themselves, but, no longer bound together by the old Association, they were not 
consulted in the decision to dissolve. The disappearance of the NZCWU affects their 
own ability to persuade employers to negotiate collective contracts. 
"We had this sudden void from Taupo down to Invercargill, simply had no 
coverage and we thought, good god, this is going to make things really difficult 
for us up here." (COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
In the new negotiating situation, COMPASS had enough problems in its own region 
to over-stretch its capacity without compete with the NZCTU plan for redistributing 
NZCWU. 
llWe have said in the regions where the NZCWU used to be, especially retail, we 
won't recruit. If they come to us, we will refer them back. But at the end of the 
day if they want to be with us, then surely the bottom line has got to be 
maximising unionisation." (COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
16 Early this century 'one big union' was the goal of what the Red Feds called 'industrial unionism' 
(Olssen, 1988), meaning the organisation of the working class through unions rather than through 
political parties, which they regarded with scepticism. 
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Membership losses of around 45% of membership forced COMPASS to cut back 
drastically on its organisation. From 13,828 in February 1991, membership fell to 
around 7,000 in June 1992. By mid 1992 only 4 organisers remained, with a much 
smaller support staff. There was no longer an educator and the new legal department 
of two officers set up in early 1991 was also gone. Trimmed back, the union was a 
viable organisation. A financial membership would make it about the same as NZNU 
in 1990, although with considerably worse workforce logistics. 
"We could survive independently, but if we did that we would run the risk of it 
becoming a purely a bargaining agent instead of a union. II 
(COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
Between 1991 and mid 1992 COMPASS reassessed its direction for the future. In 
early 1991 it was set to pursue a 'more market' approach at the higher end of the 
clerical labour market, including 'user pays' services to non-members on individual 
contracts. Feedback from current members, however, was against this. Despite the 
1990 market research survey, active members were keen to retain the word 'union' 
with the new name. Although acting as a bargaining agent for individual contract 
negotiations on a 'user pays' basis ... 
" .. could be a lucrative way of supplementing income, but we are so busy with 
fee paying members ... We have made the conscious decision that we are a 
union and we want to remain a union." (COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
Research on the proliferation of new non-union bargaining agents (Boxall & Haynes 
1992) suggests that it was employers rather than employees that were using their 
services. The necessary priCing structures for individual legal work are unlike to 
appeal to great numbers of clerical wage earners, compared to a $3-5 a week 
membership fee. 
With the decision to focus on collectivism rather than other means of organisational 
survival, COMPASS began to explore more seriously amalgamation with other unions. 
Their choice was the SWU as the largest local union for low paid occupations. At the 
other end of the country Southland also joined SWU. Groups of NZCWU membership 
picked up by SWU have become part of a 'COMPASS' division within the union, 
providing a skeleton national structure for clerical workers. Some regional organisers 
have been given responsible for routine serviCing of these clerical members, with 
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back-up clerical expertise 'from COMPASS or Southland when necessary. COMPASS 
officials feel it is a matter of training SWU organisers in the ways of clerical workers 
and visa versa; that it is a matter of culture and approach. 
"We still believe, and we think we have been proven right, that clerical workers 
want their own identity. Now that may be snobbery in some cases but.. .. we 
know the culture of clerical workers ... 1f that is what they are, that is what we 
have got to represent, so it is important." (COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
With full amalgamation in July 1992, clerical workers formed a COMPASS division of 
SWU, alongside the Health, Hospitality and Catering, Education, Commercial Service, 
Performance and Entertaining division, with an Community Services also proposed. 
Each division has industrial autonomy but resources, management and general policy 
are under the control of regional executives and a national executive, made up of 
regional presidents and secretaries and representatives of standing committees of 
women, Maori and Pacinc Island members. Regional executives have one repre-
sentative specifically elected by each division; but the national executive of regional 
presidents and secretaries mayor may include a clerical worker. 
The advantages of amalgamation for the remaining two clerical unions are chiefly 
financial. There are savings in sharing a building, and sharing accounting, 
administration and support costs. More surprisingly, savings 'from no longer having 
their own executive meetings was also cited as an advantage. 
"There won't be an executive and that's a fairly expensive operation." 
(COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
Amalgamation as a division of SWU represents considerable loss of autonomy for 
COMPASS. However, officials feel that clerical identity and industrial autonomy will be 
retained under the new structure and that is important to their members. They point 
out that although, say, clerical workers in large accommodation hotels may one day 
decide to shift to the hospitality division, only clerical workers can make that decision 
and only clerical workers may disband or change the COMPASS division. 
This amalgamation raises interesting complexities with regard to the representation of 
union staff. COMPASS covered SWU clerical staff, who on amalgamation became 
represented by their own employer. Northern SWU organisers already belonged to 
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their employing union; some are now likely to join M&C along with SWU organisers 
and clerical staff formerly covered by NZCWU. In mid 1992 a staff contract was 
negotiated jointly by COMPASS and M&C with swu, to cover both organisers and 
support staff despite SWU's initial request for separate contracts. Although COMPASS 
is now part of SWU, COMPASS officials feel comfortable representing SWU's own 
organisers and staff. Any personal grievance will go before a mediator for a binding 
decision, with no right of appeal which would take it into the public arena. 
This, however, is the exact situation that the two Christchurch organisers found 
unsatisfactory in 1991 and was equally unsatisfactory for other staff at the time of 
NZCWU's dissolution. 
Conclusion: "rhe End of an Era 
The 1989 breakdowns in award negotiations demonstrated clearly the importance to 
low paid women workers of state supports to the bargaining power of industrially weak 
unions, and the effects that further labour market deregulation under the Employment 
Contracts Act, 1991 would have on women workers. 
Because of the extremely scattered nature of the clerical workforce, working closely 
with employers, industrial action to back award negotiations is less easily organised 
and carries greater personal risk than for the occupations in which classic union 
tactics developed historically. Workplace organisation through delegates is 
problematic, because of the scattered distribution of clerical union members among 
many small firms. These difficulties in union organising were exactly the reason why 
clerical award rates were so low and clerical skills remained undervalued. It is also 
why in most OECD countries private sector clerical workers have no unions and no 
means of negotiating minimum rates or conditions in the market for their labour. 
A way around these structural limitations to unionisation and bargaining by clerical 
workers was provided from 1936 by a particular package of state supports which 
strengthened the position o'f industrially weak unions. Clerical union officials became 
adept at working within the arbitration framework to secure benefits for their members. 
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Extreme workforce fragmentation meant that most clerical union members were not 
well organised on worksites or active participants in their union, but the award system 
enabled union of-ficials to organise the market for clerical labour. 
This focus on institutional mechanisms protecting clerical workers may seem to 
support the neo-liberal view that state intervention has distorted the natural workings 
of the labour market to prop up an inefficient organisation. On the contrary, the cleri-
cal unions have been highly efficient in pursuing their goals through maximising 
strengths and minimising weaknesses. The strength of their large female membership 
was utilised through political rather than industrial strategies. 
As feminists moved into decision making positions in the clerical unions, they 
recognised the gender of their members as central, not incidental, to clerical work. 
The fact of a predominantly female membership helped them to construct a set of 
collective interests which provided new strategic possibilities. Issues and tactics were 
developed which had their origins in the women's liberation movement and in feminist 
analyses of women and work. Feminists becoming actively involved in the clerical 
unions saw that union membership could be made more attractive to women by 
. raising issues of concern to them as women at work. New areas of activity included 
union education and consciousness raising for women members; support for issues 
like childcare, fertility control and parental leave; confronting sexual harassment in the 
workplace; and revaluing women's skills in wage negotiations. 
The political power of the large membership was harnessed to raise the priority of 
these issues on the agenda of both the union movement and the Labour Party. By 
championing issues which had wider application than just their own members, they 
harnessed the political power of the wider women's movement and its organisations. 
By moving outside the restrictive labour relations framework, they used the power of 
the state, through legislation, to force employers to implement changes which could 
not be achieved through direct negotiation. 
"When it came to issues that you could get the public behind, we were in the 
forefront and people were listening to us." 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, July 1991) 
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Part of this strategy involved changes in policy and in structures in the collective 
institutions of the union movement. Success in trlis was limited, however, by the 
adoption of strategic directions by the union movement which were better suited to the 
labour market position and classic union tactics of industrially strong male dominated 
unions. These differences in strategy are discussed in Chapter 11. 
The absorption of NZCWU's more easily organised sections into other unions was part 
of a strategic plan by the NZCTU to restructure the union movement on industry lines. 
In response to the predicted deunionisation of other clerical members, NZCTU 
proposed extending the Minimum Wage Act as a protective minimum code of workers' 
rights. In the view of NZCTU leaders, that was all the clerical unions ever provided for 
much of their membership. 
"I would argue that a lot of those people were never unionised, they paid 
subs ... what they got was a union enforcement agency ... 1 don't think they were 
unionised in the classic sense of being part of a collective." 
(NZCTU Elected Officer, June 1992) 
Clerical officials were the first to admit the limitations imposed by clerical workforce 
logistics, but saw their alternative strategies as successful, both in responding both to 
their situation and to the problems and culture of their predominantly women 
members. 
"There is no way in the world that the clerical unions could ever, under the old 
system or now, organise completely all the people that are members. But I 
think we did a hell of a job." (COMPASS Organiser, June 1992) 
What the clerical unions were able to do under the traditional labour relations system 
was not to organise the members, but to organise the market for their labour in 
both traditional and new ways. Officials focused on the identity of their members, as 
women, and as workers who were often vulnerable to employer pressure and often 
alienated from 'classic' union tactics. Though many members regarded unionism as 
a form of insurance, the clerical unions provided an organisation in which members 
could be active and through which new and different issues could be raised. They 
had the numerical strength to represent members' interests in wider contexts and used 
women's political power in a number of arenas to further women's interests at work 
and in the labour market. 
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"I think we were streets ahead, in terms of identifying who our members were, 
how best to organise them and what to do for them ... We said, no, our members 
are women, so therefore we have to do things different. It didn't meet the tradi-
tional mould of what unionism was abouL.Now whilst we were probably 
laughed at in many ways for the way we perceived our members, it still 
worked." (NZCWU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
Had voluntary unionism alone been introduced in 1991, it would have reduced the 
financial viability of already existent clerical unions and meant a riskier but more 
conscious unionism on the part of a smaller membership. Industry bargaining on 
behalf of members was already a reality in growing numbers of clerical documents. 
Industry unionism was resisted because it threatened the organisational viability which 
made possible labour market protections for the largest and industrially weakest 
section of the clerical workforce. It would undermine negotiating strength, as well as 
political strength. 
The Employment Contract Act did all of the above at one blow. In destroying the 
award system which supported mUlti-employer negotiations, it destroyed all protection 
of the highly fragmented clerical labour market. It also fatally undermined an important 
organisation had been active in raising a series of issues of interest to working women 
in New Zealand. 
In the view of the NZCWU Women's Secretary, the labour relations system had 
changed, but clerical workers' need for an effective union and one which would 
respond to the specific demands of women members has not changed. 
"Something will rise because there are going to be a whole bunch of women 
who are dissatisfied ... l've got to believe that because the work we did in the 
clerical union wasn't just a job, it was near and dear. If I didn't believe that 
women will fight back, then I shouldn't have been in that job. II 
(NZCWU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
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CHAPTER 8: NZ NURSES ASSOCIATION AND NZ NURSES UNION 
Introduction 
This case study examines labour relations strategies in a profession which is 96% 
female dominated and has always been led by women. It looks at how legislative 
changes over the 1980s and early 1990s have affected organisations representing 
nurses in botl1 public and private sector health care. It shows how these intersected 
with a generational change in leadership to produce a shift in strategy towards greater 
union activism. The new generation brought with them a feminist analysis of nursing 
which influenced strategies and involved both the nurses' unions studied here in the 
gender politics of the union movement. 
From 1908 until the late 1980s, the NZ Nurses Association, the oldest and largest 
organisation representing nurses, pursued a professionalisation strategy to raise the 
status of nursing in New Zealand on the model of the medical profession. This strate-
gy creates a marked contrast with the history of unionisation among clerical workers 
and cleaners. The research covers a period in which nurses sought to integrate this 
purely professional strategy with a strong industrial1 stance. This followed rapidly on 
from, and was part of, internal upheavals within NZNA arising from the greater 
expectations and activism of ordinary nurses during the 1980s. 
When this research began in 1990, representation on wage bargaining for the nursing 
workforce was shared by three organisations: the NZ Nurses Association (NZNA), the 
NZ Nurses Union (NZNU) and the Public Service Assn (PSA). The majority of nurses 
were represented both industrially and professionally by NZNA, which had coverage 
of public general and obstetric hospitals. The PSA covered around 2,500 psychiatric, 
psychopaedic and public health nurses as a minority within its wide ranging 
membership among state employees. This difference of coverage had historical 
origins: some health services were always a central state responsibility while others 
1 See note on language, page 29. 
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were developed jointly by private practitioners and local authorities, before being 
transferred to government responsibility in 1938 (Hay 1991). NZNU, representing 
nurses in the private sector, was registered as a union in 1974 but only became 
organisationally independent of NZNA in 1987. 
There were also other nursing organisations with a professional focus. The Nurses 
Society, which split off from NZNA in 1977, has a high membership among nursing 
students and maintains a high media profile in the Auckland region. Te Kaunihera 0 
Nga Neehi Maori 0 Aotearoa (National Council of Maori Nurses) has a high 
membership among Maori nurses, and has a strong focus on issues of Maori health. 
There are also small independent organisations based on specialisms, such as the 
College of Midwives and the Occupational Health Nurses Association. 
The choice for this study of labour relations was the two organisations with registered 
industrial coverage of nurses only2: the NZ Nurses Association and the NZ Nurses 
Union. When trlis study began the first membership vote had been taken to consider 
reamalgamation; by mid 1992 negotiations were nearly complete on the detailed 
structure of a new NZ Nurses Organisation, which now offers industrial and 
. professional representation to all nurses. 
Public and Private Sector Nursing 
In 1990 43,899 nurses held annual practising certificates from the Nursing Council: 
34,872 registered, 9,527 enrolled3• However, this included nurses who keep their 
certification current while temporarily out of the workforce or as a background quali-
fication for work in a related field. Fifty percent of all certified registered nurses and 
65% of enrolled nurses were employed by Area Health Board in general, obstetric and 
2 PSA membership data does not specifically identify nurses. Although wage rates are negotiated 
by occupation, members are organised by worksite without distinguishing nurses from other health 
professionals. A study of PSA's large and· complex organisation, interests and strategies would 
constitute a thesis in itself. 
3 Programmes for enrolled nurses have varied greatly in length and content so that there is variation 
in the training background of enrolled nurses currently employed. 
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gynaecological hospitals, NZNA's area of industrial coverage. In addition, there were 
around 6,000 unqualified nurse aides, working mainly in the private sector represented 
by NZNU. 
Of the total nursing workforce, only around 6% are men. Male nurses are 
concentrated in psychiatric and psychopaedic nursing under PSA coverage. NZNA's 
membership of general and obstetric sector nurses was 95.4% female in 1990. 
NZN U's female membership was still higher at 98%, with males extremely rare among 
its unqualified nurse aide members, whose pay and status are low. NZNA's 4.6% 
male nurse membership occupied a disproportionate 12% of positions above staff 
nurse, a fact to which women nurses often refer. 
Unions have been theorised as a secondary form of organisation in response to their 
primary organisation by the fact of their employment (Offe & Wissenthal 1985:176). 
Considered in this light, the union organisation of New Zealand nurses reflected in the 
first instance a strong historical separation in the labour relations frameworks 
governing public and private sector employment. Hospital services, which employ the 
majority of nurses, were developed jointly by medical practitioners and regional 
government, then transferred to central government in 1938 (Hay 1991) bringing the 
majodty of nurses, represented by their professional association, into the public 
service. The line between public and private health has never been absolute and 
present changes in the role of the state are shifting it further towards privatisation. 
However, for fifty years two distinct systems set wages in the public or private health 
sector. This distinction between the civil service and the private sector labour market 
was removed when state negotiations were brought under the Labour Relations Act 
in 1988 and by the Employment Relations Act 1991 which now regulates all 
employment negotiations. This change is allowing the state, along with private sector 
employers, to fragment national negotiations and lower wages in its own labour market 
(Hill 1993a). 
As a result of this traditional dual labour relations framework, there were during this 
study two nursing occupational unions registered under the Labour Relations Act 1987 
with separate industrial coverage of public sector and private sector nurses. For this 
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reason this account begins with a description of the industrial coverage of each 
nurses' union at the time of the study and the membership differences between the 
two organisations as a result of that coverage. These membership differences, along 
with later material on public and private employer differences, help provide an 
understanding of the tensions on professional and industrial issues between the two 
unions whose stories are woven together through this account. 
NZNA, which has represented the majority of New Zealand nurses since 1908, 
originated as a professional association with a historic interest in setting wage levels 
in the labour market for nurses. Under the State Sector Act 19S8 it was required to 
deregister as an incorporated society and register for the first time as a union under 
the Labour Relations Act 1987. At March 1990 I\lZI\lA had a financial membership of 
27,131, a 12% increase on the previous year's membership Of these 21,374 were 
registered and enrolled nurses, hospital aides and employed student nurses, whom 
it represented industrially. A further 1,787 were 'Category B' members; that is, they 
were represented industrially by another union and joined NZNA at half fee, or were 
not covered by any award and chose to belong for professional reasons. These in-
cluded PSA members, tutors covered by ASTE and some NZNU members, particularly 
practice nurses. The remainder were nursing students and honourary members 
(NZNA 1990). 
Under the Labour Relations Act 1987 NZNA negotiated two awards. One covered a 
mere 36 occupational health nurses employed in technical institutes, who were already 
contemplating a move to the Association of Staff in Tertiary Education (ASTE) which 
covered nursing tutors. The other, the NZ Hospital & Area Health Boards Nurses 
Award, was the largest national nursing award, covering all categories of nurse 
employed by Area Health Board in general and obstetric, maternity, geriatric hospitals 
and related community services. 
Under the previous State Services Act 1977 and previous public sector labour 
legislation, this award had been a Determination which covered all grades of nurses 
in the hospital hierarchy. A feature of State Sector Act 1988 was its adoption of the 
private sector model of a clear management/worker divide, removing all those earning 
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over $50,000 from award coverage and placing them on individual contracts. In the 
1989 award round NZNA lost coverage of nurses above grade 16. Their ranks had 
already been depleted by rapid restructuring from 1988 which brought nursing and 
medicine under the control of management. By 1991 only about 100 nursing positions 
above grade 16 existed. These nurses are now on individual contracts, usually 
negotiated without NZNA assistance, although most retain membership of their 
professional organisation. 
The award also covered unqualified hospital aides, who were admitted to membership 
of the nurses' professional association 'from 1975. At that time NZI\lU was registering 
awards for the private sector which covered both qualified and unqualified members, 
who could join NZNA through a joint membership arrangement. It then became logical 
to extend NZNA membership to aides in public hospitals. However, by 1988 only 
3,516 hospital aides were employed in public health care. Most were employed in 
long stay geriatric and psychiatric care, although most wards employed an aide for 
unskilled and clean-up tasks. The proportion of aides in Auckland public hospitals was 
particularly low because of the greater acutity of hospital services there. Some NZNA 
officials, as well as NZNU officials, considered that NZNA's strong professionalisation 
strategy and lobbying for a fully qualified nursing workforce had in fact acted against 
the employment interests of enrolled nurses and aides in the public health sector. 
Nevertheless, NZNA officials liked to point out that their aides enjoyed wage rates 
which were around 15% higher than those in the private sector. 
In the late 1980s the proportion of unqualified members in NZNA was also affected by 
government funding policies and public hospital closures which shifted most long stay 
care into private sector religious and welfare hospitals and rest homes, covered by 
NZI\lU. Private sector elective surgery and routine emergency care were expanding 
while the public sector retained responsibility for specialist areas, high-tech medicine 
and critical and intensive care. These changes also meant an increase in the propor-
tion in NZNA's membership of highly trained specialised nurses with a strong interest 
in professional issues. 
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Since 1974 nurses employed in the private sector had been covered industrially by 
I\lZNU. By early 1991 I\lZI\lU represented nurses covered by seven industrial 
documents listed below, bringing together a much more diverse group of members 
than in NZNA. The first covered the majority of members; the last four were single 
employer agreements covering about 10% of the membership: 
- NZ Private Hospital Nurses Award 
- NZ Practice Nurses Award 
- NZ Occupational Health Nurses Award 
- NZ Family Planning Assn Nurses and Counsellors Agreement 
- NZ Plunket Nurses Agreement 
- Nurse Maude District Nursing Assn Agreement 
- HELP Foundation Agreement 
As encouraged by the Labour Relations Act 1987, NZNU was exploring suitable 
composite arrangements with other unions for its scattered occupational health nurses. 
It was also negotiating new awards, since an estimated 5-10% o'f private sector nurses 
were not covered by any document. NZNU was attempting to negotiate a document 
for rest home nurses, some of whom were paid at private hospital award rates, 
working together with the Hospital & Hotel Workers Union who already covered 'home 
assistants' doing domestic and nurse aide work in resthomes. NZNU was also trying 
to organise 'bureaux' nurses employed by temporary agencies, who were covered 
only once they step onto a worksite covered by an award, but not when sent to a rest 
home or private home. NZNU was exploring the possibilities an award for medical 
laboratory nurses. Beauty therapists had also approached NZNU for possible 
representation, since their work involves such procedures as skin treatments, 
depilatory electrolysis and eyeliner tattooing, which make nursing indemnity coverage 
attractive. 
"In the voluntary and private sectors there are whole swags of workers that 
aren't unionised. The changing nature of health care means that a lot of these 
jobs haven't existed previously and are just starting to take off." 
(NZNU Staff Official, Nov. 1990) 
NZNU's financial membership in late 1990 was 9,223: 72% employed in private 
hospitals, 12.5% GPs' practice nurses, and 6.5% Plunket nurses. Because of its 
coverage of private surgical and geriatric hospitals, its membership was less qualified, 
less professionally focused and there were more Maori and especially more Pacific 
Islands members than in NZNA. The proportion of qualified to unqualified members 
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was 51% registered, 8% enrolled or obstetric; 40% nurse aides; and 1% were Karitane 
nurses working for the Plunket Society. Trlis higrl proportion of unqualified members 
meant the professional/industrial dichotomy faced by NZNA was even sharper for 
NZNU. 
NZNU's registered nurse members were practice nurses, theatre nurses and in the 
middle and higher positions in private hospitals. The 2,500 nurse aide members of 
NZI\lU made up the majority of the staff in private hospitals. High use of unqualified 
staff is made possible by the lower acutity of most private sector care and the very low 
proportion of qualified staff required under the Private Hospital Regulations. In long 
stay private care it is nurse aides who give hands-on nursing care to patients under 
the supervision of qualified nurses who perform specialised nursing tasks. 
NZI\l U's membership was concentrated in areas generally less affected by rapid 
advances in medical technology requiring specialist training (although increased drug 
prescription makes nursing work in all areas more complex). Geriatrics, general 
practice and infant care have low medical prestige and a strong connection with 
women's traditional family role. I\lZI\lU's interest was not the establishment of a fully 
qualified workforce or further technical skill development, but greater recognition of its 
members' human relations and caring skills, often informally acquired - that is, the 
revaluation of women's traditional work. 
As with other unions, NZNA's and NZN U's data on the ethnic composition of their 
mobile membership was very incomplete. In recent years recruitment forms have 
included a question on ethnicity (as have Nursing Council practising certificate 
applications) but this is not always filled in by members. NZNA officials had' no idea' 
of the ethnic composition of its membership but recognised a concentration of Maori 
women among Enrolled Nurses. This was understood to be because Maori girls, often 
from families in low socio-economic groupings, have tended to opt for shorter training 
which allows them to start earning sooner. There was a geographical difference in 
organiser perceptions of membership composition, which may be verified as better 
data is accumulated by both NZNA and hospital equal employment opportunity 
programmes. South Island organisers said there are 'very few' Maori nurses and a 
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'handful' of Pacific Islands nurses. In Nortrlland there was a noticeable and vocal 
Maori presence; these Maori nurses were often supporting households with 
unemployed adults. 
NZNU estimated up to 15% of its membership were Maori, Pacific Islands or of 
another ethnic minority, concentrated in particular regions and in particular kinds of 
nursing work. A Maori elected official suggested 4% Maori and 7% Pacific Islanders. 
The Maori members were thinly spread except in areas such as Northland, Gisborne 
and Rotorua, where one hospital had around 80% Maori. Some were older registered 
nurses with years of experience in the public sector. Pacific Islands members were 
concentrated in nurse aide work, and in Auckland and Wellington. Of NZNU's nurse 
aides, around 20% were Pacific Islands women. They were concentrated in Auckland 
hospitals, where as many as 80% of aides were Pacific Islanders. An important issue 
for Pacific Islands members was lack of recognition of non-NZ qualifications, particu-
larly for Samoan registered nurses, who often work as enrolled nurses or aides until 
they are able to complete bridging course requirements. Part of the requirement is NZ 
experience, but the NZ Nursing Council only recognises experience in the public 
sector, where few jobs are available for the unqualified. 
The differences between the two memberships arising from differences in worksite 
coverage is illustrated by a difference in terminology. NZNA referred to 'hospitals 
aides', whereas NZNU at its 1989 Conference established 'nurse aide' as appropriate 
terminology for their unqualified members, who are defined as aides to the nurse, not 
to the hospital. Eighty years of professional history was reflected in NZNA's control 
over the word 'nurse' and its restriction to registered and enrolled staff - 'trained' 
nurses. With a much larger membership of aides, NZNU sought recognition of the 
caring work that aides do. 
NZNU had a higher proportion than NZNA of members employed parttime. However, 
both unions represented a much greater proportion of parttime workers than the 
clerical unions, and both were experiencing problems of increased casualisation of 
nurses' employment. As a 24 hour, 7 day industry, health care lends itself to a 
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flexibility of employment which may suit women's own needs, but is increasingly the 
focus of employers' strategies. 
Until the mid 1960s when social attitudes and state policy on the employment of 
married women changed, nursing as both a job and a lifetime career tended to 
employ single women in fulltime employment. Over the last 25 years increased labour 
market participation by married women and the expansion of both public and private 
health services has included a steady increase in the parttime employment of nurses. 
A 1988 survey of wage levels among NZNA's membership showed a shift of qualified 
nurses to parttime work. The proportion of aides in parttime employment remained 
fairly steady, but their employment in public hospitals decreased during this period 
under the strong push for qualified workforce in public health. 
Although precise data is not available, this trend towards parttime employment is 
continuing. Organiser perceptions of parttime employment were 50% for Auckland 
Area Health Board nursing staff; 80% for Canterbury. There was even less precision 
around what 'parttime' actually meant: whether it was one shift a week or 9 a fortnight. 
However, in public hospitals parttime nursing employment is still made up of full 8 hour 
shifts, rather than the trimmed hours of the private sector. As is common statistical 
practice, available Area Health Board nursing figures were in fulltime equivalents of 
qualifi~d and unqualified staff, which obscured parttime status and changes in 
proportions of parttime employment. 
Position Year Percent Parttime 
Qualified nurses 1977 19% 
1986 46% 
Hospital aides 1977 -86 52-58% 
........................................................................................................................................................................................ ~.?~?.~~~.~.~.~.~!. ............ .. 
1986 50% 
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A substantial majority of NZNU's membership worked parttime, especially practice 
nurses, plunket nurses and nurse aides. Parttime and casual employment is 
characteristic of bureau nurses for whom NZNU was trying to negotiate an award. 
NZN U too had little concrete up-to-date information about parttime employment, hours 
worked and changes to hours, but the variation was much greater than in the public 
sector, especially for nurse aides. 
"The most amazing hours. Someone coming in from 8 to 10 just to do the 
showers, that's a/l they do, they might only do it on Thursdays ... peak time 
coverage." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Changed shifts and shortened hours were increasingly the cause of individual 
grievances. However, members were not always aware of their right to the hours for 
which they were employed under the 'contract' implicit in the initial hiring. Some were 
accepting unwelcome changes to hours of work without contacting NZNU, for fear 
losing all employment. 
"One nurse started off with 28 hours, she's down to 12 now, she didn't know it 
was her right... I said, no, you do not give away your hours. They don't have the 
right to take hours from you, but we have no problem with them giving you 
more." (NZNU Organiser, June 1991) 
The more 'flexible' hours in the private sector are often attractive to nurses, since the 
long shifts in public hospitals do not match the school day. Private hospitals with 
lower acutity, particularly long stay hospitals, usually run two 5 hours shifts to cover 
the day, with more staff on mornings, and skeleton staff at night. They offer 
permanent rather than rotating shifts and often use permanent night or weekend-only 
staff. This system allows employers to juggle parttime hours to best and cheapest 
advantage with regard to penal time rates, overtime and fulltime privileges negotiated 
under the awards. But these arrangements may also be convenient for mothers 
seeking paid employment. 
Parttime employment is lower among PSA nurse members. Research in 1984 showed 
that 39% of all registered nurses in public hospitals were parttime: 42% of those in 
general/obstetric hospitals but only 10% in psychiatric and psychopaedic hospitals 
(Dixon 1987:62). Dixon attributed this to differing policies and negotiating strategies 
by I\lZNA and PSA arising from the different gender mix of the membership and 
285 
decision makers of each. NZNA saw parttime work unequivocally as a solution to both 
the shortage of registered nurses and the conundrum of women's desire to earn and 
their social responsibility for children and domestic work. l\Ilore flexible employment 
was seen as a good thing for their overwhelmingly female membership. 
However, in times of recession and high unemployment this is problematic, as parttime 
work becomes increasingly an employers' strategy to provide 'flexibility' and labour 
cost cutting (Beechey 1987). In nursing the situation is complex, as there was high 
unemployment among nurses graduating in 1991 and 1992, but high turnover and 
labour shortages in high stress areas requiring experienced, specialised nursing staff. 
The needs of employers for different kinds of nurses vary, as do the flexibility needs 
of nurses which, in the experience of NZNA officials, are not always due to family 
responsibilities. Opting for shorter hours has been the individual response of some 
nurses to recent workload intensification. To obtain greater control over hours 
worked, some nurses move to bureau employment. In 1991 Auckland Hospital was 
wasting so much of its budget on nursing bureau services that it established its own 
flexible bureau-type system. In the view of NZNA officials, this solution did not address 
reasons for the retention problem, which it attributes to high stress, inflexible rostering, 
and a 'walking on water syndrome' in the senior medical staff of some units. 
The fewer the hours worked, the less likely nurses are to join their union. NZNA had 
a parttime fee for those working 5 hours and less - on application to its National 
Council, a point which rankled with members. However, for both unions, since 
parttime employment is so prevalent, the fee was considered already a parttime fee. 
"Just because you are a parttime worker doesn't mean the benefits you get from 
the union are any less, the union does heaps of work protecting the rights of 
parttime workers, and indemnity insurance costs just the same." 
(NZNU Staff O'fficer, Nov. 1990) 
The separate public and private frameworks of New Zealand's traditional labour 
relations system constructed the pattern of separate negotiations and documents 
covering different groups of nurses in public and private sector employment. These 
separate systems and different memberships lay behind the two separate occupational 
unions for nurses which existed when this research began. The reorganisation of 
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public and private sector bargaining under one labour relations system from 1988, and 
the shifting line between public and private health sectors makes moves towards 
amalgamation of the two organisations logical. 
However, NZNU was first registered as a private sector union for nurses in 1974 ~ not 
1936. Its first awards were negotiated in 1975, and it was only in 1987 that NZNU fully 
separated from NZNA, its parent organisation. NZNU can be seen as the offspring of 
NZNA and private sector labour relations legislation, but both its late birth and its 
separation from NZNA are explained by NZNA's historic development as a professional 
association, and the recent tension between its professionalisation strategy and the 
present need for collective action in the face of economic and state change. The 
existence of separate unions for public and private sector nurses was structured 
formally by the labour relations framework but informally by nurses' choice of and 
shifts in collective strategy. 
The Professionalisation of Nursing 
An understanding of the shift in strategy and of the strike action taken by nurses 
'around the country in 1992 needs to understood against the background of NZI\lA's 
professionalisation strategy, including the development of nursing as a profession in 
New Zealand, its complex relationship with the state, and the parameters of nursing's 
professional terrain which continue to be contested at the present time. 
Historically, nursing has provided both a 'profession' for women from middle class 
backgrounds and a route to middle class status for working class women. Nursing 
comprised a hierarchy of positions and qualifications from Chief Nurse to nurse aide, 
and for this reason, political attitudes among NZNA and NZNU members range the 
spectrum. But it was the efforts of nurses acting as a collective organisation that 
gained professional recognition and middle-class status and rewards for the 
occupation as a whole. 
The development of nursing as a profession in New Zealand has parallelled the British 
case, with the strategies of both national organisations linked through membership of 
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the International Council of Nurses which grew out of the International Council of 
Women at the turn of the century (Salmon 1984:119-20). As with a number of other 
professions (Witz 1986; Macdonald & Ritzer 1988:260-3), professionalisation was 
achieved by means of a strong relationship with the state. In this strategy, in which 
the medical profession was taken as a model, the power of the state is harnessed to 
achieve professional closure and autonomy, and professional control over a body of 
knowledge to be studied by selected entrants, preferably at state expense. In return 
for this formal recognition, the state requires formal controls over the standards and 
behaviour of the profession on behalf of citizens. This is the path that NZNA followed 
from 1908 to build recognition of nursing as a profession, able to command autonomy 
over its practice, with appropriate remuneration and conditions. The historic goal, and 
the criteria for affiliation to the International Council of Nurses, was strict 
self-government by nurses. The strongly gendered nature of nursing within the 
medical division of labour made female leadership an achievable goal. 
Central to what was achieved by the professionalisation strategy until the late 1980s 
was a continuing coincidence of interests between nursing and the state, as state 
responsibility for health services grew, and with it a role as the major employer of 
nurses. In the early years, the rapid development of the profession owed much to 
very close links between the NZ Trained Nurses' Association (as it was first called) and 
the Department of Health; NZTNA officers and Department of Health nurses were the 
same people. In 1908 Hester Maclean, chief nurse in government, was elected first 
President of the Central Council, with a clear vision of how effective government and 
hospital nurse leaders could be in influencing health service policy. 
The advantages of the arrangement were not one sided ... NZTNA saw clearly 
the pOlitical gains that could be made with departmental leadership, while the 
nurses of the Department had a forum for discussion, advice and action. 
(Kinross 1984:109) 
Concerns at NZTNA's first meetings were nursing training and standards of practice 
- that is, issues defined as key attributes of a profession. NZTNA was successful in 
restricting training to public hospitals only, enabling reciprocity with British nurse 
registration in 1919. Nursing education was developed in hospitals by senior nurses 
but included lectures by medical staff. Practical training was 'then very much within the 
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context of the gender and class divisions of labour, and the ethic of service was 
strongly reinforced. 
Professional progress was assisted by an increased demand for nursing labour with 
Labour's 1938 public health policy and World War II. As the welfare state rapidly 
developed public health care services, there was initially an increase in the use of 
unqualified staff. ' Degradation of labour' through task fragmentation and use of 
cheaper unskilled staff was met by a strong push by NZNA from the 1950s for a 
qualified nursing workforce in public health. Formal education was a means of gaining 
recognition and reward for the skills involved in nursing, particularly those caring and 
human relations skills considered 'natural' to women. Bringing the nursing body of 
knowledge fully under the control of the profession was an essential step in 
professionalisation which could only be achieved by moving it out from under the 
control of hospital hierarchies dominated by the medical profession. This was 
achieved in the mid 1970s through a long campaign to government, which argued the 
state's own need, as ultimate employer, for a fully qualified nursing workforce to 
provide a quality health service The change was opposed by Hospital Boards, since 
student nurses provided a cheap and flexible workforce to cover unsociable or peak 
hours. However, their value to employers was eroded by a high attrition rate, a new 
nursing curriculum (district, public health, psychiatric nursing) which already involved 
training outside the Hospital which paid them, and the penal rates and limited work 
hours won after changes to state sector bargaining in 1969. Evidence of reduced cost 
effectiveness was thought by NZNA to have tipped the balance of government 
decision-making towards basing nursing education in polytechnic based education 
(Carey 1984; Carroll 1984; Kinross 1984:115-116). 
When nursing education was transferred to technical institutes from 1973, the ratio of 
qualified to unqualified staff in the public hospital workforce was 1 :2; by the mid-1980s 
this had been reversed (Kai Tiaki Dec/Jan 1989:2). An emphasis on nursing 
education was an important part of NZNA's professionalisation strategy. As a 
professional body of knowledge was developed, ensuring control of it by nurses, not 
doctors or hospital employers, became an issue. Access to that knowledge and 
certification as registered or enrolled nurses was controlled by the profession itself. 
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Nursing knowledge continued to be developed in order to increase nurses' 
professional autonomy - that is, their control over their own labour process - relative 
to other groups in the hospital hierarchy. 
"Nursing built itself up as a workforce to where it wasn't the old idea of the 
medical superintendent telling the nurse what to do. Now she would say, no, 
this is a nursing issue. I will come back and tell you what we are going to 
do." (NZNA Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
The relationship between the state and the nursing profession can be traced through 
successive legislation which has both professionalised and regulated New Zealand 
nursing. In 1925 legislation established the Nurses & Midwives Registration Board, 
which included two senior Health Dept members and an appointed doctor, but 
nevertheless gave nursing 'themajority voice on the regulatory statutory authority for 
its own profession, an important step forward' (Kinross 1984). The present Nursing 
Council is responsible for examinations, the registration of nurses considered both 
qualified and 'fit and proper', annual practising certificates, and professional discipline 
through 'peer review', 
The parameters of professional autonomy continue to be terrain contested by the 
state, with its various interests as professional regulator, health care provider or 
employer, and by other interest groups in health care, in particular the medical profes-
sion. This contestability and constant minor shifts in the relative positioning of nursing 
as a profession are illustrated by issues current during the study period, as the nurses 
unions sought to further or to defend the degree of professional status which nursing 
has achieved. 
As part ofthe review of the Nursing Act, 1977, the Health Department circulated a draft 
policy paper in 1988 which attacked the professional status of nursing in a number of 
areas, It gave greater powers to the Minister of Health at the expense of specific 
professional input from nursing organisations. 'Professional judgement' and 
'professional nursing knowledge' were not included in definitions of nursing practice, 
nor did definitions of nursing practice cover the practice, direction and supervision of 
enrolled nurses and aides, an important area of debate within the nursing unions and 
with the Health Dept and employers. 
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The paper suggested removing control over standards from the Nursing Council to a 
complaints assessment committee and an independent disciplinary tribunal. In 
addition, the 1988 Area Health Board Act gave unprecedented disciplinary powers to 
general managers while ignoring management's role in maintaining professional 
standards. The nurses unions had frequently criticised the Nursing Council as 'too 
harsh on nurses facing discipline and unduly punitive rather than protectionist'. There 
was also concerns about natural justice and about' doublejeopardy' or possible even 
triple jeopardy; that is, professional penalties on top of criminal or employment ones. 
However, they were adamant that professional control should remain in the hands of 
the profession itself. 
To achieve that fully, they considered that the composition of the Nursing Council 
should be altered. Consumer representatives, including Maori, should be included, 
a Heath Department representative was acceptable, but the medical representative and 
the employers' representative from the Area Health Boards Association should be 
removed. 
"How dare the medical profession think they have the right to govern another 
profession. .. Doesn't matter what the doctors are like, they shouldn't be there." 
(NZNA Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
The Health Dept paper suggested that annual practising certificates should be 
competency based. Recent failures in the medical and legal professions appeared to 
be behind members' support in principle for this at two NZNA conferences. However, 
NZNA officials doubted the practicality of testing the 43,000 nurses currently 
registered. They opposed the concept as individualising responsibility for matters 
which are beyond a nurse's personal control and competency. In their view, individual 
shortcomings are related to workplace inadequacies, staffing levels and safety issues 
and these are a collective responsibility. Competency based certification would 
separate out individual professionalism from its industrial and wider political context. 
While these Health Department proposals could mean setbacks for the nursing 
professional, the 1990 Nursing Amendment Act was a very real success for the 
strategy of professionalisation. It increased professional autonomy for midwives in 
291 
relation to the medical profession, by granting them right to prescribe and sole 
responsibility for care of the client. 
The Act has enormous consequences for nursing in that the autonomy and 
rights won by midwives set a precedent for the nursing profession to seek them 
as well. (Kai Tiaki Oct. 1990:21) 
In the post-war baby boom years the medical profession had increased its control over 
childbirth and midwifery through the establishment of a Chair of Obstetrics and 
obstetrics training hospital in Auckland. Lobbied by the Medical Association, the 
Minister of Health took the attitude that every woman in New Zealand was entitled to 
have a trained doctor at her confinement. Specialist midwifery schools were eventually 
closed, despite opposition by midwives. The Nursing Amendment Act 1990 opened 
the way for direct entry midwifery training to overcome midwife shortages in New 
Zealand; 70% of the 1500 practiSing in 1990 were trained overseas. Direct entry 
training would be make midwifery more accessible to Maori and Pacific Islands women 
and mature students. 
Increased autonomy for midwives came as a result of lobbying by midwives' and 
nurses' associations, but also by patients' rights groups. From the 1970s women in 
New Zealand as elsewhere have organised to reject doctors' usurpation and 
pathologising of their birth experience (Oakley 1984b; Donley 1986), and to mount a 
more general challenge to medical power over women's bodies (culminating in the 
Cartwright inquiry into cervical cancer research in 1987 (Coney 1988)). The medical 
profession's efforts to reassert professional dominance over midwives and the birth 
industry can be witnessed in their increased newspaper and television comment on 
birth difficulties and public criticism of particular midwives. In November 1992 the 
NZMA and General Practitioners Association opposed NZNA's suggestion of very 
limited prescribing rights for specialist nurses in Family Planning and Diabetes Clinics. 
Although the Nursing Amendment Act was celebrated as a great success for the 
nursing profession and for women, NZNA officials expressed some misgivings which 
related to the autonomy of the profession vis a vis state control. The inclusion of 
direct entry midwifery in the Amendment Act which allowed increased right of 
prescription, rather than as part of the Nursing Act revision, had preempted expected 
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input by the nursing profession, which had yet to work through implications for nursing 
philosophy and education. 
Complete professional autonomy is being achieved by a small but growing number of 
independent nurse practitioners, who offer a nursing service outside the immediate 
controlling context of the doctor/nurse division of labour, as self-employed 
professionals. Massage, homeopatllY and other alternative practices are often offered. 
Of concern with regard to professional standards and control of nursing work were the 
Basic Caregivers courses being set up in 1990 by the Health Department and 
Department of Social Welfare to provide formal training and recognition of volunteers 
and women caring privately for relatives. These courses at state expense would 
benefit private sector health employers who employ nurse aides for long stay care. 
Both nurses' unions made strong representations to the Health Department on what 
they saw as an inappropriate 'nursing' component in these courses, inadequately 
backed by nursing knowledge, which could place both employees and patients at risk. 
A recent theme in nursing education is a 'holistic' approach which includes social and 
spiritual aspects of patient wellbeing, and an emphasis on the autonomy of the nurse 
professional fully responsible for the beds pace. This view of the autonomous nurse 
connects to a model of nursing work organisation which moves away from a 
'degradation of labour' pattern of task fragmentation and the use of cheaper unskilled 
staff to revalue and integrate the more mundane tasks of nursing into the demarcated 
territory of qualified staff. 
From 1908 to 1988, then, New Zealand nurses pursued a professionalisation strategy, 
not unlike that pursued by the medical profession a century earlier (Witz 1986). It was 
a strategy which relied on a strong relation with a regulating state and benefited from 
the development of a welfare state in New Zealand with increasing responsibility for 
health care services. The coincidence of nursing's interests with those of the state 
allowed the nursing profession to improve its position both in the labour market and 
within the gendered division of labour with the medical profession. However, from the 
mid 1980s changes in the economy and the role of the state under successive 
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governments meant that such a coincidence of interests no longer exists. It was this 
change that led to the shift in strategy of the nurses unions which is central to this 
account. 
Unionisation 
NZNA's professionalisation strategy can be regarded as a success in meeting its goals 
and furthering the interests of the profession as a whole over a eighty year period. 
However, as a professionally focused organisation it was less concerned with meeting 
the day to day needs of the majority of nurse members. In fact, professional status 
as not only a strategy but as an ideology tended to obscure the actual workplace 
status, pay and conditions of nurses low in the hierarchy, especially nurse aides and 
students. Although improvements came with state labour relations changes in the late 
1970s and the moving of nursing education to technical institutes from the mid~ 1970s, 
in some ways increased professional autonomy over nursing education reinforced the 
gap between professional ideology and employment reality. Concepts of 
'professionalism', 'professionaljudgement', standards of practice became emphasised 
to the point where the actual power relations and practices of the hospital hierarchy 
came as a shock to new nursing graduates (Perry 1986). 
As nurses' professional organisation NZNA had a role in wage setting from its very 
beginning. However, it long resisted being defined as a union, considering that the 
classic tactics of unionism would lower the prestige of the profession and bring 
'ridicule to the uniform' (Carey 1984:23). 
In early years Public Hospital Boards were independent employers. NZNA officials 
negotiated directly with each as best they could, and set recommended rates for 
nurses in private employment. When Labour introduced compulsory unionism for all 
private sector occupations in 1936, NZNA successfully blocked both the establishment 
of a Dental and Medical Nurses Union and coverage by the Hospital Workers Industrial 
Union, on the grounds that private sector nurses' interests were already represented 
by their professional association. NZNA's constitution was altered to admit student 
nurses, so as to forestall their coverage by the Hospital Workers Union. Pressure did 
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result in a conference resolution to register a private sector award, but an 
accommodation to NZNA's professional sensibilities was made by a government in 
need of nurses for both its 1938 public. health policy and its war effort (Carey 1984). 
In 1946 as a full public health system began to get under way, the Minister of Health 
established an Advisory Committee comprising representatives of the Health 
Department, Hospital Boards and NZI\lA to set a binding minimum scale for nurses, 
including Plunket and private hospital nurses. The Hospital Boards Employees 
(Conditions of Employment) Regulations, 1947 were the first official recognition of 
I\lZI\lA as an employee organisation for negotiating purposes. But I\lZNA was unable 
to negotiate its claims with effect, and unwilling to mobilise the industrial strength of 
either public or private health nurses. NZNA argued for some years for the penal rates 
for unsociable hours which had been paid to mainly male mental health nurses since 
1948, and this was only achieved in 1965 following a government review (Carey 1984). 
Following the inclusion of formal conciliation and arbitration procedures in the State 
Services Act 1969, NZNA achieved a relativity of pay and conditions with psychiatric 
nurses, including strictly 8 hour shifts and two-day breaks, an improvement well 
remembered by older nurses. As part of the public service sector, NZNA benefited 
from highly centralised pay fixing, receiving Annual General Adjustments with irregular 
specific comparisons with private sector earnings. Block negotiated conditions of 
employment for the whole public sector were well ahead of private sector conditions, 
particularly those most relevant to women. 
All this widened the gap between public and private nursing. After repeated votes 
against it, the 1971 NZNA conference resolved that the National Executive secure the 
right to negotiate salaries and conditions of employment for registered nurses outside 
the scope of the State Services Act. The only way to do this was to form a union and 
on 2 April 1973 the NZ Nurses Union was registered under the new Industrial Relations 
Act (Carey 1984:38-39), after 37 years of gestation. 
Legally and constitutionally NZNU was established as an independent body, but its 'first 
Committee of Management were members of NZNA's National Executive and its 
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National Secretary was NZNA's Executive Director. At its first Conference a new 
Committee of Management was elected, but the National Secretary/Executive Director 
umbilical cord remained until 1987. Through it flowed the initial capital that got the 
Union on its feet. NZNU was reliant on NZNA for services as well as funding, and field 
officers worked jointly for the two organisations. 
"When NZNU was first conceived by NZNA this was feasible because there were 
only about 200 members." (past NZNU Elected Official, Nov. 1990) 
It was possible for fulltime nurses to belong to both NZNU for industrial coverage and 
NZNA for professional reasons, and receive indemnity insurance and Kai Tiaki for the 
price of one subscription, split between the two organisations. Since NZNU covered 
nurse aides, this meant that unqualified nurse aides could for the first time become 
members of NZNA. However, I\JZI\JA did not represent them industrially and its 
professional focus was of little interest to most. In 1975 NZNA extended its own 
membership to public sector hospital aides, while actively lobbying for a fully qualified 
public sector nursing workforce. 
When NZNU held its first Conference in Christchurch in 1974 there were 184 members 
nationally. By 1982 NZNU mernbersrlip had grown to 5,800, generating sufficient fees 
to fund the union. Lack of clarity in financial arrangements now created problems 
between the two organisations. The initial capital stake had never been repaid but with 
inflation this no longer looked so large and deserving of gratitude. About half NZNU's 
members had dual membership, so half their fee went to NZNA, creating in NZNU's 
view 'an administrative nightmare'. Yet field officers' time, rent and other services by 
NZNA were charged to NZNU. Cars and items of furniture were purchased by NZNU 
and used by joint officers. Committee of Management members were expected to 
approve and be ultimately responsible for financial statements with insufficient time to 
inspect or discuss them. 
"We were just a rubberstamping organisation, we didn't really know what we 
were doing, why we were there and we had no real say in any thing ... (around 
1981) We said we would like a two day meeting, we had to stay overnight, I 
think that is probably when the change started .. .By talking to other people we 
found out we were all concerned about the same things. We decided next day 
when the balance sheet was presented, one of us would stand up and say we 
wanted to keep it and take it home." 
(past NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
296 
NZNU members, particularly enrolled nurses and nurse aides, felt they were not well 
serviced or represented by the senior nurses who still controlled NZNA. The Executive 
Director /National Secretary at that time had a stronger professional orientation than 
the Executive Directors who had set up NZNU. The professional closure of NZNA's 
lobby for a fully qualified nursing workforce was seen by NZNU as not only detrimental 
to nurse aides, but unrealistic: 
"By 1986 there were enough people around with the brains to know that unless 
we discovered oil off the coast of NZ we are never going to be able to afford 
it./I (NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Nor was the joint field officer arrangement thought satisfactory. In 1985 NZNA's public 
sector award campaign was felt to be overshadowing the needs of NZNU members. 
When in 1986 NZNU hired its own separate field officer to work from the Auckland 
NZNA office for a year, results were much more satisfactory. In 1987 financial matters 
came to a head. A 'recharge' was made by the NZNA for underpaid services, initially 
of $183,000, eventually settled at $86,000. 
By this time, the perception of NZNU's Committee of Management members was that 
the umbilical cord was beginning to flow backwards. The time had come to cut it: the 
. question was how. 
"I think the people on the old Committee of Management were extremely brave 
to have done the things they did. They were conservative women ... but they 
knew they could get a better deal if they took a position and actually did it. 
Nobody thought they would." (NZNU Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
In late 1986 a joint NZNA/NZNU official with a private sector union rather than nursing 
background was appointed as NZNU's fulltime Industrial Officer. He was instrumental 
in the Committee of Management's decision to achieve what they wanted through a 
complete separation of the two organisations. In April 1987, the NZNA Executive 
Director was resigning, and the time was felt right to appoint an independent National 
Secretary, another joint field officer with a nursing background. In July 1987 the Com~ 
mittee of Management decided to set up its own offices in Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch, and employ its own staff. This fully separated from NZNA what was 
already a constitutionally independent organisation. 
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"There was no consultation of the nurses, with the membership of either the 
Union or the Association. They were presented with a fait accompli, though 
constitutionally it was all done quite correct/y." 
(past I\lZNU Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
In the view of many people in both organisations at the time of this research, the split 
was unnecessary, though the grounds for discontent were not denied. Some felt that 
a thorough-going financial and organisational review would have been sufficient; NZNA 
was itself moving towards restructuring and could have addressed NZNU's concerns. 
However, much of the eventual extent and speed of NZNA's restructuring can be 
attributed to the requirements of State Sector Act, 1988. The shock of NZNU leaving 
also furthered the case of those in NZNA who sought organisational changes to 
improve representation on labour relations issues. 
The separation was handled badly by both sides and caused a lot of pain. The tale 
becomes a confused one of recrimination, accusations of personal ambition, threats 
to freeze funds, personality clashes and physical tussles over office equipment. 
Although most actors are no longer with either organisation, some distrust and a 
strong feeling of competitiveness continued between the two at the time of this 
research, slowing the process of reamalgamation. In interviews, the criticisms heard 
on each side were remarkably similar, and revolved largely around the professional-
ism/unionism debate also internal to both organisations. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s a purely professional stance by NZNA became 
less tenable. State intervention in the form of wage freezes in 1976-77 and 1982-85, 
followed by state procrastination on wage negotiations in 1985 fuelled the push within 
NZI\lA for unionist strategies to balance the traditional strategy of professionalisation. 
And in 1988 it was the state that tipped the balance - too far for some members - by 
simply requiring NZNA to reconstitute itself and register as a union under the Labour 
Relations Act 1987. Ironically, just as NZNA the union completed the slow legal 
process of winding up as an incorporated society, National's Employment Contracts 
Act, 1991 declared all unions incorporated societies. 
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Democratisation 
Democracy, participation and structure were the organisational issues of the 1980s for 
nurses. These issues were the source of tensions between NZNA and NZN U leading 
to the split, and within NZNA itself. When NZNA forced by the State Sector Act to 
register as a union, this carried a stage further an internal upheaval already under way 
about creating a more democratic organisation providing an improved service to 
members in the workplace. This was part of the general move towards greater 
democratisation of the union movement which had brought many women into greater 
involvement in and leadership of the clerical unions. 
Before 1989 NZNA was organised outside and separate from the workplace, with 
eventually 69 branches making up an incorporated society. As representatives of the 
professional association for nurses, its officials had rights to intervene in the workplace 
to represent its members - or to discipline them. Its coverage of all ranks of nurse 
meant the domination of the organisation by senior nurses, who attended its evening 
meetings while others worked shifts. Their presence discouraged staff nurses from 
speaking up at branch meetings; enrolled nurses and aides were probably unaware 
they could attend. 
"Often the local secretary was your Principal Nurse, so you didn't operate like 
a union. You operated like an orchid society. /I 
(past NZNA Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
"That was in the days when our Determination was locked up in the Principal 
Nurse's office. You had to ask to see it. /I 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Dec. 1990) 
Yet decisions from such unrepresentative meetings, backed by the membership 
numbers of the whole region, led to policy at national level. Standing committees, 
including one for industrial matters, comprised representatives from the full range of 
nursing, but vacancies were not filled by election by the membership. The elected 
National Council made its choice from suitable nominations put forward by branches. 
The move for change which began about 1981 could not be said to come from a 
majority of ordinary nurses. The hierarchical organisation within NZNA was not 
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designed to hear or respond to membership views. Rather it came from a group of 
activists, largely 'from the Auckland area, pressuring the leadership to change NZNA's 
structure and strategies. This was organised through a series of local meetings and 
a special national conference. As well as going through established channels, they 
adopted women's liberation tactics such as a 11eroic bus ride to Wellington by the 
Auckland Action Group to challenge feminist-style the official delegates and office 
holders at the 1985 Conference. The aim was to make the organisation more 
representative and more responsive to the workforce of ordinary nurses. A stronger 
industrial approach was felt to be needed as the wage freeze ended. 
"We were looking to bring the Association into the twentieth century. /I 
(NZNA past Elected Officer, Jan. 1991) 
Progress was slow but restructuring was well under discussion when the NZNU split 
from NZNA in 1987. Thinking was in many ways still along the lines of a more 
democratic professional organisation, when legislative changes settled the 
professional/industrial argument. The State Sector Act, 1988 required NZNA to regis-
ter as a union under the Labour Relations Act 1987, which stipulated aspects of 
unions' formal organisation and powers. The internal political groundwork had already 
been done to transform NZNA from a senior nurses' club into a organisation which 
represented members lower in the nursing hierarchy. It rapidly reorganised to cater 
for industrial as well as professional needs. 
"We were looking at restructuring anyway but...still along the lines of a 
professional body, we had a corporate plan and a mission statement ... People 
became very clear about what needed to happen to ensure that it could deliver 
in terms of the Labour Relations Act...a workplace structure./1 
(NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
The process of developing the new constitution was completed in 1989 and in the 
transition the old branches with their professional focus were disbanded. Nurses 
became direct NZI\lA members, voting individually by virtue of their employment 
relation under the award, rather than as members ofa branch, with the branches 
themselves members of the NZNA incorporated society. NZNA's organisation became 
workplace based, with worksite meetings, elected delegates, delegates committees 
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and direct membership ballots on major industrial issues4. Members with 'acommon 
interest of professional, geographic or political concern' could form regional sections 
to deal specifically with these - as far as professional issues can be separated from 
industrial issues. 
Ideally, workplace meetings and committees could debate the range of industrial and 
professional issues that arose. However, the constant change in labour relations 
systems and Area Health Board management restructuring have overloaded work-
places and delegates with industrial issues, which have necessarily received more 
attention from union officials. Sections are issue specific and have formed more slowly 
as interests arise. To debate issues on a broader base from a variety of perspectives, 
a few regular regional Forums have been organised by members, particularly nursing 
tutors, which in some ways fill a space left by the old Branch meetings. 
Under the new structure, both workplaces and sections were represented on eleven 
regional councils, which were in turn represented on the National Council responsible 
for the management of the organisation. In addition, only three representatives of 
national sections were on the National Council. Also on the National Council were the 
. chairpersons of seven-member directly elected Professional Services and 
Socio-Economic Welfare standing committees. This means that at all levels except the 
local and in the standing committees themselves, industrial and professional interests 
were present. But at all levels only Category A members could vote on industrial 
matters, i.e. only those covered by an award could participate in decisions on it. 
From 1955 a Economic Welfare standing committee (SEWC) had had primary respon-
sibility for industrial policy and strategy. In the new labour relations environment, the 
largely professional oriented Council members accepted SEWC advice perhaps more 
readily than PSC advice. Study days on industrial matters were scheduled to fit with 
4 There is a small historical irony in the return to worksite meetings. At the time of NZNA's lobbying 
to shift nursing education out from the control of Hospital Boards, activities were organised off hospital 
premises. Before the 1970s most students lived in nursing homes and lacked transport; meetings in 
hospitals or nursing homes increased attendance but were felt to undermine an independent stand. 
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bi-monthly National Council meetings in Wellington. Elections at the 1991 Conference 
saw a complete turnover of the National Council members elected four years earlier. 
Major decisions were referred directly to the membership, usually with 
recommendations from the National Council, such as decisions on the NZCTU 
Compact, compulsory unionism, a possible composite award with PSA health 
professionals, reamalgamation with NZNU. Remits come from members and sections 
to the annual Conference which is the highest, if slowest, policy making body. Input 
is constantly solicited for lobbying on health sector restructuring and professional! 
political issues such as the Nursing Amendment Act and the Nursing Act review. 
Members, often delegates, are sought to represent nurses on Area Health Board 
effectiveness studies. 
Was NZNA now membership driven? No, but structurally it could be, which was a 
major change from the past. As a professional association as well as a union, it 
actively involved more of its members than most unions (Thomson 1990:83,114). Paid 
officials, especially organisers, were usually nurses who had come up through the 
NZNA organisation and its politics. But initiatives and many decisions continued to 
conie from relatively small numbers of exhausted activists and elected or paid officials, 
some of whom had been involved in various ways since the early 1980s. 
NZNU's separation -from NZNA arose from lack of democracy and adequate represent-
ation for its different membership within NZNA before the restructuring just described. 
However, on separation it inherited some of NZNA's problems in that its formal 
structure remained based on the old branch system. Organising and activities were 
increasingly workplace oriented where numbers were sufficient for this to be possible, 
and delegates were elected to liaise with -field officers on workplace problems. 
However, the constitutional structure was based on nine regional branches which put 
forward remits and delegates to the annual Conference. As with NZNA, the 
Conference was the highest policy setting body of the union, subject only to ballots 
of the membership_ A Committee of Management was responsible for the overall 
running of the union between conferences and was the employing body. In reaction 
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to past experience of pre-19B? NZNA, there was a strong feeling that this committee 
should reflect the kinds of nurses that make up the membership. 
"On our management committee are the nurses who shovel the shit, who empty 
the bedpans ... They don't sit in an office and tell people what to do." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Although the branch structure suffered from the some of the same problems of low 
attendance and unrepresentativeness that I\lZI\lA experienced, it continued to make 
sehse for NZN U nurses to meet together outside the workplace. Membership in a 
region was spread across a number of hospitals, clinics, and a proliferation of Plunket 
rooms, GPs' surgeries and other isolated worksites which were not easily organised. 
Nor would worksite organisation bring NZNU's very different kinds of nurses together. 
Tile situation at the time of study was a hybrid of branch and worksite organisation, 
but progress towards a more effective structure was delayed as reamalgamation of 
NZNU and NZNA became likely, since this in itself would necessitate a fundamental 
constitutional revision. 
Where then were decisions being made? Most initiatives came from the Secretary and 
paid staff and were taken to the Committee of Management for decision. There was 
also input from worksites and branches where possible. 
'~ lot of the impetus or thoughts about the future come from the staff because 
that we are paid to do that, we are paid to advise and support. We give the 
Committee of Management the information they need to make decisions on." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
However, one aim of NZNU leadership was to encourage the election of progressive 
and strong minded people on to the formal decision making body, the Committee of 
Management. Committee of Management members came up for election every two 
years, and a full turnover was achieved between separation from NZNA and the Octo-
ber 1991 Conference. 
"The old ones were much more conservative than the new guard ... dynamic, 
have good ideas ... (In the past) I don't think the union was Committee of 
Management driven. It will be now." (NZNU Staff Officer, Jan. 1990) 
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While there was commitment to a democratic union in principle by decision makers, 
structural reform was not necessarily seen as a greater priority than rapid and efficient 
progress in building the union. Branches continued to have importance, but were 
sometimes used for the legitimation of decisions really made in other ways. For 
example, it was recognised that the presence of Maori and Pacific Islands people on 
the Committee of Management, and a more visible commitment on race issues, was 
important to encourage membership and involvement by those groups. A suitable 
Maori woman already active as a worksite delegate was encouraged to attend branch 
meetings. There was an unusually large attendance at the branch meeting where 
voting in her support took place, which annoyed the small number of regular 
attenders. 
The NZNU officials with the widest experience of the union movement suggested that 
it is not unusual 'for democracy to be organised.' However, the problems with 
ineffective and undemocratic structures were fully acknowledged by both paid and 
elected officials. 
"There are now being genuine attempts at changing (NZNU's) structures to 
make it more democratic ... 1 would take issue with anybody if they thought the 
NZNU was a democratic union ... (but) I honestly believe that NZNU is the most 
progressive, dynamic, exciting, move-ahead union in NZ, I've got no doubt 
about it. /I (NZNU Staff Officer, Jan. 1991) 
'}.\s confidence builds up, one or two people might find themselves a little 
surprised when those democratic structures actually begin to operate. /I 
(NZNU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
Voluntary Unionism 
Like other public sector unions, NZNA has always been a voluntary organisation. 
From 1988 to 1991 under the State Services Act and Labour Relations Act it was 
bound by the same provisions as private sector unions; that, three yearly ballots of the 
membership were to make unionism compulsory or voluntary for all workers covered 
by an award. Accordingly, in 1989 NZNA conducted an expensive, low-response 
postal ballot which established by a small majority that existing members thought 
membership should be compulsory. But there was never an intention to enforce this, 
as voluntary unionism seemed immanent with a change of government. Nurses no 
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longer covered by the award - those above grade 16 - remained, in any case, purely 
voluntary members as did other Category B members whose employment fell outside 
the coverage of NZNA's awards. 
Beyond the need for union expertise with individual problems and collective 
negotiations, officials believed that nurses joined NZNA for two main reasons: 
membership of their professional organisation and access to block-bought professional 
indemnity insurance. An indemnity insurance scheme begun in 1971 was continued 
on legal advice after the establishment of Accident Compensation. Although with 
some incidents legal responsibility may lie with the employer or instructing doctor, 
coroner's enquiries, Accident Compensation medical misadventure claims or 
disciplinary proceedings may involve legal fees and awards against nurses. Recent 
changes in ACC coverage have increased the importance of indemnity insurance for 
nurses. 
"Nursing is one of the few occupations where, when you make a blue, you can 
actually kill someone. II (past NZNA Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
NZNA membership grew after 1988 as nurses increasingly saw the need for collective 
negotiating strength and individual protection, and as NZNA's effectiveness as a union 
grew. During the State Sector Act campaign in 1988 nurses joined up so they could 
join in the threatened strike. About 2000 new members were gained. Membership 
increased 12% in the year to March 1990, and in late 1992 membership was over 80% 
of full potential coverage. 
Voluntary unionism, then, was not an issue for NZNA. In fact, other aspects of the 
Employment Contracts Act, together with the changed management and budgetary 
environment in public health, have provided extra inducements to join the union. Since 
collective contracts legally bind only signatories, it could not be assumed, for example, 
that employers will extend NZNA negotiated rates and conditions employer to 'free 
riders' in the same way as past awards with legally binding blanket coverage. 
"When they are in the union, they are all looking to get out, and now there is the 
opportunity, they suddenly realise the value of the organisation doing it all for 
them." (NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
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The increase in membership was noticeable at the time of planned action against the 
Employment Contracts Bill. 
'7he theatre supervisor said I will need an on-call team, every person in my 
department has joined the union, I have no-one - and she was at the meeting 
herself ... Before (the Bill) they could have run the theatres in Christchurch with 
all non-union nurses." (NZNA Organiser, May 1991) 
Private sector nurses came under compulsory unionism provisions of labour relations 
legislation from the inception of their awards. Meetings ballots in 1975 showed all 
award groups except Plunket nurses were in favour of compulsory union membership, 
despite employer opposition. Membership dropped about 20%, largely due to 
turnover. 
'7hat was not due to members leaving ... new staff weren't joining up. The 
situation back then was we had no staff to do it." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
NZNU did not enforce compulsory membership beyond active recruiting by delegates 
who informed nurses that membership was legally compulsory. The compulsion itself 
was objectionable to many, who were in any case protected by blanket coverage of 
the award: 
"(One nurse) always attended meetings, quite outspoken, but I always 
suspected she wasn't a union members ... She said 1'1/ never beyond to your 
union as long as it's compulsory, but come May it's quite on the cards that 1'/1 
join." 
(NZNU Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
In late 1990 NZNU officials were optimistic about the likely change to voluntary 
unionism, as so much work has been put into organising private sector nursing since 
1987. 
"1 think nurses on the whole have become much more unified over the last few 
years. People aren't talking about leaving because of voluntary 
unionism ... talking about continuing and needing to be stronger because of the 
economic climate." (NZNU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
Like NZNA, officials felt NZNU provided for private sector nurses' professional needs, 
including indemnity insurance, but in their view professional issues were not their 
members' first priority in belonging to the union. 
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"They see we can cover their professional needs as well but that's not the 
reason they belong to us, they belong to us for the industrial cover ... Ours says 
'Union' so they know exactly why they belong." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
NZNU officials saw potential membership growth in the continuing expansion of the 
private health sector under present government policies. However, it was recognised 
that a permanent membership drop of 20% under voluntary unionism, such as that 
experienced in 1984-85, would affect NZNU's financial viability. NZNU attempted to 
geUee deduction written into the 1990 Private Hospitals award, but without success. 
Although most employers were deducting fees, some used the discretionary nature 
of deductions as a weapon against the union during disputes. Without deductions or 
automatic payments members easily become unfinancial, and this was seen as likely 
to cause membership losses. In November 1989, with an eye already to voluntary 
unionism, NZNU had held a general back-fee amnesty. 
"There will be problems when people get a big bill they know they don't have 
to pay." (NZNU Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
"With voluntary unionism around the corner, every action we take we have got 
to think, how is this going to encourage members' commitment to the union. /I 
(NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
. In November 1990 the broad content of National's proposed Employment Contracts 
Act became known to Wellington unionists and it was clear that, not just voluntary 
unionism, but the fragmentation of awards to individual enterprise bargaining could 
seriously affect NZNU's viability. 
The Changing State Employer 
Just as differences between the membership characteristics of NZNA and NZNU 
stemmed from their different public and private health sector coverage, so too the 
differences between their negotiating and organising situations stemmed from the 
differences between the public and private sector health employers with whom they 
dealt. 
As a union representing public sector nurses, NZNA was certainly a secondary form 
of organisation of workers organised primarily by one central government purse string 
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- Vote: Health. Much of NZNA's industrial strength, relative to other women's occupa-
tions, has derived directly or indirectly 'from that fact. Current difficulties in both 
negotiations and in hospital workplaces stem from changes in the role of the state as 
employer, as well as changes in its responsibility for public health care. Although 
I\lZNA's national and rather centralised structure derived from its historic function as 
a professional association, this was reinforced by a long relationship with a centralised 
national employer: the state. This contrasts with the regional development of most 
private sector unions, such as the clerical workers and cleaners unions. 
I\lZNA's development parallelled the growtll of state responsibility for public health 
services and the state's role as the major employer of nurses. The first standard code 
of nursing pay rates was suggested to hospital boards by the Health Department after 
universal 'free hospital care became fully funded by government in 1938. The 
employer-employee relationship between the Health Department and nurses 
represented by NZNA was reinforced through successive legislation. However, NZNA 
encountered increasing difficulty in negotiating with its state employer over the late 
1970s and early 1980s. 
When Labour lifted the wage freeze in 1985, NZNA argued that low nursing wages had 
slipped against both inflation and wages in other occupations. The Health Department 
(1985) had identified a severe nursing shortage and recommended incentives for 
nurses returning to the workforce and recruitment of overseas nurses with recognition 
of their qualifications. This report was backed by BERL research on nursing migration 
and economic cycles and NZNA's own research which linked the shortages to wage 
rates. Despite this, the Health Services Personnel Commission made a nil offer and 
procrastinated on further negotiation. This led to the 'Nurses are Worth More' 
Campaign and for the first time ever, nurses' gave 14 days' notice of a one day strike. 
In 1986 the Labour government appointed a taskforce to a review health services. Its 
1988 report reflected the market philosophy its Business Roundtable chairman (Gibbs 
1988). Inefficiency, waste and waiting lists were grounded firmly in lack of 'managerial 
prerogative' (I\lZI\lA 1988b) and the restructuring of health management began, in line 
with the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 and State Sector Act 1988. Despite 
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disclaimers, the Gibbs report provided the script for policies of both Labour and Na-
tional governments, but the driving force behind the policies was government deficit 
as the recession deepened and tax revenues fell. 
Under the State Sector Act, 1988 and the Area Health Boards Amendment Act, 1988, 
Area Health Board management and labour relations were restructured. Chief 
executives of Area Healtrl Boards were given full responsibility and power to hire and 
fire, along with a vague requirement to be 'good employers' and provide equal 
employment opportunities. The Area Health Boards, coordinated through their 
Association, became the negotiating employers, but the State Services Commission 
maintained central government's interests in award negotiations. 
While these changes gave greater nominal autonomy to Area Health Boards as 
employers and managers, policy enforcement through fiscal control increased greatly 
in Labour's second term. Area Health Boards were under contractual obligation to the 
Health Department to pursue new strategic health priorities but their ability to do so 
was limited by budgetary pressures and 'accountability'. As reducing the internal 
deficit became a primary goal of government, the public health 'service' became the 
health' industry' and managements became budget driven. Boards were expected to 
absorb wage increases in 1987 and 1988 (Walsh & Fougere 1989:220), then health 
budget cuts in 1989 and 1991. A shift to population based funding affected some 
boards more than others, with variation also in the timing of the budget squeeze. 
When the Auckland Area Health Board attempted to resist government policy by 
overspending its budget, its elected members were dismissed by the Minister of Health 
and a Commissioner appointed. Wellington Area Health Board was threatened with 
similar treatment. As Pat Walsh and Geoff Fougere point out, there were inherent 
contradictions on the employer side of the table: 
While the credibility of the general managers' industrial strategy depended upon 
the Government's firm resolve not to provide additional funds, the elected 
boards had good reason to press the Government for more. 
(Walsh & Fougere 1989:224) 
However, with regard to managers, the inverse of this point was also true: labour 
relations aspects of the State Services Act had linked general managers' personal 
309 
career interests to successful implemention of government policy. Under budgetary 
pressure for management efficiency, beds, wards and hospitals were closed, services 
centralised, reorganised or restricted to weekdays only, staffing levels fell and 
workloads intensified. Facilitating government health cost reductions were 
management restructuring, appointments with business rather than health expertise, 
and managers' terms of employment under individual, performance-based contracts. 
Health managers were not prepared to take a stand against the budgetary pressures 
imposed on them. 
"When the first lot of cuts came in, they said they didn't like it any more than we 
did. We said, well, why don't you come with us to government and say it's not 
good enough. Oh no, we couldn't possibly do that, we couldn't be seen to be 
political." (NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
A central purpose of the State Services Act 1988 was to reorganise state bargaining 
on department - i.e. 'industry' - lines, rather than occupational Determinations which 
applied across the whole civil service. With nursing, occupation and department 
coincide, but in 1989 the existing national Determination needed to be codified as an 
award under the Labour Relations Act 1987, incorporating block conditions from the 
Health Service Personnel Commission manual for the whole public health sector: 
'~ time consuming and messy exercise." (NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991). 
From 1989 until 1992 this national award covered all categories of nurse employed in 
general and obstetric hospitals by Area Health Boards; each nursing job category was 
described and assigned to one national pay scale. It was now a minimum rate, rather 
than a paid rate, document, giving employers the 'flexibility'to pay above-award rates 
- an option they did not use. 
In comparison with the awards for clerical workers and cleaners it was an elaborate 
document. It incorporated civil service conditions achieved in the past - leave 
entitlements, including long service and tangihanga leave, meal and rest breaks, public 
and state service holidays, transfer provisions. It spelled out the requirements, 
protections and payments of a 24 hour service - overtime, penal rates, night rates, 
rostering rules and minimum breaks between 'shortchange' shifts, clothes changing 
time, call back conditions. There was no differentiation or disadvantaging of parttime 
workers. Additional allowances covered transport, isolated workplaces and relieving, 
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uniform and shoe allowances. Concessions to professional requirements included 
payment of practising certificate fees, leave to attend NZNA section groups, the 
Nursing Council and statutory boards and committees. 
A notable feature of the award was the very generous, cumulative sick leave provision 
in the first few years of employment, which had been achieved through the 1970s. 
Another feature was a clause setting out legal parental leave entitlements with an extra 
incentive of 30 days' pay (to women only) returning to the nursing workforce. 
The award, like the historically confining labour relations system itself (Harvey 
1992:60), focused on negotiated rates and conditions. In areas of concern arising 
from the content of nursing work, the union's role and rights in the workplace and in 
relation to management were much less clearly spelled out. 
"In a lot of situations our document isn't that good, you can't slap it down and 
say, it says you shall do this or that like the Ten Commandments, because quite 
often it is 'may' which is discretionary to them anyway." 
(NZNA Organiser, April 1991) 
However, a major addition to the award, gained in the settlement of the 1989 strike, 
. was the Protocol on the Management of Change, under which NZNA became involved 
in: 
... any review (prior to the commencement) which may result in significant 
changes to either the structure staffing or work practices affecting employees ... 
(NZNA 1990b) 
The NZNA officials interviewed were convinced of the need for a national award. From 
a union viewpoint, one award united the national strength of nurses behind smaller or 
more vulnerable groups of nurses. But NZNA's preferred argument was based on 
professional concerns and ideals of service. The same quality of nursing care should 
be available to patients anywhere in the country and this would be undermined by 
regional rates. Uniform national rates encourage the mobility of highly experienced 
and qualified nurses between regions. 
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The national award also paid equal rates to grades of nurses across specialisms: in 
NZNA's view, if eacrl kind of patient is entitled to an equal standard of care, then all 
nurses are entitled to equal rates and conditions. 
Uniform recognition and reward across nursing specialisms is increasingly important 
in the context of changes in medical and nursing technology. The connection between 
masculinity, technology and reward (Cockburn 1985) mean that increased nursing 
skills are more likely to be recognised when they related to increased technical 
hardware. But this tendency reproduces the devaluation of traditional 'nursing' skills 
and advances in knowledge and skills in 'down market' areas which involve less 
hardware and gadgetry, such as paediatrics and geriatrics. 
"People who work in operating theatres have technical skills but don't exercise 
the same interpersonal skills as someone looking after a dying old lady. The 
minute we get into those comparisons, we are devaluing the very skills of 
nursing." (NZNA Elected Officer, Dec. 1990) 
Connections between masculinity, technology and fashionable medical specialisms 
may affect budgeting and funding, as units become costed separately and competition 
between them is increased. Private care of the elderly provides ample cautionary 
examples to support these arguments, made by NZNA and NZNU alike, since much 
of the split between public and private health care services is along these lines. 
In sociology of professions terms, NZNA's arguments in support of a national award 
may be seen as seeking to maintain a level of reward appropriate to the quality of 
nursing work which the profession ensured through its control of education and certifi-
cation. This is the basis of NZNA's historic bargain with the welfare state, and the 
means by which it has ensured nursing's labour market position relative to other 
female dominated occupations. 
Negotiating in Public Sector Health 
Negotiations with the State Services Commission and Area Health Boards 'from 1988 
was a very different experience for NZNA from dealing with the old Health Services 
Personnel Commission. In November 1988, the employers initially offered a nil pay 
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increase to avert job losses; penal rates, call back and other allowances were 
attacked; and senior nurses were to be removed from award coverage. NZNA was 
fortunate in 1988 to have just supplemented their industrial officer with an assistant 
with a private sector experience. The whole procedure became more formally 
negotiated via mediators, much more confrontational, and, in NZNA's view, logical, well 
documented argument appeared to have little place. 
"I find it very frustrating the games men play, wage negotiations where you don't 
even think about settling until 4 o'clock on the third day of the second group of 
talks ... As they went out, one said, oh well, we won that one. I thought it was 
about negotiating, not winning and losing ... The employers are as locked into 
this ritual as those darlings from (a certain union)." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Jan. 1991) 
NZNA tried to take as many nurses as they could afford along to negotiations, partly 
to have every kind of nursing expertise available and partly because: 
"Until they see the employer sitting there saying, 'No, I am not going to give you 
that', they don't believe how difficult it is to get the employers to budge." 
(NZNA Staff Officer I March 1991) 
A hospital aide acting as an award assessor reported: 
I found the whole system very frustrating, mainly because the State Services 
Commission panel seemed so apparently ignorant of the issues facing our 
members and some of their ideas were so off track they weren't even funny. 
(Kai Tiaki June 1990: 12) 
The employers were often represented by personnel officers, not General Managers, with 
few nurses or women. In 1988: 
"We made the comment that if they were negotiating with a predominantly female 
workforce we would appreciate it if they had more women on their negotiating 
team - the next year they did." (NZNA Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
"I think women negotiate in a very different way from men, tend to be logical in 
their presentation, have done their homework and are willing to listen and to 
compromise ... Any nurse worth her salt negotiates for her client, for her family, in 
the hospital, so as far as negotiating skills, they just need a bit of honing." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
But although the employers' team had representatives from the hospitals, the Area Health 
Boards, their Association and the State Services Commission, the ultimate employer was 
hiding behind the arras at each award round. 
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"They have to have Cabinet approval for their limits, so it's not a free and frank 
negotiation." (NZNA Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
"This hands off policy - we found out there was a group of six cabinet ministers, 
every time the settlement was coming close, the State Services Commission would 
run off and tell them. We have said, we'll go and talk to these people. They get 
all twitchy about that, because they want to be seen as the ones managing their 
hospitals. The reality is they aren't. Not in money matters anyway. 1/ 
(NZNA Organiser, March 1991) 
In the first award round under the State Services Act it took industrial action in February 
1989 to get a 2% wage increase, no clawbacks and the Management of Change clauses, 
but coverage of senior nurses was lost. This was a nine month document only. In 1990 
4% was achieved, with changes to charge nurse margins and referral of various 
clawbacks to a joint working party. 
In late 1990 NZNA initiated its 1991 round with a claim of 3%, in line with the Growth 
Agreement between Labour and the NZCTU before the change of government. Employ-
ers were warned of nurses' willingness to take. industrial action to ensure settlement 
before 1 May5, not the award's expiry date 30 June. On 30 April 1991, all public health 
sector awards were rolled over at the nil wage increase announced by government for 
the whole state sector. That was the same day nurses' strike action in protest of the 
Employment Contracts Act was prevented by an injunction sought by employers over its 
legality. 
NZNA officials pointed out that, over the two-and-a-half year period between the State 
Services Act and the Employment Contracts Act, nurses' wages had increased 8% while 
inflation over the same period had been around 14%. This 8% was below the increase 
achieved for most male dominated private sector awards over the same period. With the 
repeal of the Employment Equity Act, 1990 the possibility of a pay equity adjustment had 
been lost. This was despite demonstration by nurses of tlleir willingness to take strike 
action in support of both their claims and against legislative changes which they saw as 
5 The intention of government had been to introduced the Employment Contracts on 1 May 1991; 
procedural delays, rather than recognition of International Labour Day, meant it was finally enacted on 15 
May 1991. 
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against their interests. Neither of the actions threatened by nurses in early 1991 were to 
achieve pay increases; they were to protect their negotiating rights. 
"People are saying to us that they would rather have their conditions than money, 
now that's the first time ... they would rather have their jobs and conditions." 
(NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
Wage rates had successfully been held down during wage rounds since the State Sector 
Act, but a main target of employer attack over those years was conditions rather than 
basic pay rates. As well as continual pressure on penal payments for working unsocial 
hours, employers chipped away at allowances, such as for transfer of employment, call 
backs and transport. Transport allowances are important to nurses since little public 
transport operates when most shifts begin and end and personal safety becomes an 
issue. 
The decimation of higher nursing grades as part of Area Health Board restructuring meant 
more staff management tasks were being devolved to charge nurse level. In 1990, far 
from rewarding the greater responsibility and skills this involved, employers suggested 
extending individual contracts to charge nurses as 'management'. As part of the 1990 
settlement, contested items were referred to a joint union/management working party, but 
this became hard to convene as management awaited the new regime under National. 
A joint working party had been working for some time on changes to salary structures, 
including penal rates and a clinical career path (NZNA 1988a). 
Penal rates and allowances were an important part of the earnings of those who provide 
24 hour care in hospitals. In Auckland Hospital, for example, only 14% of nurses, 
including the charge nurses, work normal daytime hours from Monday to Friday. NZI\lA 
estimated that approximately one third of their membership was on a basic rate which 
was less than the average wage. Penal rates raised the wage bill, but to remove them 
would bring certain industrial action since nurses relied on regular penal rates to top up 
their base rate to an adequate recompense. As NZNA's President wrote in an editorial: 
If employers ... are having even the teensiest wee fantasy about nurses giving up 
their penal rates, I can only say' FORGE-nT'. That is, unless the managers intend 
coming on to the wards and departments at 8pm and staying overnight and every 
weekend, because tile nurses will Ilave gone to the beach. 
(Kai Tiaki Dec/Jan 1991 :2) 
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Instead, management had been cutting its penal rate bill where possible by reorganising 
services to daytime and weekday schedules only. This also reduced earnings, but the 
attack was less direct if the requirement and opportunity to work unsociable hours were 
simply not there. 
On the change of government, officials felt NZNA had its negotiating position and 
strategies much more clearly thought through than had the employers. Employers 
seemed slightly surprised at the pressure from public health unions to renew awards for 
another year before the introduction of the Employments Contracts Act. Their greater 
concern was with funding and with National's new Taskforce on Health. The objectives 
set for the Taskforce already included a philosophical separation of 'health service funders 
and providers' likely to mean more institutional restructuring. At this point, in NZNA's 
view: 
"The wild card is the government." (NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
Management Rules OK? 
Award negotiation remained essentially centralised between 1988 and 1991. However, 
the 1988 Act restructuring Area Health Board devolved management control into the 
hands of budget-driven administrators. Despite some variation between regions, this 
changed and hardened workplace employment relations for nurses. 
The old triumvirate system of medical superintendent, administrative manager and chief 
nurse that had operated in most hospitals provided three interacting hierarchies of 
responsibility. On paper the management triumvirate was a trinity of equality. The 
ultimate bureaucratic measure of power and status, office furnishings, showed the true 
picture: the doctor was God. 
Restructuring hospital management placed private sector executives in policy setting and 
management positions placed managers on short term performance contracts and set 
them budget-trimming performance goals. Management numbers were increased to 
provide cost accounting and a new phenomenon, planning. 
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"Two things we agreed with the Gibbs report on: one was lack of information 
systems; the other was that there are very few skills in management within the 
health sector. /I (NZNA Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Initially, the proposals for structural changes had inspired hopes of improvement: that 
medical power would be challenged and reduced; that' good management' would move 
on some of the' deadwood'. This included, in the view of NZNA officials, some senior 
nurses whose management skills had been questionable and whose disciplinary style 
could be devastating. 
"Never any degree of confidence that nurses' interests would be protected ... Those 
people tended to be divorced from the realities that were facing nurses. /I 
(NZNA Organiser, April 1991) 
But in the restructuring, it was more than a few 'old school' nurses who disappeared. 
Nursing as an autonomous profession was decapitated, with the traditional career path 
in nurse management all but lost. Chief and principal nurses' positions were abolished, 
usually through attrition and non-replacement, or converted to advisory positions; the 
supervisor position above charge nurses all but disappeared. When nurses above Grade 
16 were removed from award coverage in 1989 in accordance with the State Sector Act, 
many had already gone; by 1991 only around 100 nursing positions above grade 16 
remained. 
The decapitation of the nurse manager career path came at the very moment of an 
generational revolution in NZNA, which might otherwise have defended the profession's 
senior jobs. There was still some ambivalence in NZNA towards the 'old guard' of 
nurses; delegate structures were not in place to relay information rapidly to officials; many 
positions had gone before NZNA officials heard of proposed changes. The overall effect 
on the profession of these rapid changes was more easily seen in hindsight. 
"I would have thought losing your principal nurses throughout NZ would have been 
a huge professional issue to pick up and to have fought tooth and nail, but I don't 
believe NZNA did anything really./I (NZNA Organiser, June 1992) 
Many unit management tasks, unit budgeting and staff rostering were pushed down on 
to charge nurses, without additional instruction, recognition or remuneration. This was 
often welcomed by charge nurses as giving greater job control and responsible 
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autonomy. By 1991 unit managers - not nurses - were being appointed to oversee these 
tasks. 
Management positions were open to nurses with the requisite qualifications and skills. 
Some few had moved into these jobs; by 1991 one General Manager was a nurse. But 
generally the chain of communication, knowledge, responsibility for nursing care from 
bedspace to hospital policy had gone. The concept of autonomous nursing might 
continue to be emphasised at the bedside but the career path that provided a high 
degree of professional autonomy over the whole nursing labour process had been 
severely cut back. Nursing had been capped by a layer of service managers who needed 
nursing advice. 
"There is far more middle management than ever before. Whereas before the 
whole of nursing was done through the chief nurse, the whole of the medical stuff 
through the medical superintendent, the whole of administration through the 
general manager ... What you create is a manager at every pOint... The power of 
nursing to administer itself is being chopped back to that level." 
(NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
There was some variation between Area Health Boards. Auckland was the early example 
of rapid imposed change. In Canterbury there was never a triumvirate, even on paper. 
In Southland the triumvirate became a straightforward chain of command: administration 
manager, medical supervisor, principal nurse - which brings the nurses firmly under the 
doctors. NZNA found Southland to be particularly intransigent as an employer, despite 
benefiting under 1990 funding changes. 
"That's where all my personal grievances are. I thought at first I was a failure as 
an organiser because I couldn't settle things without going to a grievance hearing, 
but I recognised finally it's the people you are dealing with, because every 
grievance has been successful." (NZNA Organiser, April 1991) 
Elsewhere, cooperative attitudes towards NZNA officials changed with new management 
personnel, or under pressure of further cuts, such as a 10% overall funding reduction in 
1991. The adjustment to population based funding criteria and differences in the nature 
and timing of budget cuts and restructuring of individual Area Health Boards meant NZNA 
had to meet crises and attacks on staffing levels at different times around the regions, as 
well as the overall attack on the award. Nurses were 50% of hospital workforce numbers, 
but 80% of the labour cost, because nurses (and a few junior doctors) were the ones who 
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were there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Budget-driven managers saw nursing as a 
wage cost, not as the essential service entailed in the hospitalisation of patients. 
"It's the era of the bean counter, the controller of the money." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Jan. 1991) 
Nurses are united in recognising that management restructuring constitutes an attack on 
nurses and on nursing as a profession (Thomson 1990:51-52,112). 
"Nurses were getting into a very powerful position, we were saying, go away, 
nurses control nursing, don't tell us what to do, this is a nursing matter ... a very 
highly qualified nursing workforce who were becoming a real challenge in their 
own right. They've been kneecapped, our career structure is gone." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Jan. 1991) 
For many years NZNA had been proposing a clinical career path for nurses, to 
complement the nurse manager and nurse educator paths. This would mean 
non-management positions above charge nurses within each unit for a clinical nurse 
specialist who would take responsibility for orientation, backup, and updating and 
developing nursing skills and procedures for new technology. In 1991 real progress 
began to be made on tllis with employers, just as opportunities for a specifically nursing 
career up through management to Chief Nurse had disappeared. 
Two views were expressed about this. One was: 
"If you are talking about managing a nursing service, then nurses should manage 
a nursing service because other people don't know about nursing services. If you 
are talking about managing nurses, you don't need a nurse to do that." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
The other was the 'nursing has been kneecapped' view. This recognised that the new 
management hierarchy was not just about management skills, it was about control and 
about power. 
The 'professionalisation' strategy that promotes nursing as an autonomous profession 
may be seen as ideology or professional closure, but that too has its inherent' industrial' 
side. More than ever, management exercises the power of decision making. 
Management decisions affect nursing as a professional practice and nurses as workers, 
and nurses are no longer in positions where they have full power to make decisions 
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which affect nurses. Non-nursing managers now control staff and control outcomes of 
the small negotiations around nursing practice in the workplace. Staff nurses and 
enrolled nurses may well have sometimes wondered whose side some senior nurses were 
on, but that is not the issue. Retaining nurse manager positions is about retaining a 
measure of power for nurses inside an extremely hierarchicaillealth system, and tllat is 
an industrial issue. Making it work for ordinary nurses would also be an industrial issue. 
Initially, doctors too felt threatened by increased management power under restructuring. 
Funding restrictions and budgets placed unaccustomed limitations on medical priorities 
and prerogatives. By 1991 the evidence of service manager lists from Canterbury and 
Auckland was that medical men were moving into the top layer of management positions. 
"The power is with whoever controls the money, not who has the theoretical or 
clinical know/edge, so naturally doctors would crawl on bare knees over broken 
glass to get there. II (NZNA Elected Officer, Jan. 1991) 
Workload Intensification 
Intensification, rather than technology, was the major change in the nursing labour 
process in the last few years. Short staffing and time pressure were the two most 
common causes of frustration identified by nurses in a national survey in 1989 (Walton 
1989:35). NZNA officials interviewed for this research reported workload intensification 
as the major workplace issue as rapid restructuring impacted on the individual nurse. It 
connected to issues of stress, safe staffing levels, and nursing turnover and shortages. 
The term 'intensification' comes from labour process theory; in nursing practice the 
problem was seen as 'increased patient acutity'. As patient bed stays were shortened 
under tighter budgetary management, the overall level of illness in the ward increased. 
A similar effect resulted from the transfer of public hospital long stay patients to lower 
staffed private hospitals and resthomes. The intensity and risk levels of nursing work 
were increased. This was risk not only to the patient but increased risk to the nurse: 
back injury is to nursing what repetitive strain injury is to clerical work. 
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Each day nurses chart the level of each patient's dependency and from this a formula 
establishes the staffing levels needed for the following day. The formulas were 
considered inadequate by nurses and by NZNA. Among other things, they did not 
include the half hour's work it took to plot the dependency of, say, five patients. It is not 
just the number of nurses that ensures safety, but the mix of qualification, experience and 
familiarity and of permanent or bureau nurses. The formula had been used effectively by 
NZNA officials to argue about safety and to support nurses refusing to work below that 
staffing requirement, yet in 1990 organisers reported that many wards were routinely 
working below this staffing level. 
In the hospital labour process, acutity has been organised and concentrated into 
particular units and particular hospitals. Auckland public hospitals are the acutity 
centrifuge: not only is Auckland the car crash capital of the country, but very sick people 
are flown in from Kaitaia, Waikato and Tonga. They are moved on again quickly to clear 
beds paces. This situation has provided opportunities for politicking between consultants 
and budgeters via the front page of the NZ Herald. It was, however, charge nurses who 
retained the autonomy to close off admittance to Critical Care, because nurses were the 
front line of 24 hour patient care. 
The call for 'safe staffing levels' combined concerns about professional standards with 
concerns about job stress and job security. In 1989 Auckland Hospital nurses identified 
it as the most important priority for I\lZNA (Thomson 1990:57). NZNA prepared a guide 
for safe staffing levels and protections for nurses in the award. With increasing acutity 
or higher surgical workloads, hospitals or units could be up to prescribed staff levels -
Auckland was not - and yet have dropped below what the nurses on the job considered 
to be safe levels. The mix of experienced and inexperienced, permanent and casual or 
bureau nurses, adequate clinical resource and the amount of administration now 
devolving on to charge nurses also affected safe staffing levels. 
In June 1992 NZNA surveyed members registered or enrolled for more than 11 years. 
Of 403 respondents, 31.6% believed that there were not enough nurses in their ward to 
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provide safe care. Many felt that inadequate funding was compromising patient care. 
Fewer than half expected to still be in nursing in five years' time. 
Staffing levels have been identified as a major factor in nursing stress: 
(Nurses) are obliged to spread their work thinly, work in unfamiliar wards, skimp 
their service, work long hours and cumulative shifts, accept more clinical 
responsibility than that for which they had been trained and then, with only a few 
exceptions, have their study periods curtailed. The staff shortages made inroads 
in their private lives and eventually induce absenteeism, discontent with the job and 
lowered morale. (Green, Taylor, Walkey 1989:14) 
Nurses' health is affected, as is job satisfaction. Those who are not coping may leave the 
job or profession, passing the load on to another less experienced nurse. Nelson nurses 
who thought they should and could cope when management did not respond to their 
concerns were eventually all sent on sick leave by the Area Health Board's occupational 
health officer (Kai Tiaki July 1990). The Nelson incident illustrated the need for individual 
nurses to recognise personal work problems as aspects of collective problems for the 
whole profession. Nurses' call for safe staffing levels was not just about professional 
standards, it was also about control over nursing work in the face of budgetary attack. 
The pace of recent change, and the concomitant confusion and lack of planning, had 
became an issue in itself. Since 1983 when Hospital Boards became Area Health Boards 
public health service restructuring has been continual, with no time to let a new system 
settle before the 'next lot of service restructuring (that) will be tile one that fixes things' 
(Kai Tiaki Nov. 1990:16). 
"People have a speed wobble, just constantly assaulted by change. It does feel 
like an assault, with each change it puts more pressure on them, they feel their 
working conditions get tighter and tighter." (NZNA Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
One suggestion was that nurse managers needed better negotiating skills to persuade 
managers of the resources required for safe care. However, with the depletion of senior 
nursing ranks, it seemed nurses themselves would have to draw the line. In recognising 
the link between industrial and professional concerns, NZNA officials felt a strong 
professional identity would enable nurses to refuse to continue to work in unsafe 
conditions. But at Auckland: 
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Tile hospital's nurses don't share these visions - they are more concerned with 
sheer survival getting to the end of a shift safely while standards slip and systems 
turn on their heads around them. (Kai Tiaki Nov. 1990:16-17) 
For NZNA officials, as well, the constant change was frustrating. Under the Growth 
Agreement, NZNA negotiators were all set to redefine the meaning of 'productivity' and 
argue in their wage claim that nursing workloads had been intensifying for several years 
with no recognition for performance at all. But things changed - 'first the government, 
then the basis of New Zealand labour relations, then came new restructuring proposals 
for a fundamental institutional shift to the public funding but separate contracting out of 
health services (Upton 1991; National Interim Provider Board 1992). 
Private ..... """........ Health Employers 
In contrast to NZNA's central relationship with its single state employer, NZNU had to deal 
with a variety of employers, documents and employment situations. In this respect its 
situation was typical of private sector unions, and closer to the situation of the clerical 
workers unions discussed in Chapter 7. 
Private sector health is a growing and profitable area of the economy, one of the few in 
recent years. Private enterprise has always played a part in New Zealand's public health 
services. The medical profeSSion was able to influence political decisions on which 
services would be state funded to ensure universal access and sufficient capital 
investment. In others the special relationship between physician and patient continued 
to be expressed through the professional right to set a fee for services (Hay 1991), 
although increaSingly state subsidised. When most hospital services were transferred to 
cental government responsibility in 1938, some small hospitals and resthomes, particularly 
those established by religious and welfare organisations, and general and specialist 
practices continued in private ownership. 
During the 1970s and 1980s private hospital services expanded under tightening state 
budgets and free market ideology. Hospital waiting lists increased 'user pays' solutions 
for those able to afford it. Public hospital budget cutting, Social Welfare subsidy 
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arrangements and 'back to the community' slogans shifted geriatric and psycho-geriatric 
long stay care out into the private sector. The private health 'industry' is also fuelled by 
private health insurance marketing to meet both routine family health care by general 
practitioners and fears about delays and inadequacies on public hospital services and the 
policy shift from universal free access to 'user pays' health care. The funder /provider 
split proposed by National's Taskforce on Health in 1991 (Upton 1991) promised future 
expansion of business opportunity through contracts to provide established public health 
services. 
There have been a few recent bankruptcies due to over-rapid expansion of private health 
enterprises, but generally private health is a successful area of capitalist expansion. The 
areas most favoured are low capital, low risk routine surgery, routine Accident & 
Emergency, and geriatrics. High risk, rligh cost areas of major surgery, serious illness 
and critical or intensive care continued to be covered by public expenditure. With an 
aging population there is profitability in geriatrics and other long term care. There is 
money being made in private health services. 
"Each year employers say, 'We are poor, times are tough', so we do some research 
about growth, plush shag pile carpets, new hospitals or wings opened ... so we can 
say, well, let's look at that." (NZN U Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Profitability in private health often relies on forms of state funding and subsidy which have 
always blurred the line between public and private health provision. Plunket clinics and 
Nurse Maude district nursing are long established non-profit privately organised services 
which attract considerable state funding, as do Family Planning and the Help Foundation. 
GPs set their own fees and run practices as private businesses, yet receive a state 
subsidy for their practice nurses' wages as well as a subsidy per patient visit. Social 
Welfare subsidises Care available to long term patients in private care, but not in public 
hospitals. In 1974 Accident Compensation was devised as a cost effective alternative to 
medical misadventure or negligence suits, which benefited employers, medical and nurse 
practitioners and insurers as well as workers, the general public and the welfare state. 
Looked at from another angle, ACC has been a means by which state funds have passed 
into the hands of GPs, physiotherapists, chiropractors, podiatrists and dentists for visits 
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related to accidents and encouraged the recent growth in sports medicine as a private 
health market niche. 
Although a union for nurses employed in the private sector became feasible with the 
legislative reforms of 1936, NZNU was only established as a result of the expansion in 
private health care and through nurses' struggles in the 1970s. Its members remember 
how trlings were before the awards and understand the risks to them in bargaining 
'reform'. 
"Some unions have had awards running for many years and no one can remember 
the fights that went on to get those conditions. Our membership can remember. 
If the young ones weren't there, they will certainly tell them ... No way they want to 
go back to the situation where they were more or less at the mercy of the 
employers as to what wages and conditions they worked under." 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
"It actually surprised me ... how strongly they felt about their award, just how 
informed they were, when you took them step by step ... of what exactly the 
implications were." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
For a theatre nurse, returning to the workforce, who found employment in private sector 
nursing in the early 1970s: 
"The conditions were so appalling I couldn't believe it...Being fairly young I had 
never asked what people were going to pay me, it just didn't occur to me that it 
would pay 20c an hour less than a meat packer's job, with no secure hours ... 1 
found out I was underpaid for the first three years of the award." 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Until NZNU was registered in 1974, there was no compulsion for private sector nurses to 
join a union. Their membership of NZNA was low; nurse aides were in any case 
ineligible. Once NZNU was registered, membership needed to be built up, as well as 
awards negotiated. Since a degree of employer cooperation was needed for access to 
members, the preferability of coverage by a nurses' organisation was pointed out to 
employers. 
"One thing we played on a lot... was that if they didn't have a nurses' union they 
would have the cooks' and cleaners' union covering everything ... and we were nice 
nurses." (past NZNA/NZNU Officer, Feb. 1991) 
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A similar argument was put to the nurses themselves. On the one hand, they would 
receive protection and minimum rates and conditions; on the other hand: 
"This will be your kind of union, it will be different, it will have some professional 
input." (past I\JZI\JA/I\JZNU Officer, Feb. 1991) 
NZI\JU was registered under the Industrial Relations Act, 1973, which allowed direct 
negotiations between unions and employer groups. It was through Court arbitration, 
however, that I\JZNU achieved its awards and levered private sector nursing rates up 
towards the level of wages for nurses in public hospitals. 
NZNU negotiators initially proposed one Private Sector l\Jurses Award to cover its nurses, 
on the model of NZNA's document covering public health services. They were unable 
to achieve this against opposition from the diverse range of private sector employers. 
They took their claim to the Arbitration Court which ruled that five separate documents 
should be negotiated with different groups of employer. Four of these were settled the 
following year. The struggle was then to bring rates and conditions up to parity with 
public sector nursing, in most cases by exercising their right to arbitration on award 
claims. The case for state parity was most easily argued in the case of employers who 
received government funding. 
"The conditions we agreed to in the beginning were very poor, particularly for 
parttime workers ... We didn't realise how many of our members were parttimers and 
it has taken years of chipping away to change those conditions." 
(past NZI\JA/ NZN U Officer, Feb. 1991) 
The award for private hospitals was settled in July 1975. In 1976 NZNU obtained a 
Arbitration Commission ruling for a 31 % increase for nurse aides, and 9% for other 
nurses. In 1978 a Court ruling gave parity with the public sector rates. Over the next ten 
years slow improvements were made in conditions - for parttimers, penal rates, call 
backs, leave. In 1986 25%-30% was achieved to compensate for inflation during the 
1982-85 wage freeze. 
In negotiating the occupational health nurses award in 1974, NZNU officials found 
themselves dealing with large manufacturing and freezing works employers. 
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"It was a real learning curve for me ... Their main objective was to make sure that 
there was nothing in the award or its conditions that could lead a change in their 
other awards." (past NZNA/NZNU Officer, Feb. 1991) 
These employers attempted to reduce the award's coverage and effect by refusing to 
negotiate parity with state sector nurses and retaining a low salary bar for award 
coverage. This was the tactic used against clerical workers: nurses were often paid just 
above the exemption rate to discourage union membership. Since occupational health 
nurses are often the sole nurse on large work sites with other unionised workers, under 
Labour Relations Act, 1987 the strategy of NZNU officials was include them in composite 
agreements where possible. This was not seen as ideal by many occupational health 
nurses, the largest number of whom work in freezing works where unions are well 
organised but male dominated and militant. However, a composite document overcame 
members' isolation and weak negotiating position, while allowing I\lZNU to represent their 
interests, sort out grievances, provide indemnity insurance, etc. 
"It takes a lot of energy for one nurse buLthen they are in there for good, with their 
various clauses relating to them." (NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Besides belonging to NZNU for industrial coverage, occupational health nurses organised 
an active Occupational Health Association, whose National Secretary was on I\lZI\lU's 
Committee of Management. 
NZNU also had 'enterprise' agreements with specific, quite large national employers, 
which involved small numbers of members compared to its blanket coverage awards. In 
November 1975 documents were settled for Plunket and Nurse Maude nurses. The 
Nurse Maude District Nursing Association is a South Island district nursing service run as 
a charitable trust and largely funded by Area Health Boards. The Plunket Society, a 
nursing service for new mothers and babies, received a direct government subsidy 
equivalent to nurses' wages until 1990, when state funding became based on a contract 
for services. In 1977 a state linkage clause was achieved and subsequent award rounds 
brought slow improvements in conditions, allowances and leave. 
"For years afterwards, people in our (Plunket) Head Office were saying, you 
shouldn't join the union. .. because we will look after you ... (but) at long last we 
started to get better conditions." (NZNU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
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The Family Planning Agreement was first negotiated for nurses in 1989. This became ' 
a composite Family Planning document for nurses, counsellors, educators and clerical 
workers in early 1991. The HELP Agreement was settled at the end of 1990. 
Of the original five awards the most difficult to achieve was the practice nurses' award. 
It was twelve years before a document was finally settled at the direction of the Arbitration 
Court. Reasons for this long delay were: strong opposition from GPs; logistical difficulties 
of mobilising a rather conservative and totally atomised workforce (usually one per 
worksite); and two wage freezes imposed by government. 
Like the Plunket Society, GPs received a state subsidy towards the cost of employing 
practice nurses. At the time of research this was 75% of the nurse's wage or 50% plus 
a benefit per domiciliary visit. The scheme began in 1971 with a 50% wage subsidy for 
rural nurses to improve rural medical services, and was set up by the NZ Medical 
Association and the Health Department without consulting NZNA. In 1974 the Medical 
Association secured an increase to 100% and the scheme was extended to urban 
practices. However, it was cut back to 75% in the mid 1980s. 
"Very few employers have ever got government wage subsidies and GPs are really 
. the main ones ... Even with thaL.the number of problems we have with doctors that 
go bankrupt is quite high" (NZNU Organiser, Feb. 1992) 
In 1977 doctors agreed to a voluntary code of conditions for practice nurses, but by 1981 
this was clearly not working. Employers still refused to negotiate an award and NZNU 
went to court again. With such a high level of wage and patient subsidy, practice nurses 
might well be considered state employees, but in 1983 the Health Department declared 
the GP to be the employing party, to be represented in negotiations by the NZ Medical 
Association, not a Health Department negotiator. The Court required NZNU not only to 
demonstrate that practice nurses needed award protection, but that they wanted it - an 
unusual requirement under New Zealand labour law. The award was registered in 1986. 
NZNU's reliance on the Arbitration Court to settle this award is to be noted. It shows the 
importance of a binding procedure for conciliation and arbitration to a female dominated 
occupational group with all the characteristics that lower industrial bargaining power: tiny 
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isolated worksites; close working relationship with employer; a strongly gendered job; and 
a strong moral commitment of service to a vulnerable clientele. The employing GPs, on 
the other hand, were well organised and represented by the NZ Medical Association, a 
high status professional body with considerable political influence. 
Even with an award, GPs delayed paying negotiated wage increases to their nurses 
because their wage subsidy was paid at the time of the award round for public sector 
nurses. The subsidy contract with the state bound GPs to a strict demarcation of nursing 
duties. However, a survey of practice nurses in regard to NZNU's pay equity claim in 
1990 revealed that actual duties included not only receptionist work but tasks like 
'cleaning the fish tank'. 
"Practice nurses have come quite a way collectively but on an individual basis they 
are stuck right down in that gender inequality stuff where they are housewives for 
the GPs in lots of ways." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Although all but the Plunket agreement referred to 'minimum' rates, the rates in NZNU's 
documents were in fact paid rates. Only one or two private sector health employers in 
the country paid above award rates. From 1989 all awards included three days' paid 
bereavement leave on the death of varyingly specified relatives or partners. This was a 
specific concern of Maori and Pacific Islands nurses and was an issue being raised in a 
number of unions. For both Maori and Pacific Islands people, full cultural obligations of 
bereavement in the extended family and community involve the time and expense of 
return to a whanau's traditional marae or island of origin. 
In 1989 and 1990 some issues arising in NZNU's award negotiations were similar to 
difficulties being experienced in the public sector: budgetary pressures, devolution of 
management tasks onto charge nurses, workload intensification, penal rates. Others 
reflected pressures on private sector unions in the face of expected changes, at first 'from 
voluntary unionism, then in 1991 from much more radical changes anticipated with the 
Employment Contracts Bill. 
"You are basically protecting what you have got, that is the reality of the award 
round." (NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
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In 1990 negotiations with private hospitals, NZNU officials claimed 6% against an inflation 
rate of 7.5%. Anticipating voluntary unionism, they asked for union fee deductions to be 
formalised in the award. Although 164 out of 175 hospitals were already deducting, this 
was refused. NZNU also asked for a joint committee on improving staff:patient ratios, 
because of the inadequacy of statutory requirements and current staffing levels. 
Employers raised discussion of penal rates and a ten hour day. They offered a 4% wage 
increase offer, dependent on change in the charge nurse de'finition. This had just been 
upheld by the Labour Court in the first of two disputes of rights, awarding a nurse 
$40,000 in back wages. Employers wanted to include specific managerial tasks as well 
as staff supervision and nursing care. Charge nurses would be responsible over 24 
hours and 7 days and only 'appointed' charge nurses would be paid as such, regardless 
of actual work and responsibilities. Like nursing management changes in the public 
sector, this had implications for career paths and for staffing levels, and effectively pushed 
management responsibility down the wage scale, de-recognising skills and intensifying 
workloads without reward. Talks broke down, with nurses taking strike action before tl-lis 
change was dropped. 
In Plunket award settlements long delays were resulting from uncertainties about 
government funding. In 1990 Plunket's funding was put on a contract basis like that of 
the Area Health Boards, and budgets were similarly tightened. That year's negotiations 
centred on improving rates for very low paid Karitane nurses and whether these should 
be performance based. These less qualified nurses work from the Plunket family centres 
which replaced Karitane hospitals and provide longer term attention for babies with health 
difficulties or poor parenting. Over 11 % was obtained for Karitane nurses and 4% for 
Plunket nurses. Plunket health workers were included in the award and agreement 
reached on union fee deductions. Unsettled issues were the state parity clause, which 
the Plunket Society believed was no longer appropriate as labour law no longer 
recognised relativities, and case loads which NZNU considered unacceptably high. NZNU 
and the Plunket Society made a joint submission to government with regard to funding 
and plunket nurse case loads. 
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In 1991 the Plunket Society brought in consultants who recommended restructuring to a 
more management oriented hierarchy, and the IJse of highly qualified, highly paid 
paediatricians plus more low qualified and voluntary staff; that is, fewer registered nurses 
were to be employed in what was essentially a nursing service. 
The practice nurses award had been stretched a little to cover private A&E clinics 
established in the late 1980s. Two of these went bankrupt, giving NZN U considerable 
difficulties in recovering nurses' wages. It became clear that some of these entrepreneur 
employers would be obstructive, particularly on penal rates, in the 1991 award round. In 
agreement with other GPs, it was decided to protect the national award and 'deal with 
these unscrupulous employers on a site by site basis', with a warning to nurses not to 
sign individual documents. 
"The maverick doctors, the new wave of doctors - the NZ Medical Association are 
quite nervous of them and have basically kept them locked out from most of the 
award talks." (NZNU Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
In all 1991 negotiations there was pressure from employers to remove penal rates, and 
concessions had to be made to renew awards at 2% before the passing of the 
Employment Contracts Act. However, indications at this point were that employers would 
want some kind of multi-employer collective contract for their particular section of the 
health market: 
"Most employers I have spoken to are happy they have signed up their award for 
another year, so they can all watch what's happening, all get used to the new 
environment... They might allow voluntary unionism to set in for a while before they 
make a move, see how much that weakens the uni~Kf\lU Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
Private health sector employers may be broadly categorised into two groups: owners or 
managers of commercial businesses, and managers of religious and welfare hospitals and 
non-profit services. Despite the rhetoric of service and care-giving frequently used, the 
employment relations of nurses under the first group differs little from those of other 
women employed by private sector businesses. The second group, while less profit 
driven, can sometimes be exploitative because of service ideals which may lead to 
unrealistic expectations of employees. 
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Crosscutting this profit/service categorisation are problems which arise from the size of 
the establishment. Larger hospitals tend to have more formal, professionalised 
employment relations and a larger nursing staff provides opportunities for support and 
solidarity, delegate systems, more frequent visits by union organisers, etc. The smaller 
the establishment, the more likely nurses are to suffer the vulnerability of isolation and the 
problems of highly personalised employment relations. 
For example, nurses in general medical practices experience the same close, highly 
gender-structured employment situation as secretaries, giving rise to many of the personal 
grievances on which NZNU represents its members. Practice nurses are registered 
nurses with a stronger professional than industrial orientation, but this tendency is 
countered by the frequently high-handed behaviour of GPs. NZNU officials had no 
hesitation in publicising cautionary tales in NZNU News to impress on practice nurses 
their need for personal grievance protection, which under the Labour Relations Act 1987 
was only available through union membership. 
Because of the commercial nature of health care in the private sector, workplace relations 
and negotiating are very different from the collaborative employment relations that existed 
until recently in public sector nursing. 
"We know not to trust our employers when they say something, it's fact of life and 
they are not going to give us anything, but the state sector is just learning that." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
"They might be giving care, but in the end it's getting people in the beds and the 
dollars at the end of the week." (NZNU Organiser, April 1991) 
When the Private Hospitals Award was renewed in 1991, it seemed likely that it would 
eventually break up into three documents for different kinds of employer. Religious and 
welfare hospitals taken together are about half the private hospital system. A second 
group are chains of large, well established hospitals owned by groups of doctors, major 
New Zealand investment companies or multinational companies. The third group are 
owners of quite small hospitals, usually for geriatric care, who are sometimes medical 
men getting in on private sector expansion, or small business people without a health 
sector background who have acquired a hospital as they might a corner dairy. 
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NZNU organisers were under no illusions about the service ideals of employers. Both 
large chains and small single hospital owners have a strong cost and profit orientation 
and can be quite ruthless with staff. Some small owners try to avail themselves of 
subsidised employment schemes or any other means of reducing wage costs. 
"We are going to have to get a lot harder because our bosses aren't really 
concerned about us, they are concerned about the money. They come up with the 
wonderful terms that we use, but to me it is buying and selling of human flesh." 
(NZNU Organiser, June 1991) 
If staffing levels and workload intensification were a problem in state sector hospitals, the 
situation was no better in private health care. The state regulates the private health sector 
through the Private Hospitals Regulations, 1964 and amendments in the 1970s. The 
Regulations set out the number of registered, and registered or enrolled, nurses per 
number of beds for which the hospital is licensed. The formula averages one qualified 
nurse for every 5 beds, but this ratio includes nurses employed in management work and 
covers 24 hours of care. There is no regulation or recommendation governing the 
number of nurse aides who do the bulk of the caring work in long stay hospitals. NZNU's 
members have been experiencing the same tightening of staff levels and workload 
intensification as the public sector. 
"Over a full week it works out at 7 minutes of a registered nurse's time per patient, 
per shift." (NZNU Staff Officer, Jan. 1991) 
This inadequate regulation of private sector hospitals had both professional and industrial 
consequences for NZNU members. 
Nurses must not interpret structural problems within the health system as individual 
failings ... nor should our harshest criticisms be of each other. 
(National Secretary, NZNU News July 1988) 
"We get the nurses to document increased numbers of skin tears, increased falls, 
that's the only way we can fight it. We haven't got good regulations we can fall 
back on." (NZNU Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
NZNU officials considered the regulations inadequate to ensure standards of care and 
had been lobbying since 1987 for a review. More recently they had been seeking the 
appointment of a Health Commissioner and Complaints Process for health care in both 
public and private sectors. 
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In the larger private hospitals, the 'employer' with whom the organiser and delegates deal 
with on a day-to-day basis is usually a nurse in a management position, rather than the 
owner. The manager named under the Private Hospitals Regulations and any senior 
nurse paid above $37,500 were exempted from the award, although some were members 
of NZNU. This meant that good communication between nurse 'employer' and union 
officials about nursing and standards of care was often possible. 
/I(Theyare) pretty loyal to their owners ... but because they are nurses, they have a 
loyalty to nursing, they know about nursing, know the difficulties, and relate to me 
as an organiser and as a nurse./I (NZNU Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
/llf you have got a business man running the place they haven't got a clue. They 
don't want to know either, al/ these women making a fuss ... Our job is to sort out 
the fuss./I (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
However, the Principal Nurse 'employer's' very professionalism and nursing knowledge 
can lead to high expectations and quite harsh treatment of the less skilled nursing staff 
in private hospitals. NZNU officials felt the low ratio for qualified staff unfairly places 
unqualified and inexperienced staff in situations of patient risk for which they are not 
trained. When incidents occur, an industrial issue - a warning or a dismissal - results from 
what management would see as a professional failure, but NZNU would see as a failure 
of management. 
Under the Private Hospitals Award, the religious and welfare hospitals tended to be better 
employers than the profit-seeking businesses. Some were quite progressive in their 
principles. For example, NZNU's Maori organiser worked with the largest church hospital 
chain on aspects of implementing a commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi. However, as 
occurred on some of the clerical unions's community service worksites, and indeed with 
unions themselves, some of NZNU's disputes with religious and welfare organisations 
arose when employers saw themselves and their staff as so dedicated to service ideals 
that the normal paradigm of employment relations did not apply. An example given was 
award breeches and unreasonable expectations in a small Catholic hospital employing 
mainly Catholic nurses. 
/lThe nuns were in the management jobs but of course the law didn't apply to them, 
they were nuns ... Only answerable to God./I (past NZNU Delegate, April 1991) 
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Organisi Nurses 
These differences between employers and workforce distribution in the public and private 
health sectors presented the two nurses' unions with very different organising situations. 
NZNA was fortunate among New Zealand female dominated unions in that the bulk of its 
membership was employed on a few large hospital worksites and, until 1992, under one 
set of negotiations. Difficulties in the logistics of organising arose less from geographic 
fragmentation than from temporal fragmentation. Nursing is a 24 hour, 7 day, rostered 
shift industry with a high proportion of parttimers; it is only possible for organisers to meet 
a portion of the members on a worksite at any given time of the day or the week. This 
makes elected delegates important to effective organising; large worksites make it 
feasible. 
When NZNA was seen as a professional association consulted on Determinations, rather 
than a 'real' union, its hospital based Advisory & Representational Committees received 
greater tolerance from managers than other hospital unions, but much less serious 
consideration. Attitudes to activities in work time hardened as NZNA began to operate 
tilore as a union, and, after constitutional changes in 1988, organised worksite 
committees and delegates. Generally speaking, however, organisers are free to walk onto 
public hospital sites and contact delegates or members. Access and worksite meetings 
are limited by difficulties in nurses leaving patients, but reasonable access to workers and 
to wages and hours records has been guaranteed by legislation and respected by public 
health managers. 
In the late 1980s NZNA increased its organising staff from 5 to 12 in six regional offices, 
for the 21,500 members covered by the award. Although members were concentrated 
on very large worksites by New Zealand standards, this was a much lower ratio than for 
most unions. To be effective NZNA had to rely on active delegates. 
"I see my role as training delegates to be good delegates that get out to the 
membership because I actually can't get out to 1000 members. They can do it 
better than I can, they are on the job ... They can pick and choose the right times." 
(NZNA Organiser, April 1991) 
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An essential function of an effective delegate structure is to provide a rapid two-way flow 
of knowledge and of information. Officials recognised that NZNA's delegate structures 
were not yet organised in sufficient depth. Ideally, a well organised hospital would have 
a delegate and a deputy in each ward. Progress towards this ideal was limited by 
turnover, insufficient knowledge and experience, willingness to give time to union matters 
and confidence. Officials felt that the delegate system worked well to convey information 
to members, but less well in conveying the views of members back to NZNA staff. In the 
current rapid restructuring of health, inadequacies of communication and of members' 
knowledge of agreements and rights had at times limited NZNA's effectiveness in 
representing their members. 
':4 lot of changes would be going on, but nurses weren't letting the organisers 
know until it was too late to do anything. They didn't realise that there was an 
agreement, that they could work through a process about changes ... (or) they didn't 
understand the industrial implications. /I (NZNA Organiser, June 1992) 
Organisers involved delegates in meetings with management and introduce new 
convenors or delegates to management as the appropriate NZNA contact person. They 
tried to break down the view pushed by management that the union was paid officials 
interfering from outside, rather than that a union is made up of members and their 
representatives, supported by the officials whom they employ. 
In private sector nursing, the range of employers and documents meant a mUdh more 
complex task for NZNU organisers. NZNU's membership lacked the locational 
concentration which aided organisation for NZNA. Although a large minority of the 
membership was in rural areas and small towns, 54% of members were located above 
the HamiltonjRotorua line. This reflected the market for private health care in the 
wealthier Northern urban centres, but also pressure on public health services due to 
funding formulas which ignored regional variation in population growth rates. However, 
under the private hospital award alone, there were 60 Auckland worksites to visit 
compared to 14 for the public sector. Of over 2000 worksites covered by NZNU only 116 
employed more than 30 nurses. Only 20 employers had more than 100 nurses; 29 
employed 50-100; 43 employed 25-30. Practice nurses worked in ones and twos 
alongside GPs and receptionists covered by the clerical unions; occupational health 
nurses were also in ones and twos. Plunket nurses work in small groups on scattered 
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sites, but were becoming well organised. This more difficult logistical situation was 
compounded by a higher proportion of parttime workers than for NZNA. 
NZNU's membership was also more divided than NZNA's by level of qualification and type 
of nursing. The gulf to be crossed by solidarity among nurses and principles of unionism 
was much greater, making it difficult to come together industrially as a group with a 
common set of interests and concerns. The most isolated members, practice nurses and 
occupational health nurses, were among those with the highest qualifications, most 
professional orientation and generally lowest identification with unionism. NZNU's 884 
practice nurses members were estimated to be only around 60% of all practice nurses, 
despite the compulsory union membership clause voted into the award. They were the 
group most likely to have dual membership with NZNA for professional reasons. NZNA's 
professional section for practice nurse had 400 members in 1990, although NZNA 
covered industrially only around a dozen, in Area Health Board clinics in areas too 
impoverished to attract GPs to establish private practices. 
In 1990 NZNU had a national staff of 18, eight of whom were organisers. This gave a 
ratio of 1:1,250 members, which was considered a little low. Hospital sites and plunket 
were visited regularly, but for logistical reasons practice nurses could only be visited for 
specific problems, and had otherwise to be covered by written communication and 
occasional recruitment drives. Organisers' style, in both unions, was dictated by 
members' expectations and nursing's aspirations of status, rather than the more 
confrontation traditions of unionism. In approaching both members and employers: 
"I just knew, as a nurse of 20 odd years, what I had to do to get the membership. 
I had to look like a matron or capable of being a principal nurse or important, or 
it wasn't going to work. II (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Under the Labour Relations Act, most private hospitals were cooperative about access 
to members at tea breaks or meetings by arrangement. There were a few hospitals, 
however, that NZNU organisers found very difficult, where every obstacle was put in the 
way of organisers and members although legal requirements were strictly adhered to. 
These were hospitals run by businessmen who employed Principal Nurses with strong 
management loyalty. 
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'They sequestered me away in a little room and bring the nurses to me one by one. 
Only the ones who say, I would like to speak to the union. They make it very 
intimidating for the nurses, often have to walk past the Principal Nurse's office, so 
they stand out like a sore thumb. II (NZNU Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
In the view of officials, such behaviour was shortsighted. 
"We are often in there dealing with disputes, so in those places management is 
helping to foster union loyalty by the way they behave ... There are other hospitals 
that are more skilled than that and play that paternalistic game, happy 
families ... where we will have trouble in the new environment. II 
(NZNU Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
Delegates were elected in private hospitals and clinics, often a registered nurse and a 
nurse aide as these tend to have different problems. Two or more were preferred for 
reasons of support and vulnerability, as well as fuller coverage of shifts. Delegates are 
often seen as stirrers since it is they who raise issues with management, and the role may 
require careful 11anding. 
"I didn't want to be seen as the one, I said are you laying a complaint? In the end 
one of them had had enough, I said right, you lay a complaint with the Principal 
Nurse, she said go to your delegate, which is me. From then I actioned it, called 
a meeting, took a vote./f (past NZI\lU Delegate, June 1991) 
Yet delegates can assist good management, as NZNU organisers would point out to 
employers. 
"Where they have got a Pacific Islands delegate and employers are prepared to 
work with them, there are fewer problems than anywhere because their own 
people can explain it or say this is not right.. . Employers don't communicate, they 
just do things." (NZNU Organiser, April 1991) 
The role of NZNU delegates was to welcome and recruit new members, disseminate 
information and feed back responses. They alerted organisers to workplace problems 
and, in the view of officials, an experienced delegate played a role that supplemented the 
work of the 'outside' organiser. At times they provided initial support to members in 
dealings with employers. 
"When nurses had problems I went and stood beside them, if I felt a warning was 
unjustified then I spoke up ... The nurse has a right to know who has laid a 
complaint, when it occurred, so they have a right to address it II 
(NZNU Organiser, June 1991) 
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As with NZNA delegates, effectiveness was limited by turnover, experience and 
confidence in acting on behalf of others. 
"(One nurse) doesn't call herself a delegate, she is a contact. But she's a great 
delegate and I think she is almost there is terms of accepting the delegate title, she 
thinks that perhaps she could do it." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Often good delegates were nurses who became involved in a workplace issue through 
a sellse of natural justice, rather than any initial commitment to unionism. One Maori 
nurse who later became an organiser had initially been quite reluctant to be a delegate. 
"I said, back off ... 1 am only here because these girls feel threatened and I can help 
them in some small way, but I won't be falling over backwards for unions. /I 
(NZNA Organiser, June 1991) 
The nurses unions' use of trade union education came much later and was less marked 
as a strategy than with the clerical unions. Both fully utilised their paid education leave 
entitlement and took up TUEA subsidies to employ union educators. NZNA had one 
fulltime educator based in Wellington to cover the whole country. Its union education was 
generally directed at delegates rather than the general membership. As a plateau was 
reached in demand for delegate training, programmes were developed to meet the needs 
of particular groups, such as enrolled nurses and charge nurses, and on current issues 
such as the Effectiveness Study process and the Employment Contracts Act. Seminars 
offered on assertiveness, public speaking and biculturalism had fewer participants. In 
setting a regional programme for the year delegates were asked to choose from a range 
of topics. The educator felt that delegates whose own needs had been met were not yet 
sending along ordinary members or finding out what kind of union education might 
interest them. 
From October 1989 NZNU employed its own half-time educator who established a very 
full first year's programme of basic and advanced delegates courses. At the time of 
research, education programmes had not been in operation long enough to build a solid 
structure of knowledgeable delegates for NZNU's very mobile workforce. High turnover 
in Auckland meant additional delegates' seminars had to be included in the second year's 
programme. Well attended seminars were held on current issues, such as legislative and 
bargaining changes, and skills such as public speaking, assertiveness, communication 
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and meeting procedure. Planned health and safety seminars which covered stress had 
to take a back seat to delegates seminars. 
"Two seminars last year which had waiting lists were current issues and 
skills ... unfortunately because it is the delegates ones which are the most important 
to the union." (NZN U Staff Officer, Jan. 1990) 
At first, attendance was by organisers 'shouldertapping' likely delegates. More 
self-selection became possible as the whole year's programme was advertised in NZNU 
News and through workplace posters, and information was solicited on what most inter-
ested members. NZNU's educator saw delegate training and other programmes as vital 
to supplement written communication to members, particularly those with lower 
educational levels or whose first language is not English. In December 1990 a successful 
seminar for Pacific Islands members was run by the TUEA Pacific Islands coordinator in 
Samoan, with NZNU input in English. 
In late 1990, a 'study day' of NZNU officials debated whether to make the educator 
position full time, given the high demand, particularly in Auckland. It was decided against; 
the current level of education and organisers' contact with and support of delegates was 
thought sufficient. It was to be supplemented by production of a handbook for delegates 
and recruitment material. Recruitment and servicing the membership, rather than 
education, were seen as important in the new environment. 
"The decision was no, because education was not really seen to be a high priority 
or relevant." (NZNU Staff Officer, Jan. 1991) 
On her resignation in March 1991, the educator was not replaced because of tile 
expected impact of the Employment Contracts Act on membership and impending 
amalgamation with NZNA. 
Since nurses are a highly educated occupational workforce, improved written 
communication to members became an important strategy from the late 1980s. This was 
particularly the case in the larger, better resolJrced NZNA. Following constitutional 
change away from branch structures, ballot forms and the monthly journal began to be 
posted directly to individual members. Background papers and other material were 
circulated to workplaces and sections, with frequent calls for input from members into 
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hospital effectiveness studies and other professional and political matters. The formerly 
very dry journal Kai Tiaki6 was transformed into an attractive and readable magazine, with 
news about what nurses are doing around the country, photographs and illustrations, 
regional organiser reports, analysis of political and restructuring changes, information on 
nurses' rights, and progress reports on negotiations. Although around half the content 
was feature articles on nursing practice, there was criticism from some members that the 
journal now over-emphasised tile industrial to the neglect of the professional. 
In 1982 NZNU began its own small newspaper, NZNU News, which by 1990 was a 
bi-monthly 8 page paper, with industrial and political news, tales of grievances, reports 
on court cases, and regular information on rates and rights, as well as what was 
happening within the union. This was supplemented by flyers on specific issues and 
newletters targetting particular industrial groups. 
With an eye to voluntary unionism NZNU officials began making strong efforts to seek 
members' views and input, often through information mail out and delegate phone in. An 
example of this was asking nurses to choose their preferred male comparators for the 
Pay Equity claims from a range of suitable occupations. 
" ... so it becomes their claim, that they helped form and they are in behind it." 
(NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1991) 
Communication and reliable feedback was particularly vital for NZNU because of the 
fragmentation of the private nursing working force, and because of very low participation 
at branch meetings. However, written communication had its own problems of language 
and appropriateness with some sections of its membership, which NZNU attempted to 
address through use of Samoan, Tongan, sometimes Maori, and organising hui and fono 
where Maori and Pacific Islands members could get together. 
"We try to make all our publications in simple clear English, some we translate. 
Pay equity was all translated, parental leave - there is actually a lot available that 
has been translated .... The problem is it's all written information (which) relies on 
organisers getting out and talking to people, because information doesn't get really 
understood through written media." (NZNU Staff Officer, Jan. 1991) 
6 Although union newspapers provided information for all the case studies, Kai Tiaki was a particularly 
rich source of detailed information and official views. 
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Health and safety issues presented an area of union involvement which officials felt could 
attract nurses who perceived unions generally as 'too confrontational'. There were a 
number of concerns in private sector health, and I\lZI\lU officials could represent members 
on these to employers and to government in ways which were positive for both patients 
and nurses. 
"So much of nurses' work is caring for others that in many hospitals employers do 
not perceive employee safety as equally important.'(I\lZNU Organiser, April 1991) 
The occupational hazard of nursing work is back injury. Nurses may perform up to 50 
lifts, transfers or turns in a shift. In Australia it is estimated that over 50% of nurses will 
suffer back injury. In New Zealand nurses rank fourth on the Accident Compensation 
Commission's occupational list for back injuries and have a vital interest in changes to 
accident compensation provisions. In 1989 787 registered nurses and a proportionately 
much higher 510 nurse aides claimed accident compensation. In geriatrics, lifting of 
patients is a major, exhausting aspect of the job, and considered to be one of the 
reasons why NZN U's members favour shorter shifts and parttime work and resist the 
suggestion of the 10 hour day. Nurse aides receive no formal training in lifting techniques 
but do the bulk of this work, often with too little help at inadequate staffing levels. 
Both NZNA and NZN U officials lobbied government on Accident Compensation changes 
which were prejudicial to nurses, but were unable to prevent an increase to two week's 
standdown before wage compensation and the loss of lump sum payments. With 
employers' levies now based on actual accidents in their own worksite rather than 
industry-wide ratings, NZNA officials thought nurses' claims were more likely to be 
disputed by employers. False representation of past injury or illness may lead claims to 
be rejected, but such disclosure may affect employment chances. The nurses unions 
also lobbied for a Manual Handling Code of Practice for factories and commercial 
premises, supporting I\lZCTU's view that this should include the right to refuse work that 
puts an employee at risk of injury. 
Currently, without a mandatory code .. :from a health and safety perspective nursing 
is not a profession to be considered as a career. (NZNU News June 1990) 
An increasing problem for private sector nurses and nurse aides was aggression and 
violence as psycho-geriatric patients 'returning to the community' were finding their way 
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into private hospitals. NZNU officials were working with employer and senior citizens 
groups to develop training programmes to help staff handle such behaviour professionally 
and effectively. 
In both public and private hospitals and accident and emergency services, AIDS has been 
a concern, as both a professional and a health and safety issue. NZNU officials worked 
with the AIDS Foundation to disseminate information and ensure adequate protocols for 
protection. In one private surgical hospital, medical staff had not thought it appropriate 
to inform nurses that a patient was HIV positive. 
Following a resthome fire which killed seven residents, NZNU surveyed 93 private 
hospitals and attempted to raise inadequate fire safety arrangements in award 
discussions. Together with the Firefighters Union, I\JZNU lobbied for improved regulations 
in private hospitals and resthomes. The Health Department agreed to review the matter 
after completion of a code of practice for Old People's Homes. 
"It's a very slow process and private hospital owners are of course on the 
committees that are getting these regulations reviewed. 1/ 
(NZNU Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
Nurses' more general concerns about night security were only treated seriously by private 
sector employers when NZNU took this up as a health and safety issue. However, these 
are all areas where the possibility of adverse publicity can move mountains. 
The dual role that NZNA and NZNU played as professional associations as well as 
industrial unions was important in encouraging active involvement. NZNA met and 
developed its members' professional interests by providing special interest sections in its 
organisational structure. Any 10 nurses could take the initiative to form a section, which 
would operate locally, nationally or both. Most focused on a particular nursing specialism, 
e.g. oncology, nurse educators, but others were formed by particular grades or social 
groups to address their own concerns; e.g. enrolled nurses, Samoan nurses. 
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Grievances and 
As with clerical workers, one of the best means of ensuring nurses' support for their union 
was the successful sorting out of individual workplace and wage related problems. With 
its focus on professional concerns and centralised negotiating, this aspect of union work 
was badly neglected by NZNA officials before 1989 and given high priority in the 
independent NZNU. NZNU obtained $250,000 in 1988 and over $400,000 in 1989 for 
members in wage recoveries and compensation for unfair treatment. 
'~s a union organiser the biggest thing I do is meet that immediate need of the 
individual nurse who has been sacked or something has happened in the 
workplace ... ff you are not there for that, if you are not available, you just lose the 
individuals. II (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Although public service appointment and promotion review procedures were lost under 
the State Services Act, coming under the Labour Relations Act 1987 brought NZNA 
access to personal grievance procedures against unjustified dismissal, duress regarding 
union membership, discrimination, and sexual harassment. Access to personal grievance 
procedures, together with NZNA's new organisational structure, changed the way it could 
represented its members at work. 
liThe personal grievance legislation I think really makes you front up to being a 
union, it is that basic sort of gripe stuff that people bring to you now, whereas 
before nothing even got done with it. Certainly couldn't have tackled issues like 
casualisation." (NZNA Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Because grounds for personal grievance were spelled out in the Act, it was possible for 
NZNU officials to represent members - such as nurses in resthomes - who were not yet 
covered by an award. Having such procedures formalised in the Act and in awards 
enabled them to sort out workplace problems other than those listed as grounds for 
grievance, by ensuring that the union could protect members who raised issues or 
questioned practices. 
"You always get victimised if you complain, that's normal, isn't it?" 
(NZNU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
"I think members are much more motivated to be members and to be supportive, 
whereas once, say, six years ago ... workmates would think if we support her we are 
likely to get victimised too. But now because people know ... something can be 
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done, they are actually willing to support their colleagues." 
(NZNU Organiser, June 1991) 
In one 110spital, nurses' concern about in adequate standards, not of nursing but of 
medical care, led to the suspension of their spokesperson and the forced resignation of 
their principal nurse, for whom NZNU officials took personal grievances cases. This was 
just three years after the National Women's Hospital enquiry into cervical cancer research 
raised questions about the role of nurses, as well as doctors, in the failure of peer review 
and medical ethics (Coney 1988). 
On principle, NZNA officials' regarded a personal grievance case as a failure'. Few of 
NZNA's grievances or disputes of rights went as far as the Court. Most wage and other 
problems were resolved by organisers, with industrial and legal advice from the national 
office, although varying grades, hours and penal rates make the pay system extremely 
complex. Errors were seldom in favour of the nurse. One principal nurse balanced her 
budget by placing all district nurses on the wrong grade. When this was challenged, she 
contested job descriptions in the negotiated and registered award and suggested that 
nurses work up to their proper grade through performance evaluation. During dispute 
on trlis, the Area Health Board restructured, fragmenting the problem and its resolution 
across areas of service unit responsibility. 
An indication of the more difficult employment relations traditionally operating in the private 
sector may be seen in the fact that when a qualified lawyer was needed, NZNA used the 
services of an outside firm, whereas NZNU, much the smaller organisation, employed its 
own lawyer. However, one important and successful case taken by NZNA was against 
an employer who victimised nurses for joining the 1989 strike' illegally'; they were covered 
by the award but joined NZNA only after strike notice had been given. This case had 
implications for the whole trade union movement. 
In contrast, when NZNU took its lawyer on staff in 1989, there was already a backlog of 
cases. As with the clerical unions, success in legal matters helped establish a strong 
presence with employers. Four or 'five wage claims successfully taken would have the 
effect of upholding the award. 
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"Once a decision is made in the Court you are a hell of a lot better off. Very rarely 
do we lose. The employers are finding that out."(NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
"We have had a lot of dismissals and wage claims ... Some of it is flow-on effect 
from the union not having a strong presence in the past, employers are used to 
getting away with things and so we are starting to establish a presence ... 
industrially, legally and politically. We have had to do that a lot more than maybe 
we will in the future." (NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
However, NZNU officials drew on a range of tactics to settle disputes with private health 
employers. 
"We look around at different ways to settle a dispute ... How can we use industrial 
stuff on site, a resolution or a delegate going to talk to the boss, or is it going to 
take an angry meeting .. .Is it going to take some sort of public embarrassment like 
a picket, or someone else from outside coming to talk to them, a legal person, or 
is it going to take a mediator or a court to do it." 
(NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
As in NZNA, most individual problems were handled locally by organisers through 
discussion with the employer and the earlier stages of mediation, until the point where 
legal expertise is required. If the issue had implications for the whole membership or for 
future award interpretation, decisions about action were made more centrally. If the 
matter was taken further, the NZNU organiser usually followed the member's case 
through mediation and perhaps to the Labour Court where it came under the responsi-
bility of the legal officer. But often all that was needed was the presence of a third party 
to facilitate communication and sort out differences. 
"All I did there was paint out the value of nursing and the value of each individual ... 
Most of the work that I do with practice nurses and GPs is counselling, literally 
group facilitation where I sit in the middle and go, 'When whathisname says that, 
how does that feel for you?' ... And he goes, 'Oh really, I never thought of that. III 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Some problems arose from failure to meet professional standards expected by senior 
nurses or other managers, but both NZNA and NZN U officials were now likely to ask what 
management was providing in the way of personal help or inservice training to bring the 
criticised nurse up to scratch. 
Pacific Islands nurse aides sometimes received particularly unfair treatment. NZN U 
officials might investigate a warning and find that the nurse aide was unclear why the 
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warning was given, what her unacceptable behaviour was, because of language prob-
lems. 
"They have got English adequate for the job and for fair communication, but if 
employers want to see them confused and looking silly, they can do it by using 
certain kinds of language. And they do." (NZN U Staff Officer, Jan. 1991) 
In cases of serious error - situations in which indemnity insurance becomes important -
the unions represent the nurse before tile Nursing Council and/or in a personal grievance 
against unfair discipline or dismissal. These may be referred to a higher level in the 
mediation procedure than with other occupations as a specialised knowledge of nursing 
and professional issues is often required. Employers, particularly GPs, have sometimes 
been dissatisfied with mediation outcomes and appealed. Sometimes it has been the 
nurses unions that take things further. There was concern among a few interviewees that 
cases may be pursued too far on the basis of being legally 'winnable', in ways that may 
be against the interests of nursing as a service profession. This view reflects the 
professional concerns that led nurses in the private sector to form their own occupational 
union rather than join an existing industrial one. 
Generally, the personal grievance procedure under the Labour Relations Act was thought 
to be working well. There was, however, a 'catch 22' for unions in that the labour 
relations system until 1991 legally obliged them to represent members within their 
registered coverage. NZNA has twice - and NZNU once - been taken to court by 
members for failing to pursue a personal grievance far enough. The unions' positions 
were upheld but the cases were time-consuming. This particular difficulty does not arise 
for lawyers, or now for 'bargaining agents' under the Employment Contracts Act. 
Asserting the parameters of nursing work is at the heart of nursing's professional project 
(Garmarnikov 1978; Witz 1990) and this continues to give rise to disputes, despite 
negotiated definitions of nursing positions laid down in awards. There has been 
considerable pressure from employers for 'flexibility', particularly in smaller private sector 
workplaces. Before the Private Hospitals award was achieved in 1975, qualified nurses 
were at times expected to turn an equally experienced hand to other forms of women's 
work; in one Nelson private hospital: 
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"In summer the doctors would be on holiday ... They expected theatre nurses to zap 
up the fruit trees and pick and bottle - and we used to do that because if we went 
home, we weren't paid./I (past NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
The caring work of NZNU's nurse aides, at the bottom of the qualification and skill 
recognition hierarchy, was often expected to carryover into general domestic and 
cleaning work, intensifying their workload. 
"I have always felt that the poor old nurse aide is seen as the dirt nurse. /I 
(NZNU Organiser, June 1991) 
In 1987 a dispute arose when one private hospital asked its staff to sign a enterprise 
contract which would included up to 20% domestic work in their job. In such situations: 
"There are two arguments: one lot who say, well, they are my patients and I want 
them to have a decent breakfast, and the others are saying, you can't get them out 
of bed by yourself and we are rushing and pushing them. We haven't got enough 
time to look after the patients." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Registered nurses, both in hospitals and working for GPs, also experience demarcation 
problems, since nurses often find it difficult to draw strict boundaries around caring for 
a patient. The nurses unions attempt to combat infringements, both through negotiation 
with the employer in the workplace and through legal protection of what constitutes 
nursirig as a professional body of knowledge. An example is a dispute in 1989 which 
arose over nurses handling wet and soiled laundry from a sluicing machine. Most of the 
morning shift was suspended and nurses picketed the hospital. The Labour Court ruled 
that nurses should handle linen 'only to a point where the risk of contamination from that 
linen is beyond the need for nursing expertise' (NZNU News Aug.1990:3). From that 
point it was the work of domestics and subject to their award negotiated by Hotel & 
Hospital Workers officials. Work practices at that hospital were reorganised accordingly. 
However, on such matters, it was important for organisers to check, not assume, what 
members wanted. In one very small hospital nurses had negotiated their own 
arrangement: they did the laundry, but also brought in their own and did that too. 
NZNA was involved in a similar dispute in 1992 when North Shore Hospital moved to save 
$200,000 by making nine kitchen staff redundant and added their meal delivery work to 
nurses' workload. Nurses were willing to compromise on serving food to patients, but 
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not clear dishes, if they were assured of permanent backup coverage for emergencies. 
However, management refused this offer without costing it and the matter went to the 
Employment Court. While such disputes can be portrayed as examples of inflexibility and 
occupational demarcation aimed at protecting job rights, there are very real reasons of 
nursing standards and hygiene why nurses caring for the sick should not handle food, 
used dishes or soiled laundry. But in the present climate the real issue is savings on 
labour costs for employers and workload intensification for nurses. 
The Industrial Democracy Protocol 
An important outcome of the 1989 public health sector strike, achieved with NZCTU help, 
was a Management of Change protocol added into awards, which gave public health 
unions a right to consultation on 'significant changes to. the staffing structure or work 
practices affecting employees' and direct union involvement in effectiveness studies and 
staffing reviews. While NZNA officials have considerable grounds for ambivalence about 
the way the industrial democracy protocol has worked, it has been an important means 
of drawing nurses into union affairs, and the union into the immediate workplace concerns 
of its members. 
The inspiration for this was brought back by unionists from Victoria, Australia where health 
workers gained a 4% wage increase which they themselves were to fund through savings 
identified by effectiveness studies (Wainwright 1990). No such precise trade was 
negotiated in New Zealand but clauses on Industrial Democracy, Management of Change 
and Staff Surplus7 were added to NZNA's award. Union involvement was extended to 
job evaluations when unions referred the matter was referred to the Labour Court. An 
earlier voice of nursing expressed through the nurse manager hierarchy was all but gone, 
but another voice was being raised on restructuring issues through a formal participation 
process involving managers and unions. 
"What saddens me is that we have to legislate before people accept an idea that 
managers and the workforce could work together to mutual advantage. It seems 
7 This a mere four years after the Health Department's report Nurse Workforce Planning (1985) 
recognised growing labour shortages. The intervening factors were the Gibbs report (1986) and a growing 
fiscal deficit which led to reductions in state spending. 
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to me a basic tenet of good management that no manager should impose 
decisions without asking the people who will be most affected." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
There was considerable initial manoeuvring to establish what was meant by consultation, 
'significant changes', and the connection between effectiveness studies and budget 
trimming. Terms of reference and time frames for each review or study do not always 
allow the work to be truly cooperative and effective. In 1989 in a leaflet to employees on 
the industrial democracy protocol, the Canterbury Health Board and management 
recognised it as 'an extremely useful mechanism for obtaining employee/union 
commitment regarding the necessity for change'. 
As effectiveness studies progressed, however, Canterbury management seemed less 
approving: 
"Most management is opposed to them, see them as the union having too much 
input, take too long, too many people coming out from work." 
(NZNA Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
The benefits to NZNA of involvement have been earlier and better information about 
management changes, despite some red herrings, media leaks and employees threat-
ened into media silence. But involvement in reviews and effectiveness studies absorbed 
a great deal of union energy. Much of the effectiveness of its input depended on whether 
local delegates or organisers had the skills, resources and time to make the studies work 
(Wainwright 1990). Particularly crucial was negotiating the time scale, terms of reference 
and ensuring good nurse representatives before the work began. The South Island health 
unions attempted to seize the initiative by laying an already prepared methodology on the 
table: 
"For me process is important. I really believe that if you get off on the right foot 
with the right process you are more likely to get a better outcome - than if you wait 
to the end and try and oppose it." (NZNA Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
NZNA officials had few illusions about the industrial democracy protocol as a strategy, 
since the union's role was defense: if it wasn't involved, outcomes would be still less in 
their interest. Organisers' views were divided, for example, on whether the study of 
Christchurch geriatric hospitals was a success because it saved 60 beds, or a failure 
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because it lost 50. Feelings about effectiveness studies were more positive than about 
reviews of staff positions, since positive input about the future or transfer of services was 
possible. Nurses were glad at least to point out resource and planning problems before 
the event, not afterwards. 
"We might not like everything that the Board proposes and we might not be able 
to turn it around, but we will certainly be able to modify it... It is a matter of us trying 
to have some voice." (NZNA Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
Nurses have hands~on knowledge of their service areas and effectiveness studies can be 
seen as using workers' knowledge to do management's planning. Often this participation 
came after, not before the key decisions which constructed the topic of study. A decision 
to close Christchurch Women's Hospital and the Chisholm ward at Hanmer Springs was 
made which preempted an effectiveness study group just convened, and the public health 
unions considered taking a dispute of rights case about this disregard of the Protocol. 
Similarly, the Canterbury Health Board mounted a major campaign in 1992 to consult the 
public about which - not whether - hospitals should be closed. 
The term 'industrial democracy' for these processes is optimistic, perhaps deliberately so; 
'worker participation' would be more accurate, since little management power was in fact 
shared (Deeks & BoxaIl1989:330-31). Although committees had balanced representation 
and a democratic process, both their topic of study and their eventual recommendations 
were set in a context in which management prerogative prevailed. The reality was that 
neither effectiveness studies nor staff reviews got beyond management's cost cutting 
agenda and government's priority framework which defined the welfare state as 
, unaffordable'. 
"I don't think it would happen in any other job, where you would be told your job 
is not needed any more at $35,000 but you can do the same work at $30,000. We 
will have a review which will prove it. .. Some people accept it to protect and save 
their jobs. II (NZNA Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Arbitration or Industrial Action? 
In 1985 public health sector nurses gave notice of strike action for the first time in New 
Zealand's history. Historically, industrial action has not been a strategy for nurses firstly, 
because of moral constraints on leaving dependent patients; secondly, because it was 
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regarded as inconsistent with nursing professionalism; and trlirdly, because the 
negotiations and employment security of state employees have been premised on notions 
of loyalty and service which precluded strike action. Such thinking was behind NZNA's 
long reluctance to register a union for nurses in the private sector, although conciliation 
and arbitration provided an alternative to industrial action. 
The history of NZNU's awards related above shows its reliance on the Arbitration Court 
which provided a state guarantee of labour rights. The long struggle to achieve an award 
for practice nurses shows that institutional supports to union negotiation were just as 
important to this scattered occupational group in the 1970s and 1980s as they were to 
clerical workers in the 1930s, but they still did not make achievement of an award 
automatic. 
Arbitration was also used successfully to bring private sector nurses rough parity of 
wages and conditions with nurses in the public sector; that is, across the whole labour 
market for nursing. There has been a general belief in New Zealand that the public sector 
has ridden on the labour relations coattails of the private sector, but NZNU's awards and 
examples from my third case study show that the reverse has often been true for low paid 
occupations. 
Like the clerical unions, NZNU made good use of the arbitration system in disputes of 
rights under its awards, as well as in disputes of interest in negotiating. As private 
enterprise expanded in health, there was strong resistance to union organising and 
workplace representation. NZNU officials had to rely heavily on the assertion of legal 
rights to represent workers and the right to take employers to arbitration for a settlement. 
However, the right to arbitration on disputes of interest was removed by legislative 
changes in 1984 and 1987. The State Sector Act 1988 removed recognition of 'fair 
relativity' between private and public sector, but allowed the possibility of an all-or-notrling 
'final offer' arbitration clause in public sector awards, rather than the specific rights to 
strike contained in the Labour Relations Act (Roper 1988). However, NZNA did not take 
up trlis option. The State Sector Act obliged NZI\JA to register as a union under the 
Labour Relations Act, and officials recognised that past professionalisation strategies 
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would no longer be sufficient to protect members' wages and conditions in the 
restructured state. 
Without arbitration, both public and private sector nurses were obliged to use more 
militant tactics to back negotiations. In 1988 NZNU nurses staged a hospital sit-in to gain 
a redundancy agreement. In 1989, a vote by NZNU nurses for a 24 hour national strike 
was sufficient to settle their award. Small disputes and actions increased in the private 
sector, but it was not until 1990 that private sector nurses actually went on strike to settle 
the private hospitals award. Interestingly, it was the more professionally oriented public 
sector nurses who in 1989 first demonstrated their willingness to back their bargaining 
position by leaving the patients. 
The traditional constraint on nurses taking industrial action is a moral one. The values 
underlying nursing, and which often attracted the nurse to her profession, are values of 
service and caring. When a nurse withdraws her labour of caring for sick people to 
protect or further her own economic interests, the most direct affect appears to be on the 
patient, not a private hospital owner or an employer remotely placed at the top of an Area 
Health Board hierarchy. Public opinion, directed by a capitalist media, finds it easier to 
focus on the' innocentvictims' of union action than on the actions of employers, wrlich 
are little reported. What kind of woman, says the ideology of femininity, would desert a 
sick person for her own selfish ends? And what union would rashly cash in the halo 
around nursing? 
Nurses are often politically conservative, and their self-identity as professionals, not as 
workers, had limited their industrial effectiveness in the past. But the moral constraints 
on striking and the possible consequences of withdrawn care are real concerns for 
nurses that harbour workers and factory hands need not consider. The decision to 
withdraw labour from emergency and critical care units remains a difficult one which both 
nurses' unions allow nurses to take on an individual, rather than majority basis. 
On the other hand, unlike most women workers, nurses are extremely well placed 
strategically: nursing services are so essential to the health' industry'that even a one day 
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strike can be effective. Since the ultimate employer in public health services is the 
government, the cessation of services has political implications. In any confrontation, 
nurses, as archetypal \ goodwomen', attract a public sympathy that is unusual for strikers. 
They receive more sympathetic media coverage than other unions, and have developed 
considerable skill in this area. Officials consciously draw on the 'ministering angel' image 
of nurses which fits with the traditional role expected of the 'good woman', 
"If nurses go on strike they have full support from the public, or 95%. Just by the 
term 'nurses' they come over as squeaky clean, and that does help. It 
(NZNU Staff Officer, Jan. 1991) 
In private sector health, media coverage, showing employers in a bad light relative to 
caring nurses and vulnerable patients, can have a lingering bad effect on business. 
"We use the media quite often to resolve a dispute because they really run for 
cover ... A private health system has got to be seen as efficient and able to deliver 
and any bad publicity is quite disastrous for them. II 
(NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
However, in the competitive private health market, there may be reasons for limiting use 
of this particular weapon, as in a dispute with one private Accident and & Emergency 
clinic: 
"If we wanted to use the publicity machine, we know he would go out of business 
because people would say that's terrible, but if we do that we would also put 12 
nurses out of employment." (NZNU Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
Putting the patient 'first constrains not only strike action but other forms of union activity. 
Like other women with family and community commitments, nurses find little time for 
union activities outside work time, but hesitate to come to paid union stopwork meetings 
during work hours or take Paid Education Leave because of their duty to their patients. 
In private hospitals: 
"You can't say, when can we have a two hour stopwork meeting that is most 
disruptive, because they won't come. They will come when they think the patients 
are all right... (or) they'll work an extra two hours at the end, it doesn't matter what 
you say to them, because they can't fit the work in." 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
These factors must all be considered by officials in any industrial campaign to mobilise 
the nurse membership, and enlist public and political support. Of typically female 
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occupations, only teachers, the other main profession for women, are in a similar position. 
Yet despite moral constraints, nurses' unions have a potential industrial strength that most 
female dominated unions lack. 
Public sector nurses first demonstrated that strength in 1985. After the wage freeze NZNA 
presented a well-researched claim that nursing wages had not kept up with inflation and 
rates in other occupations, and that serious staffing shortages (Dept Health 1985) were 
linked to low wages. The response was a nil offer and procrastination on further talks. 
Political pressure was added by a well supported' NursesAre Worth More' campaign and 
street marches. But success was only achieved when, for the first time, New Zealand 
nurses gave 14 days' notice of a one day strike. This achieved settlement at 13.5% 
above the state services Annual General Adjustment, 19% in all. This was some degree 
of wage equity for nurses, but at a large cost increase for the government as employer. 
In 1988 NZNA joined other public service unions in demonstrating against the State 
Services Bill, though the notified strike was called off by the NZCTU as concessions were 
made. The demonstrations did not prevent the Act being passed, but did lead to 
considerable amendment of it. 
In 1989 it was just the public health unions who struck, united in response to a nil award 
offer with clawbacks, following the decimation of staff and closing of hospitals and 
services. This was the first wage round with separate awards for each state department 
which excluded senior staff, and employers may have perceived the unions as being in 
a weak position (Wainwright 1990). But the health unions had begun working together 
as part of the Combined Health Employees Committee (CHEC), organised together with 
community groups to raise public awareness of the threat to public health funding, and 
coordinated their award negotiations under the auspices of the NZCTU. NZI\lA's own 
strike policy was 'friendly demonstration', but nurses should' dowhat they felt comfortable 
with'. 'Continual Visual Presence,8 lines rather than not-to-be-crossed pickets were 
recommended, though some delivery vehicles turned back anyway. Enthusiastic local 
8 In nursing practice, a CVP line usually goes into the arm. 
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action was organised by nurses, as was skeleton staffing and emergency service 
coverage. The industrial action resulted in some gains: a 2% wage rise and the 
Management of Change Protocol. 
Ensuring public opinion remained on the side of nurses and ensuring nurses themselves 
supported the strike meant a strategy of maintaining emergency and essential services, 
through the use of volunteers, of non-striking nurses or by not allowing some nurses to 
strike. This was the basis on which the strike ballot was taken. In the 1985 strike NZNA 
officials had told nurses that the strike vote applied to everybody covered by the award 
and those who were unwilling should apply for an exemption. In 1988, in a more astute 
strategy, they told them that only NZNA members were allowed to strike9 - and gained 
2000 members. 
The 24 hour strike in 1989 was the first time a notified strike by state sector nurses went 
ahead. Some nurses remained against striking and provided skeleton staffs. However, 
NZI\lA received criticism from others for holding back essential service units that had 
voted to go out, and for not gaining more before withdrawing notice of a second one-day 
strike. Nurses' attitudes to industrial action were changing. 
"There are still a lot of nurses who probabJy won't strike, but there is a growing 
pool of people who will ... They don't fear it any more, they'll threaten it.. .. Now when 
they get angry that's what they see as a solution. It's not too good all the time, you 
still need to negotiate ... J said, it's illegal, don't worry about that but give notice, you 
might get what you want by giving notice rather than walking off, you don't need 
to lose your pay yet." (NZNA Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
The view of NZNA officials is that you use the strength that is appropriate to the task. For 
a one-day strike, a first day of striking, it would not be appropriate to take out all services. 
Some nurses will always remain opposed to striking under any circumstances and 
alienation of these members is reduced if they are used in skeleton staffing. However, 
it is unlikely that NZNA would allow a strike to continue for six weeks, as in the 1985 
nurses' strike ill Victoria, before withdrawing Accident & Emergency, Critical Care and 
theatre staff. 
9 This was a point of legal doubt under the 1987 Labour Relations Act, which was clarified after the 1989 
strike in a court case referred to earlier. 
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NZNU's turn for national industrial action came in 1990 when award talks broke down 
over attempts to change the definition of charge nurse. Officials considered that making 
a wage increase to all nurses dependent on a clawback for one group was an attempt 
by employers to divide nurses. However, industrial action was supported by nurses at 
all levels, partly because penal rate payments for unsociable hours were also targetted. 
The 24 hour strike in February 1990 involved both NZNU members and H&HW domestic 
workers, who were having similar difficulties with the same employer negotiators. Over 
90% of private hospital nurses stopped work, demonstrated and marched. 
"It was almost a 95% strike, I think even as union officials we were stunned at the 
support it had .. they just walked out en masse." (NZNU Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
When talks again broke down, a further vote for a 48 hour strike endorsed by over 80% 
of nurses was sufficient to ensure settlement. Talks had broken down repeatedly despite 
conciliation procedures and employers had refused NZNU suggestions of voluntary 
arbitration. 
"If you have made your best effort and you've been polite and nice and nothing's 
worked, then they will be behind you all the way. You can go in then and wave the 
red flag and stomp and swear and they will be right behind you ... The other thing 
is, if they get angry ... their sense of justice. It's part of that whole moral thing, when 
that's outraged, then you have got them, and you've got them for life really." 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Because of nurses' strong feelings about leaving patients, the vote was managed in a 
unusual way which ensured maximum turnout if the strike went ahead. Six hospitals 
willing to accept NZNU's award claim were exempted from industrial action, but most em-
ployers did not break ranks. Nurses on each worksite voted separately on whether or 
not that hospital would join the strike, i.e. they would not be obliged to strike on the 
majority vote of all hospitals, but only 011 their own decision. Support was overwhelming. 
When talks broke down again, a second vote was taken for the 48 hour strike. The vote 
for the first strike was not assumed to be sufficient mandate to call another. 
"It's all very well to say we'd go on strike but unless the nurses had seen us to be 
consulting and coming back to them and saying 'This is what has happened at the 
talks now', none of them would have gone on strike ... The vote was closer because 
then it was real." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
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NZN U rules about the functions and power of branches maintain centralised control over 
any action or negotiating around local disputes. In practice, regional field officers 
responsible for a site exercise considerable autonomy in day-to-day matters. Like clerical 
union officials, NZNU organisers identify regional variation in the best way to approach 
or organise members; what is acceptable in one area may not be in another. Often it is 
delegates who have the best feel for their own people, as was demonstrated by one 
Otago NZNU delegate during this strike. 
"She asked everybody to sign a letter to go on strike ... The day of the strike if 
anyone attempted to come into the workplace, she pulled out their letter ... and they 
all accepted that and thought, oh well, I did sign it. Luckily I only heard about that 
one two days later, it could be seen as undue duress. But no one got upset by it." 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
In mobilising nurses for industrial action, an NZNU organiser talked in feminist terms of 
empowering women to make their own decisions, rather than pressuring them into action 
they were not sure about. 
'f!\s far as I am concerned 'union principles' is what the members want to do and 
how they want to do it. Sometimes as an organiser you don't agree, but if it goes 
wrong, part of empowerment is for them to learn and view it differently next time." 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
In April 1991 nurses joined national demonstrations against the Employment Contracts 
Act organised by the NZCTU, but there were differences of opinion about a call by some 
unions for a 24 hour general strike. NZNA and memberships of other public health sector 
unions voted in favour. The issue was linked in with early renewal of their awards before 
the Bill was passed. The Labour Court granted the Auckland and Otago Area Health 
Boards an interim injunctions against this strike action, not because it was incorrect or 
illegal but because employers maintained they could not guarantee public safety. It was 
clear that other Area Health Boards would also seek injunctions, so strike notices were 
withdrawn. Action on 29 April was reduced to protests and rallies organised as 3 hour 
stopwork meetings, which were the unions' entitlement under the 1987 Act and their 
awards. On 30 April NZNA and other public health sector unions accepted a nil wage rise 
settlement to 'rollover' their awards for a further year despite the Employment Contracts 
Act. The nil wage increase had been announced by the National government as policy 
for the whole state sector for the 1991 round. 
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NZNU officials voted against a 24 hour general strike at a meeting of NZCTU affiliates. 
The proposal did not allow them time to consult members or to give 14 days' notice as 
an essential industry. To be legal under the Labour Relations Act, industrial action had 
to be within 60 days of an award's renewal date. 
"It would have been illegal. If we had had time to go round and have meetings 
and give notice, the executive would have recommended that we participate. II 
(NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
The strong service ideals of women who choose nursing, reinforced by nursing education, 
mean the decision to strike is not easy. Despite members' support for the strike, the 
clear necessity and its effectiveness, the strike action was in itself not felt as a success, 
because nurses still felt that they had abandoned the patients. 
"Nurses are ridden with guilt. And of course employers know that and will use that 
against them al/ the time. II (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Feminism and Nursing Strategies 
Both NZNA and NZNU were unions headed by women, but this was not something 
achieved as part of second wave feminism, as with the clerical workers unions. NZNA 
had always been an organisation with women in the positions of power. In 1908 
international recognition as a nursing professional organisation required that it be run for 
nurses by nurses and, given the extreme female domination of the occupations, this 
effectively meant by women. At the time of study both unions had elected women 
secretaries - the position of greatest practical power - and women presidents. NZNU had 
one male staff member and all its branch presidents and secretaries were women. There 
were changes during the study in NZNA's elected positions and staff: the previously 
all-woman executive gained two men; the three men on the Socio-Economic Committee 
were reduced to one; and three men on a staff of over 30 rose to six by 1992. This 
minority of males overrepresents the tiny proportion in the nursing workforce, but 
nevertheless: 
"0ne of the joys .. .it is basically women running the organisation. The males are 
very few and far between, and most have a specialness about them just by virtue 
of having chosen a non-traditional career." (NZNA Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
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Over its history, NZNA frequently spoke out on the women's issues of the day and 
worked together with other women's organisations, particularly on women's health issues. 
This orientation was strongest in its first three decades and in recent years, with a more 
introspective focus on the development of nursing itself during the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s. Early concerns included name suppression for women charged with infanticide 
or concealment of births; venereal disease and a call for women doctors and nurses at 
clinics; and demanding a government inquiry into abortion in the 1930s. The National 
Council of Women was a longstanding and powerful ally of NZNA in improving the status 
of women within the community and within the health service (Kinross 1984), and NZNA 
remained an affiliate. 
The organisational upheaval of the 1980s in NZNA was not about gender, as in the 
clerical and several other unions for female dominated occupations, but rather about class 
and making NZNA relevant to ordinary nurses. However, with the fresh generation of 
activists and leaders came a new feminist analysis of nursing. Women in the highest 
elected positions of both NZNA and NZNU identified themselves as feminists. Organisers 
and other staff interviewed expressed a strong feminism, for example, in their analysis of 
public health sector restructuring as not only an attack on the profession of nursing but 
as detrimental to women as workers: 
"Whether they are doctors or whether they are these managers from outside, from 
the private sector, they are still male managers dealing with a largely female 
workforce." (NZNA Staff Officer, March 1990) 
This feminism cannot necessarily be extrapolated to the membership or even all those 
actively involved in NZNA, who are described by interviewees as 'amixture' of feminists 
and non-feminists. However, a feminist analysis is more likely among New Zealand 
nurses than the socialist one common among active unionists in other occupations, 
particularly male dominated ones. Marxist concepts of class relations, in any case, 
remain undeveloped with regard to service work or state employment. Although industrial 
relations is now taught in polytechnics and both nurses unions now provide union 
education, nursing education has traditionally provided little analysis of employment rela-
tions. Given the development of feminist thought among New Zealand women in general, 
nurses are more likely to draw on feminist concepts for an understanding of relations in 
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hospital hierarchies, since nursing professional autonomy has clearly been a statement 
of assertion within the marked gender division of labour in health care. In the mid 1980s, 
for example, a Feminist Nurses group formed in Auckland. 
My perception of NZNA as a organisation, rather than of particular individuals, was that 
its stance was liberal feminist, rather than radical or socialist feminist, and that it was 
careful to value its more traditional members. Both the feminists and the more traditional 
were, however, well united behind a view of NZNA as a pro-nurse, pro-women 
organisation. The most traditional of members had a strong identification with nursing as 
very much a women's profession. They supported policies that valued women and 
considered the realities of women's working lives. 
Among NZNU officials and in its public stance, feminist principles and feminist issues were 
more overtly espoused. NZNU's secretary had a policy of hiring brains and a 
commitment to women'. 
"Nursing issues are women's issues ... that is very clear to us, that's the basic 
fundamental philosophical understanding we have." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Early in NZNU's independence this secretary published a strongly feminist article on 
NZNU in a nursing journal, containing a radical analysis of the medical division of labour 
in which nurses have internalised attitudes of subordination: 
Since nursing .. is a traditionally female occupation, it is necessary ... to understand 
the oppression of women to gain insight into some of the most persistent problems 
in nursing. (Breen 1988: 17) 
NZN U recognised the lack of solidarity and often harsh treatment by management nurses 
of nurses lower in the hierarchy as oppressed group behaviour and horizontally displaced 
hostility. 
"If you look at them, socially and industrially there is always somebody who 
controls them, who has got more power than nurses, which is the doctors." 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
"Still nurses are very hard on each other. Punitive .... collectively we are still very 
judgemental and we don't like to see somebody who stands out really." 
(NZN U Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
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The strategy which NZN U derived from this analysis was to empower nurses by improving 
their self-worth. This was particularly important for those at the bottom of the hospital 
hierarchy. Despite pride in being a nurse, nurses often do not value themselves and their 
own work highly. 
'They receive messages from everybody that what they are doing is not much cop. 
But they need ten positive messages to counteract one negative. Probably we are 
all like that.. .. II (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
':4s a union we think the way we can do that is to improve nurses' self esteem, 
things like pay equity and saying how we are worth it..Unless we do something 
about how nurses feel about each other, the union wouldn't be successful. /I 
(NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
At a more collective level, empowerment meant communication, feedback and trying to 
involve members in the work and decision making of the organisation. NZNA's structure 
of workplace organisation and professional sections provided a variety of bases for this. 
With NZNU it was more difficult because of structural problems, both of membership 
location and present union organisation, besides the 'double burden' of paid work and 
family and community responsibilities carried by most nurses. The progress made in its 
first three years was been considerable, perhaps because so little effective organisation 
was there in the past. 
/lThat was one of the lovely things about starting work with a union that didn't have 
any traditions ... held on to from 50 years ago, a matter of being able to go out there 
and help people create policy." (NZNU Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
The question arises as to whether NZNU officials were too far ahead of the membership 
in their radical feminist thinking; for example, in taking a position on issues like 
pornography that might be thought peripheral to the business of a union. The view of an 
elected officer was: 
/lOf course, or ahead of the majority of members. But that's going to be so on 
anything ... all sorts of things women put up with and don't necessarily think about 
whether it is right or whether they should have to .. ,1 think that submissions (on 
issues like pornography) have been considered by the members as well put...A 
number of paints other people hadn't thought of, most of us thought, 'Good on 
you',/I (NZNU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
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In expressing a view on issues for women which go beyond immediate concerns of 
employment relations, professional issues or health, NZNU officials recognised that, in 
nursing, women's gender role structured both the job and the problems of the job. 
Like the clerical workers unions, nurses drew on the campaign style tactics of Women's 
Liberation. For nurses in the public health sector, such tactics were effective in backing 
wage round negotiations in 1985 - unlike the clerical unions' similar tactics to settle their 
1989 award negotiations. The difference was that just one employer was involved, and 
that employer was the state and amenable to public political pressure. A large and 
successful 'Nurses are Worth More' campaign was mounted. Local branch members 
devised their own tactics to publicise the issues, attract media attention and bring the 
pressure of public opinion to bear on government decisions makers: petitions to MPs, 
'Nursesare Worth More' t-shirts, badges and car stickers, as well as street marches and 
rallies. NZNA still had a small slush fund from the $54,000 worth of badges, stickers and 
other campaign material sold at that time. 
'Nurses are Worth More' was a slogan that nurses identified with and got behind in 1985. 
It combined nurses' public image and own self-image of service with the distasteful matter 
of money in an acceptable way. It was a view that stayed with nurses as they joined 
other female dominated unions and women's community groups in the high profile 
campaign for legislation on employment equity, using similar tactics to the 1985 
campaign. 
Feminist Judo 
NZNA had over 80 years' experience in using the power of the state to further its 
interests. This was the core of its professionalisation strategy, although the judo of 
professionalisation was feminist only in that, in the case of nurSing, it raised the status of 
an occupation into which women have been segregated. The weight of the state could 
be doubly to nurses' benefit on issues where the state's role as provider of quality public 
health services coincided with its role as legitimator and regulator of professions. Past 
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examples are the transfer of nursing education to polytechnics and the gradual shift to 
a fully qualified nursing workforce discussed earlier. 
NZNA as an organisation and its nurses as employees and consumers were philosoph-
ically committed to a high quality public health service and materially interested in its 
continuation. Since public health care, professional interests, and members' employment 
all fall well within the state system, NZNA officials had no hesitation in taking a strong 
political role by lobbying government on anything and everything that concerned it. 
IIff we don't try to demonstrate the place of nurses in the scheme of things, nobody 
else will.1I (NZNA Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
NZNA officials were actively lobbying to alter government health policies and consequent 
management strategies which meant that underfunding was leading to understaffing. 
'Nurses continuing to cope with intensified workloads and stressful conditions in a spirit 
of service and dedication only perpetuates in the minds of managers and government the 
idea that staffing levels are not inadequate' (Kai Tiaki March 1990:2). Under 'hands off' 
government, NZNA's historic close relationship with the Health Department had gone, and 
the Department itself had been reduced in size and role. This made all the more 
important NZI\lA's efforts to become a policy maker through a strong and public lobby 
to government on health matters. Officials and membership groups lobbied on broad 
changes such as the Gibbs report and National's Taskforce as well as more specific 
matters such as cervical screening programmes, and smoking in public places. As part 
of in CHEC, NZNA worked with community groups such as the Canterbury Health 
Coalition and Wairarapa Health Action to prevent hospital closures. 
NZNU also took an active interest in influencing policy or legislation to benefit women, 
particularly with regard to work, but also in other aspects of their lives, such as 
pornography and the Marital Properties Act. Officials attempted to coordinate their 
political strategy with other groups within nursing, with whom there had at times been 
tensions. Following the Nursing Amendment Act I\lZNA officials met with midwives on 
aspects of further proposed changes to the Nursing Act. NZNA's National Action Group 
met with Te Kaunihera 0 Nga Neehi Maori 0 Aotearoa with a view to lobbying authorities 
on bicultural development of nursing within the health services. 
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NZNA was involved in, rather than a leader of, recent campaigns on women's issues. It 
was not heavily involved in the campaign for sexual harassment in the mid-1880s, but 
sexual harassment clauses were incorporated into NZNA's awards and are held as 
important by officials. Since separation from NZNA, NZNU has taken a strong official line 
on sexual harassment, even in one incident occurring between two of its own members; 
a situation in which some unions, including NZNA, see difficulties in acting. 
"I think union officials should take a strong stand ... where the evidence is that the 
person has offended, I think you have to be quite firm that you don't act for them." 
(NZNU Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
Changes in NZNA's structure, including the splitting off of NZNU, were part of the 
changes that New Zealand women have been making in their lives and in society as a 
whole, and may allow a stronger feminist direction for the organisation in future. 
lilt will be interesting to see with the next women's issue, whether they are there 
pushing it. I think they still focus a lot more on health than women's issues. The 
changes that have occurred in the last few years might mean something different 
in the future.'1 (NZNA Organiser, May 1991) 
NZNA's involvement in lobbying for legislation on pay equity for women goes back to the 
equal pay campaign, when it was represented on the Council for Equal Pay & 
Opportunity. In 1960 NZNA made a submission to the Equal Pay Implementation 
Committee, but male and female rates for nurses were only abolished by a government 
committee in 1965. At this time male nurses earned about $200 a year more than 
women, and a married rate for male students continued a few years more (Carey 
1984:44). By the time of the campaign for equal pay for work of equal value, 60% of 
NZNA's membership still earned base rates below the male average wage, and in wage 
rounds under the Labour Relations Act rates were slipping relative to male trades. 
Following separation, NZNU became one of the unions most heavily involved in the 
campaign for legislation on employment equity. In both nurses' organisations the issue 
was promoted by officials and strongly supported by nurses. Members were kept 
informed of developments and encouraged to participate in petitions, letter writing, 
marches and rallies. 
365 
"Nurses have really taken on the Pay Equity cause - partly because they love the 
comparison with pOlicemen, though it isn't actually a terribly good comparison." 
(NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
As a women's occupation, nursing is often considered a middle class and relatively well 
paid job for women. 
"My friends who are male nurses talk about how poorly paid they are compared to 
their friends, whereas most people would think nurses are quite well paid, all 
things considered." (NZNU Elected Officer, April 1991) 
The nurses' unions considered that members were underpaid for their work and skills 
compared to comparable male occupations. As a strongly gendered occupation, nursing 
utilises skills and values considered appropriate and natural to women, and readily 
available. Caring work by nurse aides is low paid as unskilled labour. Pay equity 
assessments using accepted management techniques would measure the skill, effort and 
responsibility of nursing, revaluing not only acknowledged skills but also aspects of the 
work - caring and human relations - which are socially invisible yet are the reason nursing 
is considered a suitable occupation for women. 
Skills involved in nursing are not only undervalued in the market and underpaid by 
employers, they are often undervalued by nurses themselves. The organisational skills 
used by a nurse in charge of a ward of 40 constantly changing patients, changing care 
requirements and a rotating staff, 24 hours and seven days a week, are not recognised 
as management skills. NZNU officials saw not only low pay, but many workplace 
problems and the difficulties of building union strength among nurses as arising out of 
traditional female socialisation and essentially low esteem. 
"Nurses don't value (their own) management skills ... They think if they can do it, 
anybody can do it. II (NZNA Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
"We are saying it's because they are nurses, but a lot of it is because they are 
women." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
The legislation that resulted from the campaign in 1990 was compromised and 
cumbersome, and it was clear that it would not survive the imminent change of 
government. But NZNU med pay equity claims as soon as the Employment Equity 
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Commission opened, along with the Clerical Workers, Distribution Workers and Service 
Workers unions and the PSA. 
"Putting those claims in will hopefully bring the issue alive for more nurses, not just 
some academic exercise." (NZN U Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
NZNA did not rush to make a claim. This was not from lack of enthusiasm but because 
of the multi-layered nature of its nursing award. It was important politically that the first 
claims be successful. The most suitable cases compared precisely definable groups 
whose skills, functions and actual paid rates could be clearly established. Nursing covers 
a wide range of skills, responsibilities, specialisms, qualifications, working conditions, but 
any definition which included all the skills, effort and responsibilities would extend far 
beyond the range of any individual nurse. NZNA's claim would need to be divided into 
small distinct groups, but processed as one claim, so as not to fragment the award and 
possibly divide nurses against themselves. A claim for the whole award would take a long 
time to prepare and process. 
Any claim we make for nurses has to be able to stand up to intensive scrutiny 
because when we ask for a pay equity assessment, our case has to be a good 
one, as we won't get a second change. (Kai Tiaki Sept. 1990:16) 
"So our decision was we would wait, be involved in the campaign but not rush in 
with a claim immediately, because we wouldn't want to botch it up for us or make 
the first claims unsuccessful for others." (NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
Politically, too, it was useful for claims from private sector occupations to lead the way, 
to show that the economy could survive without underpaying women. The state as liberal 
mediator on behalf of voting women was already showing some signs of anxiety about 
the consequences of pay justice for the state as employer of a large female workforce. 
From its diverse membership; NZN U filed two claims. The first was for practice nurses, 
its second largest but most weakly unionised membersrlip group, comparing them to 
uniformed branch police and environmental health officers. This was followed by a claim 
for its lowest paid group, nurse aides, as part of NZNU's ongoing effort to highlight the 
value of the caring work and unrecognised skills of unqualified staff. An initial list of 
comparators was submitted including ambulance drivers. 
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"Feedback so far is that all of the (private hospital) nurses are behind the claim, 
they can see that if you raise nurse aides they can. .. use it to raise their own rate." 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
"Some (nurse aides) have been in long term care places for five, six, seven years 
and they have a tremendous amount of skill that isn't acknowledged." 
(NZNU Organiser, June 1991) 
NZNU officials involved their members in the work of the claims made for them. A short 
list of suitable male comparators was submitted to practice nurses to indicate their choice. 
"Some of them nurses wouldn't identify with. .. They were quite clear that they didn't 
want to be compared to those, it's that blue collar/white collar business. /I 
(NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Uniform branch police were picked because they had a national employer, a set national 
pay rate, 24 hour, 7 day shifts, statutory responsibilities, interaction with people, 
interpreted and assessed situations, saving and maintaining life, etc. In contrast to 
registered nurses' three years training, police were paid full salary, not a student grant, 
during a mere six months of training, yet a constable's base pay exceeded a senior staff 
nurse's. Environmental health officers were also in the health industry, earning 
$4,000-$8,000 a year more than staff nurses and had only recently established a three 
year Polytechnic training course. 
"Nurses identified with (police), partly because we had been using the comparison 
for ages, but also because they themselves see the stereotypes (that) you are 
steered towards as a little girl or boy." (NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Pay equity was for NZNU a strategy in relation to the state, seeking legislative intervention 
in its negotiating relationship with private sector employers, as equity assessments would 
be incorporated into award talks. However, NZNU officials also saw pay equity as very 
much a strategy with regard to members. Like the clerical unions, NZN U officials saw 
benefits in a high media profile on health and women's issues for credibility with a 
scattered workforce. 
"NZNU sees this as an opportunity to increase awareness even if (the Act) goes ... ft 
is no accident that we were first in there with the claim because weVe been 
working towards that whole awareness thing the whole time we have been here." 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
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A pay equity assessment by a state agency would give independent verification of nurses' 
worth. From that point nurses' sense of justice would mobilise them behind getting the 
pay equity claims accepted by employers in the next award round. Recognition of nurses 
through pay equity would help self confidence in dealing with other workplace problems. 
liThe key is to get an official report from an outside body ... We are not being 
unreasonable ... This report says your job is clearly undervalued, the employer is not 
valuing the important role you play, do you support us putting in an award claim 
for it? Then you mobilise, get them involved and active. II 
(I\JZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Even with the repeal of the Act, and lack of action on a National alternative, I\JZNU officials 
felt progress had been made in both political and consciousness raising terms. The 
opportunity for pay equity legislation was gone but certainly not forgotten by nurses. Pay 
equity and claims had been a political reality, however briefly, and nurses knew they were 
worth more. 
"Something they have wanted for years and they can see it coming just into their 
grasp only to see it snatched away, so that has been quite a good rallying point." 
(NZNU Organiser, Jan. 1991) 
Identity Politics 
Women in nursing work have a strong primary identity as 'nurses', identifying nursing as 
a 'profession' and nurses as women, within a gendered division of labour in health care 
(Salvage 1985; Mackay 1989: 132-157; Witz 1990; Bessant 1992). This originally 
developed as part of past strategies of both NZNA and overseas organisations to build 
recognition of nursing as a high status profession, able to command autonomy over its 
practice and appropriate remuneration and conditions. Interviews with Auckland nursing 
tutors confirmed that professional ideology taught in New Zealand reinforces this identity. 
as well as critiquing it from a feminist perspective. This identity as nurse is based in the 
strongly gendered nature of an occupation which utilises virtues designated feminine. 
From the viewpoint of industrial organising: 
"That is both nursing'S strength and its weakness." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
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This strong' nurse' identity is recognised by both NZNA and NZNU officials as necessarily 
the base for mobilising their members. 'Worker' does not feature as an image in nursing 
culture and NZNU officials had to remove the word from drafts of their awards. 
'''Workers Unite', nurses hate it when you call them workers, hate it, communisty 
stuff." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Cutting across the potential for solidarity provided by this identity as a nurse is a 
consciousness of differences of class and status between nurses as part of the 
hierarchical organisation of hospitals. An underlying cause of the split between NZNA and 
NZNU, and a central problem in bringing together NZNU's own membership, were 
perceptions of class/status differences between variously qualified nurses and nurse 
aides. A symptom of this mentioned by one organiser was that in correspondence 
nurses always identified themselves as 'RN' or 'EN'. 
"If you are a nurse, you are acutely aware of the social structures and the levels 
and where you are in it." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Employment in the private sector of itself lowers status. The profits may be in the private 
sector, but the high prestige, high-tech medicine is in the public sector. 
"There must be something not so great about you if you work in the private sector, 
because if you are a nurse you would really want to be in the public sector .. that's 
where all the important stuff is." (NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
Nurse aides share this personal identity as a nurse - understood as an experienced 
caregiver rather than as a holder of a professional qualification. Membership of NZNU 
carries significance: 
"If you are in the Nurses Union, it means you are a nurse." 
(NZNU Organiser, Nov. 1990) 
This is particularly strong among Pacific Islands nurse aides, whose culture gives higher 
status to caregiving than does Pakeha culture. Maori and Pacific Islands nurses, 
concentrated in lower grade and unqualified work, go unrewarded for the experience they 
often have from care of the elderly in their communities. The old are much more likely 
to be cared for in the Pacific Islands and Maori extended family than in Pakeha society. 
Some nurse aides do in fact hold nursing qualifications which are not recognised in New 
Zealand. 
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Conversely, Pakeha nurses lack skills wl~licll Maori and Pacific Islands nurses and nurse 
aides have - the skills of language and cultural sensitivity to care for Maori and Pacific 
Islands patients. Around a quarter of the Auckland population is now Maori or Pacific 
Islands. Hard economic times undermine the health of lower socio-economic groups, 
which in New Zealand are overwhelmingly Maori and Pacific Islands, and put more 
pressure on traditional families. For traditional Maori, the Pakeha institution of the hospital 
is not a good place for birth or death, yet more Maori are coming into geriatric care. 
Feelings of abandonment by the patient and guilt by the family are compounded by 
uninformed behaviour by staff which is culturally offensive. 
"They think that the Maori is sulky and difficult ... many things that have been 
offensive so he withdraws more and wants to die ... We need to have more Maori 
in there and even young Maori need to be taught some cultural things." 
(NZNU Organiser, June 1991) 
The tendency to a wrlite middle class bias in nursing practice can be linked to past 
professionalisation strategies in nursing education, and government policies for student 
support. NZNA recognises that increasing access costs, such as high student fees, are 
detrimental not only to economically disadvantaged social groups but also to the public 
service nursing provides. 
"The people who are providing the service ought to reflect the population that you 
are serving .. .People from lower income groups, who in this city are particularly 
Maori and Pacific Islands, are overrepresented as clients of the health service but 
grossly underrepresented as the technical providers of care." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Dec. 1990) 
A better understanding of cultural assumptions and differences in etiquette and belief is 
of particular importance for Pakeha nurses working in areas of high Maori or Pacific 
Islands population. The response to NZNA education seminars on these issues has not 
been high. Biculturalism and 'cultural safety' were included in nursing education, with 
mixed responses from students in the 1980s (Shadbolt 1984; National Action Group 1991) 
and recent public controversy. 
For the same reasons that Maori and Pacific Islands women are marginalised in the 
labour market, they feel, and are, vulnerable to prejudice in the workplace. They may feel 
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too threatened to assert their rights or become involved in unionism. As NZNU Maori 
officials reported: 
"We are not used to speaking up, used to having someone else speak up for us. 
It is therefore difficult for Pacific Islands and Maori nurses to be assertive. 1/ 
(NZNU Organiser, April 1991) 
"I couldn't afford to make a mistake, one because of my position (as delegate) and 
two, because I was a Maori u that really came into it. I guess we have got to prove 
ourselves that we can do it." (NZNU Organiser, June 1991) 
In the Pakeha world of the hospital, Maori may emphasise their taha Pakeha rather than 
their taha Maori and keep a low profile. 
';4 lot of Maori go into the woodwork ... there are very few that will speak out." 
(NZNU Organiser, June 1991) 
Yet Maori and Pacific Islands nurses have special needs as workers and can bring special 
value to health care for a culturally diverse population. Officials are aware of the need for 
NZNA and NZNU as unions to recognise the needs and specific identity of Maori and 
Pacific Islands members, and to take up the challenge of the Maori community to the 
union movement. 
Of the two unions, the greater organisational response has been from NZNU, which has 
a proportionately higher membership of Maori and Pacific Islands nurses and greater 
leadership commitment to the issue. In 1989 a meeting was held with representatives of 
the NZCTU Runanga and Te Kaunihera 0 Nga Neehi 0 Aotearoa. A Maori organiser was 
hired in 1989 based in Hamilton, and another in Christchurch in 1991. (However, by 
mid-1992 both had resigned.) In March 1990 a national hui was held at Mataatua Marae 
in Mangere, with a attendance of 16. A runanga was formed which met several times 
before a second hui for the Northern region in Hamilton in April 1991. This drew around 
40, showing that the response was there when a space for Maori women was made in 
what was essentially a Pakeha structure. For many who attended, it was the first time 
they had attended a nursing hui, and for a few it was their first hui on a marae. A local 
support group for Wellington Maori nurses was also formed. The chairperson of the 
Runanga felt she had good support from union officials. 
"ff I make decisions, I just say we need to do this and that for Maori people. So 
suddenly we are advancing. I feel within 15 months the advancement has been 
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anything up to 400%, now that's fantastic. Because Maori people are gradually 
coming out." (NZN U Elected Officer, June 1991) 
The aim was an ongoing Runanga to act as a central executive coordinating any local 
groups which form, rather than the independent and ad hoc organisations common 
among Maori (and, incidentally, feminists). 
"Okay, we are using a Pakeha structure when Maori is very tribal ... because we 
need to grow together, be strong and united," (NZNU Organiser, June 1991) 
So far the Runanga has been involved with education, networking and confidence 
building. The primary focus was industrial, to look after the specific needs of Maori 
nurses. This was intended to complement the focus of Te Kaunihera 0 Nga Neehi 0 
Aotearoa on issues of Maori health and Maori clients of the health system, and carry Te 
Kaunihera's concerns into the private sector workplace. 
NZN U has held two successful fono for Pacific Islands members, as well as seminars. 
These did not result in an ongoing committee, perhaps because no specific organiser 
time was allocated to following up on the fono. However, Auckland organisers believed 
the fono were useful to increase informal networking between Pacific Islands nurses. 
Following the fono there was also an increase in Pacific Islands members contacting 
organisers with personal work problems. 
Although NZNU accepted the need to improve its structures and relevance to Pacific 
Islands members, Maori officials were particularly concerned with issues of 
self-determination for Maori as tangata whenua as a first step. 
"There is no reason why later we can't awhi Pacific Islanders in, but let's get 
ourselves established." (NZNU Elected Official, June 1991) 
Some Samoan members of NZNA took advantage of the professional section structure 
to set up a Samoan Nurses Section in 1989. This provided the space for them to come 
togetller and focus on issues such as recognition of Samoan registration. A fono for 
Samoan nurses was held in 1990. However, the organisational focus was on NZNA's 
larger membership of Maori nurses. 
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The National Council of NZNA made a policy commitment to biculturalism in 1988 and 
promoted this with the membership via remits at conference and a circulated discussion 
paper. A hui of Maori nurses held in Opotiki in April 1990 recommended Maori represen-
tation on the Socio-Economic, Professional, and Certification Committees and a Maori 
seat as of right on the National Council. It asked NZNA to recognise Te Kaunihera 0 Nga 
Neehi Maori as representing the views of Maori nurses. Research on Auckland Hospital 
nurses' attitudes to NZNA showed that Maori nurses felt their wish for biculturalism and 
consultation with Te Kaunihera was being insufficiently represented by NZNA delegates 
(Thomson 1990:87). 
From 1990 until her resignation in early 1992, NZNA employed a Maori organiser, an 
enrolled nurse, based in Rotorua. 
"I knew it was a good appointment when one very old and conselVative person in 
Opotiki told me we had made a dreadful mistake." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, Dec. 1990) 
Progress was slower in NZNA than in NZNU. The Maori organiser pointed to a number 
of factors in this. The first was somewhat circular in its operation: lack of organisational 
recognition in the past made Maori women both ineffective and invisible. 
"Because there was no Maori structure within the organisation, Maori women 
couldn't find each other and there was no structure to work through." 
(NZNA Organiser, April 1992) 
Secondly, Te Kaunihera 0 Nga Neehi Maori 0 Aotearoa provided an alternative identity 
focus for Maori nurses which has tended to weaken the push within NZNA for 
organisational change to provide specific space for Maori nurses. Te Kaunihera 
developed as a Maori professional organisation with a strong focus on the health of the 
Maori community. As NZNA had industrial coverage and the right to represent nurses 
under the pre-1991 labour relations framework, Te Kaunihera had not been a forum for 
addressing industrial or workplace issues. Under the Employment Contracts Act it would 
be free to represent Maori nurses industrially but it does not currently see this as its role. 
A third factor in slow progress was the priority ranking given to different issues by NZNA's 
leadersrlip, despite the policy commitment to biculturalism. 
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"It just becomes a secondary issue. There are always more major issues of 
concern and something has to be shelved, so that one always is." 
(NZNA Organiser, April 1992) 
In the view of this Maori organiser, an effective response to the concerns of Maori nurses 
would provide organisational space for them both at the workplace level and at the 
national level. Local workplace organisation would allow Maori nurses to meet up with 
each other to develop and voice their concerns. 
"There needs to be Maori groups in the hospitals, specifically to look at Maori 
issues, then link up with the next hospital so you know what their concerns are that 
you could help on." (NZNA Organiser, April 1992) 
She believes NZNA's policy commitment to partnership under the Treaty of Waitangi 
should include representation on its National Council. 
'There has to be a Maori representative at national level as of right. Because we 
are such a small number of people that we would never get someone through the 
system up to that level." (NZNA Organiser, April 1992) 
Integrating the Professional and the Industrial 
The changes described above - the separation of NZN U from NZNA, and NZNA's own 
changes in internal structure and in tactics - represented a major shift in strategy. From 
a historical reliance on a professionalisation strategy to improve the status and rewards 
of nurses, the organisation of nurses was changed to combining that professionalism with 
a strong industrial stand, and with forms of collective organisation Wl1icl1 could represent 
and service members more effectively on employment issues. This shift was achieved 
through a great deal of internal politicking and debate on NZNA's historic perception of 
unionism as incompatible with a professional identity. 
The perceived dichotomy between the professional and the industrial was resolved in both 
NZNA and NZNU through strong policy assertions that the two were intertwined at all 
levels of nursing work. They should therefore be combined in nurses' representative and 
professional organisations. This assertion was central to NZNA officials' ability to bring 
more conservative members with them into the post-1988 era. It was a persistent theme 
in interviews for this research. 
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Both NZNA and NZN U officials constantly pOinted out to members the interlinking of the 
two in workplace problems and in the wider work of the organisation. An example was 
given of a nursing 'incident': an old woman falls out of her hospital bed. Is this an issue 
for professional standards of care or for guidelines on restraint set by principal nurses? 
Has a ward protocol been neglected and is it an issue for discipline? If a nurse aide is 
dismissed, it becomes an industrial issue. Was it a matter of insufficient supervision or 
training, and is that an industrial or a professional issue? Was it attributable to low 
staffing levels, and is that an industrial, professional or a poor management issue. Or is 
it a pOlitical matter relating to Private Hospital Regulations? Is old women falling out of 
bed of professional interest to NZNA's gerontology section, or should an nursing ethics 
committee consider the inhumanity of strapping old people down? 
Recognition of the inherent intertwining of the professional and industrial in nursing work 
allows a shift to the view that taking a strong industrial stand is not incompatible with a 
professional identity. The past exclusive focus on a professional strategy sapped nurses' 
potential industrial strength. In the past: 
The objectives of NZNA have meant Clinging to the principle that the patient must 
come first. At times this has meant the nurse coming a poor second. 
(Carey 1984:22) 
As the industrial and professional came to be recognised by members as inseparable in 
a commitment to standards of care in public health, past weakness was being turned into 
industrial strength. Where action was based on nurses' strong moral sense of justice, a 
strong identity as nurses could enable them to stand together. On that collective identity 
NZNA officials were trying to build a organisation that could meet both the professional 
and industrial aspirations of nurses. 
"That is actually where our strength lies, even though it means we spend a lot of 
time agonising over it." (NZNA Elected Officer, May 1992) 
The professionalisation strategy used the power of the state to assert nurses' autonomy 
and status within the gender division of labour which structures health services. In recent 
years, however, it has been not the medical division of labour which has been of most 
concern, but the employment relation between nurses and state sector managers and 
negotiators. As long as NZNA maintained a relationship with the Health Department that 
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could be described as 'symbiotic' (Kinross 1984: 1 09), industrial strength was less 
important. However, the state stepped back from that close relationship with its public 
servants. Changes in state policy hardened employers' negotiating stance and legislation 
required professional organisations involved in wage negotiations to register as unions. 
There was an inordinate amount of industrial change to be communicated and dealt with, 
giving rise to criticism by some members that NZNA neglected professional issues. The 
intention was that the fully developed structure would cater well to both. If industrial 
aspects were overweighted, it was perhaps because the government had its thumb on 
the scale. 
NZNA and NZNU had a wider brief than most unions. As professional organisations, they 
were centrally concerned with the content of nursing work, not just terms of employment. 
For NZNA the project of the 1980s was to restructure a successful professional 
organisation into a democratic industrial organisation which could represent nurses more 
effectively in award negotiations, and in the problems of the workplace. The goal was to 
balance the industrial and the professional in organisational terms, in recognition that the 
two were intricately intertwined in the labour process of nursing. 
"We haven't come whole yet, people still talk about the professional side of it and 
the industrial side, whereas the whole lot is just totally interlinked ... We still haven't 
come together because a lot of nurses can't cope with the word union and utilising 
in its full context ... 1t it is something to do with a meal break, okay, go to the union; 
if it is something to do with the patient, you can't." 
(NZNA Organiser, April 1991) 
NZNA's new structure was designed to provide for professional as well as industrial, but 
special interest sections were still in the process of formation at the time of research. 
Workplace and delegate structures appeared not yet to be as effective in facilitating 
feedback as they might be. There had been little time to establish new systems at all 
levels and refine them to full effectiveness. Changes of policy and legislation and 
constant Area Health Board restructuring diverted attention and energy away from such 
organisational tasks. 
Dissatisfaction about industrial concerns being subordinated to NZNA's profession-
alisation was central to the separation of NZNU from its parent body. The issue of 
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integrating the professional and the industrial continued to be also central to discussions 
(and competitiveness) between NZNA and NZNU in proposals to reintegrate the two 
organisation. Each maintained that it served its members in both areas better than did 
the other. 
It was clear that an influential proportion of NZNA's members saw themselves as 
professionals, and were being brought to unionism more trlrough the government's efforts 
than through their own. Some professionally oriented nurses with specialist training or 
in senior positions were vocal about their concerns. There were, however, many nurses 
in the public sector who were not actively concerned with professional issues, but who 
might be wary of involvement with a union, or unwilling to spare the time, unless they had 
a specific grievance. 
"They just worry about the pay at the end of the day, just the job. Your charge 
nurses, unit managers tend to carry the professional side of the organisation." 
(NZNA Organiser, June 1992) 
A much larger proportion of NZNU's members had little interest in specialised professional 
matters and a primary interest in employment protection in a higher risk environment. 
"In the private sector they are really dumped on and they see it. We have no 
illusions about the power structure and where the power base is. And our 
members are becoming more and more aware of it." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Nurse aides, in particular, were not interested in the more esoteric professional concerns 
of registered nurses - specialisms, nursing education curriculum, Nursing Council, etc. 
However, it was participation in just such concerns and in the raising of professional 
status that attracted registered nurses in the private sector to reamalgamation with NZNA. 
NZNU officials agreed strongly that the profession and industrial were inherently 
intertwined, but in its view, whatever the issue, whatever professional aspects and 
arguments arise, in the end it would be the member's employment that NZNU was 
defending. 
"Nine times out of ten you can boil it down to industrial. We know through history 
and through international information that a professional organisation of nurses will 
not survive alone, it has to have the industrial arm." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
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I\JZI\JU officials saw a route to higher professional standards of care and high professional 
status for nurses through defending nurses' employment rights and mobilising them to 
assert collectively the value of their work and themselves. 
"We are a union and proud of it. That is how you are going to improve standards 
of care and professional things, through organisation ... It is all about the 
organisation and the politicisation of the membership." 
(I\JZI\JU Elected Officer, l\Jov. 1990) 
The differences in perception between I\JZI\JA and I\JZI\JU - especially their perceptions of 
each other - were central to resolving the problems of reamalgamating the two 
organisations. 
Amalgamating the Public and the Private 
At the time of study, I\JZI\JA and I\JZI\JU were in the process of negotiating an amalga-
mation into one union by April 1993. 
The initial proposal for amalgamation at an I\JZI\JA conference is believed to have come 
from practice nurses; that is, from registered nurses who belonged to I\JZI\JA as their 
professional association but who were covered industrially by I\JZI\JU. The matter was 
raised at the 1989 and 1990 conferences of both I\JZI\JU and I\JZI\JU and both member-
ships voted in favour of investigating the options. The issue was membership driven: 
nurses thought they should be together. 
There was some reluctance on the part of officials in both unions since the causes and 
the difficulties of the split were still fresh in their minds. I\JZI\JU's interest increased -from 
late 1990 as the content of l\Jational's labour relations policy became clear. In a 
deregulated labour market, NZN U expected to suffer coverage losses if its awards 
fragmented into enterprise bargaining, affecting its financial viability. Under voluntary 
unionism, membership losses were likely among practice nurses, the least organised 
group with the most difficult, personalised employer relations. Some would prefer NZNA 
as their bargaining agent, although NZNA undertook to respect the NZCTU Code of 
Conduct on contestability of coverage. Amalgamation would resolve this particular 
problem, while offering economies of scale and resource rationalisation. 
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For the few private sector nurses who maintained double membership, amalgamation 
would have the savings attraction of paying a single fee, instead of two, 011 top of the cost 
of their annual practising certificate. It would provide opportunities for involvement in 
NZNA's professional sections for those interested in particular specialism, e.g. theatre 
nurses. 
"Of course we want the professional side because we know that nurses want 
access to it. We've got theatre nurses and practice nurses and other groups who 
want access to a good professional organisation. And the Association people are 
saying, we know the future is as an industrial organisation, the professional 
intertwines al/ the way through" (NZNU Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
However, other sections of NZNU's membership feared losing the improved repre-
sentation they had had since separation, if their minority concerns were again submerged 
in a large organisation with a primary focus, professional or industrial, on qualified nurses 
in the public sector. NZNU officials were unwilling to amalgamate unless a new structure 
could ensure an adequate voice for NZNU's lowest paid and 11ardest-to-organise 
members. Nurse aides and enrolled nurses would be a smaller proportion of the 
amalgamated organisation, besides being spread across a wider range of employer 
situations. Nurse aides from both sectors would make up only around 21 % of the 
combined membership, whereas they were currently 40% of NZNU. NZNU's smaller 
industrial groups would become tiny minorities in the larger organisation. 
Because of past experiences, the financial aspects of an amalgamated organisation would 
need to be very clearly worked out. 
"If we can get it right, NZNA is the organisation to amalgamate with as far as our 
membership is concerned. The thing is getting those structures right and getting 
an organisation that is workable and can service both sectors, private and public." 
(NZNA Organiser, April 1991) 
NZNA officials also had reservations about amalgamation, since NZNU's industrial 
difficulties would become the business of the new organisation. The ways in which 
private and public nurses could, or WOUld, support each other in resolving disputes with 
different employers under different contracts were very limited. This was already a familiar 
situation for NZNU, which had not had the single employer and one comprehensive 
award that NZNA had enjoyed. Economies of scale would help ensure the continuation 
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of services and negotiation for private sector nurses, as amalgamation would bring 
together a membership at current levels of around 36,000 nurses, including NZNA's 
professional-only members. 
In early 1991 NZNA's Socio-Economic Welfare Committee was against the amalgamation, 
for several reasons. From the point of view of industrial effectiveness, they saw no merit 
in an amalgamation based on purely professional sentiment, driven perhaps by conser-
vative Category B nurses. It would bring NZNA insoluble industrial problems without 
increasing industrial strength. 
"The private nurses are not going to go out in support of public nurses and public 
nurses are not going to go out in support of private nurses. They can't under the 
(Employment Contracts Act) now and they would have been pushing it under the 
previous law." (NZNA Elected Officer, May 1991) 
They saw amalgamation with a private health sector union as cutting across I\JZI\JA's 
commitment to a publicly funded and accountable, quality health system. However, like 
other unions, NZNU supported publicly funded health services, for the very good reason 
that its low paid members themselves relied on them. 
"We have always had a stated political position that we support the continuation 
of a free, accessible, top quality, culturally sensitive public health system, but our 
job is to look after the private sector nurses./I (I\JZI\JU Organiser, Feb. 1992) 
However, with possible increased contracting out of health services to the private sector, 
the Committee had doubts that this political commitment would hold up. In an 
organisation spanning public and private, internal conflicts of interest might arise in 
defending redundancies, for example. This raised the issue of whether nurses would 
support not just an economic but a political unionism (Deeks & Boxall1989:276); whether 
NZ unionism was to be about marketing services to members as individuals, or about 
partiCipating in society to improve conditions for working people as a whole. Aspects of 
this question, as part of a professional discourse on health, have always been relevant 
to nurses whose job involves the provision public health services in a welfare state. 
However, even NZNA staff who expressed opposition to amalgamation with NZI\JU in late 
1990 and early 1991 expected it to go ahead, because nurses would vote in favour of it. 
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"I think the amalgamation will occur because the predominant number of nurses 
are not unionists, they are professional nurses." (NZNA Organiser, May 1991) 
The benefits were greater financial viability and economies of scale in resources and 
specialist skills; greater professional interaction for members; a more united political voice. 
Some of NZN U's internal contradictions due to the polarised composition of its 
membership and their divergent interests in organising might be resolved by the greater 
range of nurses under an amalgamated organisation, but might also bring a return of the 
problems suffered before separation. The difficulty was to arrive at an organisation 
structure which gave members value for their union fee, representation for all groups and 
the right blend of industrial and professional concerns. 
I/(An NZCTU Official) said to me, what with NZNA's smugness and our paranoia, 
she doesn't know when we are ever going to amalgamate. And that's it in a 
nutshell." (NZNU Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
An early structure suggested by NZNU (News July 1988) was to separate out into a joint 
'College of Nursing' matters of 'purely'professional concern - such as nursing education, 
the basic caregivers course, certification issues, the Nursing Council, Nursing Act review, 
etc - while continuing autonomy of industrial representation in private and public sectors. 
Other nursing organisations would be encouraged to participate in the College. This 
suggestion was rejected by NZNA, since professional and industrial matters were 
intertwined. The suggestion cut across NZNA's resolution of its internal 
professional/industrial debate. A 1989 proposal for a Federation of all nursing 
organisations also came to nothing, and NZNA members at Auckland Hospital felt NZNA 
had not done enough to unite the various nursing organisations (Thomson 1990:87). 
In late 1990 NZNA and NZNU jointly funded an independent investigation, which proposed 
a new structure with workplace representation to 14 regional councils and a national 
council, with special occupational and interest representation assured at regional and 
national levels and proportional private/public sector representation (Steel 1991). This 
would give a National Council with 29 members (up from around 20), which was unlikely 
to function effectively or meet economically. With regard to the integration of the industrial 
and professional, the proposal appeared to assume their integration by ignoring them, 
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rather than by providing structural space for these issues to receive attention. However, 
the report provided a basis for discussion and a beginning to concrete negotiations. 
Progress was slow on issues of representation. NZNU wanted representation on a 
National Council of Maori and Pacific Islands nurses, nurse aides and enrolled nurses, 
and nurses in small workplaces. This represented a large step for NZNA, in the 
implementation of its policy commitment to biculturalism, and in that interest 
representation of this kind cuts across numerical representation of NZNA's much larger, 
much more qualified workforce. The national executive would again be unworkably large. 
In April 1991 NZNA's National Council accepted representation for Maori and enrolled 
nurses, and nurse aides scraped in by one vote. It voted against specific Pacific Islands 
representation, but for Maori representation, tackling biculturalism first in recognition of 
the Treaty of Waitangi. 
In November 1991 a postal ballot of both memberships was in favour of amalgamation 
based on a preliminary structure proposal. The structure proposed at this stage retained 
private and public executive committees while operating joint regional and national 
councils. However, as serious negotiation on a constitution began in a steering 
committee and issue sub-groups, the structure for the new NZ Nurses Organisation 
changed considerably into a more fully amalgamated form. 
At this stage all specific representation positions were dropped to make the transitional 
and future executive a workable size. However, at a combined Special General Meeting 
of delegates the chairperson of NZNU's Runanga spoke with such effect that repre-
sentation for Maori was gained. 
"Some of the NZNA people said to me, 'But we can only move as fast as our 
members on biculturalism. I I said some of it has to be a executive direction, it's 
leadership. If we wait until every nurse in this country is ready to acknowledge 
biculturalism, we will all be dead and buried." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
The resulting structure allowed for both professional and industrial organisation, with 
specific representation from the professional and industrial advisory groups and Maori 
Runanga on the National Executive, as well as representation from regional councils, 
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where the industrial and professional are integrated. During a transition year the national 
e~ecutive would have representatives from 13 regions and from public and private 
Bargaining Advisory Groups for public and private sectors. It would be led by the present 
NZNU National Secretary and NZNA Executive Officer who would both retire from office 
in 1994. The new National Executive would consist of 15 members: the president, a 
single national director who must be a nurse, the chairperson of the professional advisory 
group, chairperson of the Runanga and 11 regional representatives with public and private 
sectors no longer distinguished. As a joint statement pointed out to members at the time 
of the ballot: 
The future structure of the health system is likely to merge or make less distinct 
the public and private health sectors. It istherefore important that the new nurses' 
organisation is flexible enough to adapt to whatever reorganisation of the health 
service finally emerges. (Kai Tiaki Nov.1991 :21) 
lVIembership of the new NZ l\Jurses Organisation (I\JZI\JO) is wider than NZNA's traditional 
membership for two reasons. Firstly, NZNU had a more diverse industrial coverage of 
nurses, both in kind and in qualification. Secondly, the Employment Contracts Act no 
longer restricts the occupational coverage of unions through registration. With the 
collapse of NZCWU, NZNU undertook to cover GPs' receptionists and other clerical 
workers on its private health sector worksites. It already represented councillors and 
clerical workers in Family Planning. While the number of non-nurses concerned was very 
small, there were some who saw diversity as likely to affect NZNO's professional 
orientation. 
In 1991 the College of Nursing proposal surfaced again. A meeting convened in August 
in Palmerston North established a project team to consider the formation of a College 
which would have as its primary purpose a professional focus. With no involvement in 
industrial issues or contract bargaining, it would devote its energy purely to professional 
matters in a way these nurses felt I\JZI\JA could not. Senior officials of NZNA attended this 
meeting, but NZNA's National Council decided against supporting the concept because 
the College appeared to be in competition rather than collaboration with NZNA, because 
NZNA already fulfilled the professional function outlined, and because membership was 
not open to all nurses whatever their status. 
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The College was being organised under dual Maori and non-Maori patrons with equal 
Maori and non-Maori representation on its Council. Its vision was 'Professional excellence 
in nursing practice, education and research, in a negotiated relationship with tangata 
whenua; A unified forum for examining issues relevant to nursing and health of the 
community.' Although earlier proposals called for one body to unify the various 
organisations representing nurses, the College was made up of direct individual 
memberships, not organisations. It was open to registered nurses only, who could apply 
for acceptance as ordinary members or as fellows (sic) on the basis of their experience 
and qualifications. Application criteria make it clear that this would be an professional 
organisation for the elite of nursing. The impetus came mainly from nurse educators who 
did not share the industrial situation of the majority of nurses in either the public or private 
sector, with strong input from some members of Te Kaunihera 0 I\Jgaa l\Jeelli 0 Aotearoa. 
This development was the reaction of small numbers of very professionally orientated and 
career minded nurses to the strong industrial direction nurses have had to take, and to 
amalgamation into what they felt would be a organisation devoting little space to purely 
professional issues. However, by 1992 both I\JZI\JU and NZNA officials saw amalgamation 
as a vital strategy in facing a shift 'from public to increased private provision of health care. 
Moves in this direction gathered speed under the National government. 
''Amalgamation will mean we have one unified body of nurses where the 
demarcation of public and private won't matter. Whatever happens ... we can fight 
industrially, politically, professionally as one group, not two and we are not 
doubling up on resources." (NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
Nursing and NZCTU Strategies 
The State Owned Enterprises Act, 1986 and State Sector Act, 1988 implemented a private 
sector model of ownership, management and labour relations for the institutions of the 
state. The trade union movement recognised the implications of this for state sector 
unions in the formation of the NZ Council of Trade Unions which in 1987 brought together 
in a new organisation the Combined State Unions and the unions affiliated to the 
Federation of Labour. NZNA was active in the CSU and continued to maintain a high 
profile within the NZCTU, with its Executive Director on the NZCTU executive. 
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'~ lot of hard work was done to ensure that NZNA had a voice within the CTU, we 
pushed to get (our Executive Director elected) on the Executive ... It has proved to 
be absolutely vital, we have a major input on the executive ... It keeps the profile of 
our union up and keeps us involved in the issues of the CTU." 
(NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
"If we ignored that position I think we would be doing our members a disservice, 
we would have decisions made over us that wouldn't suit us." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Nov. 1990) 
I\lZI\lA was well represented at the second I\lZCTU Biennial Women's Conference in 1991 
by elected officers from Christchurch and Auckland, as well as Wellington staff. Regional 
organisers are encouraged by head office to participate in local NZCTU committees as 
well as CHEC. 
"There isn't major involvement around the country with our members (but) we 
coordinate a lot of our activities at a national level." 
(NZNA Organiser, Oct. 1990) 
Although registered as a private sector union since 1974, NZNU only became active in 
the union movement on separation from NZNA - effectively after the NZCTU became 
operational in 1988. As a much smaller organisation with more limited resources, it was 
far less involved in the development of NZCTU than NZNA, except as a voting affiliate. 
Its main involvement was on women's issues, aspects of which were coordinated under 
the NZCTU umbrella. Where NZNA tried to maintain a high input at the policy level of the 
union movement, much of NZNU's work with other unions was at the level of practical 
issues and workplace disputes. 
The NZCTU's plan to restructure the union movement proposed grouping both the nurses 
unions within a health sector union, together with half the Hotel & Hospital Workers Union, 
the health sector sections of the PSA and splinters of other unions with some health 
sector coverage (NZCTU 1989a). It should be remembered that historically H&HW was 
the union whose coverage nurses in the private sector rejected. 
In public health sector award negotiations, it could be said in 1991 that some small 
progress had been made towards restructuring awards on an industry basis. Under the 
auspices of the NZCTU's Health Sector Standing Committee, NZNA worked closely with 
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other public health sector unions in the industrial action in 1989, in award negotiations in 
1990 and 1991, and on the effectiveness studies - primarily with the PSA for health 
professionals and the H&HW for orderlies, cleaners and kitchen staff; the Clerical Workers 
Unions in the South Island and the Northern Association of Local Government Officers; 
and to a lesser extent unions representing male trades employed in hospitals. 
"We get touted around the CTU as being a very good sector ... put up as an 
example of how unions should behave and organise themselves, but it is bloody 
hard work, we come with different agendas, different views and that always creates 
problems." (NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
These unions first began to work directly together, independently of NZCTU structures, 
through the Combined Health Employees Committee (CHEC) at the time of the 1989 
industrial action and negotiations. In a campaign-style organisation of unions and local 
community groups, CHEC committees formed in most centres in response to the closure 
of services and hospitals. In 1990 CHEC lapsed somewhat, as responsibility for 
effectiveness studies was assumed by regional NZCTU coordinators. 
"The industrial democracy protocol has drawn workers within the health sector 
together so that the various health unions have come to work more closely 
together." (NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
One outcome of this closer working together was that in 1991 NZNA, PSA and SWF 
insisted on negotiating the renewal of their awards together, at the same date, a move 
disliked by employer negotiators. In November 1990 NZNA's membership voted in favour 
in principle of negotiating a composite national award together with the PSA to cover all 
nurses and health professionals. This would have involved 35 occupations and around 
10,000 PSA members. At this time some Socio-Economic Welfare committee members 
favoured an amalgamation in this direction to one with NZNU. In their view, it would 
strengthen NZNA's industrial base vis a vis its employer, which was the basis of the 
NZCTU's argument for industrial unions. However, others felt this would be quite 
unacceptable to many nurses, whose main focus and identification was professional, and 
possibly incompatible with membership of international nursing bodies. 
In 1989 NZNA had been the least confident of the major partners in the health sector 
strike. By 1991 it was the PSA national office, partly because of internal splits, which was 
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slowest to see the need to join in the union campaign against the Employment Contracts 
Bill. 
"We didn't go with the PSA at national level, we went with the SWF; that is, 
changing the direction of our linkages," (NZNA Staff Officer, May 1992) 
Linked award settlements increased negotiating strength, although the implication in this 
that professional nurses were prepared to go out in support of the cleaners' award was 
never put to the test. As members of the unions met together and work together more, 
NZNA organisers felt class barriers between occupations may be softening: 
"We work very well at the member level, mine were greener ... (When a nurse raised 
a question) other people there, other health employees, gave her answers, they 
interact, they listen and she changed her mind." (NZNA Organiser, May 1991) 
Gender prejudices may take longer: 
"Our women don't accept the male chauvinism of some of the tradesmen. They 
might be conservative feminists but they have some feminism that makes that 
relationship very difficult...Just the traditional men, might be an orderly or a boiler 
maker, but the way they put things to our members ... Still that bit of antagonism 
with the PSA men nurses too ... They tend to look on our women as pathetic, but 
in the last three years our women members have been stronger in the health sector 
than the PSA men nurses." (NZNA Organiser, May 1991) 
Cooperation between unions in private health was more pragmatic and little based on the 
NZCTU sector plan, which appealed to neither NZNU nor H&HW officials. In workplaces, 
demarcation disputes involved cooperation, rather than disagreement. NZNU was 
interested to set professional boundaries on the handling of food or laundry beyond the 
immediate tending of the patient and resisting attempts to increase nurses' workload. 
Trlis coincided with the interests of H&HW o·rficials. 'Flexibility' by nurses would mean 
encroachment into the areas of work available to their members, and consequent job 
losses. 
NZNU did not see industry or sector unionism as the best way of servicing or mobilising 
its members. 
"The argument is that everyone would be covered, as jobs changed they wouldn't 
fall through a hole. I'm not absolutely convinced ... It depends what is the key issue, 
working in a particular industry or is it your occupational identification?" 
(NZNU Staff Officer, Nov. 1990) 
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While nurses and domestic workers worked together and were sometimes both involved 
in industrial disputes, concerns about social status and a media-influenced view of 
non-nursing unions as 'too militant' continued to make closer industry-based union 
organisation unacceptable. Despite earlier neglect by NZNA, nurses in the private sector 
never opted for coverage by the long established H&HW union. 
"One of the reasons nurses wanted a nurse orientated union, and did not want 
other people running it, was they saw that nurses had a different view of life, and 
what was important and what wasn 1t. 1I (NZNA/NZNU ex-Organiser, Feb. 1991) 
This attitude was reinforced during the 1990 strike by the uncouth behaviour of some 
male H&HW organisers towards both nursing staff and their own members, swearing and 
calling them scabs. This was far removed from NZNU's own ideals of organising to 
empower women. 
'There are ways and ways (to get people out) ... the irreparable damage ... Those 
people will never go on strike or it will be as quivering wrecks with no 
understanding and a permanent loathing for the union movement. Just not a good 
way of organising. II (NZNU Staff Officer, Jan. 1991) 
H&HW's coverage of a large female membership in the two 'industries' of hospitals and 
hospitality is in fact based on class; it organises low paid, low status service workers. 
Even nurse aides on similar pay preferred the higher social status carried by the image 
'nurse', Although cooperation and support could be achieved, NZNU officials felt that for 
many of their members the social gulf between nurses and hospital domestics was as 
large as that felt between nurses and doctors, 
In terms of NZCTU's sector plan, then, both interest in this as a strategy and progress 
up until 1992 was greater in the public sector than in the private. Despite increasing 
cooperation, there were considerable gUlfs to be bridged between the analysis and 
organising tactics of officials of the nurses unions and H&HW, as well as class and/or 
gender identification of their members. While industry or sector union might build a 
strong negotiating base with employers, it cut across the past strategy and continuing 
idenmication of nurses as a profession. Those NZNA officials who did favour a single 
public health 'industry' union saw it as a goal for the distant future. The far stronger base 
for organising membership solidarity and collective action, identified by officials of both 
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nurses unions, was nurses' very strong identity as nurses. It was this rather than 
health industry solidarity which moved the nurses unions to amalgamate. 
While NZNA was broadly supportive of and involved in NZCTU policy making, not all 
the initiatives of NZCTU's leadership nor the strategies adopted by the NZCTU as a 
whole were what NZNA would have chosen, although NZCTU mediation in negoti-
ations had at times been very helpful. NZNA officials initially abstained on the 
Compact until they could take it to the membership. Because of its vague wording, 
NZI\lA officials had doubts about how the Compact would be used, and what it would 
mean for women and Maori. But it was endorsed at the April Special Conference on 
the recommendation of NZNA's National Council. The Growth Agreement which 
followed limited unions to a 2% wage increase, plus a possible 1 % for 'productivity', 
just as NZNA's negotiators were going into the next wage round with a 4% claim. 
"By putting it up there, it becomes a pOSition that is around anyway, even if it 
is not formally adopted." (NZNA Organiser, October. 1990) 
Not all NZI\lA officials were happy with this. Some organisers saw it as cutting across 
the pay equity strategy into which they had put considerable effort. 
"I don't think we should be buying into this Growth Agreement at all. I think the 
issues of gender are really important and women's wages do not need to be 
cut. If someone wants to do something for the economy, well, let all the men 
out there do something. They earn 25%10 more than us, they can afford it." 
(NZNA Organiser, October. 1990) 
NZNA took a neutral stand on the Growth Agreement within the NZCTU and planned 
to put it to the membership together with a vote on negotiating on a composite basis 
with the PSA. But with the change of government, officials let it slide. 
"If the Labour government had stayed in, once we had done the deal with them, 
I would have expected delivery on everything else that was part of the Compact. 
Now whether that would have happened or not, we will never know." 
(NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991.) 
Like other unions for female dominated service occupations, officials had difficulty 
with the production orientated concept of arguing an additional 1 % for increased 
1~verage weekly ordinary time earnings, 1990. 
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productivity. Productivity could not be easily measured as an outcome of nursing work. 
It could translate as workload intensification under lower staffing levels. This had already 
been occurred for some time, and resisted by NZNA officials because of stress on nurses 
which lowered both retention rates and standards of nursing care. Since 1989 nurses 
had been formally involved in working with management to increase service effectiveness, 
without a linking of savings to wage increases which the Australian Accord contained. 
"Because of the way the Growth Agreement is written, it is looking at future 
productivity. Nurses were saying, we can't be more productive than we are 
now ... The effectiveness studies and review procedures under the (1989) award, 
what they actually were was saying, let's look at this area and make it more 
efficient and effective - that's a productivity argument." 
(NZNA Staff Officer, March 1991) 
NZCTU's Vice President broUght the initial Compact to NZNU's Committee of 
Management in April 1989. Officials did not initially support the NZCTU's Compact. 
However, a paper was circulated to branches and the 1989 Conference voted qualified 
support for the concept. Officials considered the Compact lacked detail and it was 
unclear how it would affect concurrent strategies for women. They were sceptical about 
what the costs of the deal would be, in view of the role played by FOL leaders in the loss 
of unions' right to compulsory arbitration on disputes of interest in negotiations. It was 
Labour and FOL leaders who had preferred increased free collective bargaining, with 
greater right to legal strike, to the old system of arbitrated negotiations on which NZNU 
had relied to achieve and improve its awards. Yet within so short a time that greater 
freedom to negotiate was being traded for a centrally imposed across-the-board 2% wage 
increase. 
But while some unions might be glad of an assured 2% in that wage round, the Growth 
Agreement was a constraint on NZNU's bargaining position. It was in an expanding and 
profitable industry, not a contracting one like manufacturing or engineering. Like NZNA, 
NZNU negotiators had been planning a claim of around 3-4%. Now it had a limitation to 
2%, plus the problem of defining nursing 'productivity'. On this, NZNU officials took a 
similar view to NZNA. In negotiations with Plunket, for example, NZNU was already trying 
to address excessive case loads. NZNU members were tapped for ideas and evidence 
about increased workloads and other changes, and NZNU produced a 15 page 
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document for the award round. arguing that 'productivity' should include the unrewarded 
job intensification of the past few years. 
Dissatisfactions expressed by NZNU officials were as much about the process, as the 
content, of the Compact and Growth Agreement. They were corporatist strategies 
already decided on by NZCTU and political leaders, and brought to the affiliated unions 
for endorsement. NZN U officials were expected to decide on the issues before members 
could be consulted or asked to vote. There was, however, some pragmatic acceptance 
of the Growth Agreement by NZNU officials as a party political strategy. At the time, what 
appeared to be drafting instructions for the National's future Employment Contract Act 
had 'fallen off the back of a fax machine' and were being rapidly circulated among unions. 
"That was a an attempt to keep a Labour government in office. It was worth a punt. 
We had pay equity on the boil, we knew what we were facing with a National 
government... We have now got National and women have gone back 100 years." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
The work of both NZNA and NZNU officials on redefining the productivity concept to 
make it relevant for nursing work was overtaken by political events. With National's 
Employment Contracts bill before the House, NZNA and the other public health unions 
agreed to a nil increase renewal of their documents for another year before the Bill 
became law. 
Employment Contracts Policy in Health 
The increase in employer power brought about by the Employment Contracts Act 
(Anderson 1991) was felt by NZNU members within days of its passage into law, with 
some employers threatening nurses with the 'new environment' and unilaterally changing 
their hours of work, although national awards remained in force until early 1992. 
"Two practice nurses at the same time, same thing. The number of calls I fielded 
that Thursday and Friday. Then fourteen people turned up at my place on 
Saturday." (NZNU Organiser, April 1991) 
When the Practice Nurses award was renewed for another year in 1991, it no longer 
included the new emergency clinics set up by medical entrepreneurs. This left them free 
to negotiate at once under the Employment contracts Act, and in June 1991 NZNU 
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became involved in a small but important dispute with one of its most difficult employers. 
Twelve nurses employed at a 24 hour A&E clinic were handed their 'new contracts', which 
included 14 hour shifts, split shifts, no penal rates, no overtime pay, a 20 km restraint on 
other employment and a $40,000 'fine for breech of business confidentiality. NZNU began 
negotiations on their behalf for a collective contract including a redundancy clause, but 
five days later the employer gave the staff 'new conditions', to commence without 
negotiation the next morning. These included 12 hour shifts, split srlifts, one nurse to be 
made redundant and one to be casualised. The nurses stopped work and picketed the 
clinic, and within five hours the employer agreed to negotiate. 
The employer got his redundancy cheaply when one nurse found other, more reasonable 
employment. NZNU then proposed a flexible roster and a flat hourly rate, with slightly 
higher rates for unsociable hours and sole responsibility. The employer rejected this, 
refusing even clauses dictated by legislation, such as parental leave, personal grievance 
and disputes. In late July he made eight nurses 'redundant', leaving four nurses to staff 
a 24 hour, seven day clinic. The nurses voted unanimously to strike, but also to picket 
24 hours a day so as to cover any life threatening situation which arose. The strike lasted 
37 days. 
The employer sought an injunction to have the strike declared illegal as related to 
redundancy or unfair dismissal, but the Employment Court upheld the nurses' right to 
strike in support of a collective contract. Bureau nurses were brought in, but the clinic's 
hours of opening were severely reduced. The nurses received a great deal of media 
attention, and financial and moral support from other unions, including NZNA. In 
September the building was closed by its owner for non-payment of rent and the clinic 
went into receivership. However, as an emergency clinic serving a population of 150,000, 
it had considerable business potential and NZNU was able to negotiate satisfactory terms 
of employment with prospective buyers. In the view of the nursing director involved, the 
nurses' action had helped put their employer out of business, but had in the long run 
ensured both employment on satisfactory terms and the future of a community service. 
Their NZN U organiser acknowledged that this employer presented an extreme case, but 
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pointed out that employees' rights and protections were naturally never devised in relation 
to good employers. 
The majority of NZN U's new negotiations under the Employment Contracts Act did not 
commence until awards expired in 1992. During 1991 Private Hospital employers 
expressed interest in dividing Private Hospitals award into three multi-employer contracts, 
but in March 1992 negotiations simply fragmented into enterprise bargaining. NZNU's 
secretary suggested that the relatively new private health industry lacked the long 
established networks and personal contacts between employers that would have made 
collective strategising possible. This lack of unity was exacerbated by the prospect of 
competitive tendering for public health services in 1993. The one area in which this 
fragmentation acted in NZNU's favour was resthomes. Employers had collectively 
declined to negotiate with I\JZNU in 1990. Under the Employment Contracts Act, the 
standard enterprise basis of bargaining removed the possibility of an award but also 
fragmented employer solidarity. Dealing with individual resthome employers, NZNU and 
SWU officials together achieved some collective wage documents, which had not 
previolJsly been possible. 
Surprisingly, it was NZNU's most difficult employer group, GPs, wrlich agreed to one of 
the few mUlti-employer contracts so far achieved. After some months of pressuring 
employers and organising nurses, a satisfactory contract for practice nurses was 
negotiated between NZNU and the General Practitioners Association, which individual GPs 
opted to sign. Initially, employer negotiators wanted the contract to become null and void 
if, as was likely, the government subsidy for practice nurses was removed. However, an 
agreement was reached that the parties would meet and negotiate a managed change 
if the subsidy was lost. 
"We said, no, it is in the interests of everyone, doctors, nurses and clients, if we 
come together and work something out, not just all splatter and no process." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
However, GPs have so far refused to include, or negotiate a separate multi-employer 
contract, for medical receptionists. Under NZCTU prompting, NZNU assumed 
respOnsibility for NZCWU's members in the private health sector and wrote to them 
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offering membership and services. Some clerical members have been picked up and 
included in worksite contracts. Numbers are small, since private health services are 
heavily concentrated in the population centres of the North where clerical workers 
continue to be members of COMPASS. Medical receptionists are the largest group; more 
clerical staff are employed by private surgical hospitals than by geriatric hospitals or 
resthomes. Once the first round of contracts was completed, officials planned to assess 
the situation of these clerical workers and how best to represent them. 
"When the NZCTU rang me, I said from the Union's point of view we feel fine about 
it, but we will need to talk with NZNA before I say yes, to see where that leaves us 
with amalgamation. So we all met and it was fine, because in this environment we 
have got to look after people. The bottom line is that workers have to be given the 
choice of union representation." (NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
In private hospitals I\lZI\lU officials set out to renegotiate one award into around 200 
enterprise or worksite contracts. The expected membership losses - around 20% - came 
not through individual resignation from voluntary choice but through loss of coverage 
where employers refused to negotiate collective contracts and discontinued union fee 
deductions. Fee deduction became an important point in NZNU's contract negotiations. 
"Our membership has held up ... Where employers have just stopped 
deductions ... people still want to belong, it's just a motivation thing, they don't get 
around to it for another six weeks and we have lost that revenue. Some of them 
never get around to it." (NZNU Organiser, Aug. 1992) 
The enterprise base of negotiation involved nurses much more directly with their own 
employer, an aim of the Act frequently cited by its advocates (Myers 1992:4; Birch 1991, 
1993; Boxall & Haynes 1991). But they continued to be represented by NZNU: only two 
groups of private sector nurses chose a non-union bargaining agent. At one North Shore 
resthome, staff negotiated directly with their employer, getting a good base rate in 
compensation for penal payments. When the employer broke the contract and cut rates 
back, they rejoined the union. Fragmentation to enterprise bargaining reduced collective 
negotiating strength, however, with many employers attempting to break it down further 
to individual contracts. 
"Very, very few advantages to the Employment Contracts Act but it certainly brings 
negotiations home to the nurses in the worksite, brings home what is happening 
to them, and what the employers want is devastating .. .It is more personalised for 
the nurses, but the outcome is much worse." 
(I\lZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
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Six months after expiry of the award, half the country's private hospitals had concluded 
collective contracts with NZNU. Most difficulty in negotiations was experienced in 
Auckland, the region with greatest concentration of population, the most private hospitals 
and the greatest competition to keep beds filled. 
"Some of that competition is government driven. One very quick way to stop 
spending money is .. .referring people to a resthome rather than hospital care so 
they save a subsidy... There are now stage 2 and stage 3 resthomes that have 
people who a year ago would have been in a hospital, so they are not getting 
proper care." (NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
By October 1992 only a third of Auckland private hospital employers had a collective 
contract with their nurses. Another third were insisting on individual contracts only, on 
the advice of the Health Employers Council. The largest employers were the most 
difficult. Southern Cross, who own 10 out of New Zealand's 30 private surgical hospitals, 
wanted all nurses on individual contracts, and were hiring new staff on inferior terms. An 
experienced senior theatre nurse was offered a job at the highest staff nurse rate under 
the old award, but with no penal rates and only legal minimum holiday and sick leave. 
Although the Act protects against individual contracts 'inconsistent' with a workplace 
collective contract, this is no protection where existing employees are unable to achieve 
a collective contract and hold on to existing terms of employment through 'assumed' indi-
vidual contracts under the Act. 
"They have said quite blatantly, if they can get registered nurses to work for $9 an 
hour, then they will employ them. It is better for them to have a job than being 
unemployed, that is their argument. That's a 30-40% wage cut for a registered 
nurse." (NZNU Organiser, Aug. 1992) 
The large religious and welfare hospitals, formerly considered good employers, resisted 
incorporating current terms and conditions in collective contracts. Presbyterian Support 
Services (PSS) initially wanted one national enterprise contract, but after four months of 
discussions NZNU officials decided they could only achieve contracts acceptable to 
members by breaking negotiations down to a regional level. A contract was agreed for 
the whole of the South Island, followed by one for Hawkes Bay. Auckland PPS employers 
refused to compromise on their position. Auckland Methodist hospitals employers also 
generated problems for NZNU. While negotiation were being conducted, nurses at one 
. hospital were being taken off their normal weekend shifts unless they signed the 
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employer's offer. NZNU was able to stop this by obtaining an interim injunction on the 
basis of eight personal grievances filed against this one hospital. 
PSS nurses were reluctant to take strike action to back their position, deterred by high 
unemployment as much as moral constraints. Strike action might risk escalating the 
situation as, following the Employment Court judgement on the IHC case, employers 
could use a partial lock-out of current conditions to force acceptance of their contract 
offer. An alternative was presented when a Tauranga nurse suggested a hunger strike, 
following the example of Norwegian police for whom striking was not a legal option. The 
proposal for a 48 hour hunger strike was readily taken up by nurses at other PSS 
hospitals and resthomes, spread to domestic workers and then to staff in Methodist 
hospitals and resthomes experiencing similar negotiating problems. The action involved 
around 650 workers in Hamilton, Tauranga, Thames and five hospitals in Auckland. 
"The nurses are saying, we have to get used to going without food because the 
contract the employers are forcing on us means we wontt have enough food in the 
cupboard for our families." (NZNU Organiser, Aug. 1992) 
"Legally we haven't got many rights any more because they can lock out, and they 
will, some of them. It's really scary for all workers, not just nurses. So a hunger 
strike is just brilliant." (NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
The hunger strike captured the high moral ground from religious and welfare hospital 
employers. It attracted considerable attention from the media and also from church 
leaders who had already spoken out against the Employment Contracts Act. 
Concessions were achieved on eleven points, but employers refused to negotiate further 
on penal rates. NZNU officials felt unable to accept the employers' final offer on behalf 
of members, leaving it to members' own choice whether to sign the new contract or 
remain on their existing terms and conditions under an 'assumed' individual contract 
under the Act for the duration of their employment. 
"As the bargaining agent we could have signed the contract and everyone who had 
authorised us would have automatically been covered by it (on majority 
ratification). We knew that there was so much resistance to it that we felt we had 
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no choice but to refuse it ... Our membership would have resigned."11 
(NZNU Organiser, Aug. 1992) 
Such a situation made NZNU appear ineffective as a bargaining agent. In one hospital 
a group of nurses, without resigning union membership, paid $50 per head to a 
bargaining agent with an Employers Association background. NZNU officials were sure 
he would be unable to move the employers from their intransigent position. 
'The employer has told us, they don't care who the bargaining agent is, there will 
be no further negotiations on this contra ct. .. (but) The law allows all these bodgies 
to come in and make moneY,/i (NZNU Organiser, Aug. 1992) 
Similar negotiating problems in another hospital resulted in a double situation for the 
employer which added to administrative costs. Most existing staff refused to accept a 
10% buy-out of their penal rates and remained on existing terms, but new employees 
were paid 10% higher base rates under the new contract. Staff turnover will eventually 
result in all employees on new individual contracts with no collective organisation. 
Some small employers also took advantage of the Act to change hours of work and cut 
labour costs. One formerly cooperative owner of three small geriatric hospitals employed 
a bargaining agent, stopped union deductions and refused to speak directly to the union 
or to his employees. A few dismissals, then resignations by other nurses, enabled him 
to achieve a rapid turnover to a majority of new employees. 
"By creating a horrible situation he has speeded it up. He has now got people 
working for very poor wages and conditions and the Act allows him to do that. /I 
(NZNU Organiser, Aug. 1992) 
When another small employer denied an NZN U organiser access to members, calling in 
police for trespass, NZNU took the case to the Employment Court. A 56 page decision 
ruled in favour of NZNU, maintaining that union access guaranteed by the Employment 
Contracts Act took priority over owners' rights under the Trespass Act. Even with 
'urgency' it was six weeks before the case reached the court. During this delay the 
11 In a similar situation the Northern Distribution Union signed such a contract with a cinema chain 
employer. then made procedural mistakes in ratification at two cinemas. In late 1992 they were taken to 
court by some of their own members. The issue was whether, given the procedural mistakes, these 
members could withdraw their bargaining authorisation so as not to be bound by an collective contract 
inferior to their current terms and conditions. 
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employer pressured his staff of mainly Pacific Islands nurse aides, one by one, to sign 
individual contracts. He dismissed the one registered nurse who refused, as was her 
right under the Act; NZNU took a personal grievance on her behalf. But by the time the 
Court established the right of NZN U, and all unions, to approach employees at work, the 
possibility of collective organisation and negotiations had been lost. 
Because of such delays in access to the Court, NZNU officials felt that, far 'from access 
to personal grievances procedures being expanded by the Act, in practical terms a legal 
remedy no longer existed: 
"We are having to avoid taking court action because it is just not viable, not in the 
interests of anybody. We are probably settling a lot of things that would not have 
been settled a year ago, a lot of grovelling or that person loses her job. /I 
(NZNU Organiser, Aug. 1992) 
In disputes of interest in negotiations, the Act allowed only industrial action as a possible 
means of backing employees' position. But increasingly highhanded behaviour from 
employers, ineffective protection from unjustified dismissal, and high unemployment, even 
among nurses, mean that NZNU members in private hospitals were unwilling to strike. 
"We have been unable to find a group of nurses to take an employer on at this 
stage. We think if we had had a industrial dispute in a hospital earlier in the piece, 
and it had been successful in getting a collective contract, that would have had 
some effect. Instead we have had to negotiate our way through everything, 
knowing there is nothing beyond negotiations." (NZNU Organiser, Aug. 1992) 
Legality in industrial action, in processes of ratification and in giving 14 days' strike notice 
has an importance for health unions sometimes not fully appreciated. In an essential 
industry industrial action is more easily blocked by employers through expensive 
injunctions, court cases and appeals. If the Business Roundtable should be successful 
in its lobby to bring labour relations under common law (NZBRT /NZEF 1992; Ryan & 
Walsh 1993), employers would be able to sue for damages for loss of business during 
strike action. 
"We know that there are employers that would love to take us to court for an illegal 
strike action and wind us up. That is uppermost in my mind now, under the 
Employment Contract Act, that if we do anything illegal they will take us to court. 
(Under common law) being sued for quarter of a million would wipe us off the face 
of the earth" (NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
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Both NZNU and NZNA officials are conscious of this increased risk but believe the hunger 
strike demonstrated how repression can breed ingenuity. 
"All sorts of risks now with the Act in terms of taking action, but all that does is 
make unions a bit more ingenious about how they run the action. II 
(NZNA Staff Officer, May 1992) 
In this new environment, professionalisation is revealed as a strategy to be measured only 
by its success. In 1992 contract talks, when NZNU's secretary drew on time honoured 
arguments about quality care and the professionalism of nursing: 
"They said, you are just a worker like any other, you are no different. That is the 
first time ever that that has been said to me." (NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
The central goals in NZNU's 1992 negotiations, as for other unions, were to achieve 
collective contracts and to maintain the overall level of earnings from penal payments, 
although not necessarily penal time rates themselves. Annual leave and sick leave were 
reduced to legal minimums in many of its contracts. Because the public and private 
sector provide different kinds of health care, with different labour demands and shift 
patterns, the private sector already had a lower penal time bill than in the public sector. 
Penal rates made up 10%-15% of private hospital nurses' incomes, but around 30% of 
public sector nurses. ' Penal earnings were therefore more easily negotiated into new 
relatively lower base rates, which would give the private sector a considerable labour cost 
advantage if public health services are put out to contract. NZNU officials attributed much 
of their negotiating difficulties over collective contracts and penal rates to their employers' 
wish to position themselves competitively as future public health service providers. 
Collective negotiations and penal rates were also the central issues of the 1992 round for 
NZNA. The issue of collective contracts was decided not by individual nurses nor by 
employers, but by government dictate. NZNA's national occupational award was broken 
up into 'enterprise' negotiations by distancing employment by the state to the individual 
employer responsibility of 14 different Area Health Boards (Hill 1993a). On 25 March the 
Minister of State Services and of Labour told Area Health Board general managers that 
there would be no multi-employer contracts, although close consultation with the State 
Services Commission would be expected: 
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Expectations are that Boards will achieve progress in a way similar to the reforms 
recently achieved in the private sector, particularly in regard to greater flexibility in 
working hours and modification of penal rates. (NZNA 1992) 
Drawing on discourse about flexibility and productivity, the Boards set out to lower state 
labour costs through an concerted attack on penal rates. Despite a continuing belief that 
a national nursing award underpinned national standards of care, NZNA officials were 
forced to accept this 'fragmentation, but tried to maintain a national approach to regional 
negotiations. 
"35,000 workers across the country, people who have the same qualifications 
doing the same job, same responsibility and probably performing to the same level 
but being rewarded differently in different parts of the country." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, July 1992) 
The 1992 negotiations of the public sector health unions' lacked the coherence of the 
previous wage rounds. Their initial suggestion of a 'core' national contract was 
immediately rejected by the chairperson of the Area Health Boards. For NZNA officials, 
meetings of the Health Sector Standing Committee of the NZCTU became sessions more 
for reporting than strategising. The regional variation in contracts and disputes over eight 
months of negotiations originated with the employers, as did slowness of progress. Area 
Health Board employers wanted fewer documents, but, to NZNA officials, they seemed 
to have little appreciation of the time required to negotiate and coordinate existing terms 
and conditions in each. 
The State Services Commission, named as a party to nurses' regional contracts, 
maintained the government's agenda of removing penal rates. But the 14 Area Health 
Boards each had their own budget problems and their own formula for renegotiated base 
rates which lead to 14 quite different contracts. Despite and because of its hard line 
agenda, the State Services Commission, was seen by NZNA negotiators as a positive, 
coordinating presence. 
"They kept the SSC in the (Employment Contracts) Bill, because the government 
still wants to sit at the table. 1I (NZNA Organiser, March 1991) 
"We want the SSC in there to apply the reins to the excesses of some of the 
individual employers./I (NZNA Staff Officer, May 1992) 
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The involvement of more nurses in previous award rounds paid off now that contracts 
were negotiated by regional teams of nurse assessors and local organisers. They were 
aided by NZNA advocates on an exhausting schedule between one set of negotiations 
and the next. Although paid leave was granted to assessors by most Boards, preparation 
sessions, transport, accommodation, meals and other expenses of meetings which ran 
several days and late into the night made the process very expensive for NZNA, if very 
revealing to the members involved. 
"We have built up teams in each area ... between 5 and 10 assessors and the 
negotiations are happening in people's own backyards, but it has been a steep 
learning curve for a lot of people ... 1t actually exposes (the employers) to a large 
number of workers who can see what real idiots they are. /I 
(NZNA Elected Officer, May 1992) 
As the speed, if not the precise form, of National's health policy agenda for 1993 became 
clear, a smooth transition of nurses' employment to future institutional forms became an 
important part of contract negotiations for NZNA officials. An initial difficulty was employer 
negotiators who both personally and institutionally did not expect to survive the next 
round of restructuring. 
'~t the moment they aren't focusing on anything other than what they can make in 
savings right now, whereas the union is trying to look at the long term ... What else 
is there for us in this round? .. When we raised the transitional process (to Crown 
Health Enterprises) they say it's not their job, it's someone else's job, the 
government's job. /I (NZNA Staff Officer, May 1992) 
Employer rhetoric about flexibility and productivity angered NZNA officials, since both 
were achievable without fragmentation of the national award. Wellington Hospital had, for 
example, demonstrated a 17% productivity increase. NZNA believed flexibility could be 
achieved both under the existing award and through further negotiations. 
"(Flexibility) only gets focused on hours of work ... There are other areas where we 
can be extremely flexible ... The award doesn't have that much in it which is 
inhibiting, I believe .... If they are going to deal with penal rates we want to look at 
the whole situation of hours of work and how that impacts. /I 
(NZNA Staff Officer, May 1992) 
In the view of employers, penal rates were an overly complex wage system which 
inhibited cost predictability. However, any reduction in penal rates was an attack on the 
earnings of nurses. At Auckland Hospital, for example, only 14% of nurses, including 
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charge nurses, work daytime hours Monday to Friday; the majority work rotating shifts. 
NZNA's initial position was that penal payments represented 30% of their members' 
earnings; officials were prepared to negotiate, but only on a 'cost neutral' basis which did 
not reduce nurses' overall earnings. Since opportunities for penal earnings were already 
being eroded by limiting services to week days only, NZNA officials considered that earn-
ings would be better safeguarded by a professional salary for a professional qualification 
rather than payment for hours worked at ordinary or penal rates. Such a change involved 
negotiating current penal earnings into a higher base rate, and this was basis of 
negotiations. However, since shift work has proven adverse effects on both health and 
social life, there would be additional flat allowances according to the kind of shift 
rotating, permanent early or evening, or night - for which nurses would be required to 
make themselves available. 
The variations in outcome stemmed from this incorporation of penal payments into a base 
rate. Contracts settled in Southland and Otago were criticised by members for a poorly 
organised ratification process and, inevitably for the first contracts settled, for what they 
did not achieve. Despite talk of bringing employers and employers closer to negotiate 
around regional needs, the bargaining stance by employers was harder than in national 
award rounds: 
"They say they want to get away from old style unionism confrontation and threats. 
In Otago the first offer was 5% if you settle before the 30th, and every day after that 
the offer does down - blackmail stuff." (NZNA Elected Officer, May 1992) 
Otago and Southland were the first regions to settle contracts. To compensate for loss 
of penal rates, nurses in Otago received a 10% increase, and in Southland 14%, plus shift 
allowances, with a one-off payment for those losing regular penal earnings. This trimmed 
about 3% off nursing wage budgets and meant a regional pay difference between 
Southland and Otago staff nurses of about $200 per year. The employers want charge 
nurses on individual contracts. The Southland contract excluded them and only clinical 
charge nurses were covered in Otago, altllough NZNA continued to press for a separate 
collective contract. This succeeded in pushing the management/worker divide further 
down the hospital hierarchy, in line with the increase in management tasks delegated to 
positions with lower rewards following the decimation of nurse manager positions. 
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Southland was the only region in which NZNA was not formally recognised as a party to 
the contract. However, officials felt that a union presence and enforcement of the 
contract would be maintained through NZNA's well organised delegate structure. In all 
contracts fee deductions and paid education leave were achieved, both important to 
effective union organisation. 
These issues, and particularly the 3% saving in labour costs, were also on the agenda of 
other Area Health Boards, although first offers were considerably worse. Northland Area 
Health Board initially wanted a $9 million saving on a $23 million budget, threatening 
service cuts and job losses if savings were not achieved. Northland nurses called their 
bluff: 
"They said, If removing our penal rates is the only thing keeping these hospitals 
open, give us our redundancy and we'll be off!" (NZNA Organiser, July 1992) 
Northland settled on a cost neutral basis with a 7% increase to the base rate and a '1:1 at 
penal allowance. Changes were made to allowances and hours of work, with a 
time-off-in-lieu option for overtime worked. In other areas, Area Health Boards persisted 
in using the change to regional negotiations to cut wage costs. In August 1992 Waikato 
talks broke down over penal rates and were not settled until November. In Bay of Plenty 
a proposed settlement reached between the Area Health Board and NZNA was rejected 
by members. Manawatu/Wanganui began to employ casual staff on an 'interim collective 
contract' with a 6% increase in rates but no penal payments, threatening not to employ 
again any nurses who did not sign. Under the Employment Contracts Act, nurses' only 
recourse was industrial action. Through September and October 1992, Taranaki, 
Canterbury and Wellington, Nelson/Marlborough and Auckland nurses overwhelmingly 
voted for successive 24 or 48 hour strikes to force progress in negotiations. Pickets and 
marches were organised with full media coverage. Employers brought in some bureau 
nurses through the pickets, although NZNU asked its members not to undermine NZNA 
nurses' strikes. 
For the first time NZNA allowed critical care and A&E nurses to join the strikes, organising 
only emergency standby teams of mainly non-members. The Taranaki Area Health Board 
threatened its intensive care, neo-natal and A&E nurses with not only court injunctions but 
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charges of professional misconduct under the Nursing Act. However, this time interim 
injunctions on grounds of public safety were refused and the Court upheld nurses' right 
to strike under the Employment Contract Act. 
While employers' proposals varied, the main issue for NZNA became achieving a 'cost 
neutral' alternative to the penal payments which employers were determined to abolish. 
Officials were prepared to negotiate on minor allowances and on hours of work, provided 
protections were maintained, such as minimum breaks between shifts or the right to 
choose or refuse new 10 hour shifts. 'Cost neutrality' pertained to employers' wage 
budgets, however, not nurses' earnings; there were still nurses whose pay was reduced 
by the change. At a large Auckland meeting in August it was officials who argued for the 
shift to a 'professional salary' while nurses on the floor argued angrily for compensation 
for the stress and disruption of working unsociable hours. NZNA officials presented the 
meeting with a choice of strike options to be put to a ballot by all members: a 24 hour 
strike followed by 48 hours the following week, or indefinite strike action. Officials' 
recommended the first option, which was passed, but around one third of the nurses 
present were angry enough to opt for indefinite strike action. This clear demonstration 
of willingness to strike was enough to bring employers back to negotiations on a different 
tack. 
It was proposed that the new pay system incorporate job evaluation and performance 
pay, a long standing issue. Evaluations had been introduced over the previous few years, 
and employers were pressing for them to be attached to pay scales. However, in 
negotiations it became clear that their aim was to trim labour costs, not to ensure a 
quality service. Even the cost of implementing performance pay would come from the 
nursing wage budget. 
"We said if you want a performance based system, there are no quotas. If you 
want excellence in the workplace, then you put in place a system that will enable 
everybody to achieve that. So that is probably where we will get hung up in the 
end." (NZNA Elected Officer, July 1992) 
In late September nurses refused to ratify a pay package negotiated between the 
employers and NZNA officials. That is, in contradiction to the ideology behind the Act, 
the new rati'fication process was a constraint on officials' ability to compromise rather than 
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to lead an unwilling membership into industrial action. The contract was rejected partly 
because of lack of clarity on a number of issues, but also because of qissatisfaction on 
others, such as the exclusion of senior enrolled nurses from the base rate rise. In 
addition, the employers had already recruited new nurses on terms rejected by NZNA 
members. Negotiations resumed. 
By late November Auckland nurses were again planning strike action as talks broke 
down, with employers sticking at a 7.5% increase to the base rate as compensation for 
penal payments rather than the 10% sought by NZNA negotiators. This would mean a 
drop of $8,000 a year for some nurses. Another large Sunday meeting was held, to 
which, this time, interested members of the public were invited. Ballots showed 97% of 
nurses in favour of a two day strike, followed by five days the following week. Less media 
attention was given to the issues under negotiation than to the Neo-Natal Unit babies 
flown out to other hospitals. Neo-natal nurses in Australia declined to help out New 
Zealand employers. Strike notice was withdrawn on 16 January when nurses ratified a 
new offer of a 10% base rate increase, time-and-a-half for weekends, time-and-a-quarter 
for nights, double time and a day in lieu for public holidays. Charge nurses moved from 
hourly rates and allowances to a graded salary structure, with an extra payment for those 
whose earnings over the previous six months had a high penal rate component. It was 
agreed that there would be no quotas restricting recognition of nurses' skills. This was 
the 'cost neutral' outcome that NZNA had been seeking, although it would mean a loss 
of earnings to nurses who worked frequent weekends. 
These negotiations, and members' reactions to them, are recounted here in detail as an 
example of how 'more market' policies in labour relations and health delivery, and the loss 
of an arbitrated alternative, pushed angry nurses into industrial action, despite moral 
constraints and professional scruples. Nurses in large public hospitals are arguably the 
best organised, best strategically placed of the female labour force, highly skilled middle 
class professional, yet in the new environment it took them eight months and repeated 
industrial action around the country to defend themselves from a 3% cut in earnings. 
"It is an indictment of our labour relations system that nurses have had to fight for 
seven and half months and move to the brink of a major strike just to resist budget 
cuts. II (NZNA Organiser, Jan. 1993) 
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In the 1992 round attempts were made by some Boards to exclude charge nurses from 
the collective contract as performing a management role. From an understanding of 
NZNA's history, however, officials considered the continual lowering of the dividing line 
between management and nurses as counterproductive to management interests as it is 
likely to strengthen the union stance of nurse employees. 
"It's dumb from an employers' point of view. By excluding them from being part 
of the collective contract they are excluding people ... who would be the leaders. II 
(NZNA Elected Officer, July 1992) 
In the 1992 regional negotiations, nurses who would once have been NZNA's leaders 
were sitting on the employer side of the bargaining table, negotiating against their own 
professional organisation and, in a few cases, the bargaining agent for their own individual 
contract, NZNA. Though the nurse manager hierarchy has all but gone, the continuing 
need for nursing expertise has meant that some nurses were now in management 
hierarchy positions. In the view of NZNA officials, their presence at negotiations improved 
employers' understanding of nursing issues. However, other negotiators being used by 
some Area Health Boards were Employers Federation bargaining agents with no health 
background. 
The 1992 negotiations for public sector nurses implemented the Employment Contracts 
policy in the state sector. The essential task of the Act was to fragment national awards, 
introducing wage competition between workers in occupational labour markets. In public 
sector health this was achieved fragmenting the employer side of the negotiations: the 
unitary responsibility of the state for employment was devolved to 14 Area Health Boards 
negotiating separate and differing documents. This fragmented the bargaining power of 
NZNA as a major health union, despite nurses' professional status and industrial strength 
(Hill & Du Plessis 1993). 
Labour costs were only marginally reduced in the 1992 round, but old patterns both of 
bargaining and of penal payments for unsociable work hours were broken as the first step 
in freeing up the state's own labour market in health, with an eye to reducing the fiscal 
deficit (Hill 1993b). In the 1991 financial year government expenditure on health, adjusted 
for inflation, had been reduced by $100 million, with further reductions in 1992 (Kai Tiaki 
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July 1992:9). Since 1989 government health spending per person dropped by almost 7%. 
Nurses' defence against the 3% cut to their earnings followed a slow erosion of real 
wages and staffing levels over five years. 
The Privatisation of Health 
Running parallel to implementation of National's Employment Contract policy was the 
development of its plans to restructure health services to introduce market competition 
in the name of efficiency. State funding was to be split from health service provision, as 
recommended by the 1988 review (Gibbs 1988), reflecting the neo-liberal economic view 
that efficiency is achieved through the separation of ownership and management. The 
14 Area Health Boards would be reorganised as four Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) 
which will divide up and contract out current health services, either to present providers 
reorganised as 23 Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs), or to private sector competitors 
(Upton 1991). 
"What people say generally is that the public/private demarcation will become 
blurred. I would go one step further and say it won't be blurred, it will be private." 
(NZNU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
In 1991 an National Interim Provider Board (NIPB) was established, made up of health 
professionals, health managers and businessmen, and headed by a chairman of the 
Business Roundtable. Its purpose was to plan and set up the funder RHAs and provider 
CHEs. Already in 1991 the prospect of competition between public and private hospitals 
was affecting nurses' ability to resist staffing cuts under hospital restructuring. 
"There was talk about if the hospital wasn't running efficiently by next year they 
wouldn't be able to compete for services ... Either they traded off the principal nurse 
position or they would lose seven staff nurses .. .It was awful, they didn't feel it was 
a trade, it was like blackmail." (NZNA Organiser, June 1992) 
The 1992 report of the NIPB formed the basis of the Health and Disability Services Act 
establishing the new institutional structures and requiring public hospitals to be run as 
'successful businesses'. The new framework was to be up and running before the 1993 
election, although at November 1992 progress was slower than planned. Should Labour 
win the election, whatever structure was in place would be retained, on the grounds that 
408 
yet another restructuring, even in reverse, was undesirable, but public health services 
would remain state owned and tax funded. 
In the view of NZNA officials, the NIPB report and the legislation were driven by market 
ideology to the extent of ignoring the very nature of the 'business' concerned. A health 
driven process would identify health needs, what services would meet these and then 
what organisational structures would be appropriate. 
"The structure is being created first and considerations about how the country's 
health needs will be met will apparently have to fit in with that." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, Dominion 15 May 1992) 
Under National's health policy, not only was the provision of health care being fragmented 
to introduce market competition, health consumption was also being individualised. User 
charges were introduced in February 1992, although takings were considerably below 
expectation and some charges were later dropped. Nurses collectively refused to 
participate in charging for services. Extra clerical staff were required, with some hospitals 
contracting business bureaux to handle the additional clerical work, computing and debt 
collection. In the longer term this neo-liberal principle of individual health consumption 
would extend to individual health care plans, allowing people to extract their individual 
entitlement to public funds and spend it as they chose in the health market. The 
technicalities of such a plan were uncharted and undebated. 
"You then have to work out the actuarial risks for every individual person who 
wishes to remove their share of the health fund. It's a logistical nightmare." 
(NZNA Elected Officer, May 1992) 
Tt-lis individualisation of health consumption would ignore collective responsibility for poor 
health and its social consequences. NZNA officials recognised it as a plan to facilitate 
privatisation of the health 'industry' at continuing public expense. 
"This would enable private medical insurance companies to become 
comprehensive health care providers bolstered by funds from the state. 1/ 
(NZNA Elected Officer, NZ Herald 3 March 1992) 
NZNA had strong professional and health policy disagreements with National's proposal 
to turn the public health service into a unstable contracting industry, but the labour 
relations implications were of even greater concern. In public statements, NZNA officials 
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made connections between the $10 million National had already spent on health 
restructuring and employers' penny pinching at contract negotiations. The Auckland Area 
Health Board's spending on restructuring in 1992 equalled their proposed saving on 
nurses' wages; nurses were being expected to absorb a 3% cut while a former chairman 
of the NZ Business Roundtable was being paid $750 a day to oversee the health 
changes. 
"Nurses will not accept cuts in their wages to fund the Minister of Health's 
nightmare. II (NZNA Elected Officer, July 1992) 
Officials recognised some benefits in recent restructuring, particularly in bringing all health 
services, public and private, under a centralised administration which could identify and 
meet health goals. However, they saw most benefits of the change as merely part of the 
normal progression of critique and improvement of any public service. 
'There are some positive things but mostly they are longstanding problems that 
ought to have been dealt with long since. They may succeed this time because 
it is being done in the context of an overall reform of the service. But you don't 
need to split funders and providers or introduce individual health care plans to do 
those." (NZNA Elected Officer, May 1992) 
As the Auckland negotiations dragged on, employers wanted to take into account the 
imminent division of the Auckland Area Health Board into three Crown Health Enterprises. 
NZNA had been concerned to ensure that each regional employment contract provided 
a smooth transition of nurses's employment to the new CHEs. From 14 regional 
negotiations in 1992 nurses' collective employment contract will fragment into negotiations 
with 23 CHEs, plus however many private sector enterprises are successful in securing 
contracts for health services. In addition to regional differences in 1992, variations in 
terms and conditions will come as a result of direct local competition between public and 
private health providers, for whom nurses' wages will be the major cost. 
The labour relations effects of such competition for services was already seen in NZNU's 
negotiating difficulties in 1992. Major private sector health employers tried to resist or 
simply refused to negotiate collective contracts and pushed down wage costs, despite 
present profitability, with an eye to competing against public health providers, who had 
just completed relatively 'cost-neutral' regional collective contracts. In this regard, an 
I\lZI\lU organiser and a NZNA staff member both pointed out that the bargaining agent 
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advising the NIPB on its future labour relations approach was also acting for the largest 
private chain of surgical hospitals, Southern Cross, who insisted on individual contracts 
only for their staff. 
This positioning to compete for public health services affected the employment of Plunket 
nurses by late 1992. Earlier that year a collective contract had been negotiated which at 
last addressed nurses' caseloads. But from 1993 the Plunket Society's funding would 
pass to Regional Health Authorities and Plunket would have to tender for the right to 
provide its own historic service. In November 1992 it announced a 20% reduction in 
nursing staff. NZNU, nurses and mothers protested against the redundancies, organising 
petitions and 'Pram Power' rallies in the main centres and demanding that Plunket be 
properly funded as a 'core' health service. 
Collective contracts negotiated by the nurses unions with particular employers, in public 
or private sector, can do nothing to ensure that those employers will win contracts for 
services, or that contracts for services once won will held in future years. Current 
planning is for contracts for service with a term of one year, renewable. Such a short 
term of contract reduces service providers' ability to plan, although lack of forward 
planning was one of most generally supported criticisms of the 1989? Gibbs Report. The 
ability to terminate is, however, seen by policy makers as the key to improving efficiency 
through competition. Debate on criteria for termination has included discussion of 
whether some CHEs should be allowed to fail 'pour encourager les autres'. 
For nurses, employment by contracting health providers will logically also become based 
on a one year term. This puts the employment security of highly qualified, highly skilled 
nurses, a key profession for women, in the same casualised situation as women cleaners 
working for contracting companies (discussed in the next case study), whose industrial 
problems revolve around employment status on change of contract. While the Minister 
of Education talks of the need for an educated, skilled workforce, the Minister of Health 
is undermining the main incentives for achieving education, skill and a middle class job; 
that is, relative employment security and a reasonable level of reward. 
"In some ways I don't get too angry about all of these things because, while it is 
bad for workers, it is going to be even worse for the employers because of the 
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backlash that will inevitably come ... It is so unworkable that you are not actually 
going to be able to run a health service. II (NZNA Elected Officer, May 1992) 
Conclusion 
The changes described above - the separation and reamalgamation of NZN U and NZNA, 
and NZNA's own restructuring - were changes in organisational form underpinning a 
major shift in strategy by nurses. From a historical reliance on professionalisation to 
improve the status and rewards of nursing, they moved to balance professionalism with 
a strong industrial stand, in recognition of 'the intertwining of the professional and the 
industrial' at all levels of nursing work. If, as some nurses feel, there has been some 
recent neglect of the professional, it has resulted from the need to defend nurses' terms 
of employment against strong attack by both public and private sector employers. 
Although these changes were responses within a changing labour relations framework, 
their timing does not match legislative changes. The registration of private sector nurses 
union came 38 years after legislation made it possible; major change within NZNA was 
well under way before the State Sector Act. To some extent these organisational changes 
were a response to changes on the employer side of the bargaining table, such as the 
expansion of private health, the roll back of state and tighten public health budgets. But 
changes within NZNA began in the early 1980s while public health was still expanding and 
well funded, if arguably not well managed. The initial impulse for the organisational 
changes came from nurses' assessments of their own needs and how to meet them. 
Professionalisation was an effective strategy, and the protection and furtherance of 
nurses' professional status continues as a major concern of the new amalgamated 
Nurses Organisation. But it was not sufficient. By 1980s women's expectations of 
democratic organisation and responsiveness to individual problems had risen among 
nurses, as among other union memberships. As labour relations problems became more 
acute, their expectations of industrial effectiveness grew and with it their willingness to 
reconsider moral constraints and take action themselves, although the moral dilemma is 
always present. Nurses had two important advantages over clerical workers: the 
centrality of their caring work to the enterprise of their employer, private or public, gave 
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nurses strategic power; and for many of them, workforce concentration on large hospital 
worksites made collective use of that power logistically possible. 
Nurses in the private sector, including a high proportion of unqualified nurses, needed a 
stronger industrial stance than they felt able to take as part of NZNA. The extent of 
NZNA's own organisational and strategy changes was not evident at the time of 
separation. Reamalgamation of the two unions was an appropriate strategic response 
to health policy changes which will enable the new NZ Nurses Organisation to represent 
the collective interests of nurses wherever the line between public and private is drawn. 
"The amalgamated organisation has been a long term strategy. A number of 
organisational steps to position us so that we are responding better, regional 
expansion, improving our financial management and information systems. I guess 
our major goal is to keep nurses employed in the health service. 1/ 
(NZNA Elected Officer, May 1992) 
However, the push to reamalgamate began before the changes in public/private provision 
of health services became clear. This change too was membership driven, because 
members themselves believed 'nurses should stick together'. That is, it was a strategy 
and an organisational form based on a collective occupational identity at a grassroots 
level, an identity recognised and built on by women officials of both unions. 
Traditional professionalism and present unionism are based on both a historic and a 
current feminist understanding of nursing as a women's profession and of NZNA and 
NZNU as organisations of almost entirely women members. Feminist unionist issues like 
sexual harassment and pay equity have been espoused by leaders of both organisations 
as issues of importance to their members, although with varying degrees of emphasis. 
NZNU was particularly radical on issues related to women, but the once conservative 
NZNA was moving slowly in the same direction. 
"I would like to see in 5 years time whether NZNA has reverted back, stayed still 
or gone forward. I have a feeling it will go forward and become more radical as 
time goes on, in both a union way and a feminist way. In my opinion, that is good, 
it is finding its feet." (NZNA organiser, Nov. 1990) 
In five years from that prediction the fully amalgamated NZ Nurses Organisation will be 
covering the whole labour market for nursing across a diverse range of employment 
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situations. It is likely to be a market very much changed by the reorganisation among the 
employers who provide health services, as well as the state framework for labour 
relations. 
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CHAPTER 9: CLEANERS & CARETAKERS UNIONS amalgamating with the 
HOTEL & HOSPITAL WORKERS UNIONS into the 
SERVICE WORKERS UNION OF AOTEAROA 
Introduction 
In this third case study of unions representing cleaners, the concerns of members 
arise less from the gendered nature of the job than from insecure employment, short 
hours and low earnings - although these are job characteristics disproportionately 
experienced by women. Classic union strategies of strike action and pickets have 
been more appropriate to commercial cleaners than to clerical workers or nurses, 
since they can disrupt client-contractor relations in a highly competitive industry based 
on tendering for short term contracts. However, this study shows the importance of 
centralised bargaining and arbitration to the unionisation and bargaining power of 
cleaners and other 'secondary' labour market occupations now covered by the 
amalgamated Service Workers Union of Aotearoa (SWU). 
This case study contrasts with the previous two in tllat it considers a female dominated 
occupation with predominantly male union leaders. Although around 80% of cleaners 
are women, the Cleaners & Caretakers Unions (C&C) (with which this research began) 
and the Hotel & Hospital Workers Unions (H&HW) (with which they amalgamated in 
1991) also represented other occupations, including heavily male dominated ones. 
This resulted in a smaller majority of women members than in the clerical or nurses' 
unions. Women cleaners continue to be underrepresented in the leadership of their 
union - a situation criticised since the mid-1970s (NZPSA 1976; Geare, Herd & Howell 
1979). 
This case study considers the priority given by leaders of these unions to the 
campaigns raised by feminist unionists. However, the primary focus with regard to 
feminist unionist strategies is on internal issues of representation for women, Maori 
and Pacific Island members, and on structural changes to encourage participation and 
allow issues important to these members to be raised. In this, SWU and its 
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component unions presented something of a microcosm of the union movement in the 
mid-1980s, described in Chapter 5. The amalgamation introduced a union which was 
conservative on women's issues into an organisation in which progress was being 
made towards 'reflecting the membership' in union decision making processes. 
The internal organisation of the new SWU - already mentioned with regard to clerical 
unions - attempts to allow for the heterogeneity of members' interests while reaping 
the benefits to survival of increased organisational size - that is, 'the standard 
problematic of democracy vs bureaucracy' (Offe & Wissenthal 1985:197, 287). The 
collective interests of women cleaners and clerical workers as minorities within this 
more diverse organisation will be a matter for future research. 
Origins, Coverage and Membership 
The cleaners' unions, like the clerical unions, could be described as 'creatures of 
legislation', The Cleaners, Caretakers & lift Attendants Unions were established in 
1936, when compulsory union membership was added to the arbitration package. 
Unionisation gave scattered, parttime cleaners in the private sector access to state 
procedures for the arbitration of an award. In the mid 1970s C&C gained an award 
for cleaners employed by the Department of Education, followed by separate awards 
for cleaners in universities and cleaners employed by contractors in schools. 
like other private sector occupational unions, the C&C unions were originally 
established, as dictated by the legislation, on the basis of regional labour Districts. 
Over most of the period since 1936 the regional unions were Northern, Wellington, 
Canterbury, Otago and Southland, with the last two amalgamating in 1990. 
Membership fees supported a secretary, a clerical worker and an office in each region, 
backed by an elected executive and the biannual general meeting of the membership. 
Through the 1980s coverage was improved through the use of parttime or shared 
organisers and offices shared with other unions in Timaru, Palmerston North, Hawkes 
Bay, Hamilton and, since 1990, Rotorua. 
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While recruitment, organising and particular disputes of rights were usually regional 
concerns, the arbitration or negotiation of national awards and their enforcement 
through the courts were centralising functions, for which the regional unions formed 
a loose federation. Trlis operated at the level of the secretaries, who maintained a 
close working relationship, which continues as SWU regional divisional heads with 
responsibility for cleaners. 
Until the mid~ 1970s institutionalised negotiation allowed C&C officials to deliver annual 
improvements in wages and conditions with minimal membership participation. With 
awards fully arbitrated , officials' contact with the membership was limited and 
responses to members' individual problems were reactive rather than pro-active: it was 
up to the member to find the union. From 1973 direct award bargaining, backed by 
access to arbitration, replaced the fully arbitrated system. As the economy tightened 
in the mid 1970s (Roper 1993a), it became clear to C&C officials that industrial action 
would be needed to gain annual wage improvements and to enforce the unions' 
interpretation of award rights. This would require more active involvement of 
members, and C&C began to employ organising staff. 
"From 1976 to 1986, there was a big learning process ... We have had to do in 
this last 14 years what was not done in the last 41 ... No one knew the cleaners' 
union ... the status of cleaners was zilch, now they are recognised both in the 
union movement and in industry as a force to be reckoned with, to be 
respected and not to be mucked around. 111 
In 1988 the five regional C&C unions linked up with H&HW unions to form the Service 
Workers Federation. Because large hotels presented better opportunities for 
workplace organising than was possible for scattered cleaners, the hotel section of 
H&HW membership had much older origins than C&C (Roth 1973). A Waitresses & 
Female Cooks union formed in Auckland in 1890. Hotel workers unions formed in the 
main centres after IC&A Act definitions were widened in 1900. Membership of hotel 
unions had been maintained by 'a mild form of coercion and intimidation' by 
workmates (Roth 1973:124). The 1936 labour reforms enabled the Hotel Unions to 
expand their coverage, doubling membership between 1935 and 1937, and to register 
an award for workers doing similar work in hospitals. Not yet quite within the state 
1 Attributions are omitted in this case study for reasons discussed in Chapter 2, page 36. 
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sector (Hay 1991), hospitals were about to become an area of rapid employment 
expansion as Labour implemented its public health service policies in 1938. As 
mentioned in Chapter 8, H&HW officials attempted to organise nurses in private 
employment, but NZNA pulled professional rank and political influence to block this. 
Like C&C, H&HW were regional unions whose national awards and award-enforcing 
activities were coordinated through a federal structure. Coverage and membership 
increased with the growth of the private health sector, tourism and the restaurant trade 
from the early 1970s. More recent expansion has been into areas of service work 
related to existing coverage, such as home helps. 
Until 1992 C&C officials negotiated four national awards covering cleaners, as well as 
a few minor agreements and composite documents. The NZ Cleaners, Caretakers & 
Lift Attendants Award was tile rlistoric main commercial cleaning award and covered 
cleaners in both the direct employment of companies whose premises they cleaned 
and in 'distanced' employment by contractors. The award also covered caretakers 
and, by the 1980s, just a handful of lift attendants. The NZ Education Service 
Caretakers & Cleaners Award covered school cleaners, a group about equal in 
number to the commercial cleaning workforce, and school caretakers. The NZ School 
Contract Cleaners Award covered schools using contractors. These were mainly large 
high schools; little primary school cleaning was contracted out at the time of this study. 
The NZ University Custodians, Caretakers & Cleaners Award covered large 
well-organised sites, most with direct employment. C&C also covered security officers, 
whose work was similar to that of caretakers and custodians, under the NZ 
Watchmen, Security Officers and Patrolmen Award. From the mid 1980s security 
services had become a growing but increaSingly casualised industry, organised in very 
similar fashion to contract cleaning. 
The majority of C&C members were employed under the two main awards for 
commercial cleaners and school cleaners. From around 1980 the section of the 
membership in commercial cleaning had risen markedly, doubling, for example, in 
Canterbury. This enabled the unions to increase staff to organise around disputes and 
support members. It also allowed an increase in the unions' assets and reserves, 
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while the sudden membership drop under voluntary unionism ill 1984-85 showed how 
important it was to have something put by. 
C&C officials attributed this growth of the membership to the construction of high rise 
office blocks in the city centres which are cleaned by contractors. It seems likely that 
this membership growth was in part due to improved union penetration as cleaning 
employment became more formalised and concentrated under the large known 
contracting companies which moved into the market in the early 1980s. Membership 
in most regions peaked around 1986-7, through rationalisation as surplus office space 
fell empty. The southern cities of Dunedin and Invercargill did not experience the 
building boom further north and the number of commercial cleaning positions, if not 
the people in them, was more stable over the decade. Membership numbers fell 
slightly in 1990-92 as economic activity and overall employment dropped off. From 
1988 numbers also fell in C&C's other main area of membership, school cleaners, as 
budgets tightened under Labour's 'Tomorrow's Schools' policy. 
C&C reported official membership numbers to the Department of Labour until 1986 but 
gave low priority to collecting information about members. Under compulsory 
. unionism, membership lists were based on the three monthly listings of employees 
supplied by employers. In 1990 suspensory loans from the Union Incentives Scheme 
Fund enabled lists to be computerised and by 1991 information was being centralised 
and analysed by the SWF in Wellington. 
In commercial cleaning, the turnover of employees is extremely high. Many, 
particularly students, do not remain in the industry. Others stop and start work, 
balancing necessity and availability, or sl-lift between companies, by choice or as 
contracts end. In the early 1980s, at the time of the wage freeze and the move of 
large overseas companies into contract cleaning (see page 431), membership turnover 
was estimated to be as high as 70% every three months. In Canterbury: 
"Every three months we were putting in two thousand workers and taking 2000 
out. Sometimes they hadn't left the industry but had left Grothal/s and gone to 
work for Diamond White or gone from Diamond White to Berkeley." 
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Turnover steadied as the big contractors settled into the market and as people clung 
to jobs in the deepening recession of the late 1980s. Security work was also an area 
of high membership turnover, but school cleaning had a relatively stable membership. 
It provided convenient neighbourhood employment and some members were long 
term employees who develop a strong sense of identity with and dedication to the 
school. In 1991 overall C&C membership turnover was estimated to be running at 
100%-150% per annum. 
The three month lag in receiving lists from employees, coupled with high employment 
turnover, meant a constant information gap. Mailing lists were always partly out of 
date. Some invalid names and addresses were those of 'ghost members', who 
worked to supplement benefits, giving false names and addresses. Others were 
people who had picked up work and already left again. The Northern membership list 
of around 10,000, used to mail out the union newspaper, contained only around 8,000 
financial members, making the union's financial forecasting uncertain. 
"You really have no final idea of what your membership has been until the end 
of the year. II 
However, some membership analyses were not possible because the relevant 
questions had simply not been asked. In 1990 the SWF research officer wrote: 
The statistics are totally silent on (and affiliates were not asked to generate) 
data about the following factors which should be crucial in tactical and strategic 
planning under any circumstances: 
- The male/female ratio of members 
- The parttime/fulltime ratio of members 
- The Pakeha/MaorijPacific Island ratio of members 
- The age distribution of members 
- The earnings of members. 
With such data we would be in a much better position to determine our 
priorities, allocate our resources, develop our education and publicity efforts, 
and generally organise nationally. (SWF 1990:5) 
What membership data did provide was information on membership fluctuations, 
coverage under the various awards and concentration by employer or worksite. A 
rough breakdown by awards of the Canterbury union membership as at October 1990 
was typical of the membership nationally: 
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Commercial Cleaners award 
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In 1990 C&C official membership totalled around 12,500, comprising Otago/ Southland 
1,800, Canterbury 3,300, Wellington 6,700 and Northern 8,000. On 14 May 1991, the 
day before the Employment Contracts Act became law, eleven SWF affiliates 
amalgamated fully into one national union, the Service Workers Union of Aotearoa, 
with a total membership of around 69,000. In July 1992 the Southland and COMPASS 
clerical unions, followed by the Community Services Union, also negotiated 
amalgamation. 
In 1990 80% of the membership of unions affiliated to the SWF were covered by six 
major awards. The NZ Cleaners & Caretakers award and NZ Education Service award 
together covered 19% of total SWF membership. H&HW's largest awards were for 
Tearooms & Restaurants (24.5%), Licensed Hotels (16%), Rest Homes (9%) and 
public sector Hospital Domestics (8.5%), with another 23% under smaller awards and 
agreements in hospitality, private sector health and security. 
On joining the SWF, then SWU, C&C linked up with workers in similarly low paid, 
parttime and increasingly casualised occupations. Of SWU's 69,000 total membership 
on amalgamation, an estimated 30,000 were cleaners or did forms of cleaning work 
under another occupational labels. Besides other occupations, H&HW covered 
cleaners in hospitals, both public and private sector; hotel house staff; boarding school 
cleaners; small numbers of cleaners in hotels and pubs (although contractors were 
often used to clean the public areas of large hotels); and rest home assistants. H&HW 
officials were attempting to negotiate an award for home helps who, like resthome 
assistants, did a mixture of cleaning and support work. Of these, public hospital 
cleaners and hotel house staff were the cleaning groups with the greatest employment 
stability and strongest union identification. 
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As will be seen, there were marked differences in the organising situation and 
industrial strength of C&C's and H&HW's different groups of cfeaning workers. 
However, demographic characteristics were similar: both groups of cleaners were 
overwhelmingly female; the racial mix reflected social stratification. The social status 
and socio-economic profile of cleaners is both precondition and outcome of their 
labour market position. 
Who Cleans New land? 
Cleaning work is heavily female dominated and this was reflected in the membership 
composition of the unions. Around 75% of C&C members, but over 80% of cleaners, 
were women. Over 90% of H&HW's hospital cleaners were women. Amalgamation 
gave swu a membership more than 80% female. Recognition of this fact, its 
possibilities as well as its constraints, had relatively recently been incorporated into the 
thinking of the predominantly male leadership of the unions: 
liThe guts of the membership is in fact women and the guts of the membership 
is where the strength lies. 1/ 
A horizontal gender division of labour can be discerned between cleaner and caretaker 
or custodian, which was reflected in C&C's coverage and membership. The male 
proportion of the membership was concentrated in security work and in the 
occupation of caretaker or custodian. Security work is extremely male dominated and 
organisers suggested that uniforms and authority may be an attraction of the 
occupation, despite its very low paid and increasing on-call and casualised 
employment. However, a few women are moving into caretaking jobs in schools. 
"About 5 years ago I met a female caretaker, the first one I'd ever met, from 
Auckland, a lovely feminine woman she was too. Fixed locks, replaced glass 
and did al/ the things a caretaker did, that was a real eye-opener for me. 11 
Supervising can provide women with an opportunity for advancement. It is possible 
for a handful of women to move up a short career ladder into management in the large 
contracting companies, from cleaner to supervisor, then manager, and a few women 
set up as a small contractors. From C&C's point of view, some of these ex-members 
made 'the worst kind of bosses': 
422 
"They know the union, they know its weaknesses as well as Its strengths, and 
they know the industry. If they take some pimply kid out of a university, we can 
walk all over him. But these women have been through it all." 
However, where worksites were large enough to require cleaning supervisors, there 
was often vertical segregation. In Otago/ Southland at least: 
"98% of our cleaners' supervisors are men. II 
In the last round of research interviews in 1992, women organisers from two different 
regions perceived an increase in the number of men they were encountering in 
cleaning work. No membership figures were yet available to confirm this, although 
labour market statistics for 1991 indicated a small increase of males in parttime work. 
Particularly noticeable to organisers was the presence of older men, former managers, 
in cleaning supervisor positions. 
'They are always apologetic about being cleaners, go to great lengths to tell 
you about their experience as a manager and always give you the employer's 
side of whatever your dispute is. 'I have been a manager and I know. 111 
Generally, cleaners were women with dependent children or were older women. The 
small proportion of male cleaners in parttime jobs were likely to be students or 
semi-retired. Men were more likely to be in the few cleaning jobs which provided 
longer hours: cleaning supermarkets with a 4 am start or all-night jobs in commercial 
cleaning. Different types of cleaning also exhibited segregation by gender. Men were 
typically hired for daytime factory cleaning or to clean machinery. For historical 
reasons, these jobs were sometimes covered by other unions. 
"Car cleaning is Engineers, so is cleaning bicycles in cycle shops. If it touches 
metal it's engineering ... The other thing to realise is, if it is high paid it is male, 
whatever kind of cleaning it is. It is not considered beneath their dignity if it is 
$11 an hour, as it used to be in Pacific Tyres. II 
At Pacific Tyres, Wellington, and Cad bury's, Dunedin, men working daytime shifts 
cleaning on the factory floor were employed directly (and participated in Pacific Tyres' 
bonus scheme), while the women cleaning the offices at night worked for contractors. 
This pattern of segregation into suitably 'masculine' and 'feminine' cleaning was 
reflected in one contracting company which cleaned ships coming into Dunedin 
harbour. Its cleaning gang comprised men to clean the engine rooms and women to 
clean the galley and the cabins. 
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Working in a low status, low skill, female dominated occupation, the cleaners in both 
C&C and H&HW memberships illustrated the racial nature of New Zealand's social 
stratification and reflected the racial geography of the country. Pacific Island women 
made up a significant portion of both memberships. Precise membership data on 
ethnicity was not available, because it had not been sought or because it was 
reluctantly supplied. Only 10% of members answered the race question on H&HW's 
recruitment form. 
"People are very nervous with the downturn in the economy, they don't want to 
give anything away that might be used against them." 
However, experiential knowledge was available. Organisers reported that Pacific 
Islanders dominated contract cleaning and hospital cleaning in Auckland and 
Wellington. Northern C&C officials estimated that 65% of its members were women 
and of those 75% would be Pacific Islanders. The Wellington union estimated that 
around 80% of its contract cleaning members were Pacific Islanders. School cleaners, 
however, tended to be local residents and were therefore Pakeha in most areas. 
There was a similar finely differentiated social pattern in hospital cleaning and kitchen 
work covered by H&HW. Organisers reported that at North Shore Hospital around 
60% of cleaners were Pakeha, followed by Maori as the next largest group, then 
Pacific Islanders; while at Auckland Hospital they were 80% Pacific Island women, then 
Maori, with few Pakeha. In Wellington hospitals around 60% of cleaners were Pacific 
Islanders and 20% Maori. As discussed later, organisers had been quicker to 
recognise and build on this feature of membership than had union strategisers. 
The feature which most distinguished the employment of cleaners from clerical workers 
and nurses was the hours of work. For many women with family responsibilities the 
first decision that affects choice of employment is the hours to be worked, rather than 
the particular occupation. This is the factor that accounts for the tendency of women 
to drop in pay and skill level on re-entry into the workforce after childbirth (SROW 
1984). 
"You find some very skilled and able women doing cleaning jobs, but they can't 
get clerical work or whatever at 6 o'clock at night." 
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Cleaning is almost by definition a parttime occupation, usually performed in the 
evening or early morning. It is frequently sought by women because its hours of work 
give them access to earnings without interfering with the traditional pattern and time 
schedule of women's domestic and childcare duties (Barnes 1981). Some women 
work longer exhausting night hours with little change in their daytime domestic 
workload (Barnes 1981). School cleaning has the additional advantage of leaving 
women free during school holidays. 
In 1990 SWF's researcher estimated that at least 85% of its commercial cleaning jobs 
were parttime, with members averaging 12.5 hours work a week. For this reason a 
flat C&C union fee for all cleaners replaced an earlier stepped fee, unless less than 5 
hours were worked. Small numbers worked fulltime day shifts in factories and airports, 
or in 6-7 hour all-night shifts in commercial cleaning, with a $3 night allowance. School 
cleaning was also normally three hours in the early evening, but schools hiring out 
their premises to balance budgets were shifting cleaning to late night hours. Shop and 
supermarkets cleaners often worked in the very early morning. Parttime employment 
among H&HW's hospital cleaners varied by region, but generally hours were longer. 
In Auckland public hospitals, the majority were fulltime, working 7.30 to 4 pm. In 
. Wellington 80% were parttime, but their daytime shifts were usually 4, 5 or 6 hours, 
with smaller numbers working 2-3 hours nighttime shifts. 
In order to earn enough income from short hours, some cleaners combined two or 
even three jobs for more than one employer. 
"People work some extraordinary hours, like cleaning supermarkets betv\feen 2 
and 5 or 6 in the morning, then going home and going out again at 5 or 6 
o'clock at night on another cleaning site." 
"One woman on the women's committee (of the SWF) does 11 hours a day at 
three different cleaning jobs, 55 hours a week. She makes about $350 (net)." 
In early 1991 Northern C&C conducted interview research which focused not only on 
obtaining a better demographic profile of its membership but information on the 
economic and family situation of women in cleaning work. They asked about childcare 
arrangements, and the number of employed or unemployed adults in the household. 
The aim was to dispel 'pin money' assumptions about women in low paid parttime 
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work and to highlight the vital importance of their earnings, not only to themselves but 
to others they helped support: 
"To get past some misconceptions about night c/eaners ... A lot of people don't 
realise how many cleaners are earning the single income for their family." 
This view was shared by those organising women in hotel and hospital work in 
Canterbury: 
"That was the single biggest change that I observed as an organiser from 1984 
through to last year. Anumber of people used to say, it's just for a bit of extra, 
a trip overseas or a new lounge suite. They had a very specific goal or reason 
for being there ... money for jam, we used to call it. That has completely gone, 
they are not talking in those terms. They are there now to balance the family 
budget. They need that money." 
Voluntary Unionism 
During the 1 984-85 period of voluntary unionism, C&C received few resignations, but 
in the first six months membership dropped just over 20%. Cleaners appear not to 
have been as alienated -from unionism as clerical workers, however. As the onus of 
recruitment shifted from employers to unions from 1985, the problem was the logistics 
of signing up new members, given high employment turnover on dispersed worksites 
which did not have delegates. When approached, however, recruitment was generally 
successful, with high recognition of a need to belong to the union. 
"We did a lot of preparation for it, we spent in that particular year something like 
$78,000 just on that campaign alone, in preparation and recruitment." 
Whereas under earlier forms of 'unqualified preference', employers effectively signed 
up members for the union on hiring, from 1985 there were longer gaps before new 
employees became paid-up members. With high turnover, Northern estimates that this 
was the main factor in a 15% loss of finance in a year. 
"But it was simply a matter of catching up. We had very little refusal. /I 
It was not always the newly hired cleaner herself who saw the need for union 
membership: 
"I had a refusal one place but the 20 workers just sat on their butts and said you 
either join or we aren't working with you ... no matter what the Act says." 
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However, this kind of peer pressure was discouraged by the untested application of 
the 'undue influence' provision in the legislation, which could result in a $1,000 fine. 
This uncertainty initially acted against delegate recruitment or even self-recruitment. 
"The workers couldn't get together with other workers because one might be 
influencing the other. Because what's undue influence? It's got a thousand 
meanings ... Someone would ring up the union to say they want to join but not 
want to give their name, terrified of this fine." 
Since the National government had frozen wages, officials could do little for their 
members at that time. The greatest membership losses were in contract cleaning 
where labour turnover was highest. Canterbury officials estimated about 
three-quarters of their loss was in that area. In early 1984 Canterbury was $26,000 
overdrawn and had a meeting which decided to dissolve the union's operations within 
three months, before it became clear that an immanent change of government would 
resolve the situation. 
Some employers took advantage of the Amendment legislating voluntary unionism by 
immediately stopping the transfer of outstanding union fees from current members. 
Union fees deducted from weekly or fortnightly wages were extremely important to 
. unions in high turnover industries, but returns were only required to be made every 
trlree months. Around a third of the union's income was outstanding at all times, paid 
by members but held by employers. 
"They said, you have to recruit them. I said, never mind that rubbish, you still 
owe us, it should go down gradually, not all at once. I was right, we clawed 
back about $30,000 off the cheats." 
This three month lag made it difficult to predict, on the basis of the earlier experience, 
how the Employment Contracts Act would impact on membership levels. Although 
unionism became voluntary, awards containing compulsory membership clauses 
continued in force until their expiry date. Most cleaning employers continued to 
deduct union fees. In 1991 only very small numbers of resignations were received, 
and organisers contacted those members personally. For that year at least both 
members and employers seemed to consider the existing system as unchanged. 
"Most members have stayed on, it is just a matter of getting them to fill in the 
few forms that are required, stating that they are electing us as their bargaining 
agent." 
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On previous experience, voluntary unionism was expected to eventually lead to at least 
a 20% drop in membership. 
'The reality is that we have quite a lot of members who do not wish to belong 
to the union. If it is voluntary they will choose not to." 
"There is a whole generation of people who have grown up with compulsory 
unionism, and with all the benefits that unions have won over the years, as just 
something that they take for granted. A significant percentage of that genera-
tion will see voluntary unionism as just a chance to save $2-3 a week, until they 
realise what a union can provide." 
"People will have to make a choice at some stage about whether they want to 
be unionised workers nor not. I think unfortunately that we'll have to learn the 
hard way." 
The expectation of a return to voluntary unionism, under whichever party became the 
government after the 1990 election, prompted a change to a more pro-active strategy 
with regard to C&C members from the late 1980s. This change lagged considerably 
behind similar moves in many other unions - particularly, the clerical unions, whose 
members had actively expressed dissatisfaction with compulsory union membership 
ten years earlier. First the Wellington union, then the other regions hired organisers 
to visit workplaces and service members. Officials recognised that organisational 
viability would be affected by voluntary unionism unless there was a greater focus on 
the membership. 
"If you don't get out and (organise) your membership says, why should I be a 
member, I never see an organiser." 
However, under the full labour market deregulation of the Employment Contracts Act, 
officials recognised that the crucial factor in union survival would be employers' 
willingness to negotiate collective contracts. Officials set about restructuring their 
organisation to operate on 60% of 1990 revenue from membership without loss of 
services or ability to recruit. The need for a streamlined organisation was the rationale 
for amalgamation into the SWU. However, the particular nature of the contract 
cleaning industry and the state's ultimate political responsibility for schools made 
C&C's situation less immediately predictable than for other industrially weak, female 
dominated unions. 
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The Cleaners' Unions and Employers 
Both C&C and H&HW were registered under the IC&A Act as private sector unions, 
with most of their membership in private employment. However, important sections 
of both unions' membership were employed by the state, and officials negotiated 
determinations for these members under the public service framework for labour 
relations. Although two distinct systems of regulation and bargaining operated until 
1988, just who negotiated for whom was historically contingent on the shifting line 
between private and state service provisions, the adoption of formal arbitration in state 
sector wage setting, and the prejudices of professional associations representing 
members in wage negotiations. 
The state as employer was also important for C&C and H&H because, until the 
legislative changes of 1987 and 1988, rates and conditions in the state sector could 
influence private sector award negotiations through the traditional recognition of 
relativities between occupations. The importance of this state connection to the 
negotiating strategies of C&C and H&HW officials is explored later . 
. As with the unions already examined, C&C and H&HW covered groups of workers in 
quite different organising situations. As well as differences in the kind of cleaning, 
those situations reflected the changing situation of employers in both private and 
public sectors. 
Nationally, around 10% of C&C members were directly employed on factory or similar 
sites: that is, on large sites working daytime hours alongside people in other 
occupations. These were the cleaning jobs most likely to be fulltime and most likely 
to be filled by men. A majority of these cleaners were on large industrial sites, which 
were well organised in each of the regions. Following the Labour Relations Act, 1987, 
some of these cleaners were included in composite industry or enterprise agreements, 
with the occupational union representation its members in the negotiations and 
continued to service them under the agreement. Examples are the composite 
documents for the packaging industry and for Pacific Tyres. Under the NZCTU 
(1989a) plan it was suggested that all such members be shifted to industry based 
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collective agreements. However, the manufacturing unions which dominate these sites 
met a problem in the relatively high rate C&C officials had achieved through state 
parity in 1986, giving an increase after the wage freeze just in excess of 30%. 
"Until 1986, there were a lot of people in the Engineers or Printers Union with 
rates of pay as a handyperson, but who should really have been in the cleaners' 
union, the coverage was ours ... When the 1986 decision came out, they 
suddenly said, well, I'm a cleaner. They came and found us." 
The C&C award contained a flat hourly rate for the job, without youth rates or skill 
increments, which was around 95% of the core trades rates and $1 an hour higher 
than rates for process workers. In 1990 the Engineers Union developed a strategy of 
negotiating programmes for comprehensive training and internal labour market career 
paths, which involved margins between unskilled rates and core trades rates. C&C 
officials felt this would eventuate in relative pay decreases for cleaners in industry 
agreements, since cleaners' current rate did not conform to the pattern being 
negotiated. Beyond that, they found the concept of a career path inappropriate to 
cleaning work, since it was the effort and unpleasant conditions of cleaning work which 
were rewarded, rather than skill. However, they were very conscious that levels of 
reward were determined by what could be negotiated, by whatever legal, industrial or 
bargaining means were at unions' disposal. 
Besides factories, there were other large sites on which C&C members were directly 
employed, already covered by industry or enterprise documents for cleaners outside 
the main award. Examples are city councils and airports. City council cleaners' 
wages and conditions were negotiated under separate composite documents covering 
other council workers. In 1990 industry-based bargaining was being considered by 
NZCTU and Engineers officials for the airports, as taking best advantage of their 
strategic position in the infrastructure; this would incorporate the documents already 
covering cleaners and clerical workers. A threat to job security which undermined 
C&C's negotiating position on this was the possibility that cleaning work would be 
contracted out, as was already occurring with airline catering. 
C&C's commercial cleaning award covered both cleaners employed directly to clean 
the premises of their employer and cleaners employed by clea contractors to 
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clean the premises of clients. This distanced form of employment had expanded 
greatly since the 1970s and was now the situation of the majority of C&C's members 
under the main award. Small contract cleaning companies had operated in New 
Zealand since the 1940s. However, it was in the early 1980s that large multinational 
contract cleaning companies elbowed their way into the New Zealand market. 
"(The change) was plagued with sackings and intimidations, physical assault 
on delegates, vehicles being damaged. Anything that involved the union, that 
was the way they were going to play it." 
Once their market position was secure, the large companies no longer needed such 
tactics. They became reasonable employers, interested in protecting their market 
reputation for quality and reliable service. A few large multinational companies 
operated ostensibly competing subsidiaries under a number of names, with the 
ownership of parent companies overseas constantly changing through mergers and 
takeovers. Five major players, through various subsidiaries, held around 75% of all 
contracts, with most of the rest held by medium sized I\lew Zealand companies. 
"You look up the Yellow Pages for cleaning, they are all listed separately but 
they are all under the control of one organisation." 
"Some large companies like Crothalls, it's very hard to keep up on who owns 
them. Their latest owner is comprised of the Australian giant P&O, a French 
water supply company Lyonnaise des Eaux who have a shocking name in 
Europe as employers, and a West Australian superannuation fund." 
H&HW also has a relationship with these big contract cleaning companies, who moved 
into some hospitals in the early 1980s and compete to clean public areas in larger 
hotels. One overseas ownership consortium which controls major contract cleaning . 
competitors in the private sector also owns a company contracting for health sector 
cleaning and a catering company which has ambitions in the public health sector. 
"Their profit is a percentage of the total contract so big hospital contracts are 
quite lucrative ... You can take a 5% return on a million dollar contract and still 
get heaps for very little outlay." 
From the mid 1980s H&HW has been opposing the extension of contracting out by 
hospitals, which brings job losses and cuts in members' hours of work. As 
government policy favours the increasing privatisation of health care, these companies 
were lobbying Area Health Boards to increase the contracting out of cleaning and also 
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catering. The H&HW newspaper Shift (Dec.1990) described a Healthserv feasibility 
study for cook~chlll methods in hospitals as 'like the fox designing the chicken coop.' 
At the time of study H&HW officials had been largely successful in combating 
contracting and most hospitals employed directly. In 1990 the Swedish multinational 
Electrolux lost its contracts in two Taranaki hospitals, which reemployed the 
contractor's cleaners directly. The only large public hospitals which were contracting 
out were Wellington, Hutt and Waikato Hospitals, who had resisted union pressure to 
revert to direct employment because of the initial capital outlay which would be 
required. 
"Auckland Hospital has no contract cleaners at all. Used to have but the 
cleaners went on strike for six weeks to get rid of them, four years ago ... They 
wanted to be directly employed again. II 
This success was due to the way the award system worked. The national award with 
blanket coverage set minimum wage rates and conditions for all cleaners whether 
under direct or contracted employment. The H&HW award had a clause requiring the 
employer to negotiate with the union over changes to hours of work, which also 
applied to contractors. This meant the cost savings achievable by hospitals through 
contracting out were quite limited under the traditional system of bargaining by 
occUpation. 
In Britain where contractors were free to pay rates outside the protections of local 
authority wage negotiations, government policy under Margaret Thatcher forced local 
councils to put out to tender services such as cleaning in schools, public buildings, 
hospitals and other local government facilities. This led to a competitive downward 
spiral of wages and cleaning standards (Coyle 1985). In April 1990 a British unionist 
visiting' New Zealand brought documentation and further warnings from the British 
experience. Disruptions and falling standards had led some councils to revert to direct 
employment or to form companies in order to comply with the tendering requirement 
in legislation controlling local authorities. 
After the early 1980s most large contracting companies settled into a cooperative 
working relationship with the unions, deducing fees automatically and respecting union 
representation. A greater problem for union organisation were small contractors with 
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just a few employees. While big 'firms follow procedures, have offices and return 
phone calls, such small employers are harder to track down. 
"The worst employers are the small tin-pot contractors ... Often a couple setting 
up who don't have a clue what to do, underpay and cause a lot of problems. 
Often young men going into it and the way they treat their staff is appalling." 
"The cleaning industry is full of mad people, mad men ... constantly shifting 
office, it's like a little underworld ... They are dodgy. You slap a back pay order 
on them so they wind the company up and it will resurface under a different 
name with different directors." 
Capital expenditure in commercial cleaning is low, so entry into the industry as an 
employer is relatively easy. The lowest tender wins the contract. Costs are almost 
entirely for labour, so profits are increased by reducing labour costs. 
However, while hourly rates were set by national awards with blanket coverage of all 
employers, costs could only be reduced by trimming hours, reducing overheads or 
lowering quality. Since cost differences between direct hiring or various contracts 
were minimal, companies had to compete on quality as well as cost. 
"We get a lot of companies ring us up and ask, what's so-and-so's Bcommercial 
cleaning like?" 
Once established in New Zealand, the multinational contractors were able to maintain 
their market position because of their market position; that is, they could afford narrow 
pro'fit margins because their company overheads and profitability were spread over a 
large number of large contracts. They could afford to bid low on a contract for the 
first couple of years to ensure they got a foot in the door, while pushing smaller 
companies out of the market. However, continuing cutthroat competition on the basis 
of labour costs was averted by the blanket coverage of all employers by the national 
award. The award set a rate for labour so tllat cleaners did not undercut each other 
in competition in the labour market - the essence of unionism - but also placed a floor 
under competition between contractors in the market for cleaning services. The 
security and quality of the contract cleaning industry was as much built on the national 
award system as was the wage security of their employees. 
"They are shit scared of the national award going because of the ability of 
anybody to go out and a bucket and mop, Mr and Mrs Smith, knock on the 
door and say, well, we'll do it for $6 an hour ... lt took us a long time to educate 
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the contract cleaning employers, they have suddenly come to realise that a 
national award is something they need as much as our members need it. It is 
the only leveller in the tendering system." 
"The big contractors always have problems with family businesses, rugby teams 
who want to do some cleaning for six months. They can't compete against 
voluntary labour, they rely on a minimum rate." 
Sharp competition between companies continues, however, to maintain profitability 
within the narrow margin between award protected labour costs, on the one hand, and 
competitive pricing on tenders for contracts, on the other. In this situation, the 
relationship between employers and union becomes complex, almost bizarre, as 
contractors use the union to keep competitors in line, and keep the industry on an 
even keel. 
"The union is the policeman of the industry." 
"They will ring us up and tell us if they suspect anyone's not (complying with 
the award), they dob each other in all the time ... A very funny relationship. One 
moment we are being quite aggressive to each other, then it will all be quite 
nice because somebody wants something." 
The nature of the tendering system creates possibilities for the union. While 
contractors shop competitors to the union, C&C officials can shop the contractor to 
the client. Clients want a cheap job done, but they do not want disruptions to cleaning 
services, or bad publicity and possibly pickets outside their building about industrial 
disputes that are not of their making. 
"Recently an employer was being difficult about paying someone's final wages, 
she was going back to the Islands and wanted her money. So we rang the 
client and told him what sort of people were responsible for cleaning his 
building." 
"You have to work within that tendering system. This union has learned to 
exploit it. Because it is such a cut-throat industry, that is a strength for us, we 
can put the pressure on clients, on the cleaning contract, and the contractor 
gets very twitchy." 
This situation provided commercial cleaners with industrial leverage wt"lich was not 
available to clerical workers whose service is provided directly to their own employer. 
As shown in the last chapter, nurses' 'client' relationship with the patient gives them 
similar leverage which their unions IJse well. Nurses' disputes attracta public support 
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which puts pressure on the employer, in both private and public health services. 
However, C&C officials were able to use leverage through the client to ensure their 
rights on a much more daily basis because of the way the commercial cleaning 
industry involves continual tendering for short term contracts. 
However, short term contracts also mean insecurity and possible loss of employment. 
Most of C&C's disputes occurred around the time contracts changed hands. Officials' 
first argument was that the contract of employment between contractor and cleaner 
bore no relationship to the contract between contractor and client: they were two 
separate issues. The cleaner took the job in good faith and should be entitled to 
security of employment like any other employee, unless there were justifiable reasons 
for dismissal. When a contract ended, cleaners should be deployed elsewhere. This 
frequently occurred, but the situation could provide employers with an opportunity to 
dispense with less satisfactory or more union-minded employees. 
"When there are high levels of unemployment, insecurity is quite a nice little 
feature for an employer to encourage. /I 
Officials' fall-back position was that the cleaner was experienced in the work on that 
particular worksite, had given no grounds for dismissal and was entitled to continue 
in her job. Therefore the new contractor should take over the existing staff on the job, 
with no loss of hours or other disadvantage to them. Pressure to do so could be 
applied through the client before the new contract was settled. 
"We tell the clients, if the new contractor doesn't agree to take these cleaners 
on, you should be aware that there will be no cleaning done in your building 
until the matter;s resolved ... Once a new contractor gets in, we are finished, so 
we have to deal with it before." 
The margin between competitive tendering by employers and the labour market floor 
of rates and conditions centrally negotiated between C&C and the Master Cleaners 
Association was tight. Between the two was the mix of hours of employment and 
workloads. Through the late 1980s cleaners came under increasing pressure from 
contractors seeking to trim hours and intensify workloads and had to resist 
encroachments on their conditions of work and employment levels. Individual 
problems, small disputes and larger industrial action all arose from this. 
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"All the problems are in the nature of the industry because of the tendering 
system. It is the most obvious example of exploitation of labour, you can just 
see it. People face hassles all the time so they are going to want help with 
those." 
C&C's second largest membership group was cleaners employed in schools; in fact, 
together with caretakers, school cleaners slightly outnumbered members in 
commercial cleaning. A typical primary school might employ a caretaker and ten 
cleaners, two of them males. Some cleaners might only work a day or two or a few 
hours each week; others more. Until 1992, the Education Service Award set rates and 
conditions for all directly employed school cleaners. Most primary schools employed 
their own cleaners; the unions, particularly in the South Island, had been successful 
in keeping out contractors. Some large secondary schools, however, whose larger 
cleaning staffs required greater management, were cleaned by contractors and 
covered by the School Contract Cleaners Award. 
Although the cleaning workforce was scattered across a large number of school sites, 
for negotiating purposes school cleaners were concentrated by their single employer, 
the Department of Education. Before 1988 the Education Service Award, like other 
state sector documents, was negotiated with relative ease, with relatively 'soft', 
cooperative relations between officials and state negotiators and reliance on arbitrated 
relativities. 
"I'm not being disrespectful because they have been in a number of scraps, but 
they have never had the experience that the private sector have had. To a large 
degree ... what is in that school document was won by people in the private 
industry, they set the tone. They are the people that did the battle. /I 
The State Services Act, 1988 removed traditional linkages between public and private 
sector. C&C's negotiating strategy of arguing the worth of each of its industrial groups 
against the others was no longer possible in either sector. In 1989 NZ Cleaners & 
Caretakers award rate was raised 4.5% and in the past this would have flowed on to 
the Education Service document. However, the State Service CommiSSion, as 
negotiator, resisted this unless certain clawbacks on conditions were agreed to, and 
the wage rates of school cleaners fell slightly behind rates in the commercial award, 
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Labour's 1998 'Tomorrow's Schools' policy shifted aspects of employer responsibility 
for cleaners, caretakers and grounds-people to the Board of Trustees of each school 
by shifting the funding of labour costs to the school's 'bulk funded' Operations Grant. 
This was part of a plan for the devolution of state responsibility to 'self-managed' 
schools (Lange 1988; NZ Taskforce 1988). While the sse continued to negotiate 
national wage rates and conditions with e&e, the number of cleaners, their hours and 
workloads were now set by 'self-managing' Boards of Trustees and principals. The 
hiring, firing and daily management of cleaners often became the responsibility of a 
Board's Executive Officer. 
"Some boards are good and treat their cleaners like people, equals ... Others 
want to save money, or want the great adventure of spending all this money on 
things for our children for a better education and forget that they need a clean 
environment to teach them in. II 
"Parents suddenly find themselves in the position of employing people. Some 
become very dictatorial, watch over the cleaners, threaten them and sack them 
left, right and centre. They don't know anything about industrial law and don't 
bother to find out." 
Operations Grants were based on the student population of the school. As Boards 
of Trustees and principals juggled cleaning labour costs against other expenditure 
priorities to be funded from the Operations Grant, cleaners' hours were reduced, work-
loads tightened and overall employment numbers fell. As officials saw it, the wage bill 
for cleaners and other ancilHary workers invited attack simply because it was the 
largest item in the Operations budget. 
"People on $70,000 a year, normally school principals, say budget problems, 
the people down below have got to be cut. If 
Since wage rates were set by the award, labour costs could only be reduced by 
trimming hours of work or by distancing the whole problem of cleaning, its 
management and employment difficulties by bringing in contractors, who were 
targetting school boards with promotional material and promises of lower costs. 
"The threat of contractors is a real threat... They want to lower the allocation of 
time for cleaning and they've said if you don't do that we are going to have 
budget problems and we'll have to bring contractors in." 
C&C officials argued that, despite possibly greater management experience, 
contractors were unlikely to be more cost effective because the school would carry tile 
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cost of a profit margin. The price of cost competition would be a drop in standards. 
In the past, a number of schools had contracted out, then returned to direct 
employment. For the cleaners themselves, contracting out would mean loss of work 
hours and income, and greater job insecurity; they are prepared to negotiate or to 
take industrial action to keep contractors out. 
Whether employers squeezed hours directly or via a contractor, in the view of officials, 
the effect of a drop in standards would be exponential. Clean surfaces in newer or 
well maintained schools are easier to reclean and good cleaning standards are part 
of ongoing maintenance. A well maintained environment is respected by the children, 
with misuse more easily noticed and discouraged by teachers, and is part of a good 
learning environment. 
"Kids treat it according to the state that it is in. /t's like wallpaper, if a bit is 
loose, someone is sure to pull it ott ... Students need a healthy fresh environment 
to learn in and if you drop the standards you not only add extra costs to 
maintenance, but also teachers will have a rougher job teaching the kids to the 
standard that sets them up for the next step. /I 
"Kids are getting a good education and a filthy school. JI 
As . hours of employment were trimmed and workloads increased, membership 
turnover among school cleaners in 1990 was the highest that C&C had experienced. 
Overall numbers of school cleaners fell. After the Employment Contracts Act was 
passed, pressure began to mount for 'enterprise' bargaining to be extended to 
individual schools as part of 'self-management', Officials foresaw that pressure would 
be put on cleaners' hourly rates as school budgets tightened, 
"If ever there was a need for unions, it's now. The workers out there in 
education know that. II 
Universities also employ large numbers of cleaners and custodians, under a separate 
national award. While most employed direct, Auckland university had several 
contractors cleaning different sections of the university as well as direct employees. 
H&HW also covered a small group of school cleaners. In 1977 an award for cleaners 
in boarding schools was granted to H&HW, with boarding schools categorised as 
accommodation rather than educational establishments. The award had been resisted 
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by employers, who argued that cleaning privately owned boarding school accommo-
dation was no different from cleaning a private home and was therefore excluded from 
regulation by the state. The 'employer' was usually a separate board of trustees from 
the school board which employed evening cleaners in the school itself. Although this 
split in coverage between C&C and H&HW· was mentioned as a reason for 
amalgamation, there was little scope for rationalisation of organiser effort since hours 
of work and employers differed. Nevertheless, omcials had worked closely together 
in the past in arguing wage parity between the cleaners before the Arbitration Court. 
Hospital cleaning, covered by H&HW unions, presents a quite different organising 
and employment situation for cleaners, particularly on the large worksites of public 
hospitals. Because of the importance of particular work hours to women seeking 
cleaning jobs, union officials considered that there was little cross-over of cleaning 
personnel between the areas organised by C&C and by H&HW. H&HW organisers 
believed their members, in public hospitals at least, identified as health sector workers 
as much as cleaners. Since the State Sector Act, 1988, H&HW had worked closely 
with the PSA and Nurses Association, as public health unions were pushed by budget 
cuts and the legislative changes into taking a stronger industrial stance. Strategies 
were coordinated, settlements linked and industrial action taken jointly. In the context 
of combined strategies for health workers, however, identity as cleaners was likely to 
be how cleaners distinguished and highlighted their own situation and needs. 
The health budget cuts and management restructuring in public hospitals described 
in Chapter 8 affected the employment situation of cleaners no less than that of nurses. 
Employment relations and negotiating was centralised and formalised by hospital 
bureaucratic structures, but constant restructuring had affected cleaning staff numbers. 
"They are at the bottom on the pile, they are the first attacked when the pressure 
is on. Instead of attacking people who cost them $80 an hour, they attack 
people who cost them $8 an hour." 
With management focused on cost efficiency, there had been not only workload 
intensification but shortcutting on standards. 
"They have been doing it for years and some young male manager will come 
in and tell them how to do their job more efficiently. I have observed some 
older women mortally offended at being told that the way you clean a ward is 
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to spot clean one side one day and do the other side thoroughly, then swap the 
next day." 
The Management of Change clauses gained in the 1989 award settlement allowed 
H&HW closer involvement in workplace matters. Organisers and delegates could 
come together with management and members of other health unions to look at 
systems and proposed changes at an earlier stage, rather than reacting with industrial 
action to decisions of management which frequently led to staff cuts. Like NZNA, 
H&HW officials had few illusions about this. 
"We have always seen the advances made in the industrial democracy clauses 
as a tool to try and increase workers' control over the work process. We have 
never seen them in terms of high flown ideas about workers and National 
walking hand in hand into the sunset." 
In private sector hospitals, the situation of H&HW's members parallelled that of 
NZNU's nurses. Despite growth and profitability in private sector health, award rates 
and conditions were worse than in public hospitals. Although there was variation 
between large and small private hospitals, and between religious and welfare hospitals 
and those owned by entrepreneurs or insurance companies, workplace relations and 
negotiation around the labour process were also worse, 
. "There is a vast difference. The private is really cut-throat, workers do as they 
are bloody tOld, when they are told, how they are told ... One psychogeriatric 
private hospital is making cleaners mop a floor with no detergents, because he 
has decided that is good enough, he knows best." 
In small establishments in particular, the demarcation lines between domestic jobs, and 
even with nursing, are blurred. As with examples discussed in Chapter 8, disputes 
about demarcation are usually about changes made by the employer, which H&HW 
cooperates with the nurses' unions to resist, rather than disputes between unions 
about coverage. As one official saw it, nursing's professionalisation strategy in public 
hospitals has had the effect over time of opening up work for H&HW members. 
"Nurses are their own worst enemy, they are fools to give away hands-on 
nursing. They have given the mucky bits to domestics and cleaners, they have 
given away part of their jobs .. .It is nurses who decide what is nursing and leave 
the rest to cleaners, it's not cleaners who decide." 
In a Three in One' campaign in 1987, H&HW negotiators had tried to amalgamate 
negotiations for domestic workers in public and private hospitals and resthomes into 
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one wage award, on the grounds that these members did exactly the same type of 
work. However, the different employer groups refused this proposal. 
In the hospitality industry, too, the organisation of cleaning work varies considerably 
with the size of establishment. In small hotels and pubs a cleaner is likely to be 
employed directly, with fairly general duties. In restaurants, waiting or bar staff may 
be responsible for the cleaning of their areas, as is the case for kitchen staff, but in 
larger restaurants a parttime cleaner may be employed. In large hotels, public rooms 
are generally cleaned by contractors, whose employees are C&C members. Guest 
rooms are cleaned by housestaff who belong to H&HW. 
Housestaff working in large hotels have been the most stable, best organised section 
of H&HW's membership, in more permanent employment and working longer hours 
than most other hotel occupations. Many hospitality occupations became parttime 
and casualised after licensing hours were extended in 1967. Previously, pubs and 
hotels had employed mainly fulltime, daytime workers, paying overtime at time and a 
half for three hours, then double time. Few people then worked outside 'normal' 
working hours, and penal rates for unsociable hours were negotiated for those who 
provided 24-hour, seven-days-a-week services in hotels and hospitals. In 1967 10 
o'clock closing was celebrated with a two-week strike of barstaff to negotiate rates and 
conditions around new hours of work and parttime evening shifts. To ensure that full-
timers retained their jobs, a clause was negotiated to restrict parttime employment to 
evenings only. However, such union controls were soon circumvented by employing 
casual staff. 
"The people who negotiated those changes never foresaw the wholesale 
casualisation of the industry. /I 
Award clauses restricting parttime employment came under strong attack in 1989, 
when H&HW's Licensed Hotels Award was one of the major awards covering women 
workers which could not be settled without access to compulsory arbitration. The 
award was then divided into three: Major Accommodation Hotel Industry Workers 
Award, the Licensed Hotels, Taverns, Bars & Off-Premise Liquor Sales Award and the 
Hancocks Award, covering hotels and restaurants owned by the Lion group of 
companies. The splitting of this award allowed employers to negotiate a document 
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more specific to their needs, but there were also spinoffs for the union in that 
negotiations more personal to tlleir situation prompted greater involvement by 
Accommodation Hotel and Hancocks members. 
Almost a quarter of H&HW's membership came under the Tearoom & Restaurants 
award, which was estimated to set rates and conditions for 23,000 workers. This was 
another of the awards which employers declined to settle in 1989. Although it covered 
young people employed in multinational fast food chains, most were women in 
parttime, high turnover employment in thousands of small businesses - a similar 
organising situation to clerical workers, whose award also remained unsettled. 
Settlement was blocked by fast food chain employers, seeking their own individual 
deals, and the award was never renegotiated. Under the Labour Relations Act, 1987, 
awards which were not umenewed remained in force for three years before lapsing, 
but under the Employment Contracts Act all unsettled awards became null and void. 
From May 1991 the situation of Tearoom and Restaurant workers provided an example 
of the impact of the Employment Contracts Act on scattered, industrially weak 
workers. 
Personal Grievances 
Most of workplace problems that C&C organisers handled for members were small 
infringements of rights under the award, usually arrears of wages or incorrect 
payments. Some employers went to great lengths to avoid award-negotiated 
payments. One Auckland company had cleaners working 12 hours at ordinary time 
rates by operating as two companies with two sets of wage and time books. At one 
school: 
"This woman had worked there for 15 years, but the principal didn't see why he 
should have to pay sick pay. I asked him if he got sick leave, he said it was 
none of my business. 1/ 
C&C organisers frequently dealt with unjustified dismissals. There was low recognition 
of cleaners' right to employment security, arising from cleaners' low social status and 
perceptions that high turnover, parttime work was not 'real' work. C&C organisers 
would insist that cleaners were given verbal and written warnings before dismissal and 
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that these could be contested by the employee. With commercial cleaners, most 
dismissals arose from disagreement over the work or personal differences with the 
supervisor, and organisers were able to resolve all but two or three dismissals a year, 
often by reinstating the person on another of the contractor's sites. C&C officials saw 
personal grievance procedures as a backup to union intervention rather than a 
regularly used tool. 
"We don't really use it much, it's a pretty hopeless system for our kind of 
industry, you've got to wait three months to get a date, then wait for a decision. 
We tend to try to fix it on the day, threaten this, threaten that." 
WI-lile personal grievances procedures might be slow and unsatisfactory for resolving 
the problems of individuals, they were an important means by which unions obtained 
precedent-setting interpretations of awards and legislation by the Labour Court. In 
1989 and 1990 C&C O'fficials pursued several personal grievance cases of importance 
to the union movement as a whole. All were connected with cleaners' right to security 
of employment; most arose in shifts from direct employment of cleaners to contracting 
out. 
In the Waitakere College and Fairfield College cases, it was held by mediators that the 
colleges' desire to contract out cleaning services was not justifiable grounds for 
dismissal and disregarded a legal requirement to be a 'good and fair employer' under 
the State Sector Act. This had implications for further contracting out in the state 
sector. 
In the course of the Waitakere case, the Labour Court upheld a rather unusual clause 
in the Education Service Award, in which it was agreed that the employer would not 
dismiss an employee while personal grievance procedures were underway. This 
ensured that wages would continue to be paid while a personal grievance was in 
mediation and C&C officials had invoked this clause in several personal grievance 
cases taken during the 1980s. The clause acted as deterrent to both arbitrary 
dismissal and to replacing directly employed cleaners with contractors, since double 
labour costs would be incurred. Following the Court's ruling, this clause came under 
strong attack in the 1989 and 1990 award negotiations, with school cleaners 
threatening strike action to ensure its retention. 
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The Shrubshall vs Hale and Sons case pointed up the difference between a court 
which recognises industrial principles and one based on common law. In early 1990 
the Labour Court ruled that a cleaner employed by a coach building company could 
not be justifiably made 'redundant' unless 'the dismissal is proved to have been 
commercially necessary in the interests of the viability of the employer'. This was a 
significant ruling. However, appeal from the Labour Court took the case into the 
jurisdiction of common law. The Appeal Court reversed tile decision, recognising an 
employer's right to dismiss surplus workers to make the business more efficient; 
'commercial reasons' for redundancy need not be restricted to the firm's survival. This 
outcome is relevant to the continuing lobby of the Business Roundtable for labour 
relations to be brought under common law (Ryan & Walsh 1993). 
Hours of Work and Intensification 
Tight competition in contract cleaning and tightening budgets in schools and hospitals 
brought pressure on cleaning's highest cost: labour. Since the awards set legally 
enforceable minimum hourly rates, the factor which employers could vary was the 
number of hours for which cleaners were employed. Workload intensification and 
decreased earnings were important issues for the cleaners' unions at the time of this 
study. 
C&C's awards set no minimum hours for which a cleaner could be employed. The 
only restriction was that cleaners brought in on weekends were to be paid for a 
minimum of three hours at penal rates. This seldom occurred since the hours for 
which most C&C cleaners were employed avoided such additional labour costs. Night 
shifts for commercial cleaning paid an extra $3.38 a night but some night shifts would 
start at midnight on Monday morning rather than 10 or 11 pm Sunday night to avoid 
penal rates. With the extension of trading hours, more shops were being cleaned on 
the weekend, but both school cleaning and commercial cleaning is almost entirely 
performed Monday to Friday. 
Penal rates were important, however, for H&HW's members hospitality and hospitals 
where workers are needed to cover seven days a week or 24 hours a day. Penal 
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payments spread through awards for health occupations in the post war years and 
increased in licensed hotel and restaurant work after 1967. While overtime payments 
compensated for work in excess of an 8 hours per day or 40 per week, where a 
standard 9 to 5 Monday to Friday week did not apply, penal rates compensated for 
'unsociable' hours even for parttime employees. Cleaners in hospitals work weekend 
daytime and some nighttime shifts, not the rotating shifts of public sector nurses. 
However, as for nurses, penal rates helped bring up the earnings of many H&HW 
members' from low base rates and short hours. 
"For parttime workers, penal rates can be crucial ... without it they would not earn 
enough to make it worthwhile to work. 1/ 
In 1991 penal rates for new employees were dropped from the Licensed Hotels award 
to settle it for another year, rather than have another large section of the membership, 
like Tearoom & Restaurant workers, immediately exposed to the Employment Con-
tracts Act. Some H&HW officials, like some of their members, were unhappy with this 
trade-off. 
"I think there should be a margin for working weekends working night time, 
because there is a personal cost in working those days and hours and people 
should be compensated for that. /I 
H&HW's cleaners in public hospitals worked longer shifts than C&C members, though 
usually less than an 8 hour day. Private hospital cleaners and domestics usually 
worked a 4-6 daytime shift, with different women working weekends. In hospitality, 
H&HW members retained a high proportion of fulltime or 6-7 hour shifts. 
An important strategy of employers, and in particular of contractors, has been to 
replace fulltime workers with parttimers. H&HW's awards contained clauses which 
helped protect against the fragmenting of fulitime employment in both hospitals and 
hotels to the disadvantage of members by involving the union in decisions to changes 
the work hours of existing fulltime positions or to create parttime positions. In 1986 
H&HW took the Wellington Hospital Board to the Arbitration Court to enforce this right. 
"There's been a constant attack on that clause since 1981. They say it's an 
impediment to being more flexible with staff. To us it's an impediment to 
exploiting them further. II 
This protection of fulltime jobs under H&HW coverage dates back to World War Two, 
a time of union and state policies protecting fulltime hours and male rates of pay to 
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prevent the 'feminisation' of the jobs of men sent off to war. With growth and in-
creased labour needs in both health care and hospitality, both industries became 
female dominated, but the clauses have remained an important means of controlling 
job fragmentation and protecting the earnings of women. 
As a strategy on parttime employment by a female dominated but male led union, it 
can be related to the differing policies of PSA and NZNA (Dixon 1987). H&HWofficials 
did not seek to prevent the increase in the parttime employment of women which 
occurred from the 1960s, but the clauses allowed a useful degree of control over the 
ratio of parttime to fulltime jobs, and sometimes allowed union input into the creation 
of jobs. They provided H&HW officials with an additional means of being involved in 
work organisation affecting members. 
'f!\ manager rang me with a proposal for one cleaner for a new unit. Paid 
mega-bucks to manage but you end up managing for them because you have 
got to say to them, where is your coverage? This person is entitled to annual 
leave, sick leave. Hadn't given it a thought. I said to him, why don't you give 
two women a job, one mornings, one afternoons, which gives you coverage 
from breakfast till tea without having to do a 10-12 day, and they can agree to 
cover each other's leave." 
The retention of this protective clause in awards reflected the better organising position 
and superior industrial strength of H&HW on larger worksites, compared with the 
situation for C&C. The strongest version was in the award covering H&HW's area of 
greatest industrial strength, the public hospitals. It was one of the clauses over which 
negotiations for the Licensed Hotels award broke down in 1989. It came under 
pressure in 1991 award negotiations, in both private and public sectors. In public 
health, this was despite the fact that, out of 14 Area Health Boards, the only one 
reporting dissatisfaction with the clause was Waikato, where contractors were used. 
"Contractors abuse that clause, therefore it causes conflict. It is not abused in 
the boards that run themselves." 
From an employer's viewpoint, costs could be trimmed by dividing fulltime or 6-7 hour 
shifts into three hour shifts. Short shifts allowed greater flexibility, greater intensity of 
effort and savings on statutory work breaks. They also make communication and 
solidarity between workers more difficult. 
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"If you employ someone for 3 hours, you don't have to give them a cup of tea. 
They don't get to sit down with their mates and plot against you ... (Hospital) 
Contractors are very keen to cut fulltime jobs into halftime jobs, then down to 
three hours. It's precisely for that reason and no other." 
At one university worksite the 'privilege' of a 15 minute tea break together at the end 
of the week was intended, not to break the isolation of solitary work in darkened 
buildings, but to allow discussion of any work related problems with supervisors. It 
was withdrawn when cleaners continued to seek advice 'from union organisers. 
It is in the nature of contracting, in particular, that employers cut costs by finding ways 
of reducing the ratio of labour hours to effort required to perform the job. Extra staff 
were not budgeted to cover sickness or leave. If a cleaner was ill, needed a night off 
or took paid union education leave, her workmates had to carry her workload. Staff 
who quit would be replaced after a week or two, rather than immediately. It all in-
creased the narrow margin of profitability at the expense of the women who did the 
work. 
H&HW's clauses on parttime work could not prevent whole positions being dropped, 
. however. 'Natural attrition' was the usual means of reducing staff numbers and 
increasing workload intensity. Although C&C officials could defend members against 
unjustified dismissal, they had no means of controlling the numbers of cleaning staff 
employed. In a high turnover industry, it was often only through delegates that officials 
learned of lost positions, although ultimately they would be reflected in a drop in 
membership numbers, as the labour market for cleaning work shrank. Natural attrition 
is portrayed by employers and media as somehow neutral, since it is a empty position, 
not a currently employed person that is dispensed with. However, union officials 
pointed out that reduction in the number of positions adversely affected both 
members' workloads and their overall job opportunities. 
More recently, employers began to trim the hours of parttime women currently 
employed. Both C&C and H&HW organisers emphasised and tried to enforce the 
unions' position that cleaners were entitled to the hours for they were initially engaged; 
that was a contractual arrangement which employers could not change unilaterally. 
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However, high unemployment made members more willing to trade hours against 
continued employment. C&C officials reported one group of Canterbury school 
cleaners who in 1991 negotiated an acceptable trimming of hours against a three year 
agreement for no further change. 
Lower staff levels and the trimming of cleaners' hours in all areas of cleaning work 
have meant considerable workload intensification. While cleaning is reasonably 
assessed as a low-skilled job, commercial cleaning is not the same as cleaning ohe's 
own home; materials, solvents and equipment are different, and it is heavy labour. If 
comparable worth is measured on skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions, 
cleaning scores on its dirty and isolated conditions and on its sheer hard work. Three 
hours' sweeping, mopping and vacuuming can feel like three hours' aerobics without 
the music. 
Effort is increased as work hours are trimmed, under both contract competition system 
and budget cuts in schools and hospitals. Organisers recognised that in some cases 
tighter control was justified. The tale was told of one caretaker who was so seldom 
seen in normal school hours that his wages were pinned to the blackboard for him to 
collect In 1990, in the view of a organiser in schools: 
"In most cases we had a bit to squeeze but...next year if they squeeze any more 
you are going to see a drop in standards." 
In many cases, however, officials felt the school was taking advantage of their 
members, as dedicated long service cleaners worked whatever hours it took to keep 
their school up to a high standard. C&C officials encouraged, for example, the 
introduction of time sheets as a way of ensuring members are paid for the extra work 
that many school cleaners have always done. 
':A lot of our long service members are experts in the job and can keep a school 
beautifully but it doesn't relate to the hours they should be working at all. " 
A tight fit between workload and hours obviates the need for close supervision. In 
commercial cleaning and on most large university and hospital worksites, Taylorist 
methods of work organisation and control have been introduced. Tasks have been 
timed and assigned to individual cleaners' workloads on tight schedules. Cleaners 
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work individually rather than in pairs or teams, preventing the time waste of a 
moment's chat or information exchange. Schedules are often too tight to get the work 
done properly, or to allow for non-routine cleaning. 
"They are expected to perform magic ... Some of the contracts are unreal, and 
the clients soon find out the hard way." 
Union officials were frequently called in when cleaners resisted cuts to hours, leaving 
inadequate time to do the job. In commercial cleaning: 
"One manager agreed to work the night and show everyone how it was 
possible, and the hours were actually increased because she couldn't do it. 
She was almost in tears at the end." 
"We tell our members they are not to run around like idiots, just do a fair day's 
work and what doesn't get done, doesn't get done." 
Logistics of Organising 
As with clerical workers and nurses, the negotiating strength of cleaners is related to 
the logistics of worksite distribution of each of C&C's and H&HW's membership 
groups. Where around 8,000 hospital domestics averaged 37 members per worksite, 
8,600 contract cleaners averaged 5 per site. In education 9,000 school cleaners and 
caretakers were spread at an average of 3 per site; 1000 boarding school cleaners 
and domestics averaged 12 per site; whereas the seven universities had 350 cleaners 
and custodians. 
The workplace fragmentation of C&C cleaners was compounded by the isolation 
arising 'from unsocial hours of work. While H&HW cleaners worked alongside other 
kinds of workers on similar shifts, most C&C members had little contract with other 
workers with whom they might build union solidarity. For the large number of 
members in contract cleaning, other workers on the worksite would in any case not 
be employed by the same company and were likely to have quite different concerns. 
The effect of worksite fragmentation and isolation on the industrial strength of C&C 
cleaners was, however, mitigated by concentration by employer. Contract cleaning 
and school cleaning involved negotiation with far fewer employers than, for example, 
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Tearoom and Restaurant workers, H&HW's weakest group, or clerical workers 
covered by the NZ Clerical Award. 
Tile entry of multinational contractors into tile commercial cleaning market in New 
Zealand concentrated the workforce into employment by fewer employers. Around 
60% of C&C's commercial cleaner members worked for the five major contractors. 
Legally required employee listings, informally agreed fee deduction arrangements by 
these large employers, and the relatively cooperative relationship between these large 
employers and the union in recent years can be seen as facilitating union penetration 
and organisation. For school cleaners, employment by a single state employer, which 
had benefits for unionisation, was being fragmented. The consequences of a 
devolution of aspects of employer responsibility from the Department of Education to 
individual schools have been discussed, and the matter arises again later in discussion 
of the Employment Contracts Act. 
With regard to day-to-day employment relations, however, cleaners' isolation and 
nighttime hours have a positive effect on union consciousness. Except in the case of 
the smallest commercial cleaning contractors, most members work apart from their 
employer and do not experience close personalised relations in which unionism may 
be constrained by the wish to maintain a pleasant work environment or by the risks 
of doing otherwise. For cleaners, working at greater distance from their employer 
than, for example, practice nurses and most clerical workers, the dynamics of the 
employment relationship are straightforward and, for the individual, the benefits of 
solidarity and union organisation are clear cut. 
Despite concentration by employer, the contract cleaning workforce itself is scattered 
over a very large number of hard to access worksites. Listings from contractors did 
not inform the union where the member actually worked, since her worksite was a 
client's premises, not the employer's. Contracts and deployment of staff changed 
constantly. Some cleaners covered more than one site in an evening, working half an 
hour on one site, twenty minutes on another, with no real base. In 1990 the 
Canterbury union contacted its contract cleaning members at their home addresses 
to find out just who was working on which work site and what hours they worked. 
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Although better contact had been better maintained with school cleaners, it was only 
in 1989 and 1990 that C&C organisers began regular visiting of commercial cleaning 
worksites with four or five cleaners, and began to arrange the election of delegates. 
"That personal contact is vital really. Because then they feel they belong to 
something instead of just receiving impersonal mail." 
There were two reasons for lack of membership organising and servicing in the past. 
Firstly, the highly fragmented nature of the cleaning workforce - by both worksite 
location and short, unsocial hours of work - made it a much more difficult and expen-
sive organising proposition than for occupations concentrated in large worksites and 
particular industries. 
"When I first came, we didn't have enough staff to get around the sites. We still 
don't have enough staff." 
Secondly, in better economic times centralised, arbitrated wage rounds had allowed 
officials to deliver annual increases to members. Over much of their history, each of 
the C&C unions had one paid union secretary, and a clerical worker, in a small 
regional office. Decisions were made at biannual or special meetings of the full 
membership, and in between such meetings, by the elected executive together with 
the secretary. The main focus was on negotiation, arbitration and enforcement of the 
award through the courts. However, the unions were not geared to respond well to 
increased individual workplace and employment problems which began to arise as the 
economy sickened. Nor were most members sufficiently knowledgeable on industrial 
issues or organised to deal with workplace problems themselves. This led to a lack 
of empathy between members and 'the union'. 
"At my first meeting, they were not happy about the union at all ... They weren't 
just anti-union, they had taken complaints through to the union office in the past 
and they felt it was not followed through and taken seriously. They did not see 
any results." 
In the late 1980s, C&C began to employ organisers, bringing the staff, excluding 
clerical support and temporary workers, to a national total of 12 in 1990. C&C's small 
membership limited the number of staff it was able to support. Access to specialised 
legal, journalistic and research expertise was seen by officials as a major benefit of 
federation, then amalgamation, I/I.!ith the larger H&HW unions. However, it should be 
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noted that long-standing C&C secretaries were highly expert in negotiation and legal 
aspects of labour relations. 
In part, this was a necessary, if rather late, response to voluntary unionism. Although 
C&C had suffered a smaller membership drop-off than many unions in 1984-85, as an 
organisation it now needed to 'market itself' to members as relevant and beneficial. 
The importance to this of regular personal contact between union officials and 
members was recognised. 
"Just to show a face, even if we have got delegates, say how are things going, 
any problems, give out information ... When we show an interest in them, they 
show an interest back." 
Active worksite organising had also increased with the loosening of the traditional 
labour relations package. Through the 1980s disputes with employers were 
increasingly backed by industrial action, but this was an ad hoc response to particular 
disputes. As employers tested their power to refuse negotiation or arbitration in 1989, 
regular visiting, the organisation of delegates and regular contact and communication 
were recognised as essential to building the kind of active unionism that would be 
needed in future. 
Written communication with members was improved. The main means of commun-
ication between C&C office and members had been general meetings of the 
membership and the union newspaper, Advance, which from 1988 was posted to each 
member's home address. When C&C joined the SWF, this paper was collated with 
H&HW's regional papers, Hosp and Shift. Following amalgamation, this became one 
centrally produced newspaper and cleaners began to hear about SWU members in 
industries and occupations other than their own. The Service Worker has a strong 
focus on people, with stories about industrial action by members, photos and 
biographies of delegates and candidates for office, reports from people on the Maori 
or Women's standing committees, news about staff changes. In 1991 essential 
information began to appear in Samoan and Tongan, and the paper was 
supplemented with leaflets on specific issues and a membership recruitment kit. 
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The problem with direct mail as a means of communication for the C&C and H&HW 
unions was not only cost, but waste, because of high employment turnover and 
inaccuracies in membership lists. Providing written information via worksites, however, 
had its own costs, delays and logistical difficulties, and in 1991 union officials were 
anticipating problems with work site access under the Employment Contracts Act. 
Access to members and potential members on worksites would be essential to 
organisational survival under any form of voluntary unionism because, as C&C officials 
recognised: 
'Two things have got to be going on, you have got to service the members that 
you have and you have got to recruit." 
Even when guaranteed by legislation, C&C organisers' access to members on 
work sites was difficult. Organisers had to work the same unsociable hours as 
members. Contract cleaners work at night in darkened, heavily secured buildings. 
Where H&HW organisers could usually just walk on to public (but not private) hospital 
worksites, C&C organisers had to obtain permission not only from the employer but 
from the client whose building was being cleaned. Precisely timed arrangements had 
to be made through the employer in order to enter the building. 
'W is difficult because the employer knows what we are up to all the time." 
Union officials' right under the Labour Relations Act to inspecting wage and time 
books entailed a separate visit to the contractor's office. While this presented little 
difficulty with the large contractors, very small employers operating from their own 
home sometimes denied access on grounds of personal privacy. One visit, to either 
worksite or office, tended to lead to others. 
"There are always problems. Once you visit, you get a rash of problems so you 
are in constant contact for a while." 
Although for negotiating purposes school cleaners were concentrated by state 
employment, they too were spread over hundreds of worksites in each region. 
However, this more stable workforce had always been visited regularly by officials 
since they were on known sites with known hours of work, and access presented no 
difficulty. Nevertheless, sorting out day-to-day problems across hundreds of school 
presented a more difficult organising situation and greater strain on resources than for 
unions whose membership is on large worksites. 
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"It would be a dream to work for a place where you have just got those set 
factories that you go to, whereas we have got bits and pieces all scattered 
around." 
Where formerly many grievances could sorted out with one phone call to the 
Department of Education, under Tomorrow's Schools' C&C officials had to deal 
separately with, for example, each of 690 schools in the Canterbury region. Pressure 
on cleaners from tighter school budgets and often poor management by Boards or 
principals meant a much higher level of intervention by union officials. Members 
needed more information on labour relations and education policy changes, and were 
having to participate more actively in negotiations and disputes than previously. 
Short term employment and parttime hours act against effective organising and create 
a vicious circle of industrial weakness which makes it difficult for unions to protect 
against further casualisation. C&C officials pointed to sections of the membership in 
more stable employment as having the most solidarity and commitment to the union. 
These were school cleaners, cleaners on the few large work sites and the Pacific Island 
women in Wellington and Auckland, who might change worksite or contracting compa-
ny but remained in the occupation. 
Members who worked longer hours tended to be more involved in the union. Since 
many women members have chosen cleaning work to fit in with family and other 
responsibilities, they have little time outside work hours for union activities. Two hour 
stopwork meetings were sufficiently short to coincide with work hours; conferences 
and seminars were not. This made the paid stopwork meetings introduced by the 
1987 Act particularly valuable for C&C cleaners. Since the Act authorised stopwork 
meetings, major contractors were quite cooperative, often transporting the cleaners 
to meetings just as they did to central city worksites. However, short hours and other 
commitments make it difficult to get cleaning women involved in ongoing union 
decision and policy making structures. 
As with clerical workers and nurses, health and safety in cleaning work was an area 
where the union could provide a service to members. While cleaning technology is 
generally low, the chemicals used are powerful. Chemical handling standards were 
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written into the Education Service and School Contractors awards, with particular 
regard to swimming pools. Vacuum cleaners were often quite old; C&C supported 
members who rejected appliances they thought unsafe, and a clause requiring regular 
electrical checks was written into the commercial cleaners' award. 
Cleaning is heavy physical work likely to lead to back and other injuries, and SWF 
lobbied on Accident Compensation changes and reported on reduced entitlements 
and new procedures in the union newspapers. An active interest was taken in the 
development of a Manual Handling Code, and of the workplace health and safety 
legislation introduced under Labour. C&C officials strongly opposed backpack 
vacuum cleaners, which cleaners often found useful for cleaning stairs but which 
involved carrying a heavy weight on the back for long periods while stooping. 
Incorrect use of polishing machines could cause internal damage and miscarriages 
with prolonged use. Unless instructed in the knack of guiding, not pushing, operators 
tend to brace larger machines against the stomach to control the vibrating movement. 
This was an issue which SWF officials researched and organisers took up with 
members and employers to good effect. 
When C&C joined the SWF in 1988, H&HW unions had around three times C&C's 
membership and a correspondingly larger organising staff. Their financial and 
organisational viability was strengthened by having large sections of membership on 
more easily organised hospital and large hotel worksites. Despite increasing 
casualisation in hospitality and hospitals, this solid organisational base allowed H&HW 
organisers to service more scattered members, and to organise new areas of 
coverage, such as home helps. 
The greater control that H&HW had over hours of work and parttime employment 
arose from this better organising situation. Organisers knew when and where their 
members worked. Access was easy and the right to it was unquestioned in the public 
sector; in the private employers were generally cooperative, though access was not 
automatic. The majority of members were on medium to very large sites where 
delegate systems could be established to aid organising. 
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The sections of H&HW membership with longest work hours and most stable 
employment were hospital cleaners and large hotel house-staff. The public hospitals 
are H&HW's easiest to organise sites and the focus of a great deal of their organising. 
Membership awareness and delegate structures had been developed tllrough 
struggles to defeat contracting and to resist workload intensification, and through the 
combined industrial action against the State Sector Act 1988 and to settle public health 
union awards in 1989. At Auckland Hospital a written agreement was achieved which 
allowed delegates to take time out from work duties for union duties. As for nurses, 
from 1989 the Management of Change clauses allowed greater input by delegates and 
officials into the work organisation of hospital cleaners. 
"H&HW have put a great deal of resources in and have done, I think, a really 
good job. We could guarantee that we could get every one of our members out 
of the public hospitals over an issue. That's how much trust has been built up 
between the members on public hospital sites and the union." 
"Unlike the C&C, this union is involved in every little decision that goes on 
inside the hospital. If someone gets an old shitty mop, somewhere a delegate 
or someone will hear about it." 
Housestaff working together in large hotels were a stable, well organised section of 
H&HW, in more permanent employment and working longer hours than most other 
hospitality occupations. They were women, often older women, who started at 7 a.m. 
and 'finished before the end of the school day. Usually working a five day week, most 
earned an almost full wage while fitting in with family responsibilities. While the big 
hotels move around those interested in developing skills for a career in hospitality, 
most stay in housekeeping, developing an identity with it, its problems and union 
matters. 
"They are the mainstay of the union so they get well looked after ... whenever 
there is a stopwork there will be a lot of women there in housesmocks." 
Generally speaking, officials of both unions recognised that it was low pay and 
insecurity of employment that made cleaners recognise the necessity of organising 
and belonging to a union. 
"The big issues that the union organises around are wages, of course, and I 
think the union has been quite effective over the years, and the other big issue 
is job security." 
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Workplace Delegates 
The election of delegates was not a feature of C&C organising strategies before the 
late 1980s. Cleaners' short hours, extremely high employment turnover, fragmented 
workforce and isolated work experience acted against establishing the kind of strong 
and reliable delegate structures which were possible on large worksites with stable 
employment. As greater right to strike replaced access to arbitration, union strength 
was built around specific industrial disputes, rather than through the development of 
structures of representation. Formal meetings of union membership which were the 
highest decision making forum provided little opportunity for down-up information 
sharing. 
From 1989, however, workplace delegates began to be elected wherever practicable. 
I n a whirlwind of organising activity Canterbury got 170 delegates elected in 1990. By 
1991 half the cleaners in the big office blocks in central Wellington and Auckland had 
delegates. 
':t\ lot of it is having that contact person ... who will ring us up. We go through 
the things they should watch out for, like cuts in hours, rumours of a change 
of contract, let us know when a tender is coming to an end, keep us informed./I 
In 1991 organisers predicted that delegates would be still more important to organising 
under the Employment Contracts Act. 
"If an employer refuses to deduct union fees, refuses to send employer lists, we 
are basically sunk unless we have a good strong delegate inside. /I 
On larger worksites, two delegates were chosen, not only to support each other, but 
to provide back-up if one left. Even on small worksites of two or three members, a 
delegate was chosen, though, as with clerical workers, some felt less vulnerable if 
called 'contacts'. 
"Once you are label/ed as a delegate you are often considered the shit-stirrer. /I 
The casual nature of cleaning employment acted against a strong delegate structure, 
and also against the development of knowledge, experience and confidence. 
"Just because you have got delegates doesn't mean you end it there. It's a 
continuous job of educating them and getting them involved in as much union 
457 
stuff as you can, helping them build up their confidence to deal with the 
employer./I 
"What makes it difficult is a very high turnover of staff. We get them working, 
then one will go and we start over again at the beginning. /I 
Reliable delegates and regular contact with worksites were essential if organisers were 
to hear of job losses through attrition or hours changed with the turnover of 
employees. Officials recognised that they could not rely on ordinary members phoning 
the office about problems to provide adequate communication, since they did not 
always report matters that they felt powerless to resist, or changes that did not affect 
them personally. 
"We have that knowledge if we are in contact with the cleaners and the 
delegates. That is why we have delegates on every site, so there is that 
communication going from the worksite to the union office. If we don't have 
that communication, we would have no idea. /I 
H&HW officials began to improve their worksite organising from the mid 1980s, well 
in advance of C&C, with delegates elected on large hospital and hotel worksites. Their 
response to the threat of voluntary unionism was to try to build active unionism among 
members while compulsory membership still provided the financial means. The 
Wellington union in particular had a strong policy of putting resources back into its 
membership through seminars, delegate training and activities to involve members in 
their unions both industrially and socially. 
"In those days this union was wonderful... We had social events, sports 
weekends with people from all around the country ... organised at a local level 
on an entertainment basis as well as industrial. If you have strikes going on, 
picketers, everybody doing things, of course those social events happen as 
well. Then we went through a lot of hardship industrially, the bosses began to 
get organised, no doubt about that, and it became a lot harder to operate as a 
union. II 
By 1990 there were sufficient delegates on pub sites to organise a delegates' seminar 
just for Hancocks employees. In part this increased activism was because the splitting 
of the Licensed Hotels award into three made pub employees feel more vulnerable as 
they were no longer cushioned by the big hotels who had carried award struggles in 
the past. But also, more positively, they were now organising around issues specific 
to their own workplaces. For Hancocks, 
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'j!\ separate award has been the best organising tool we have had and my 
regret is that we have resisted it for as long as we did." 
However, this was at the expense of the more scattered, harder to organise small 
hotels and pubs. 
Sections of H&HW membership, particularly tearoom and restaurant workers, and the 
home helps for whom H&HW officials were trying to negotiate an award, were in a 
similar situation to many clerical workers. They were scattered across many small 
worksites unsuitable for delegate-based organisation, where obvious union involvement 
carried risks since they worked more closely with their employer than most C&C 
members. In these high turnover membership groups, H&HW efforts to organise were 
less successful and effective industrial action in defence of awards had never been 
possible. 
Arbitration or Industrial Action? 
Historically, like the clerical unions, C&C owed its ability to secure national awards to 
state arbitration. Since arbitration offered an alternative to industrial action, it benefited 
unions of scattered, low paid workers with little industrial muscle or strategic position 
in the economy (Frank 1987; Walsh & Fougere 1987:188; Simpson 1987). This was 
also the case for some of the workforces that H&HW represented. 
"Fine if you are in a freezing works or a food processing plant or even a public 
hospital, but where there are ones and twos, and parttime and transient labour, 
you can't lift the industry in general by the activities of one or two activists. It 
needs some form of institutional organisation." 
C&C was typical of the unions which developed under tl1is centralised system. The 
fees of an inactive membership funded regional secretaries responsible for negotiated 
and enforcing national awards for wage rates and conditions. Awards were arbitrated 
by the Court on the basis of claims by unions and employers. Officials could refer 
award breeches to a specialised court which recognised collective rights and certain 
industrial principles and precedents (Ryan & Walsh 1993). 
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Until legislative changes in 1987 and 1988 labour courts recognised relativities between 
occupations, between occupations across industries and between state sector and 
private sector employment. This provided C&C negotiators with a useful strategy in 
direct negotiations or through court arbitration. In each award round, a close linkage 
was maintained between awards. Leading with the commercial cleaning award, the 
strategy of C&C officials was to lever the rates and conditions in one award up against 
rates and conditions in another. 
"Our awards bounce off each other, one award triggers four awards." 
Through the 1980s, C&C members demonstrated their willingness to support award 
claims with industrial action. The effectiveness of strike action increased in commercial 
cleaning as cleaners became concentrated in the employment of large contracting 
companies. Action against particular contractors in commercial cleaning and in 
schools was used to bring those awards into line (Brosnan & Wilkinson 1989a&b). 
"We have built up a bit of a profile as a struggle union as well, a few good 
strikes and so bn which has really helped a lot to get people to identify with the 
union. . .A bit of fancy footwork in the courts as well as strikes and pickets." 
However, arbitration, relativities between awards and parity between private and public 
sectors were central to C&C's negotiating strategy as long as those options remained 
available. When arbitration was made voluntary in 1984, C&C used industrial action 
not directly in negotiations with employers, but to secure their consent to arbitration 
by the Court, which continued to recognise occupational relativities and parity with the 
state until 1987. 
H&HW negotiators used a similar strategy with their different occupational awards. In 
the late 1970s an improved rate for hospital cleaners was gained by arguing better 
relativity with male hospital orderlies, also represented by H&HW. 
''They used existing rates and awards to argue parity internally and then they 
used outside examples to argue parity externally. That has been the whole way 
that (it) was organised. But back in those days they had the ability to go to 
arbitration. /I 
After 1984 only two cases involving disputes of interest in cleaners' award negotiations 
were brought before the Court, the first by C&C, the second by H&HW. In both cases 
a two pronged approach was used: firstly, employers' agreement to arbitration was 
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obtained by threatening or taking industrial action. The second prong was state sector 
parity. As in the case of private sector nurses, state parity could be used, not just to 
ensure market level salaries for state servants but, in reverse direction, to benefit low 
paid private sector employers. C&C's case in 1985 and 1986 was in fact a 
continuation of a state parity claim which began in 1979. 
lilt was after years of battling and we did it through the court as opposed to 
industrial action. 1/ 
School cleaners and private sector cleaners had always received the same arbitrated 
wage rate. In 1979 C&C claimed state parity between school cleaners and cleaners 
of government buildings employed by the Department of Internal Affairs, who were 
members of the PSA. However, the process of passing this rate on to private sector 
cleaners was interrupted by the wage freeze. In 1981 school cleaners employed by 
contractors took strike action to achieve the same rate as the main award for school 
cleaners. However, major contractors refused to pay their private sector cleaners the 
same rate they now paid their cleaners in schools. The cleaners went on strike and 
a picketing campaign centred on a major contracting company received a high media 
profile and widespread public support (Brosnan & Wilkinson 1989a). When the Court 
finally granted parity in 1985, it was with school cleaners' pre-freeze rate. A final full 
state parity adjustment of 30.1 % was not achieved until a 1986 ruling. That is, it took 
industrial action, arbitration and seven years for state sector parity to benefit lower paid 
private sector cleaners. 
The result, however, was a wage rate for cleaners which measured well against rates 
for female dominated factory-based occupations, although the hours of employment 
were short. 
H&HW negotiators promptly sought parity between their cleaners in boarding school 
residences and C&C's school cleaners. Boarding school trustees resisted this, fearing 
a flow-on effect to their kitchen staff, but industrial action was used to ensure that the 
employers would 'volunteer' to accept arbitration. 
JlWe threatened strikes al/ around the country, some groups had gone on strike 
to get the employers to agree to go to Court. And we got higher penal rates for 
the weekend out of the Court as well. Just superb. If 
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H&H did in fact achieve a degree of parity for low paid kitchen staff, by pointing out -
the cleaning content in their work. 
liThe judge asked, what do you clean? She said, I clean the floor, I clean the 
bench, I clean the pots, I clean the carrots! - and the whole place cracked up. 
She scrubbed vegetables. II 
By 1990, however, the Department of Internal Affairs had established its own 
contracting company, Quality Services, which competed in the market with other 
commercial cleaning companies. Internal Affairs' previously directly employed cleaners 
were thus separated out from any benefits of state employment and came under 
C&C's commercial cleaners award. 
By the time of study, this strategy for negotiating via the court had been reduced to 
an argument in direct negotiations with employers about the 'going rate' and 'market 
forces'. Legislative changes had removed both unions' right of access to arbitration 
on disputes of interest in negotiations and traditional relativities between occupations 
or with the state sector. The loss of the right to arbitration did not affect C&C's negoti-
ations as badly as it did the clerical unions and sections of H&HW membership. 
Threats of action and members' demonstrated willingness to walk off the job, whether 
legally or not, appeared to be sufficient to back C&C officials' claims under the Labour 
Relations Act. Outcomes of negotiations under the Employment Contracts. Act throw 
additional light on why this was so. Award negotiations did become more difficult, 
however, with industrial action or threat of it increasing in importance. 
The kind of 'fancy footwork in the Courts' that had been successful for C&C and 
H&HW negotiators had led employer groups to oppose occupational relativities, which 
were removed in the 1987 Act, and to lobby to replace awards with enterprise 
bargaining (NZBRT 1987; Brook 1989:188). It was argued that such rigidities not only 
acted against the efficient working of the market but kept those traditionally at the 
bottom of the labour market always at the bottom especially, women, Maori and 
Pacific Island workers - regardless of productivity improvements (Brook 1989:203, 
1990:76; Myers 1992:13). This argument ignored the role of minimum award rates in 
preventing the greater inequality experienced by such occupations elsewhere (Hyman 
1987:9). 
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In two examples studied here, however - private sector nurses and cleaners -
relativities were used to benefit low paid female dominated occupations, in which a 
high proportion of Pacific Island women were employed. Although H&HW was able 
to apply principles of relativity between occupations, most of the above struggle was 
about relative pay rates in different sections of the labour market for one occupation. 
The principle of relativities accepted by the Court enabled the C&C and H&HW to 
organise minimum wage rates across the whole labour market for cleaning. State 
parity resulted in an improved hourly wage which raised cleaners' rates considerably 
against other low paid women's occupations. In fact, this improvement prompted 
some factory employees to redefine themselves so as to come under C&C coverage. 
In the last award negotiations under the Labour Relations Act, the legislative changes 
and overall employment situation placed C&C members in an essentially defensive 
position. Readiness to take action varied with the industrial organising situation and 
the immediacy of the issue to the member's own situation. In school cleaning, 
difficulties were often about changes to hours of work. Christchurch City Council 
cleaners took a stand on redundancy together with bus drivers and other city council 
workers working on the same sites, negotiating with the same employer. 
"Some of them are willing to stop work at the drop of a hat. Some of the. school 
cleaners are motivated enough to take a stance if their conditions are thrown 
out." 
As arbitrated alternatives were removed, cleaners showed increasing willingness to 
take industrial action. Worksite logistics constrained large national strikes in support 
of awards, but the small number of employers and the importance of contractors' 
relations with clients made small scale action against particular employers very 
effective. Industrial action by commercial cleaning members often came in response 
to the volatile nature of the contract cleaning industry itself: 
"It's a real gutzy industry, very odd sorts of things happening al/ the time. II 
Employer-specific disputes often had implications for the wider membership and 
helped maintain overall negotiating strength. 
"When we talk to people we say, it is important that we win this dispute. You 
make the decision but if we are going to go into it, we have to stick with it, not 
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just for us but for other people. If we lose this that will flow on, other people 
will lose conditions." 
The employment relations of cleaners were not overlaid with the gender politics and 
close personal working relations between an office worker and a manager, or the 
ethical issues and constraints of nurses working with dependent patients or children. 
Classic union tactics of backing claims and disputes with industrial action were 
appropriate to their industrial situation and cleaners responded. 
"Cleaners are the salt of the earth, you talk and they understand. If you get into 
industrial action, it's basically, well, we have got to the end of the road, let's do 
something about it." 
Having made the decision to take action, the novel break from the routine of work 
could be quite stimulating. In one dispute: 
"The boss actually ended up apologising, grovelling on his knees to them. They 
kept trying to think of some other thing that they were unhappy with, they didn't 
want to go back to work, they had got geared up to have the night off." 
H&HW cleaners in public hospitals took their first industrial action against cleaning 
contractors in 1981, in the first wave of cost cuts, when a change of contractor led to 
68 job losses. This major dispute was lost, but H&HW was successful in limiting 
workload intensification in some hospitals using contractors and keeping contractors 
out of others. One strategy used against a hospital contractor combined partial work 
refusal with the threat of wider industrial action to renegotiate workloads and hours 
section by section. Where union officials and cleaners in a particular area agreed that 
workloads were too high for hours of employment, a union ban was placed on some 
duties, to reduce the workload. 
"The employer thought he could whip us by getting supervisors to clean the 
toilets, saying ha-ha, your actions are having no effect. Of course it was having 
effect if we were no longer doing the tOilets, we were happy with that! After 
three months the supervisors got sick of it and complained to the boss who 
negotiated an extra half hour." 
This strategy was repeated through several blocks until a general extra half hour was 
conceded against a signed agreement on that arrangement until the end of the 
hospital contract. 
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Coverage of cleaners, kitchen workers and orderlies in hospitals meant H&HW officials 
worked closely with other unions on site: in the private sector with the NZ Nurses 
Union; in the public sector with the NZ Nurses Association and the Public Service 
Assn, which covers health professionals and psychiatric and psychopaedic nurses. 
In the early 1980s hospital cleaners were the most organised and active of the 
occupations in public hospitals. 
"There was little organisation amongst other parts of our union, the caterers and 
the orderlies. The PSA represented very few workers at that time and the 
nurses weren't active ... Now there wouldn't be a group inside the hospital that 
hasn't taken action over something. 11 
It has been principally the actions of government - the wage freeze, the State Services 
Act 1988, and hospital and health service restructuring - that have galvanised hospital 
employees into action and inter-union cooperation. After the joint industrial action in 
1989 the NZNA, PSA and the H&HW unions coordinated their negotiating strategies 
and industrial action very closely and successfully. Acceptance of a award settlement 
for one was been hinged on an acceptable settlement for the other two. There was 
also close cooperation between organisers and delegates on effectiveness studies 
under the Management of Change clauses. 
Through the 1980s outcomes of successive award rounds were affected by the 
changing legislative framework within which negotiations took place. After the wage 
freeze a combination of industrial action and arbitration which recognised relativities 
enabled C&C and H&HW officials to achieve considerable wage improvements in all 
awards for cleaners. But with compulsory arbitration and relativities no longer 
available, negotiations became much more difficult for both unions. After 1986, C&C 
officials were able to negotiate increases for all awards, maintaining real wages against 
inflation, but had to battle to hold on to current provisions around hours and 
conditions. The legislative changes which brought state sector bargaining under a 
private sector framework which had moved away from centralised arbitration also 
forced H&HW members in hospitals into greater militancy to protect their awards. 
In late 1990 and early 1991, C&C awards and H&HW private sector awards were rolled 
over at 2% to renew them for another year before the passing of the Employment 
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Contracts Act. H&HW's public hospital awards, like all public sector awards, were re-
newed with no wage increase. To renew the Licensed Hotels award, H&HW 
negotiators had to concede the removal of penal rates for new employees in a high 
turnover occupation. In resthomes only a section of employers settled in 1991, in a 
new award for Religious & Welfare Resthomes. Workers in other resthomes and in 
tearooms and restaurants were thrown immediately into the Employment Contracts 
bargaining environment without the period of grace in 1991 that was achieved for most 
of the workforce. 
Underrepresentation in Leadership 
C&C was not among the unions who addressed issues arising from the gendered 
nature of their members' occupation. Through the 1980s the position of C&C officials 
on women's issues being raised in the union movement was more conservative than 
in H&HW, and at the far side of spectrum from clerical union officials, despite 
representation of a female dominated workforce. Reasons for tl-lis may be identified 
in the gender composition of union decision makers and the class analysis they held. 
To some extent the low representation of women cleaners in the hierarchy of their 
union reflected the concrete situation of women in cleaning work. As discussed 
earlier, the occupation's parttime hours are compatible with a traditionalfemale role 
in the family and community, but these short, unsociable hours compound the usual 
barriers to women's union participation. Although C&C women members attended 
worksite meetings and participate actively in disputes, their participation in general 
meetings and union structures and strategies was low. Since different kinds of 
cleaners work at different times of the day or night, no meeting times suited all. 
Juggling their time and their need to earn with childcare, domestic work and other 
commitments, they had little time of their own, and little time within working hours, for 
participating in union work. 
"Some just tell the caretaker, oh, you go and tell us what happens." 
C&C members in fulltime work, on the other hand, were likely to be men: the 
caretakers and security guards. It was signi'ficant that in C&C award documents, 
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wages were stated in hourly as well as weekly rates for cleaners, but only as a fulltime 
wage for caretakers. Although much security work, now organised tllrough 
contracting companies, has become as parttime and casualised as contract cleaning, 
C&C's caretakers tended to be in permanent, long term employment. Men in these 
occupations were also likely to be traditionally oriented on gender issues. It was these 
male caretakers and security guards who visibly dominated C&C union meetings and 
were disproportionately elected onto the executive, rather than the membership 
majority of women cleaners. 
However, tl"lis outline of the situation of women cleaners is descriptive, rather than 
analytic. It does not intend to suggest that women are inherently difficult to organise, 
prioritise family over working life or are uninterested in union affairs, but rather that 
questions of collective organisation and structure have not been sufficiently addressed 
(Crain 1991). The evidence from union officials, on whom this research is focused, 
was that the predominantly women members of both C&C and H&HW were staunch 
and active participants in union disputes. 
If C&C officials were increasingly recognising that the 'guts of the membership is 
. women', tllis fact was not reflected in C&C's omcial structures or hiring patterns. 
Secretaries had always been male and Pakeha, as had the majority of executive 
members. Some officials had begun to recognise this as unsatisfactory. 
"We have always only had one or two nominal women on the executive, that's 
the truth of it. .. There is a great shove going on at the moment to get this union 
to reflect its membership. It's going to take some time I can tell you." 
While the occupations which made up both C&C and H&HW memberships were 
examples of horizontal gender segregation in the labour market, the officers and paid 
staff of both showed vertical segregation by gender in union hierarchies. In C&C 
unions an increase in organising staff, including women organisers, occurred towards 
the late 1980s. In 1990 there was at least one woman organiser in each region, with 
two in Christchurch, one of whom was Assistant Secretary and, under the SWU, was 
given divisional responsibility for school cleaners in the South Island. The longest 
employed woman organiser, formerly a cleaner and executive member, became the 
sole charge organiser for Dunedin, then the only woman employed by the 
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amalgamated Otago/Southland union. By the early 1990s women sufficiently political 
to work for unions were likely to be in some way feminist. However, the C&C women 
officials interviewed did not hold feminist views as strong as those encountered in the 
other unions studied, including the H&HW. 
Until the 19S0s the H&HW and C&C unions were very similar in philosophy, strategy 
and organising style. 
"(In the 1970s) the H&HW was nothing like it is now, before its progressive days. 
Lots of money in the bank, very few organisers, tiny office, just basically 
collecting fees. /I 
Through the 19S0s, however, H&HW became a strongly progressive voice within the 
union movement in identifying and championing issues related to low pay. 
"Lots of really exciting things were happening in that union, seriously 
looking at its structures and its organising methods and attempting to 
tackle the issues of low paid workers more seriously than any union had 
really ever seemed to before ... but there wasn't any kind of feminist 
analysis at all." 
The extent to which H&HW picked up on feminist unionists issues and strategies was 
being determined by the priority given them by the union's leadership, which continued 
to be male dominated. As part of the general move towards more democratic and 
responsive unionism H&HW increased the size of its organising and specialist staff in 
the early 19S0s. As with the clerical unions, this hiring, particularly in regions with 
more progressive leadership, began to reflect the fact that some of the occupations 
H&HW covered were heavily female dominated: it was appropriate to hire some 
women~ These women organisers, usually with a background in the industry but also 
women with tertiary education, began to raise the new feminist issues and critiques 
within the organisation. As larger worksites were organised with elected delegates, 
many were women and some went on to become organisers or other officials. 
There was a higher proportion of women elected to H&HW executives than with C&C. 
Canterbury H&HW had a woman union secretary in the late 19S0s; however, this 
regional union did not join the fully amalgamated SWU. Of the individual unions which 
affiliated to the SWF the most progressive policies and rules in feminist terms were 
those of the Wellington H&HW. However, in all regions, and later in the SWU, men 
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continued to dominate the elected and paid positions of a organisation with 
predominately female membership. 
"I'd like to get some more women through to the national executive, that positive 
role, because it is mainly men ... two women are cleaners. It would be good to 
get someone through that had that confidence." 
Nor did the paid staff of either group of unions reflect the racial mixture of the 
membership. All paid C&C officials and organisers were Pakeha except for one Maori 
woman organiser in Dunedin, a relative conservative on both Maori and women's 
issues. During the period of research, H&HW unions had no more than three Maori 
or Pacific Island organisers. 
In acknowledgements that this racial mix was unrepresentative, a contradiction arose 
with other statements by C&C officials about the membership. While the collective 
nature of unionism and Polynesian cultures was constantly pointed to as a reason 
Pacific I.slanders make great union members, cultural differences were presented as 
the reason there were very few Pacific Islanders in official or paid positions. Mention 
was made of increasing the vulnerability the few experienced Pacific Island delegates 
by overloading them with union tasks. Examples given of difficulty arising from cultural 
differences included reluctance to interpret at large meetings: 
"They are shy, they think that to do that is to somehow make themselves bigger 
than, better than others, so they don't want to do it. /I 
Language differences presented a problem. Not only did Pacific Island members have 
difficulty understanding complex English and unionist jargon, but when some meetings 
were conducted in the language of the majority present, officials had difficulties. 
"We were in a meeting here about three weeks ago and I realised about half the 
meeting didn't know what I was talking about.. .. One dispute we got some matai 
and the members voted unanimously. When it was all over, I said to one fellow, 
I expected some differences to emerge there, and he said, they just told me to 
do as I was told. I don't want to build a union on that basis but I didn't know 
what was being said." 
This situation was presented as a cultural problem attaching to the members, rather 
than an organisational problem of representation. The solution generally proposed by 
both C&C and H&HW officials was for the staff already employed by the union to learn 
some Samoan. 
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Some H&HW unionists expressed disagreement with the view of low Pacific Island 
. involvement in leadership as a cultural problem. 
/II think that's a Palagi cop-out. If we provided the right environment...but we 
structure everything on a monocultural basis, even our union meetings, 
someone up in front addressing the crowd, it's foreign to them ... They have the 
capabilities, at smaller site meetings they have no problem. /I 
In this alternative view, which came from officials working most closely with members, 
a shift from Pakeha monocultural ways of working might flow from a shift in the locus 
of organisational power as a result of the more active unionism needed under volun-
tary unionism and forced reliance on industrial action under the Employment Contracts 
Act. 
/II think in the future ... because of the changes politically, the power is going to 
have to be taken from the union office and put onto the worksites in order to 
survive./I 
In H&HW, moves to hire Maori and Pacific Islanders, and to ensure their involvement 
in elected structures, began in the late 1980s and were strongest in north. In 1988 
there were a number of Maori and Pacific Island members on the executive of the 
Northern H&HW, whose secretary had a Samoan family background. Of the C&C 
unions, Northern was most receptive to change following the election to office in 1990 
of its last secretary before amalgamation. This regional difference in viewpoint is not 
unexpected, since the union organisation of low paid service workers reflects the 
regional concentration of Pacific Island and Maori population. Northern C&C adopted 
a policy of upholding and carrying out the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. When 
in 1990 a personal grievance case in Rotorua was conducted in Maori, officials found 
nothing unreasonable in that. However, Northern C&C officials disagreed with the 
Maori school board as employer taking a cultural position on what the union saw as 
a class issue of the unjustified dismissal of a cleaner. That is, Maori issues were 
subordinated to an overriding class analysis. In the past C&C had come out strongly 
against the politics of Maori sovereignty, seeing Maori interests as 'best served by 
fighting together with Pakeha workers for a better society 'from whicl1 we will all benefit' 
(Advance 1988). 
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In the late 1980s Wellington H&HW developed a 'workers policy' of hiring organisers 
from among delegates on its own worksites rather than, for example, from other 
unions or those with educational qualifications. However, under restructuring for 
amalgamation this brietly established policy lapsed in favour of 11iring proven 
organising expertise. 
Generally, the gender and race profile of officials and paid staff of H&HW, like C&C, 
did not reflect the membership profile, and males continued to hold the decision 
making and policy initiating positions. This pattern continued after amalgamation into 
the Service Workers Union. Current C&C and H&HW officials stood for particular 
elected paid positions in their unions and the Service Workers Federation with the new 
SWU hierarchy already sketched out jointly between them. These positions and their 
incumbents were slotted into the amalgamated SWU structure with little change. Of 
now-elected positions given regional and division responsibility, only one regional 
divisional head was female. 
In 1992 the Women's Committee of the SWU successfully put a remit through a 
delegates conferences to the Annual General Meetings which called for a equal 
opportunities programme to ensure hiring 'with due regard being given to the ethnicity 
and gender composition of the membership'. Like the earlier policy, this remit was 
aimed not only at a truer representation of the union's membership but also at 
strengthening the link between membership and union office. Besides a stated policy 
against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, marital status, religious beliefs, sexual 
orientation and disability, the remit included specific requirements for advertising which 
would target and encourage under-represented groups, and for a representative of the 
appropriate standing committee to be included on the interview panel. 
"We have laid out procedures on it... (For a hospitality organiser) for example, 
we should advertise in the hospitals for three or four weeks, have meetings and 
speak to people." 
Paid secretaries were both the public face of the C&C and H&HW unions and key 
decision makers in the day-to-day running of the union. While executive members 
were involved in directing the affairs of the union, representation of the unions inside 
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and outside the union movement was by paid officials - the secretary, not the 
president. 
"We pay lip service to workers representation within our organisation when we 
have a president who rarely speaks on behalf of our Federation. Why? 
Because we do not expect her to." 
Decision making on executives of the regional unions tended to be strongly led by 
secretaries and, in some cases, long established male presidents. 
"If he wants something really pushed, he will do quite a lot of talking and the 
executive members will go for it. I don't think it is questioned enough. .. 1 don't 
think they understand the importance of their role, they are actually responsible 
for the running of the union in the end." 
Several of these leaders, in both C&C and H&HW, were powerful personalities with a 
strong class analysis. While recognising an increasing need to service a membership 
which was largely Pacific Island and overwhelmingly female, their receptiveness to 
feminist and race analyses put forward by some H&HW staff and members was often 
limited. 
''Although the H&HW liked officially to have this very progressive image, when 
it came to women's issues it was pushed along by individual organisers. It was 
certainly never pushed along by the leadership of the union, who were actually 
quite actively opposed to it on some issues .. .lf it succeeded it was no more 
than it should, and if it failed, well, there was no point in doing it." 
In the past, such officials tended to see even information gathering on gender and 
race composition of the membership as more divisive than relevant, particularly those 
who had a strong belief in unionism as a vehicle for class struggle. In a industrial 
relations system with compulsory membersrlip and centralised bargaining, it was easy 
to assume that this analysis and primary class identification was shared by the whole 
membership. This was epitomised by the view of a C&C Secretary: 
"Workers tend to identify as workers, not as a Maori or a Pacific Island workers 
or a woman worker or a transvestite worker or whatever. They identify as 
cleaners." 
Certainly, C&C cleaners had no illusions about their place in the employment 
relationship. 
"They actually know what the boss is like. It doesn't matter whether he is nice 
person or a not nice person, they all treat the cleaners much the same, it's just 
a matter of degree or whether they do it with courtesy." 
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Cleaners were also conscious of the extremely low social status attached to cleaning 
work, as were other workers. When tray line kitchens were introduced at Auckland 
Hospital, for example, surplus staff expressed themselves ready to accept any alterna-
tive work except cleaning. Right through the hospital hierarchy, status is elaborately 
expressed in the colour and detail of uniforms2 . Auckland Hospital cleaners wear 
turquoise, with supervisors in pink. 
A link between the occupation of cleaning and wider political concerns about the 
lowest socio-economic classes in the current recession was made by the Northern 
C&C survey in early 1991. Under a government funded employment scheme, a young 
Pacific Island woman conducted an interview based survey of the membership and 
also interviewed leaders of Pacific Island communities to which much of the 
membership belongs. This not only established a better demographic profile of the 
membership but was specifically focused on the economic and family situation of 
cleaning women to highlight the vital importance of their earnings, not only to 
themselves but to others they help support. 
Previous work had revealed, for example, that of 120 Mangere women cleaners, 30% 
had unemployed husbands and an almost equal number had adult children in the 
household who had been unemployed for more than six months. 
"So we are coming from a particular angle, saying that's what the joint incomes 
are on average, that's what the household unemployment situation is. Because 
we are talking not only of a cultural and ethnic group but a socio-economic 
group, which is a lot different from, say, clerical." 
Interest in obtaining better demograprlic and other information about members and 
their life situation was relatively recent. Even officials with a strong class analysis now 
acknowledged a link between socio-economic class and gender. 
"Cleaners are very intelligent union-wise and political-wise, particularly women. 
They know what life is about... They know how far money goes and what things 
cost and they know if that money supply into a household drops what it can 
mean. That's why they are so astute, because every penny counts. More so 
with mature women." 
2 Nurses have to wear specified kinds of white shoes, although their shoe allowance was removed 
in 1 992; highly paid critical care consultants, however, can choose to work in jandals. 
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As unions became 'bargaining agents' under the Employment Contracts, a closer fit 
between membership concerns and union actions was recognised by officials as 
essential to organisational survival, as well as of effective collective action. But this 
information gathering about members' household circumstances was ammunition for 
a political strategy adopted by C&C, H&HW and now SWU; that of lobbying political 
parties, ministers or select committees for policies recognising the needs of low paid 
workers, and of supporting the election of a pro-union government. 
This primarily class-based strategy by these union leaders to represent the collective 
interests of their predominantly female members contrasts with the feminist analyses 
expressed by officials in the last two case studies. In particular it contrasts with the 
issues and strategies discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 aimed at making unionism more 
relevant by addressing issues of specific concern to women members. Nevertheless, 
some H&HW and SWU officials held a more strongly gender- and race-based analysis 
of members' situation than that held by C&C, H&W and SWU leaders. Some of the 
internal tensions arising from differences of perspective and preferred strategy emerge 
in the next sections. Of particular interest is the strategy of making 'pOlitical space' in 
union decision making structures through standing committees for women, Maori and 
Pacific Island members. 
Building on Gender and Race Identity 
Some H&HW officials believed that the link between gender and the occupation of 
cleaner was the key to a greater identification of members with the union. Organisers 
of both union groups saw the cultural understandings and community solidarity of 
Pacific Island members as already a valuable part of the unions' industrial strength. 
Some H&HW staff saw gender and race, not just class consciousness, as important 
factors faCilitating union organisation and solidarity. In this view, whatever issues were 
of concern to members, as women or as Pacific Islanders or as Maori, were union 
issues, whether or not they reflected a traditional class analysis. 
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Like officials in the clerical workers and nurses unions, these officials recognised that, 
for a female dominated occupation, gender relations were a constant feature of the 
employment relation and of union representation. 
"What makes it hard is that they are women delegates and dealing with male 
management or employers. A lot of women have not been used to being 
shouted at, intimidating mannerisms when they are trying to sort out a problem. 1/ 
Women organisers considered that female socialisation into concern for others and 
cooperative rather than competitive interaction could be a building block towards 
greater union solidarity. 
lilt's my experience that women are far more motivated, they have a great sense 
of col/ectiveness and fairness and are less competitive than men. I organise 
orderlies as well and there is a vast difference between the orderlies and the 
cleaners. I am positive that it is being women, Pacific Islanders, being at the 
bottom of the heap that makes the difference. II 
liMen push themselves more aggressively ... When we are fighting to get cleaners 
picked up by an incoming contractor, it is the men that will give you the dirty 
on which cleaners don't always work their full hours. 1/ 
The issues raised in Working Women's Charter and by later feminist unionist 
. campaigns were not picked up by C&C officials and were not prioritised by H&HW 
leaders. The experience of H&HW women organisers, however, was that issues like 
sexual harassment and pay equity were well received by women members. While 
some saw feminism as a middle class women's movement, they recognised the 
concerns it theorised as very much facts of everyday life for women working in low 
paid jobs - child care problems, sexual harassment, lower earnings. 
'~ lot of working class women do turn off at the word feminism and that's fine, 
because they never turn off at what the issues are really about, it's just the 
language ... When you tie issues like pay equity into practical work experience 
of those members, even if they aren't sophisticated, educated or with a feminist 
analysis, they have got the practical work experience to relate it to. 1/ 
After the Cartwright inquiry in 1987-88, H&HW women organisers in Wellington 
organised a cervical screening service at their hospital worksites. Pacific and Maori 
women, who were a sizeable portion of H&HW members in hospitals, had been 
identified by health workers as those least likely to have regular smears. This both 
picked up on a current feminist issue and was a way of making unionism relevant and 
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involving women members with the union. As a health issue and a 'service' to 
members, it could not be considered too risky by members or too feminist by union 
leaders. 
The concentration of Pacific Island women into low paid service work occupations 
(NACEW 1990) means a higher level of job stability (Larner 1990:28) and commitment 
to the occupation is found among Pacific Island women commercial cleaners in 
Auckland and Wellington than in the South Island where commercial cleaning 
members are predominantly Pakeha. While Canterbury officials reported a high 
degree of transience, in Wellington and Auckland, Pacific Island members changed 
employment between contract cleaning companies, but tend to stay in cleaning work. 
For C&C unions based in those metropolitan areas, members' identity as Pacific 
Islanders was an important factor in mobilising members which was repeatedly 
commented on in the interviews. 
"Pacific Islanders have formed strong communities in NZ and that carries 
through into their work. They see the union as quite an important part of 
working life and it is a communal thing. J' 
Organisers of cleaners in hospitals and hospitality agreed: 
"Crass generalisation, but Pacific Islanders tend to be very good unionists, 
something about the collective nature of their community." 
"Unionism in its collectiveness actually complements the Pacific Island 
culture ... Palagi (European) culture is more individualist and each for their own, 
whereas Pacific Island and Maori culture, everybody's involved .. .1 think they are 
the easiest group to organise. They get the collectiveness because of the way 
they live in their own cultures, they see the point of unionism immediately." 
Patterns of chain migration and close knit, usually church-based communities in New 
Zealand mean employment was often found through relatives and friends (Larner 
1990:26), which not only helped concentrate newcomers in particular occupations and 
particular worksites, but built a network of mutual responsibility among workers which 
become a resource for union organising. 
"In terms of organising cleaners in the hospital, really it's a breeze, because 
they have got all these networks that work. They know each other and have a 
very strong group loyalty. You have to stick together and you have to stand by 
each other." 
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Pacific Island members particularly appreciated organisers attending farewells and 
other workplace celebrations, which helped personalised links between these networks 
and the union office. 
New Zealand's social geography was particularly recognised by Wellington C&C 
organisers. Cleaners of the high rise office blocks of central Wellington were bussed 
in by contractors from the main Paci"fic Island centre of residence, Porirua. Organisers 
met with cleaners on the bus, before they separated to different buildings. In early 
1991 when union rights under the new legislation were still unclear, organisers were 
discussing the potential for community based union organising in Porirua, with perhaps 
a joint union information centre there to service and educate SWU members. A few 
'cottage' meetings held in members' homes about small issues had been well 
attended. 
"We are going to have to look at new ways of organising, particularly with the 
problem of right of entry ... do more work where people live. II 
In Auckland, chief port of entry for migration, recent refugee immigration was reflected 
in small enclaves of Vietnamese and Fijian cleaners, working on particular sites. A few 
small sites had just Filipina or Indonesian cleaners. In Wellington there were some 
new Asian members, Cambodian and Vietnamese on small sites. Although Australian 
research has shown these groups to be active and interested union members (Bertone 
1993:7), in the view of C&C officials, so far in New Zealand: 
''Asian workers seem much more quiet, they don't want to elect a delegate, they 
don't want to get into hassles. II 
The work permit problems of Pacific Islanders and of more recent immigrant groups 
meant many members had an interest in immigration policy. C&C and H&HW officials 
were not knowledgeable in this area and referred members on to other organisations 
for help. However, H&HW officials had several times acted to recover wages for 
restaurant workers grossly underpaid for long hours by employers who threatened 
deportation. Certainly neither C&C nor H&HW had any interest in exposing the 
immigration status of cleaners or in any way excluding them from award coverage or 
membership. Not only were below-award rates illegal, they undermined the labour 
rates for all workers. 
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"It becomes of interest to us when people are being blatantly exploited because 
companies can then win contracts quoting much lower wages. Then 
companies that play by the rules will be unable to continue employing our 
people." 
Although gender and race characteristics of the memberships were acknowledged by 
leaders of both union groups by the time of study, more progress in addressing the 
significance of this was achieved in H&HW. The main outcome was organisational 
chance: the development of standing committees for women, Maori and Pacific Island 
members, which gave this groups 'political space' first in the SWF, then in the fully 
amalgamated SWU. This followed the organisational pattern of the NZCTU which, as 
described in Cllapter 5, was an outcome of strategies for structural change by feminrst 
and Maori unionists. As in the wider union movement, a push for specific 
representation of women, Maori and Pacific Island workers on SWF and SWU 
executives came about because the concerns of these members, who were the 
majority of the membership, were not being heard at the highest level of union 
decision making. The continuing struggle around standing committee representation, 
and the position of C&C officials on this, are examined later in relation to decision 
making within the amalgamated SWU. 
Gender Equity via the State 
The predominance of men in C&C leadership and the strong class analysis espoused 
by some dominant personalities were reflected in the issues and strategies pursued. 
These were largely shared by H&HW leadership despite the feminist unionist views 
expressed by some lower ranking officials. This class analysis influenced the reception 
of the women's issues being raised by feminists unionists in the FOL and NZCTU. 
C&C was not, for example, involved in the campaigns for equal pay and pay equity. 
At the time of the equal pay campaign, C&C officials' work on behalf of members was 
reactive rather than pro-active and focused largely on award negotiation and court 
work. The 1972 legislation brought a single rate for women and men in cleaning work 
which was implemented in awards. Pay differences between the typically male and 
typically female occupations covered by C&C remained unremarked. 
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By the mid-1980s pay equity campaign, C&C members were much more effectively 
represented by their leaders than previously, using negotiation and arbitration, backed 
by industrial action. When the Clerical Workers Association went to the Arbitration 
Court to test the Equal Pay Act's capacity to compare women's jobs to men's, C&C 
and H&HW officials were using the same Court in a more traditional way to argue the 
comparability of similar jobs in public and private sectors, and the comparability cif the 
cleaning content in other occupations, such as kitchen hand or (at that time typically 
male) hospital orderly. This was the traditional arbitration game of relativities, at which 
C&C and H&HW negotiators had developed considerable skill. Although they stated 
clearly that women's cleaning work was underpaid, this was not argued in terms of 
gender discrimination and the value of a job's component skills regardless of gender. 
"They never said that's what they were doing because that's not the way you 
talked about these things. Yes, they were men and yes, they did think that 
women needed to be upgraded. /I 
"Right at that time H&HW were involved in a pay equity campaign but it wasn1 
called that, to get parity for cooks in industrial cafeterias with tradesmen on 
site ... with the support usually of other male dominated unions on site ... That 
kind of thing was great but it wasn't with any kind of feminist analysis at all. II 
As the Pay Equity campaign mounted in the late 1980s, however, H&HW women 
organisers and some SWF staff officials became active in it. When legislation was 
introduced in 1990, SWF's researcher submitted four claims, all within H&HW's 
resthome and hospital coverage. 
liThe H&HW record in dealing with specifically women's issues like pay equity 
has been patchy and has really depended on the energy and time and 
commitment that individual women organisers were prepared to put in off their 
own bal." 
C&C did not join in the campaign. The difference between equal pay for men and 
women doing the same job and pay equity through measuring the comparable worth 
of jobs typically done by women with those typically done by men did not appear to 
be clearly understood by all C&C officials. 
"I don't think there has been an awful lot of discussion on pay equity with our 
members. Cleaners or caretakers, male and female, are on the same rate, 
there is no discrepancy. II 
"He thought that a pay equity claim would mean that cleaners would lose 
money, he didn't understand the law actually ... 1f you got a pay equity claim for 
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cleaners he would then bounce it through al/ the other awards to make sure it 
flowed through. .. want the caretakers on 20% more to restore the relativities. /I 
A major cleaning contractor opposed the Pay Equity Bill on the basis of just this 
understanding of C&C tactics. 
The equal employment opportunity component of the Employment Equity legislation 
was reasonably judged by C&C officials to be almost meaningless f~x cleaners. There 
is extremely little opportunity for skill development and career advancement within 
cleaning itself, and cleaning is most unlikely to lead on to other kinds of work, given 
the isolated employment and work hours needs of the vast majority of their women 
members. Discrimination as conceived in equal employment opportunity programmes 
focuses on the non-recruitment of women, and Maori and Pacific Islander workers, 
overlooking their active recruitment and ghetto-isation into low paying casual 
employment such as cleaning. 
"The problem of equal opportunity rarely arises in an industry like commercial 
cleaning in which everybody is a woman, and almost everybody is brown. You 
can't say the bosses are discriminating against them on the grounds of 
recruitment. /I 
H&HW officials were also more interested than C&C in the issue of sexual harassment 
at work, recognising that for women in hospitality, this was a very real aspect of 
working life. 
"Our trades are not traditional cloth cap trades, there are a lot of yuppy pubs 
where - without wanting to sound offensive - one of the qualifications for getting 
a job is the colour of your hair and the size of your tits. /I 
The line between the accepted requirements of the job and unacceptable sexual 
harassment could be quite thin, or drawn by members themselves at a different point 
than it would be for other occupations. In 1991, a H&HW picket at a Christchurch bar 
where scantily clad women were paid by the number of drinks customers bought them 
was strictly to support their right to a base wage under the award, not about the 
sexualised nature of the work. 
Sexual harassment was added to grounds for personal grievance procedures in all 
C&C awards following its inclusion in the Labour Relations Act, 1987, but was not 
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picked up as an issue by C&C officials. For women cleaners, the physical isolation 
of most jobs reduces the likelihood of sexual harassment at work, which may account 
for the low level of understanding among some C&C officials. The C&C's first case 
in connection with sexual harassment, in 1990, was the defence of a Canterbury 
caretaker against procedurally incorrect dismissal for sexually harassing and 
intimidating a young school teacher. He received compensation for the loss of his job. 
Canterbury officials felt this older man did not realise the effects of his behaviour on 
the young woman, but the Board of Trustees was determined to terminate his 
employment. C&C organisers in other regions had a more developed understanding 
of the need to protect women against sexual harassment at work. 
lilt's that generation thing, the boys can say what they like to the girls, it's always 
been like that and now it's changed ... ft was threatening behaviour as far as she 
was concerned. II 
In 1990 the National Women's Committee of the SWF put out a booklet on sexual 
harassment for distribution by organisers to workplaces. Response from the affiliated 
unions varied. 
lilt was interesting who took them and who didn't. Some kind of guide to their 
attitude. to women as members. /I 
Union Education 
Feminist unionists in FOL women's committees and in some women-led unions such 
as the clerical unions had initiated education seminars for women on both unionism 
and gender specific issues like sexual harassment. With the establishment of the 
Trade Union Education Authority in 1986, union education became available to 
cleaners. C&C officials had not previously used union education with members. 
H&HW, with larger worksites and earlier moves to organise delegates, gave it greater 
importance. In the early 1980s, Canterbury H&HW had arranged delegate training 
sessions through the Poly tech, and Northern H&HW had trained its own delegates. 
After TUEA subsidies became available, two education officers were engaged, one by 
Northern H&HW and one jointly by Wellington H&HW and C&C as part of the SWU 
amalgamation process. 
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The work of these educators was aimed at training delegates and increasing members' 
understanding of how the union worked, how it operated within the labour relations 
system and its role in negotiating with employers. They saw union education as 
essential to effective workplace organising through delegates. 
l'Those delegates are as good as no good if they don't understand the issues, 
or what the award is .. or that they have a right to act on behalf of other 
workers ... Whether it is an industrial or an educationalorganiser, someone has 
to sit down with them and provide that education. II 
With changes in labour relations and in education policy affecting school cleaners' 
employment, it was not uncommon for cleaners to ask for an organiser to come out 
and explain issues. However, the short time available to organisers on worksites 
meant that usually only immediate individual problems are focused on. Expecting 
organisers to explain and train effectively while also handling specific problems 
underestimated the time and skill involved in education work. SWU educators pointed 
out that educational seminars were part of the work of organising, particularly if they 
met the specific needs of members from one union, or members in the same 
occupational or industry situation. Seminars could also provide a more relaxed 
opportunity for members to share knowledge of their particular situation with union 
officials. 
"The advantage of getting them to a women's seminar with people from their 
own union is that they look to each other to discuss their own problems, the 
industrial issues at work, so they are actually organising as well. II 
Wellington C&C organisers agreed that education was important to ensure that 
members had a broader understanding of their industry than was possible from their 
own work experience. 
"1f you get cleaners from different companies together they will all have exactly 
the same problems, so we try to discuss why it is, we go through the whole 
tendering system. It's not just them, it's not just their boss. Whether he is a 
nice guy or a bastard, the same things will happen. /I 
There were particular difficulties arranging union education for C&C members because 
of the nature of cleaning work and the cleaning workforce. The usual full-day daytime 
format of seminars did not 'fit into their short working hours, nor were sessions outside 
of work time suitable. The burden of family and community responsibilities which 
many women workers carry was particularly high for Pacific Island members. 
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"One of the difficulties for us is to get cleaners together, and to conferences 
and so on, because they have got kids during the day and they work at night...a 
tremendous amount of work just to get six delegates together." 
The high turnover of members also acted against developing a highly union conscious 
membership. It takes time in any occupation or job before an employee feels 
knowledgeable about her rights and committed enough to assert them. Cleaners who 
regarded the work as a temporary stop-gap, or as 'only' a parttime job were not easily 
motivated to protect either themselves or the labour market position of cleaning as an 
occupation. 
"The turnover negates that education process, they are out of the industry 
before they are at the point of having to stand up on their own two feet and fight 
for something." 
C&C officials reported that Pacific Islanders members quite often did not attend 
seminars they had registered for. Reasons were unclear but may include pressure of 
family commitments, the unfamiliarity of Palagi gatherings and procedures, and being 
expected to go to such sessions alone, rather than with a group of workmates or 
family, which would be more in keeping with Pacific Island norms. However, getting 
leave from employers for more than one member at a time was difficult. That 
member's workload was likely to fall on workmates. A solution to these problems 
being tried in 1991 was to arrange education on the same basis as stopwork 
meetings, and match worktime and locality, say, a two hour session on the Terrace, 
using contractors' usual transport to and from Porirua. 
With union membership voluntary, an understanding of unionism and the development 
of union consciousness among workers will be needed before, not after recruitment. 
Some H&HW officials saw education as an essential precondition to organising and 
collective bargaining under the Employment Contracts Act. 
"I personally believe that if the education was done some years ago, the 
situation might not have been as bad as it will be. We are going to have to 
explain to them why it is important to belong to the union, what is a union, its 
purposes, very basic stuff." 
"The union will have to make a decision about whether they want to make 
education a priority. We will be asking delegates to be organisers. You can't 
take people off the job and expect them to do that without some training. But 
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it's easier to see organising as where it is at, dealing with the immediate 
problems and bringing in the money. II 
The more traditional union view generally held by C&C officials assumed a degree of 
class consciousness among those in low paid jobs. In this view an effective means 
of raising union consciousness among members was the direct experience of being 
involved in a dispute which personally affected them. Organisers found that the 
activity, discussion and solidarity arising from a dispute had a strong educative effect. 
Since the mid- 1980s, there had been an increasing number of such opportunities to 
learn while doing, which was likely to continue under the Employment Contracts Act. 
"There is a sense of identification among a group of workers (that) ... exists 
where there has been a dispute ... That's when people see that what you achieve 
is not handed down from above, it is something that they are part of achieving. II 
After the dissolution of TUEA in 1992, SWU retained its educators, but it seemed 
unlikely that union education would be developed beyond the current level. If union 
education was seen by decision makers as delegate training, rather than the raising 
of union consciousness among ordinary members, as clerical officials saw it, the 
limited effectiveness of delegates in scattered, high turnover areas of membership like 
commercial cleaning might mean low priority given to education as a strategy. 
The Cleaners' Unions and I\IZCTU Strategies 
The issues and strategies prioritised by C&C secretaries largely coincided with those 
prioritised by NZCTU leadership rather than those developed by feminist unionists. 
This was true to a lesser extent of officials of H&HW and the present SWU. However, 
representation of a low paid casuaHsed workforce meant they too have expressed 
significant dissent on some issues. Differences arose at a concrete level over NZCTU 
policy more suited to occupations in the productive sector on large worksites than to 
low paid service work in scattered workplaces. The areas of greatest dissent were 
arbitration, sector unionism, the Compact and Growth Agreement, and response to the 
Employment Contracts Bill. However, similarity of analysis meant that at a broader 
level C&C officials, and officials of the fully amalgamated SWU, agreed with the NZCTU 
leaders on the best way forward: a party political route to a labour relations framework 
more favourable to unions, with a focus on the social wage. 
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Despite the good use made of arbitration, C&C officials expressed no strong 
disagreement with the arbitration/action trade off in the Labour Relations Act, 19S7. 
Since strike action, or the threat of it, was also part of their strategy, they accepted the 
view that the movement as a whole needed to be weaned from passive to active 
tactics. However, H&HW officials shared the views of the clerical unions. Industrial 
action taken by well organised members in hospitals had been needed to defend their 
position, rather than advance it, and without access to arbitration two large sections 
of H&HW's membership had encountered severe setbacks in 19S9. In their view, 
some form of arbitrated alternative to industrial action was necessary to protect 
isolated, low paid workers. 
NZCTU's plan to restructure the union movement on industry lines (NZCTU 19S5b; 
19S9a; Harvey 1992:66) was facilitated by the increased provision in the Labour 
Relations Act, 19S7 for composite documents and the deregistration of 'second tier' 
agreements. C&C officials were involved in composite bargaining on a few large 
work sites where members were directly employed alongside members of other unions. 
On factory sites like Pacific Tyres and LlEB, composites worked well. Factory workers 
were willing to stand behind the cleaners on small issues. Collective support 
developed because cleaners and factory workers were physically together, in the same 
building, at the same time with the same direct employer. These cleaners were men 
- unlike the clerical workers at Padfic Tyres who were excluded from union 
arrangements (see page 215). 
However, in the estimation of C&C officials, such composite agreements, possibly 
leading on to industry or enterprise worksite documents, were suitable for at most 10% 
of their membership. 
"You can only go so far with these composites. You can almost count the 
number of workers we have got on factory sites that could work well within a 
composite agreement." 
C&C officials felt this strategy was irrelevant to the majority of its members, because 
cleaners did not share common interests, common hours of work, nor in many cases 
even a common employer, with other union members employed on the same worksite. 
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School cleaners had the same employer with other education occupations for award 
negotiation purposes. But after 1988 other aspects of employer responsibility were 
devolved to Boards of Trustees, workplace problems were different and, working 
outside normal school hours, members had little contact with members of other 
unions. Where education union strategies drew on professional concerns or class 
identity, C&C officials felt their members would be poorly represented. School 
cleaners threatened by contracting, for example, had received no support for their job 
security from other occupations in schools. 
"We believe that our cleaners and caretakers won't benefit from being in the 
same union as professionals. The general reaction is that we would just be 
swallowed up and their issues would take over." 
However, the teachers' unions began to work towards an education sector union. 
Amalgamation into this was discussed at meetings, but never put forward by the 
executives for formal vote by the membership. When firm proposals for an Education 
Sector Union were developed in 1991, plans were already under way for full 
amalgamation into the SWU, with education as one of five divisions. 
"Since then at meetings and on job sites all we have got is endorsement of that 
stance. I haven't found a cleaner yet that wants a single education union." 
"Because of status (a single Education union) would be to their disadvantage, 
we are already treated like dirt, as afterthoughts ... We have got a long way to go 
before it would ever work to our advantage." 
Cooperation with other unions in education continued to develop, however, particularly 
as bulk funding of teachers' salaries became an issue. Cleaners and other auxiliary 
staff were one stage further down the path of devolution and 'fragmentation to 'free up 
the state's own labour market in education (Hill 1993a). 
"We have a close link with the other education unions. We went through the 
battle of trying to maintain separate funding for cleaning and caretaking wages 
and operational costs, and we lost. Now teachers are going through the same 
battle." 
With regard to members in contract cleaning, C&C officials pointed out that industry 
or enterprise bargaining was 'not greatly relevant'. Its aim was to group together all 
occupations employed by one industry or worksite, so that collective wage 
negotiations could be tailored to the particular concerns or profitability of that industry 
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or firm. When cleaning was contracted out, however, employment responsibility was 
distanced; the industry or firm in which the cleaning was done was the client, not the 
employer, and stood in quite a different relation to the cleaner. The cleaner then had 
nothing in common with other workers in the client firm or its industry, apart from the 
physical premises, and little contact with them since cleaning was done outside normal 
working hours. Her main employment problems stemmed from the narrow profit 
margins and insecurity of the contracting industry, not of the client's industry. 
Cleaning is required by most enterprises, large or small; like clerical work, the labour 
market for cleaning is not industry specific. When this market is reorganised through 
subcontracting, a particular contractor's business is likely to be spread across 
enterprises and industries. Their individual profitability is irrelevant; indeed, tight 
budgeting on their part is likely to be the reason for distancing the employment of 
cleaners. Contracting out has the effect of hiving off occupations from the main body 
of an enterprise or industry. Once distanced, the contracted services became an 
'industry', as it was termed by C&C officials. Considered in that light, the occupational 
award was already an 'industry' document, but with cleaners as the central, not merely 
a peripheral, occupation being organised. C&C officials pointed to cleaners' hourly 
rates relative to other low skilled female dominated occupations as evidence that 
occupational unionism had served their members well. 
In 1991 as the Employment Contracts Act was introduced, both C&C and H&HW 
officials predicted an increase in contracting out, to the detriment of cleaners currently 
employed in hospitals and schools, if the loss of awards with blanket coverage meant 
contractors could legally negotiate pay rates lower than those of direct employees. 
The first hints of National's proposals for separation of funder and provider in public 
health care made it clear that sub-contracting at all levels was intended. 
H&HW officials thought it highly debatable whether reorganising health workers on an 
industry, Area Health Board or hospital basis would further hospital cleaners' interests 
more than the close cooperation between unions which had developing since 1989, 
discussed in Chapter 8. Like C&C officials, they pointed out that progress in working 
together did not always remove problems of attitude at the membership level. A 
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Northern organiser reported nursing staff not bothering to learn the unfamiliar name 
of a Padfic Island cleaner who had been on the ward for years; and nurses standing 
in picket groups well down the road from other workers during strike action. Cleaners 
could naturally be sensitive to such slighting and class prejudiced behaviour. In 
o'fficials' view, if the Hancocks agreement, tailored more spedfically to members' 
interests had increased their involvement in the union, an 'industry' union which would 
have to bridge the heterogeneity of class and interest representation among all health 
workers might well have the opposite effect on hospital cleaners. 
C&C officials and officials of most, but not all, H&HW regional unions accepted NZCTU 
leaders' arguments about ensuring union survival and building union strength through 
increased organisation size, but not their plan for achieving it. The SWU amalgamation 
was out of line with NZCTU's (1989a) plan for 14 sector unions. This put most SWU 
members into Entertainment/Services (Food/Accommodation/Liquor; Sanitation 
Services; Amusement/ Recreation; together with Animal Care & Related; Personal 
Services; and Media Services), witrl hospital workers in a Health Sector Union and 
school cleaners in the Education Sector Union. Cleaners working for contractors 
would be Sanitation Services, with directly employed commercial cleaners sprinkled 
through all other sector unions. 
"In the divisions that the CTU put up SWU has a right to be in each one of those 
sectors, we have members in each." 
C&C and H&HW preferred to consolidate union organisation across the occupations 
and industries where they had developed. The SWU amalgamation effectively carried 
the unionisation of the main working class service jobs in the hotel and hospital 
industries across the full labour market for each of those occupations. The loss of 
blanket coverage awards and compulsory unionism under the Employment Contracts 
Act undermined such occupational closure, but SWU nevertheless brought together 
a membership with very similar problems in their labour market situation and 
employment relations. However, the I\lZCTU concept of industry unionism appeared 
to be based on the logic of product markets rather than labour markets, and its sector 
plan grouped employees with very different labour market power and workplace 
problems (Hill 1991 b). It is hard to imagine grounds for industrial solidarity between 
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contract cleaners and film makers or authors, or advertising account executives 
(NZCTU 1989a:28). 
Both C&C and H&HW accepted the Compact between NZCTU and the Labour 
government and the Growth Agreement on the recommendation of officials. Tl"lis was 
closely linked to officials' political strategy of working through the party political system. 
Despite disillusion with Labour, members accepted the argument that a means was 
needed of giving the unions a voice in economic and social policy, despite doubts 
about the Compact's vagueness. 
"We took the Compact through our (SWF) delegates conference... They said 
they wouldn't support this compact but they couldn't not support a Compact in 
principle. That statement was used to back the 2%.1/ 
C&C and H&HW officials supported the Growth Agreement as a pre-election strategy. 
However, as in other unions for service work, C&C officials found the concept of a 1 % 
productivity payment inappropriate for their members. 
"I suppose to increase their productivity you put them on rollerskates and give 
them bigger feather dusters. 1/ 
Most C&C awards settled at 2.5% in the 1990 round. Some officials saw this as fairly 
realistically of what they would have achieved anyway. With inflation around 5% it 
amounted to a drop in real wages, however, so that some organisers did not see the 
Growth Agreement as in the best interest of members. 
"I am totally opposed to the 2%, it is nothing but a wage cut. Inflation is far 
higher than 2%. That productivity argument, what does it· meant to our 
cleaners? They will have to work harder and faster and squeeze in more tasks 
in their three hours. II 
As with the Compact, there was considerable criticism from about the process around 
the Growth Agreement. The deal was made between NZCTU leaders and the Minister 
of Labour, and afterwards endorsed at a meeting in Wellington by a majority of the 
secretaries of the unions, before memberships were given the change to vote on it. 
As some other officials commented: 
"They are the ones that went to the meeting, not members or delegates. So it 
was brought back and the executive endorsed it And now we have got 
meetings three months down the track. /t's from top down, then brought to the 
rank and fi/e ... lt should be the other way round. When it is over a matter than 
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is pretty important, they just suddenly don't have time to take it to the rank and 
file." 
"There have been some classic issues run by the NZCTU and some classic 
issues run by the Labour Party that have really defied what the rank and file 
membership wanted. /I 
While C&C and H&HW leaders generally concurred with the directions and methods 
of the NZCTU, there was some impatience with the bureaucratic slowness with which 
the organisation took up, for example, ideas to promote unionism to the public. 
"We get hacked off with the slowness of the CTU, talking about a February 
campaign launch. We said right now and that is why we design a lot of our 
own stuff, positive campaigns ... The CTUs programme is too bloody slow in my 
opinion." 
Now accustomed to using industrial action to back claims and award rights, officials 
were impatient with NZCTU leadership with regard to the Employment Contracts Bill. 
It was the Wellington C&C secretary who advocated a general strike to follow the mass 
rallies of April 1991 , against the more cautious and 'responsible' stand of the I\lZCTU 
president. Both statements received wide media attention. Both preempted the 
outcome of votes being conducted at the time among union memberships. 
Like the clerical and nurses' unions, C&C and H&HW pursued an active strategy in 
relation to the state, but one focused on traditional labour relations concerns and 
aligned with the direction set by NZCTU leadership. Influencing governments to 
provide legislation favourable to unions' negotiating and workplace needs had been 
an important part of labour movement strategy since the 1880s. Although in the hands 
of C&C officials this was no feminist judo, the need to harness state power was 
recognised clearly by C&C officials. 
lIlt is the only way we can end up delivering. We can't deliver on our own 
because we are controlled by legislation, controlled by Acts of Parliament. II 
Unlike the clerical and nurses' unions, C&C and H&HW pursued this strategy by 
working through party politics, through the traditional relationship between Labour 
party and labour movement. C&C had long been affiliated to and involved with the 
Labour Party. This paid off under the Third Labour Government when a separate 
award for cleaners employed in schools was negotiated between the Department of 
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Education and C&C. However, from 1984 the Fourth Labour Government rejected 
such pressure group politics and its own historic origins. 
Despite cleaners' low socio-economic status and their objective class position as 
identified by officials, C&C's Labour Party affiliation was not automatic. It certainly 
could not be assumed by the late 1980s3 . Capitation fees to the Labour Party were 
based on the percentage of members who voted in favour of affiliation. In December 
1991 affiliation was reconfirmed by membership vote at a series of general meetings 
which also endorsing full amalgamation into SWU. Following shortly after a series of 
meetings to endorse the wage round settlement, some turnouts were extremely low. 
"There were very few people who attended that meeting and it was not a fair 
representation of a union of 3,500 (Canterbury) members. But that's the way 
it worked because I think it was depended upon by the officials and part of the 
executive that not many people come to meetings." 
C&C leaders had close personal involvement in the internal pOlitics of the Labour 
Party, in an effort to influence policy formation and the decision making of Caucus and 
Cabinet. As Labour Party membership dropped abruptly in the mid 1980s in response 
to the policies of Rogernomics, the card votes of affiliated unions carried greater 
weight relative to Party branches - undue weight, according to the right of the Party. 
Labour Party involvement was expected of C&C staff. An applicant for an organising 
position reported being asked if she would campaign for Labour, at a time in Labour's 
second term when few people in the country would. 
C&C and H&HW officials considered that the political goal of most importance to 
unions was a Labour government pushed back on the right economic and industrial 
tracks. This was the argument SWF officials, as well as NZCTU leaders, put to the 
membership before the 1990 election and the affiliation vote in 1991. It represented 
class allegiance clung to despite recent betrayals, but also an accurate assessment 
of National's labour relations programme. The policies of Labour and National 
governments were seen as confirming the need for closer linkage between unions and 
3 In December 1992, Canterbury H&HW, which had not joined the SWU, disaffiliated from the Labour 
Party at the instigation of its delegates. 
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the Labour party, to be achieved at the highest level through the Compact, but also 
by the involvement of unionists in grassroots party politics. 
"Since the 1960s the union movement has moved away from the Labour Party 
and allowed the academics to hijack the thing. We lost the guts politicians .. .I've 
been saying to the membership, look, it's coming to the stage where you either 
get involved or you allow the Roundtable to walk all over us." 
Labour market deregulation hit school cleaners and public health sector workers 
doubly hard, since the government not only set the rules for labour relations but was 
itself an employer with an interest in lowering labour costs (Hill 1993a). 
"There is a general philosophy driving all areas and education is no different. 
If they want to fix the problems they are creating (politicians) have got to 
change their philosophy and I don't think they will." 
The union movement, including cleaners officials, pressed for a commitment by 
Labour to repeal the Employment Contracts Act which was not immediately 
forthcoming. In October 1991: 
"We are starting the work now, putting together some legislation, it is being 
done with the trade union movement, on a workable system." 
However, C&C leaders recognised the level of voter disillusion with the two main 
parties and began to support a change in the electoral system to proportional 
representation. They believed the SWU would be best served by having unionists 
active in all political parties, including the smaller ones, to ensure acceptable policies 
on labour relations. 
"You stay in with the Labour Party, but your lobbying strength grows .. .It's 
. principally get the right policies in place, stick with them by all means, but don't 
be ashamed to link up with third parties that you know can get representation 
in the House, in particular if they reflect the views of our membership." 
However, officials' faith in Labour's return to a pro-union industrial policy and a more 
traditionally left economic policy was clearly stronger than their faith in the continuing 
state provision of a 'social wage', as attacks on government spending mounted along 
with the deficit. This was indicated in both the arguments for the Compact in which 
the need for input on social policy was emphasised, and in alternative, union-based 
services which SWF was heavily involved in establishing. This concern recognised the 
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relatively greater importance of tile 'social wage' to low paid workers and the essential 
unreliability of state provision in times of recession. 
"Somebody in the community has got to do it, because governments are going 
to screw up the system ... We want to ensure that there is not a new poverty 
class in this country. JI 
The Northern H&HW initiated the first South Auckland Health Centre, and from 1988 
SWF helped establish other health centres and law centres set up under the auspices 
of the NZCTU. 
"In Porirua, I think cleaners are the most heavily represented group at the health 
centre, because we organise around it.. .plus it's a fact, it was set up because 
our members couldn't afford to go to the doctor. l/ 
The SWF was also a prime mover in the IRIS superannuation scheme (NZNU was also 
involved) and Unimed health insurance, with household and vehicle insurance 
packages also being explored. SWF joined the Public Service Investment Society, 
making buying and banking privileges available to members. The superannuation 
scheme, modelled on successful union schemes overseas, was specifically designed 
by the unions to work well for women workers moving in and out of the workforce or 
between low paid, parttime, casualised jobs. It was fully portable and remained in 
effect whether or not the person was working, with contributions as low as $5 a week. 
This strategy brought together the importance of the social wage to low paid workers 
with the need to recruit members under voluntary unionism. It addressed the 
socio-economic pOSition of cleaners and sought to make unionism attractive to 
members, not only for industrial representation, but by providing low cost services on 
the basis of bulk purchasing power. 
C&C officials saw the need for the union as an organisation to communicate to 
members that well thought through strategies were being developed, in a ciear and 
positive direction. 
"We have got to be up front, doing our best, put some positive stuff forward. All 
doom is no good, you have got to put a positive organisation, positive drive and 
the facts of life. We find people will stay with that 11 
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Amalgamation into the Service Workers Union 
By the late 1980s recession had affected many union memberships and voluntary 
unionism seemed likely under a future government of either party. Economies of 
scale, resource rationalisation and the greater pOlitical power of large organisations 
were argued as strategies for union survival, and as the grounds for amalgamation of 
C&C and H&HW into one national union. 
"People get depressed about things and worried about the next years and /'ve 
been saying to our executive, you are about to head into the most exciting 
period ever ... 1f we have to restructure and shed labour, it's no different from 
what's happening to the members, we have got to experience that part of life. /I 
The regional unions of C&C already met the requirement of the Labour Relations Act, 
1987 for a minimum membership of 1000. They were of sufficient size to support 
organising staff, but only unions of around 10,000 members in fairly concentrated 
workforces could finance specialised staff, such as a legal officer or researcher. Given 
the already close cooperation between C&C officials, however, transformation from a 
federal structure to a single national union at the same level of membership would 
bring little advantage. 
The question of federation or amalgamation with the H&HW unions had long been 
under discussion. Initial approaches had been made C&C leaders during the 
1984-1985 period of voluntary unionism. Amalgamation aimed to achieve sufficient 
resource rationalisation and organisational security to survive possible heavy 
membership losses in a deteriorated bargaining environment, while providing the 
capacity for specialised expertise. 
lilt is the belief of some of us that we will be able to retain the services that we 
provide at present with a loss of income of about 40% from lower membership. " 
H&HW was the union with whom C&C had most in common and with which officials 
had worked closely in the past, as covering the largest other group of cleaners. 
Amalgamation would unite cleaners into one union which could organise the whole 
labour market for cleaning and similar work. If unions' 'monopoly' coverage of 
particular workers was removed, as employers wished (NZBRT 1987), possible 
disputes between C&C and H&HW would be avoided. C&C officials foresaw a more 
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united and rationalised approach to organising both unions' members in boarding 
schools and to the much larger problem of contracting undermining more secure 
direct employment in schools, hospitals, hotels and elsewhere. It was hoped that 
amalgamation would facilitate a united strategy to squeeze contractors from both 
private sector and public sector sides. By 1991 the marketing efforts of the 
multi-national contract cleaning companies, the final outcome of the Shrubshall vs Hale 
case, the fragmentation of awards by the Employment Contracts Act, National's 
restructuring plans for health and lessons from Britain all pointed to this as the major 
problem of the future for both C&C and H&HW. 
The model for SWU was the Miscellaneous Workers Union in Australia, which brought 
together workers in various kinds of serving work. C&C officials hoped that a better 
resourced, amalgamated organisation would improve connections with service work 
unions overseas, organising against the same companies contracting for service work 
world wide. Improved information about changing ownership and management tactics 
could be gained through such contacts .. 
"We are part of an international family and it has some very good 
connections ... It's the only way to combat it. Who virtually controls NZ? It is the 
trans-nationals through the monetarist policies and the banking institutions. II 
For historical reasons, C&C and H&HW both had similar federal structures of regional 
unions to the clerical unions. On 1 April 1988 a combined Service Workers Federation 
was formed, with loose integration of policy and political matters and jointly funded 
research and legal staff based in Wellington. C&C members made up 23% of the 
SWF; H&HW members 74%. Shortly after, the smaller Community Services Union 
joined the SWF. In 1990 SWF estimated that its awards gave blanket coverage 
protection to 90,000 workers on 12,000 sites, an average of 7 per worksite. 
Full amalgamation into one national union was on the agenda of some C&C and 
H&HW officials, but in 1988 such a centralised structure was not acceptable to all 
H&HW unions. 
"We wanted a national union but we couldn't win the H&HW organisation to that 
position, so we settled for the SWF.II 
In the view of Canterbury H&HW, federation was sufficient: 
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"The Federation is a good structure because it allows areas to retain their 
autonomy but you also have a centralised sharing of resources, centralised 
advocacy and you really had centralised policy .. .By keeping the control 
bureaucracy out of Wellington you had a lot more regional control from your 
own organisation." 
Within SWF, C&C officials continued to work as a bloc, often resolving their own issues 
without taking them for decision making by the full Federation. 
"In my opinion, personally and officially, C&C is probably the tightest union 
family in the country ... While we have formal structures within the Federation, we 
have an informal structure outside it." 
SWF's 1990 Conference endorsed in principle amalgamation into one national union, 
and negotiations began. First C&C and H&HW amalgamated at the regional level in 
Auckland, Wellington and Dunedin. Because of difficulties which arose when Drivers 
and Distribution Workers amalgamated, the intention was for regional amalgamation 
on a trial basis, as a reversible step on the way to a fully national union. However, in 
late 1990 the change of government and the first drafts of the Employment Contracts 
Bill put full amalgamation on the fast track, with the support of C&C leaders. 
"We know we can work together, we have more in common than what parts us 
and we can do this job far more effectively as one national organisation .. .!f they 
want to make it work it will work, it they want to stop it working, well it won't 
work." 
After endorsement by a round of membership meetings, the national Service Workers 
Union of Aotearoa came into being on 14 May 1991. This brought together: 
Otago/Southland Service Workers Union (1990 merger of C&C and H&HW); 
Canterbury, Westland & Marlborough Cleaners, Caretakers & Security 
Officers Union (a long established merger of unions in the original labour 
districts); 
Central Association of Service Workers (1990 merger of H&HW and C&C in 
Wellington); 
Northern Hotel, Hospital & Restaurant Workers Union 
Musicians Union 
Theatrical Workers Union 
Northern Dental Technicians & Dental Assistants Union Goined SWF in 1990) 
One of H&HW's interests in the match was the dowry of cash and assets that C&C 
brought to the amalgamation. Although H&HW was larger, C&C was more -financially 
secure, because of differences in strategy following the first period of voluntary 
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unionism. C&C officials tended to salt revenue away against future need. The more 
progressive H&HW preferred to spend revenue building delegate systems, providing 
education and seminars, paying costs and transport and involving as many members 
and delegates in union activities as possible. 
"We were kept well and truly alive by the compulsory fee system. Unions were 
able to spend a lot of money, send delegates away in large number to all sorts 
of things. Very good for democracy but also very expensive." 
"It doesn't take long to get a stockpile. You just cut out all your delegates' 
activities and bingo, you've got money. But you haven't got your delegates." 
The proponents of amalgamation believed having one national union would solve what 
they perceived as deficiencies in the federal structure by allowing more logical 
demarcation between regional coverages and providing a binding decision making 
process. As in the FOL and NZCTU, formal votes within the SWF were 'card votes' 
based on membership size, so large affiliates tended to dominate issues, but regional 
executives did not always confirm and implement joint decisions. This had also been 
the situation in the Clerical Workers Association. 
"The affiliates had power individually. Northern H&HW and Wellington H&HW 
were the two biggest, so it didn't matter much what was in the SWF rules ... The 
national federation was just an umbrella organisation, it didn't have real power, 
very different to a national union." 
Other SWF affiliates saw it differently: 
"They listed a number of faults and every single one of them could have been 
rectified within the Federation structure and weren't necessarily going to be 
rectified by a national union .. .By and large the debates within the organisation 
were pretty healthy, I thought there was a good discipline maintained." 
Canterbury H&HW and the smaller Nelson and Taranaki H&HW unions remained 
outside the amalgamation. Although members of the SWF, they resisted 
amalgamation both regionally and into a national union. The question for these unions 
was what their position would be, outside the SWU but within the continuing but much 
weakened Federation. 
In Canterbury, H&HW officials felt the speed of the process had not given time to 
make a proper decision - just the view of the Southland Clerical Workers Union on the 
I\JZCWU amalgamation. They also had seriolJs doubts about the benefits of 
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amalgamation to their own members. With over 5,000 members, Canterbury H&HW 
was well placed financially and mortgage free. On amalgamation, an additional 
$140,000 of its revenue would go to the national organisation; a sum sufficient to fund 
three organisers. This centralisation came at a time when centralised bargaining was 
seriously threatened by legislative changes and health restructuring, and local 
recruitment and organisation was needed as never before. Membership of the SWF 
had provided specialised legal, journalistic and research staff based in Wellington, from 
where a centralised political strategy was best pursued. By 1991, however, 
Canterbury H&HW officials saw this as inappropriate to the new environment being 
created by the Employment Contracts Act. 
"Centralising in a decentralising environment is not really the right way to go, 
simply the accumulation of real power. Our position is that the journalist and 
the legal officer are better off in our office than based in Wellington. 1/ 
Some officials expressed doubts about the motives behind a larger, more centralised 
organisation. Opinions expressed strongly by Canterbury H&HW officials, and quoted 
here, were also the minority view of some officials in the unions which did join SWU. 
"Certainly it gives a larger power base for those who seek power. There are 
some uses for power - representation in the Labour Party or NZCTU ... (but) 
when you increase the amount of power an organisation has, but then reduce 
the number of people that share in the decision making, we don't believe that 
is healthy. II 
On amalgamation SWU had 69,000 members employed in the serving or preparation 
of food, drink, accommodation, entertainment, cleaning, physical help, and security, 
and was the largest organisation negotiating in the private sector. Service workers in 
hospitality ,entertainment, health and community services share similar problems from 
the viewpoint of union organising. They lack both industrial muscle and social status; 
they are in jobs with low pay and low skill - or rather, low skill recognition. Many are 
employed on small worksites. Over the last 20 years of their employment has become 
increasingly parttime, staggered and casualised. A national SWU aimed to build union 
strength by uniting large numbers of workers facing similar issues in related areas of 
work. Organisers of cleaners predicted a closer sharing of experiences on both the 
similarities and the differences of their members' situations. In the view of a H&HW 
organiser: 
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"The C&C bring a different perspective to it because their people tend to be split 
up around the place, much more difficult to get in touch. .. same with our home 
helps ... Ours is a job centred organisation, theirs is centralised, that's how I find 
things." 
As other unions suffer difficulties under the Employment Contracts Act, SWU may pick 
up coverage simply because of its continuing size and viability. As already related, the 
dissolution of the NZCWU in early 1992 shifted some regional coverage of clerical 
workers to SWU. The Northern clerical union COMPASS and the Southland Clerical 
Workers Union amalgamated with SWU in mid-1992, as did the Community Services 
Union, forming divisions within the SWU structure. Both groups are strongly female 
dominated, but the additions increase the heterogeneity of occupation-based interests 
and perspectives within the organisation. 
C&C officials expected amalgamation to make little difference to most aspects of their 
job, nor to members beyond a heightened sense of security through membership of 
a larger organisation. However, there was a reshuffling and integration of work organi-
sation and responsibilities among C&C and H&HW officials. As with COMPASS, the 
transformation of independent C&C unions into just two of several industrial divisions 
. in one national union meant loss of autonomy as well as the expected benefits. 
Internal Organisation & Decision Making: 
The feminist critique of the union movement which arose in the mid 1970s was that, 
although women were unionised, they continued to be underrepresented among 
official positions, paid and unpaid, in the union. By the 1980s leadership as well as 
membership of the clerical workers unions was female dominated but, as discussed 
earlier, this was not yet the case in C&C or H&HW by the early 1990s. For this reason 
the SWU's national structure is examined in some detail to consider to what degree 
they allow the voices and concerns of women cleaners to come through to national 
policy level. The timing of this study means that no conclusions can be drawn on how 
well the new SWU will serve women members. In order to flag issues for future 
research, however, consideration can, however, be given to formal structures, informal 
processes and, in the next section, the struggle around those structures of specific 
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representation which were established to increase the input into decision making of 
women, Maori and Pacific Island members. 
In the amalgamation process, doubts and differences arose between C&C and H&HW 
officials about organisational forms and what constituted democratic decision making. 
For officials of Canterbury H&HW, the largest SWF union remaining outside the 
national union, the two questions could not be divorced. 
'~ centralised system in Wellington is at the expense of regions and at the 
expense of on the ground organisers ... ff you don't get your organisers, you lose 
delegates and don't get people coming to meetings, so once again the ideas 
of the leadership predominate. /I 
Labour legislation before 1991 traded state support of unions against a degree of 
regulation of their internal affairs, imposing minimums for financial accountability and 
democratic process. The Labour Relations Act, 1987 extended the requirement for 
democratic election of union executives and presidents to previously appointed union 
secretaries. This recognised the power that naturally accrues to a union secretary as 
the day-to-day manager and the officer best placed to put policy and initiatives before 
the executive for decision. A secretary's term of office was to be five years. Most 
C&C secretaries were old-style unionists with up to 20 years in the job. However, 
most incumbent secretaries of both C&C and H&HW were confirmed in their positions 
by membership elections. Northern C&C, referred to as 'a family business' by one 
unionist, underwent a generational change, as much in thinking as from father to son. 
The rules of SWF affiliates were roughly similar to those of the clerical unions. Elected 
unpaid executive committees and paid secretaries, elected or appointed, were 
responsible for the business of the union, with ultimate authority resting with members 
voting at a set number of meetings per year. From the mid 1980s, H&HW delegates 
played a greater role in policy formation through an annual delegates' conference. In 
C&C and H&HW, secretaries, presidents and vice presidents of the regional unions 
came together through a federal structure to negotiation national awards and act 
politically. The SWF similarly brought officials of the affiliates together at a national 
level, with cooperation at the regional level remaining informal, unless or until particular 
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regions made the decision to amalgamate. The SWF formalised into its rules for the 
first time standing committees for women, Maori and Pacific Island members. 
The SWU incorporated the unions into one national union on a much more integrated 
basis. Its internal structure consisted of three regions - Northern, Central and 
Southern - and five divisions - Hospitality and Catering, Education, Commercial 
Services, and Entertainment - with sections based on particular awards. C&C's former 
coverage became the Education and Commercial Services divisions, with H&HW's 
boarding schools included in Education. That is, although the amalgamation brought 
together occupations and enabled cooperation across the whole labour market for 
cleaning work, the internal structure had an 'industry' base. That is, divisions and 
sections reIlecting earlier patterns of responsibility and negotiation, despite the 
expected fragmentation of national awards. coverage. Divisions retained autonomy 
over industry strategy and action, under a local-to-national chain of command. 
However, decisions about policy, finances and the allocation of resources would be 
made by a national executive, based on regional representation. While local and 
regional executives included representatives of each 'industry' division, the national 
executive was based on regional representation only. All non-paid officials have a 
background in the occupation or industry in which they work, but balance on the 
decision making executive at national relied on each industry group making sure its 
candidates are put up and voted in. There is no assurance that women cleaners or 
any other hard-to-organise or female-dominated occupation, already under-repre-
sented in regional C&C and H&HW unions, will gain a place on the new national SWU 
executive by this means. 
However, standing committees for women, Maori and Pacific Island members were 
provided for. Their convenors, elected at annual hui, fono and seminars, were to be 
present on the national executive - with speaking rights but no vote. This pOint will be 
discussed in the next section. 
In the election of officers, SWU rules went further than the 1987 Act, by including 
assistant secretaries along with secretaries as paid but elected officers of the union. 
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Ironically, the actual implementation of this structure came after the passing of the 
Employment Contracts Act, which contains no requirement whatsoever for democracy 
or accountability in either employers' or employees' organisations. 
Terms of office, although renewable, were longer for paid officials than unpaid. This 
would appear to retain a certain control in the hands of fulltime paid officers. The 
structure also ensured sufficient positions with executive involvement to provide for all 
incumbent paid offers of the amalgamating C&C and H&HW unions. Some H&HW 
officials saw problems in blending the two union groups and were doubtful about how 
the overall direction of SWU would be affected by the allocation of personalities to 
positions in the new hierarchy. 
"So we have got the old Wellington H&HW style and the Cleaners style, which 
have really been in quite sharp contrast and now look at the personnel who are 
running our organisation ... (With) divisional secretaries, key personnel in the 
hospitality division in the North Island are cleaners officials. A lot of the old 
Hotel personnel have been wiped out." 
While secretaries consult regularly with their presidents and other executive members, 
considerable power of initiative and recommendation continues to lie with secretaries, 
several of whom in these unions were particularly strong and persuasive personalities. 
"The expectation that any elected group ... who are in their normal every day lives 
cleaners and waiters and hotel porters are going to be a match for someone 
got that position because of his ability as a speaker and negotiator." 
Amalgamation streamlined overall organisation 'from regional unions, each with its own 
executive and representation on the management committee of the SWF, to one 
national union. SWU's hierarchical structure was a much steeper pyramid with 13 
votes on the national executive where formerly there were around 24. As Canterbury 
H&HW officials saw it: 
"With a smaller number of bureaucrats they are making some key decisions and 
really stamping their authority on them." 
SWU rules provided for democratic input into policy through membership votes at 
meetings at least once a year: 
The supreme policy and decision making body of the Union shall be the 
membership freely exercising their will through their votes at democratically 
conducted meetings of members. (SWU 1990: Rule 15) 
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Members could also submit policy remits to the national executive who set the agenda 
for decisions at regional and national meetings. Special general meetings, at regional 
or national level, could be called by executives or by groups of financial members. 
Industrial meetings were called by officers of the union and, as was laid down by the 
1987 and 1991 Acts, a secret ballot on striking could be called by any member who 
would be party to it. 
Policy recommendations also came from annual conferences of delegates. Rule 22 
required that 'in allocating its resources the Union shall give priority to establishing a 
programme of regular workplace visits ... to elect Union delegates', Delegates had a 
responsibility to 'represent the interests of the membership ... to the Union and to the 
employer', in a clearly bottom-to- top representation, although this was to be 
'consistent with the Rules and Policy of the Union.' This strong role for delegates 
mapped out in the rules was an ideal not easily realised, for reasons already 
discussed. 
The rules regarding delegates reflect the outcome of an important debate in the 
amalgamation talks around democratic union decision making. The Wellington H&HW 
established an annual conference of delegates as the policy setting body for the union. 
C&C officials argued that fully democratic decisions could only be made by 'rank and 
file' members, through the traditional union method of general membership meetings 
or ballots. 
"It is a cumbersome operation. The whole organisation is geared towards the 
stopwork meetings, people organise for months to get good turnouts to them, 
hundreds of job meetings to explain what will happen at the meetings." 
H&HW practices stemmed from the view that, in practice, fully informed democratic 
decisions were unlikely to emerge from formal and hierarchically organised public 
meetings usually attended by only part of the membership. 
"We have a quarterly meeting system where supposedly the policy of the union 
is made. They are attended by a small number of generally the same people. 
In my view those meetings aren't a successful decision making process. 1/ 
"You get one powerful speaker who stands up, puts the recommendation, puts 
it to the vote, everybody says aye and it's done. That used to happen in the 
H&HW." 
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At such meetings the membership simply voted on what was put before them. While 
attendance at C&C worksite and other meetings about disputes or difficulties was 
usually high, general membership meeting attendance was variable, with a noticeable 
disproportion of male caretakers and security officers to women cleaners. General 
membership meetings allowed little room for the kind of full and equal discussion of 
ideas and workplace needs that experienced delegates could engaged over the 
course of a two-day conference. In H&HW such conferences had led to committees 
for women, Maori and Pacific Island members. 
The C&C position prevailed in the SWU rules, with the delegates conference remaining 
a recommending body only. H&HW officials were ultimately unable to argue against 
the democratic principle of decisions being made by 'rank and file' members. C&C 
leaders saw this as a success for democratic process: 
"There has been more a push from C&C to put the power of the union in the 
hands of the members ... We think it is a much better method of imparting 
information and getting decisions made than relying on some executive body 
or a delegates structure." 
However, some officials continued to express doubts about the actual practice of 
democracy under this structure, particularly with members for whom formal meeting 
procedures were unfamiliar or intimidating, or for whom English was a second 
language. 
"I went to some of those meetings (on the Growth Agreement). They wouldn't 
have said anything other than supporting the recommendation of the executive 
because they didn't understand the issue. That's what happens at stopworks." 
This difference of opinion on structures to some extent reflected differences in the 
organising situation of C&C and H&HW. The industrial groups organised by C&C had 
less effective, less well established delegate structures, for reasons of workforce distri-
bution rather than organiser effort or union strategy. This situation might be improved 
but not readily changed. Lack of effective and experienced worksite delegates acting 
as a conduit between officials and the membership combined with the centralised and 
institutionalised nature of wage fixing in the past. Both acted against active 
participation in union matters and informed membership-driven democracy. 
"The argument from the old hands is that the workers don't want to, they are not 
interested, they never tum up at meetings ... but if you don't educate them, how 
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are they going to know? A lot of decisions are made from the top, then taken 
to the rank and file who are encouraged to vote in a particular way. An 
example was the 2% (Growth Agreement). II 
In principle, the SWU structure allowed delegates to bring workplace concerns to 
conferences, where they might lead to policy recommendations. These then went to 
meetings of the full membership for endorsement, rejection or amendment into policy. 
The role of the executive was to administer between membership meetings the policy 
that the rank and file members had endorsed. 
The more sceptical, however, suggested that there was always room for differences 
between formal rules and informal practices in all large hierarchical organisations. 
"The SWU certainly has a more democratic set of rules than us (Canterbury 
H&HW). I think it is really a matter of how we use rules. If you don't have a will 
to make genuine democracy work, you can use the rules how you want tO,1I 
The democratic but necessarily slow and careful policy making procedure under SWU 
rules did not quite match up with recent important union decisions which had arisen 
quickly at the level of national politics, such as the 1990 Growth Agreement. The 
reality in such cases was that it was secretaries and national executives who decided. 
Also significant for the gap between democratic ideal and actual practice was the 
origin of initiatives for decisions, especially major recent ones. 
"Some initiatives come from the executive, most come from the officials and that 
is where the information comes from. II 
The amalgamation decisions, for example, were voted on by the membership, but the 
strong initiative for them came from the leadership. Some leaders continued to push 
for one national union despite earlier rejection by H&HW members in favour of the 
more decentralised federal structure in 1988. The Compact and the Growth 
Agreement were eventually endorsed by the membership on the recommendation of 
executives, but the initiative came from the NZCTU. The membership vote merely 
confirmed a political fait accompli by a corporatist NZCTU leadership. 
505 
Quite apart from the rights or wrongs of each strategy or decision, these situations 
point up the need for union leadership and full time officials to more accurately reflect 
the nature of the membership. 
Gender and Race Representation 
One way in which the specific concerns of a female dominated membership - and of 
Maori and Pacific Island members - could be raised in the new SWU was through the 
specific representation provided by standing committees. These were patterned on 
NZCTU's structures for women and Maori workers. This organisational reflection of 
membership identity in SWU resulted from developments in H&HW and was given little 
support by C&C officials. 
From the mid 1980s feminist and other progressive unionists within H&HW began to 
push for union leadership to recognise in its strategies and concerns the fact that the 
membership was predominantly women, including many Pacific Island and Maori 
women. A remit was passed at the 1984 H&HW Federation conference providing for 
a first women's conference in November 1984, and to organise it the first informal 
women's committee was begun. 
'~ group of women delegates had got extremely frustrated ... The boys seemed 
to be organising right around them and really not asking for any input 
whatsoever, and we were an 80% women membership. II 
This national gathering brought together women from every affiliate to work out aims 
and objectives to be presented at the 1985 H&HW delegates conference. 
IISome of the affiliates deliberately sent women that they thought would be 
obstructive, and they were at the beginning. But the end result was we were 
all united. II 
Central to these objectives, and a specific demand in itself, was the Working Women's 
Charter, already adopted as FOL policy five years earlier. The women's committee 
met vociferous opposition at the 1985 conference, particularly on the abortion clause 
of the Charter. 
liThe arguments from the guys were just hair-raising in my vjew." 
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The Charter was not adopted till the following year, but the 1985 Conference 
authorised a standing committee and an annual women's conference. However, the 
status of these remained informal. 
IIWe had a majority of male organisers on the staff ... The senior positions and a 
large proportion of the executive were men, so the women's committee was 
seen as a way of getting women more involved, increasing their confidence, 
rather than any kind of feminist analysis and certainly no serious look at 
structures. It was just ad hoc, it didn't have any place in the constitution of the 
union II 
Women organisers got behind the women's committee and organised a series of 
women's seminars in 1986. 
IISome had a conscious agenda to ge1...a more feminist analysis into the 
industrial organising of the union, some just at a more gut level of there are too 
many men around here and that's not velY good. /I 
When the NZCTU was set up in 1987, H&HW supported its separate structures for 
Maori and women. Yet its own committees were not formalised into the union rules 
when they were redrafted to comply with the Labour Relations Act, 1987. Only when 
the SWF was formed in 1988 were standing committees formally written into the rules, 
providing space specifically for women, Maori and Pacific Islanders in the 
. organisational structure. The initial committee for both Maori and Pacific Islanders 
became two, on the suggestion of the Maori, as the two groups raised quite different 
concerns. Annual women's conferences, hui and fono were provided for and 
representatives from the standing committee were included as full members of the 
SWF executive. 
The strategy by which this change was achieved parallelled that of feminist unionists 
within the Federation of Labour examined in Chapter 5. Policy change at the national 
level ensured the resources and organiser time necessary to encourage the building 
of similar organisation at the local level. 
IIThat (national SWF) women's committee enabled us to have a national 
conference and women's committee members hoped to get local women's 
committees at the affiliate level up and running. II 
Even in 1992: 
'~s far as the SWU is concerned, if it wasn't for the CTU national 
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women's committee still being in existence, I believe that our women's 
involvement would be even more seriously marginalised." 
Progress was uneven both regionally and between the different SWF standing 
committees. Nationally, the women's committee was the most successful of the three, 
while at the regional level the Northern Pacific Island Committee was strongest. Maori 
committees were the least well sustained, although annual hui were successful. But 
by 1992 there was a fairly strong Maori presence on Northern regional and district 
executives. 
Low involvement 'from the C&C side was a feature of all standing committees. Only 
from 1990, as amalgamations began at the regional level, did C&C women cleaners 
begin to participate in seminars and other activities. 
"It was quite an on-going battle trying to get C&C women involved in our 
women's structures ... There was absolutely no encouragement." 
Despite the relative success and continuity of the women's structures, and the interest 
members showed in women's seminars and issues like sexual harassment, some male 
officials still found it difficult to understand why women should be seen as a group with 
specific issues when women were the majority of the membership. Specific 
organisation around race gained easier acceptance, particularly in the North Island 
unions, and annual fono are well funded. 
"Again and again it's 'I can understand why we have the Maori committee 
because I don't understand anything about Maori and that means I can go and 
ask them, and with Pacific Islanders.' But they think they know about women, 
so it's not an issue." 
In Wellington and Auckland Pacific Island committees operated as a focal point for 
networking between Pacific Islanders in the well organised hospitals. There was low 
participation from Pacific Islander members in hospitality and cleaning. This was 
because evening work hours and family commitments make evening meetings difficult 
to attend and, those involved felt, because there was insufficient encouragement from 
organisers for new members and more isolated groups of workers to participate. 
"I became a delegate (but) I actually didn't hear about the committee until some 
time later ... At our delegates conference last year (1991) a lot of people hadn't 
heard about the Pacific Island committee, the women's committee and the 
Maori committee." 
508 
An important purpose of the standing committees, readily supported by leadership, 
was to encourage women to participate more fully in the union at all levels, and also 
in their workplaces. 
"For a person like myself, who knew nothing about trade unionism, those 
women's structures were really vital. /I 
"The main aim was to give women confidence, rather than to react to particular 
issues ... That is the very first job, because they will repeatedly say, I can't do 
that, oh no, I haven't got the education to get involved. If we can turn those 
women around and let them know that they can do it, because they " 
"Really probably the nicest thing about the job was seeing women who were 
exactly like me when I first came in and I watched them grow ... getting heavily 
involved and quite stroppy ... whereas in the past they would have sat quietly at 
the outside of the meeting and not even have spoken. 1/ 
In 1986 candidates from the women's, Maori and Pacific Island committees of H&HW 
were put up for elections to executive positions. However, progress was slow. In 
1991, the Pacific Island convenor's report addressed to the 'SWU Men's Committee' 
pointed out that in the phase of transition to the SWU 13 out of the 16 national and 
regional officers of the union were male. Men continue to dominate paid union 
positions. In 1992 officials pointed to two new women divisional heads and an equal 
. employment opportunity policy, but this progress lagged a decade behind other large 
female dominated unions. 
Male officials recognised the importance of the standing committees in encouraging 
participation. However, they showed much more ambivalent attitudes toward issues 
raised by the women's committees which went beyond participation in traditional 
unionism to consider issues arising from the gendered nature of jobs, labour market 
segregation, or wider issues of concern to working women. 
"They wanted to know what we are doing at our meetings and on several 
occasions they said, I am sorry, you are not convening a national meeting to 
discuss this." 
'~ keenness and commitment to promote issues around low pay and to support 
childcare ... but a great anxiety on the part of senior (male) officials not to have 
the union somehow labelled as feminist, because that would put people off. 
They were saying they knew better what women members thought than radical 
women organisers did. 1/ 
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Women's issues were seen at best as marginal by some male officials, at worst as 
women organisers using the committee to further their own political agenda. In a . 
unionist world crosscut by labour Party, SUP and WCl loyalties and divisions, rapidly 
forming networks and friendship among like-minded feminist organisers and members 
were assumed by male leaders to result from 'united front' revolutionary tactics, with 
a suspicion out of proportion to actual small party affiliation, and continuing after both 
the WCl, then the SUP dissolved. The following two statements describe essentially 
the same process of solidarity developing between women unionists. 
"She started to use the committee process to put up her own ideas. She was 
seen to be part of another political group, that's the other side of the 
coin ... There are some valid criticisms of the way (they) worked, if women or 
anybody take up that united front model of working." 
"1 enjoyed most of all meeting women from all around the country and finding 
that we had all those common interests and frustrations and needs .. .lt was 
wonderful the closeness that was established when I think back how little time 
we spent together, yet how strong the bond was. Probably that has been our 
greatest strength. I could see it in the men's eyes at meetings, that look of 
almost dismay that these women were actually friends with each other." 
The Pacific Island committee also felt pressure to limit itself to strictly union issues 
rather than broader matters that were important to them as Pacific Island workers. 
"When I joined I thought the role of the committee was to help Pacific Island 
people in our union and also take issues of concern among Pacific islanders 
to the people at the executive level. But I have been told the standing commit-
tees were set up to get members onto the executive and that's all they were set 
up to do ... The committee's sort of grown out of that, we discuss outside issues 
like immigration, overstayers, health and safety." 
They would also like to see more Pacific Islanders organising Pacific Island members. 
"Look at the number of Pacific Islanders who are organisers. There is only (two) 
and they don't cover the areas that are staffed mainly by Pacific Islanders." 
Officials agreed that having Pacific Island members on the executive was important, 
but saw this as a goal in itself, not a means of getting the weight of SWU behind 
Pacific Island concerns raised in committee. A uncontroversial example of low priority 
being given to the standing committee;s concerns was the translation of awards into 
Pacific Island languages: 
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"We were really fobbed off so many times ... When we don't have people in the 
right place, in the executive, that's the time we find that issues are very hard to 
push ... There is nobody at the moment." 
Women officlals considered that less than wholehearted commitment by union 
leadership was a factor in the varying success of the standing committees; that 
specific organiser time and sufficient resources and travel funds were essential to 
service the committees, enable national contact and to demonstrating that SWU as an 
organisation was in fact determined to reflect its membership. The power of initiative 
lay with office holders, and this included considerable power over prioritising policies 
and allocating resources in an increasingly tight budgetary situation. 
'There were big arguments in 1986 about whether we could use some paid time 
to organise women's seminars and the directive was that we had to do it in our 
own time, that it wasn't real work. II 
liThe reality is that you can have policies coming out your ears, but if people 
don't believe in them, then they'll ignore them. And again and again it 
happens." 
Amalgamation with C&C introduced a strongly conservative factor into the equation. 
Specific representation on gender and race had always been considered divisive by 
. C&C secretaries and was initially opposed in negotiations towards amalgamation. 
When the SWU rules were rapidly cobbled together for registration before the 
Employment Contracts Act became law, the SWF standing committee provisions were 
considerably weakened. Most importantly, representatives on the national executive 
lost the right to vote. Tilis was seen by women officials as a major step backwards, 
even though the vote in SWF did not give a great deal of strength. 
"The vote is one in a (membership) card voting system so you'll get 69,000 
votes and one vote for women. But if initially they have a hand vote it has some 
strength. And I think it is important to just to get it then to fight for a better form 
of voting." 
"This not having voting rights had been pushed through quite quickly, quite late 
in the piece before an effective lobby against it had time to get mobilised ... For 
people outside the Wellington circle it happened before they had even heard." 
SWU rules as at 13 May 1991, hastily written at the highest levels of the union, were 
unclear and confusing on several points with regard to the standing committees. They 
did not specified at what levels the standing committees would operate. Standing 
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committee convenors were included on the National Executive 'with speaking rights 
put no voting rights', but not mentioned for regional executives. There was no right 
to annual gatherings. Regional executives 'may' convene an annual meeting, but no 
mention was made of national seminars, hui and fono which SWF had successfully 
held for some years. The expense of bringing together standing committees members 
for national gatherings had long been a point of contention. As women officials 
understood it, the intention was that standing committees should indeed exist at each 
level, and should attend and report to executives at that level, but not exercise a vote. 
The extent of participation in executive meetings beyond reporting was unclear. 
"It is a step back .. . because they are a separate structure that is forever 
accountable and getting nothing back. They report at every level but they never 
get a vote." 
"ff you are a Pacific Island woman you lose out twice ... How do we participate 
in any organisation that gives us no vote? It is a bit like saying you can have 
a say about who will be government, but at the end of it being refused a ballot 
paper ... We only want to keep what we already have - a vote." 
The rationale for denying this vote was one that had featured strongly in the 
Federation of Labour debates on structures for the I\lZCTU. It was that these 
women's, Maori or Pacific Island representatives should not vote because they were 
not democratically elected, since they had been elected by only part, not the whole 
of the membership. 
1~/ways the criticism has been, but they are not accountable, who are they 
accountable to?" 
As women officials pointed out, this argument ignored the fact that, like delegates and 
union officers, standing committee convenors were in fact elected by the members 
whose interests they were to represent. The committees provided a forum for issues 
specific to women, Maori or Pacific Island workers who were marginalised in both the 
labour market and their own union. As committees open to and representing a 
particular section of membership, they were no less democratic than any other 
membership meeting. Convenors were responsible to present the committee's 
concerns at executive meetings and to participate on general issues from an important 
specific perspective. 
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The loss of the vote was felt as a setback by women officials: 
"It is very despairing for those of us who spent a lot of time getting those 
structures ... 1 don't think some people ever believed in them and this is a chance 
to get rid of them ... They feel very threatened by forums that they can't attend." 
Like the women's committees, Pacific Island committee members felt themselves 
undermined and devalued by criticisms about representativeness. The Northern 
committee had been kept active through strong participation by hospital workers. 
"Sometimes I think we are not taken very seriously. Just things we hear like, oh 
well, we are not really representative of Pacific Island people because we all 
work in the public hospital, so how would we know? Not taken seriously 
because they believe we are not a proper representation of the people that we 
are supposed to be speaking for, which is not true." 
One suggestion to counter these marginal ising arguments was to recruit more support 
for the issues raised by each committee through closer liaison between committees, 
and closer relations with appropriate executive members not involved in standing 
committees. This was made possible by the 'multiple identities' of SWU members -
the majority of Pacific Island and Maori committee members were women, and a 
number of the women on the union's executive committees were Maori or Pacific 
. Islanders. Issues raised by one committee could be fielded for support in other 
committees and come to executives for decision with more backing. 
In 1992 support for effective standing committees was demonstrated by the general 
membership. Since the rules were unsatisfactory in more ways than just the right to 
vote, the standing committees were able to raise the issue first at the regional dele-
gates' conferences, then at the membership AGMs. Their remit went for the lot. It 
included speaking and voting rights at all levels; annual national hui, fono and 
seminars; up to four national standing committee meetings each year for three 
representatives from each region; and the election of three national convenors. The 
remit was passed at one but not all three delegates' conferences, which meant it went 
forward to the AGMs without leadership recommendation. Nevertheless, it was passed 
with 93% of the vote in favour. 
"The leaders of the union could stand up and oppose it. But it was passed." 
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This was a situation where members supported a construction of the collective 
interests of the union as specifically including 'women's interests', 'Maori interests' and 
'Pacific Island interests', against a different construction of collective interests by union 
leaders (Offe & Wissenthal 1985) - and the membership view prevailed. 
Interestingly, the Wellington women's committee flyer urging support included a remit 
about support for gay and lesbian workers. This seems not to have been unduly 
controversial and was carried on a large Northern vote. A remit on Equal Employment 
Opportunity policy within SWU was also carried with 98% in favour. These results 
indicate that concerns about the union alienating members by being 'too feminist' were 
not justified. 
At the national level these standing committee changes added the voting power of 
three convenors to an executive of 10 national and regional presidents and secretaries. 
"That's a lot of voting power. If they hadn't been so arrogant as to think that we 
would lose it, they might have put up a compromise position which would have 
been very hard to combat." 
The central problem in the marginalisation of the standing committees and attempts 
by some unionists to reduce their influence was differences in perception about the 
purpose of the committees, which emerged in interviews. For feminist unionists and 
a few progressive men, tile committees were needed in order to develop and change 
unionism: to enable the union to address issues arising from the gendered and 
racially specific nature of the work and the workforce. 
"It's not just affirmative action, getting numbers of women in there, it's a 
question of what they represent." 
Other officials, persuaded to accept and support changes in structure, saw the 
committees as developing the members within traditional unionism: encouraging the 
less confident, less union conscious sections of the membership. 
"/t's really just to provide support to delegates to get into it and to feel 
comfortable in the organisation. /I 
Those who took the first view agreed the second was highly necessary, but did not 
see it as sufficient. 
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This second view of standing committees held by the leadership - and arguably a 
concern to contain committee activities - can be read from the wording and order of 
the standing committees' objectives laid out in SWU's rules: 
The Standing Committees shall provide a focus for their constituency to 
encourage and promote unionism, encourage participation within the Union, 
initiate education programmes and other activities of particular concern to their 
Committee which are consistent with the policy and objectives of the Union, 
promote the concerns of he Committee to the Regional Executive and National 
Executive with practical proposals for the achievement of the Committees' 
objectives." (SWU 1991: Rule 32.2) 
The rules stated the union's objectives in strong terms of 'working class unity and 
solidarity' (Rule 3.3), but include for this purpose as one of its powers 'to work for the 
elimination of sexism, racism and all other forms of discrimination and oppression and 
inequalities in the workforce' (Rule 4.11). Thus, concerns of gender and race are 
officially subordinated to a class analysis in SWU's rules, with: 
"Some attention to women's issues, to fit that progressive image ... 1 see it as a 
strategic commitment to women's issues and not a real commitment, because 
most of the people who hold power don't actually understand what a real 
commitment would be." 
. This discussion of structural changes and dissent in the union's internal organisation 
is not intended to be unduly critical of the SWU. 
Rather it presents a picture of a union organisation in mid process of change towards 
reflecting the gender and racial mix of its membership in its structure, its leadership 
and its policies. This is a process which some other female dominated unions under-
went in the early 1980s, and which some unions have yet to begin. A woman 
engaged in similar struggles in another set of New Zealand institutions referred to this 
process as achieving the 'critical mass' of women active in an organisation which is 
needed to achieve representative leadership. Amalgamations, restructuring and 
pressures from legislative change have contributed to a very fluid situation in SWU, 
which may - or may not - speed the process of this change. 
The gender and race dynamics of SWU are of particular interest to this study because 
they capture in microcosm the politics around gender and race in the union movement 
as a whole. SWU's standing committee structures mirror those of the NZCTU which, 
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as discussed in Chapter 5, resulted from a similar debate and considerable struggle 
within the Federation of Labour in the mid 1980s. In a small and more easily examined 
way, the internal changes of the SWU to represent its membership by gender and race 
also present a microcosm of radical political changes in the wider New Zealand 
society. 
The Impact of the Employment Contracts Act 
By mid 1992 all awards formerly negotiated by C&C and H&HW had lapsed and 
negotiation of collective contracts had begun on an enterprise by enterprise basis 
under the Employment Contracts Act, 1991. Differences of outcome in these 
negotiations arose from two factors: the degree of workforce fragmentation, and the 
interests of employers. Workforce concentration and organising logistics determined 
the degree of resistance possible on the union side of negotiations; however, the Act 
significantly shifted the balance of power towards employers (Anderson 1991). It was 
employers' strategies, not union strategies, which determined the form contracts took. 
And it was success or failure to achieve a collective contract that largely determined 
the pattern of membership loss or retention. 
By June 1992, SWU membership - and revenue - had dropped 32%. At October 1992 
detailed membership information was not yet available, because of the very fluid 
situation and because of temporary data chaos as all SWU accounting was transferred 
to a new computer in Auckland and reorganised. However, officials were able to 
estimate losses in each area of union coverage. 
Where large collective contracts had been acrlieved, on well-organised large worksites 
such as public hospitals, most major accommodation hotels and Air NZ, membership 
remained close to 100%. Losses were highest in the areas of greatest workforce 
fragmentation - particularly in tearooms and restaurants where the award had lapsed 
immediately in May 1991, and in those small hotels, pubs and clubs where collective 
contracts had not been negotiated following the expiry of the Licensed Hotels award 
in early 1992. 
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The three major membership areas of former C&C award coverage - commercial 
cleaning, school and security ~ were well served in negotiations because of employers' 
own preference for a mUlti-employer form of bargaining. Estimated overall 
membership loss in these areas was less than the SWU average around 20%. There 
were few resignations; most losses were in small commercial contract cleaning firms 
for whom satisfactory collective contracts had not been settled. 
In 1991 C&C officials approached the Master Cleaners Association to propose a 
multi-employer employment contract for commercial cleaners. They argued that this 
would act to provide a stable floor for labour costs under the highly competitive market 
for cleaning contracts. Because of continual tendering for contracts in the industry, 
commercial cleaning 'firms were very vulnerable to price undercutting through the use 
of non-union or cheaper labour by competitors. It was in the industry's interests for 
employers to continue to bargain as a group to avoid a downward spiral of wage 
rates, contract competition and cleaning standards. Cooperation with the unions: 
" .. .is not insane at all, it is in their interests. In that type of contracting industry, 
without a national award they are finished ... We are talking to employers already, 
that we can guarantee industrial peace, if they will play the game. 1/ 
"We have got a common enemy, you see. People that quote way under the 
standard rate to clean a building bring in labour and pay them below the award 
rate. It doesn't benefit anyone, the client pays because the standard drops, the 
workers are treated like slaves and for the employers it causes disruption and 
puts a black mark on the industry. II 
In February 1992 a multi-employer contract was settled which was Signed by all the 
major contracting companies, covering around 80% of the workforce in commercial 
cleaning. The small number of companies domihating the industry made it easier for 
cleaning employers to come together on this, against the tide of legislation and 
Employers Federation policy, than for the thousands of office or restaurant employers. 
The multi-employer contract negotiated included agreement on union fees deductions 
and organiser access to worksites, and membership continues to be solid. Wage 
rates were maintained, but in line with Employers Federation policy, penal rates were 
cut, from time and a half to time and a quarter until January 1993. After January 1993 
no penal rates would paid. However, since most cleaning is done between 
Monday to Friday, 90% of cleaners were unaffected by this change. The main group 
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whose pay would be reduced by the loss of penal rates were cleaners in shopping 
centres and supermarkets. 
It was no coincidence that employers in security also agreed to a multi-employer 
contract. This was also a highly competitive contract tendering industry with a small 
number of companies. Both chose the option under the new legislation that was 
closest to the old award that had maintain stability in their industries. -n-lis option was 
of course preferred by SWU officials, although it was not an option they themselves 
could choose under the Act. Multi-employer bargaining allowed them to represent a 
large section of membership through just one contract negotiation, rather than 
fragmenting into separate contracts with each commercial contractor, as had been the 
case for most sections of SWU membersrlip and for the clerical unions. 
However, under the Employment Contracts Act, the contract agreed by large cleaning 
contractors could not provide blanket coverage of the small competitors who remained 
outside the multi-employer contract, as was their right under the Act (S. 18(2)). Some 
of these had as many as 10 employees. By mid 1992 little headway had been made 
on collective contracts with these, who were likely to see deunionisation of their 
employees and lower rates as a way to undercut tendering by the market dominant 
multinationals. 
"My opinion is that employers who are outside of multi-employer contract are 
real bandits, they are not willing to negotiate collective contracts for their 
people ... There are already people out there on wages below the old document." 
Since the award lapsed, organisers reported spending more time on individual 
problems with these small employers. Some 'rats and mice' employers were well 
known to the union as bad employers; others were 'new brooms' picking up the small 
'key' jobs (e.g, 20 minutes per site) and beginning to encroach on larger jobs. 
"It's sometimes just bosses with contracts that are too big for them, a husband 
and wife team who take someone on and don't really understand what they 
have to payor leave requirements." 
Blanket coverage and the union's right to enforce awards had allowed officials to 
intervene and protect cleaners' rates and conditions. Now, where no collective 
contract exists, only statutory minima applied to new employees. Organisers reported 
518 
that some employers had little knowledge, or little concern, about employer 
obligations, even on such matters as ACC, leave or holiday pay. Nor was the state 
enforcing its employment related Acts. SWU was receiving complaints about Minimum 
Wage Act matters referred to them by the Labour Department. Some complaints 
involved unemployed workers sent to jobs subsidised by the NZ Employment Service 
whose officers did not see contracts, rights or employer obligations as their concern. 
The disproportionate amount of organiser time spend on such problems meant less 
attention for the cleaners covered by the multi-employer contract who made 
unionisation of the industry viable. 
liThe Grothalls cleaners pay to fund the union, just on the numbers, and they are 
not getting the visits, because it is these other people who are being sacked or 
sexually harassed or paid $4 instead of $8.60. II 
However uneconomic of effort it might be, the role of SWU officials in protecting and 
policing the deregulated fringes of the labour market for cleaning was vitally important. 
Without blanket coverage of awards or contracts to regulate the 'rats and mice', 
officials realised that undercutting on wage rates and conditions would make the 
multi-employer contract unsustainable. These employers could destabilise the market 
. for cleaning services - to the detriment of large employers, as well as SWU members. 
Whether fully regulated or fully liberalised, the labour market is the focus of workers' 
collective concern, not just terms of employment for individuals. The more casualised 
and insecure the employment, the more important this focus on organiSing the labour 
market becomes. 
In factories, local authorities and airports the small percentage of directly employed 
cleaners were incorporated into new collective enterprise contracts with their employer, 
usually negotiated by the dominant union on site. How well cleaners' interests would 
be served by this would depend on the fortunes of the particular industry and on the 
interest which the representing union did or did not take in its minority cleanin9 
members. In the debate on industry unionism this is the situation argued against by 
unions for occupations, like cleaning and clerical work, which 'span a range of 
industries (Hill 1991 b). Some cleaners directly employed on small sites were likely to 
be lost from representation by any union, along with cleaners employed by contractors 
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who do not join multi-employer employment contract. Without union coverage Against 
a background of high unemployment, SWU officials feared that falling pay rates for 
these cleaners will act as a drag on the labour market for all cleaners. 
In school cleaning, union membership remained very high. Less than 30 resignations 
were received in the month following enactment of the Employment Contracts Act. A 
small reduction in membership in the months that followed was due to Ilew staff not 
being recruited quickly on scattered school locations while officials' attention was taken 
up with difficult negotiations. 
Centralised collective contract negotiation was maintained for school cleaners. As the 
Education Services award neared expiry, the SSC announced its intention of devolving 
responsibility for contract negotiation for non-teaching staff to the Board of Trustees 
for each school. This would fragment C&C's one national document into 2,700 
negotiations, school by school: 'a bureaucratic nightmare' for the union. Opposition 
came from the schools themselves. Boards of Trustees were reluctant to add the role 
of labour relations negotiator to their voluntary workload. C&C officials canvassed 
Boards and encouraged them to resist further devolution of what schools saw as the 
State Services Commission's responsibility. 
"The feedback from the vast majority was that we didnlt get into this to negotiate 
employment contracts. We are here for the kids I education. II 
sse agreed to negotiate a mUlti-employer contract with SWU officials. Individual 
schools could then opt to sign this, or negotiate their own contract within State 
Services Commission guidelines. However, the State Services Commission's first 
proposal cut allowances, overtime, leave, penal rates and holidays, and in June 1992 
school cleaners and caretakers voted by a 95% majority for a 2-day strike. The main 
concession in the final contract was on penal rates. Full union rights of access and 
information were included in the contract. Since the great majority of schools have 
signed the contract, for C&C officials it represents a base position on any collective 
contract proposed by an individual school. 
I~ny schools that try to undercut what we see as the bottom line now will be in 
dispute straight away. /I 
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The State Service Commission's attempt to devolve contract negotiating responsibility 
to individual schools was glossed as the next step in self-management under the 
Tomorrow's Schools policy (Lange 1988: NZ Taskforce 1988). However, it was also 
the implementation of an Employment Contracts policy in the state's own labour 
market, with the aim of fragmenting national occupational awards in the state sector 
(Hill 1993a). The outcome for school cleaners differed from that of nurses employed 
by Area Health Boards, however, because the interests of Boards of Trustees and 
school cleaners coincided; both preferred the continuation of centralised wage 
negotiation and one national document. 
The resulting optional multi-employer document can be seen as success, failure or 
compromise on the government agenda. Penal rates were removed by the SSC, but 
school cleaning, like most commercial cleaning, is a Monday to Friday job. Take 
home pay was unlikely to be affected. A caretaker coming in on an occasional 
Saturday or Sunday was likely to be working more than 40 hours and paid overtime. 
The concession, like the negotiations, was ideologically driven. 
"It was quite clear that there were things they would move on and things that 
they had been told were not negotiable. II 
C&C officials saw clearly the contradiction between rhetoric about choice and a closer 
relationship between employer and employee, and policies to contain the 
government's deficit through state budget cutting. 
"On the one hand, (the Minister of Labour) is saying he wants every employer 
to sit down and negotiate with employees and work out the best deal for them. 
On the other hand, he says it is totally appropriate for him to be very centrally 
involved in the process." 
Because of the coincidence of employers' interests and union interests, then, in areas 
of former C&C coverage the outcomes of first negotiations under the Employment 
Contracts Act were considerably better than might have been the case. In 1991 it had 
seemed likely that these awards would fragment into enterprise negotiations with 
individual commercial cleaning and security companies and 2,700 schools. In the 
event, mUlti-employer contracts covering the bulk of the membersllip were continued. 
This meant that, until 1993 at least, organising and negotiating logistics have not 
changed greatly and membership was maintained at 80% of levels under compulsory 
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unionism. These cleaners could have continued to operate viably as an independent 
union, rather than amalgamating into the SWU to gain a larger organisational base as 
a strategy for organisational survival. However, in the opinion of their officials: 
"That would be a very short term view. It could easily have gone the other way." 
In hospital coverage it was again the strategies of employers - and that largest 
employer, the state - that determined the form of bargaining, while the concentration 
or fragmentation of the workforce determined the degree of resistance to 
decollectivisation that was possible. In negotiations in 1992 the situation of SWU 
members parallelled that of nurses in both public and private sectors. Changes which 
traded penal time payments into base rates were no mere ideological concession, as 
for most cleaners in commercial contracting and schools, but had real effect on the 
earnings of SWU members. 
Public hospital cleaners, along with kitchen staff and orderlies, continued to be the 
backbone of SWU organisation, as they were for H&HW. Unionisation remained close 
to 100% and sites were well organised with delegates. These members were 
strategically well positioned for effective industrial action to support collective 
negotiations. 
In the second half of 1992 14 separate contracts were settled with 14 separate Area 
Health Boards. From 1993 negotiations would 'fragment further into contracts for 23 
Crown Health Enterprises, plus however many private sector enterprises were suc-
cessful in securing contracts. Whether directly employed by the new 'health provider' 
or by sub-contracting commercial cleaning companies, these cleaners - and other 
health workers including nurses - will find themselves in the same insecure situation 
as commercial cleaning members, witll disputes arising from the change-overs in 
health service contracts. In early 1993 when this research was concluded, it was an 
open question whether a multi-employer contract for cleaners will be achieved with 
CHE employers, or whether the large commercial cleaning contractors would wish to 
retain the mUlti-employer employment contract, if separately negotiated lower rates 
could help win a major cleaning contract in public health. 
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In the private health sector, SWU membership dropped around 30% by mid-1992. 
Losses reflected the fragmentation of the workforce, with greatest losses among those 
working on smaller worksites, particularly in resthomes. Here the negotiating situation 
parallel led that of private sector nurses, as employers pushed for decoliectivisation. 
In private hospitals and resthomes, negotiations fragmented to an enterprise basis. 
SWU members and NZNU nurses had to take industrial action to back their right to 
a collective contract under the Act. This was despite the fact that private surgical 
hospitals were expanding, and geriatric care being shifted into the private sector 
attracted a government subsidy with a specific component for increased labour costs 
of 2% in 1992 and 4.5% in 1991. 
"They can use it to increase wages or the number of workers. They have done 
neither and in fact they are after the penal rates and sick leave." 
For SWU members as well as nurses, private health employers used the Act to cut 
labour costs in order to position themselves competitively for National's proposed 
contracting out of public health services. The emphasis was on breaking down 
collective solidarity through negotiating individual rather than collective contracts, and 
on cutting penal rates. 
"Even when you get 10% on the hourly rate, some of those workers are going 
to lose 20-25% of their wage packet." 
"There is no such thing as the freedom of the worker and the employers to work 
out a mutually agreed position. There is huge pressure, coming indirectly from 
government, on those private sector employers not to pay an increase on the 
hourly rate in lieu of penal time." 
The result was extreme difficulty in negotiating collective contracts, intimidation and an 
increase in personal grievances taken by the union. In late 1992 Southern Cross was 
still insisting on individual contracts. The two largest religious and welfare hospitals 
in Auckland were as difficult with SWU members as they were with nurses. They 
side-stepped union delegates and officials on negotiations, re-rostered and threatened 
dismissal to get staff to sign, and hired new staff on a contract already rejected by 
existing staff. In Aucl-<Iand, Presbyterian Support Services and Methodist domestic 
staff joined nurses in the hunger strike to exert moral rather than industrial pressure 
in support of their right to a collective contract. 
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One religious and welfare resthome employer denied union officials access while staff 
were pressured to sign a contract cutting wages by up to 27%. Some resthome 
employers proposed clauses that gave the employer a unilateral right to vary the terms 
of the contract simply 'according to circumstances'. Another negotiated a non-union 
collective contract at a good rate of pay which incorporated penal rates and leave. 
Within months he had broken the contract and reduced rates, telling employees who 
objected that they would be rostered off their usual sl-lifts and might prefer to resign. 
The NZ Resthome Association, to which these employers belonged, was promoting 
a model contract which not only removed penal rates but reduced the minimum break 
between shifts to 8 hours and put employees on one hour's notice of termination of 
employment. Current practice in many of SWU's casualised occupations was a 
minimum two days' notice; already well short of the usual expectation in NZ that the 
period of notice corresponds to the period of weekly, fortnightly or monthly payment. 
"This Employment Contracts Act was to be the great leap forward, how we were 
going to get a quality skilled workforce - on one hour's notice of dismissal!" 
Despite these examples, some private health employers recognised that forcing down 
wages would lower the industry's standards of service. It was also likely to lead to 
reduced wage-tagged subsidies from a budget-cutting government. These employers 
did not want a low skill, low wage, low fee industry, and negotiated 'roll-over' contracts 
with SWU. SWU officials planned to inform the Labour Dept, Social Welfare Dept and 
Area Health Boards which hospitals were treating staff badly, and to lobby future 
'funder' bodies to favour employers with fair employment contracts and 'good 
employer' relations. 
Hospitality was SWU's area of greatest de-collectivisation and membership loss - with 
the greatest losses in just the areas where award talks had broken down in 1989 
without access to compulsory arbitration. The large work sites of the major accom-
modation hotels remain well organised, despite negotiating difficulties. Membership 
in licensed hotels dropped 20-30%, mostly in small hotels but also in large chains with 
uncooperative employers, where resignations tended to come in batches. Collective 
coverage in tearooms and restaurants, other than the fast food chains, became 
extremely low. 
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In the large tourist hotels, progress had been made towards an agreement with a 
recognised and transferable career training structure to benefit both workers and the 
industry. This was incorporated into a proposed mUlti-employer contract to replace 
the Major Accommodations Hotels award. In August 1992 workers at several 
Auckland large hotels voted for industrial action in support of this national 
multi-employer contract, with existing conditions and overtime rates. A contract which 
incorporated penal payments into higher hourly rates and recognised skill 
improvement was then agreed by employer negotiators and ratified by meetings of the 
membership, in preference to a 2% wage rise. However, the employers then reneged 
on this and opted for individual enterprise contracts. The SWU saw this as a 
backward move not only for its members but for NZ tourism. 
"For the first time the tourist industry in NZ had started to see itself as a 
career ... That's been blown out of the water." 
In August 1992 several hotels were offering employees collective contracts which were 
not negotiated with SWU nor directly with employees. Staff were 'free' to sign or to 
remain on existing terms and conditions. Officials suspected that in the international 
chain hotels pressure had come 'from Australian superiors to use the legislation to cut 
costs. SWU officials organised a mass stopwork meeting in response and the 
situation was also raised at stopwork meetings by Australian hotel unions. 
Hancocks, the pub and restaurant chain, put all its workers on individual contracts. 
Despite declaring a $71 million profit, they offered an unacceptable collective contract 
that cut penal payments and allowances, introduced youth rates and a unilateral right 
to cut any employee's hours on a week's notice. A similarly unacceptable collective 
contract, removing conditions and union rights, was being recommended to employers 
by the NZ Hotel Association. This was undermining union negotiations, although 
some licensing trusts and other employers negotiated in good faith. The Hotel 
Association's recommended strategy was to deal with workers individually, or offer 
contracts which give existing employees some protection but put new employees on 
lower rates. Under the Employment Contracts Act, if no collective contract was 
agreed, existing employees retained their existing rates, penal rates and conditions on 
'assumed' individual contracts. However, this meant that, in a high turnover industry, 
new workers could be hired in individually at much lower rates of pay and conditions. 
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"So they are setting up two classes of workers in the hotels." 
Organisers reported that existing employees were being disadvantaged through 
rostering or coming under personal pressure, as managers come to see them, not as 
experienced and valuable workers, but as relatively expensive employees and 
therefore less desirable to retain. 
The situation in hotels in 1 parallelled that which had developed the previous year 
in tearooms and restaurants, where H&HW's award had lapsed immediately on 
enactment of the Employment Contracts Act. This area of high turnover, parttime 
employment was SWU's greatest area of deunionisation. A membership of around 
22,000 dropped to less than half, with few restaurants covered by collective contracts. 
"If you started work after 15 May 1991, all you have is the statutory minimums 
unless you have a separate negotiated contract, and our success rate in terms 
of getting new collective contracts has been low. Appallingly low. /I 
The best membership retention and most successful collective negotiation of former 
Tearooms & Restaurant Award coverage was in the multi-national fast food chains -
an example of employment and ownership concentration as a primary organiser of 
workers (Ofte & Wissenthal 1985:176). These employers had been the stumbling 
block in settling the Tearooms & Restaurants award in 1989 and two had already 
negotiated their own enterprise agreement before the Employment Contracts Act. By 
mid 1992 three of the four major fast food chains had collective contracts with SWU, 
although one had first attempted a non-union collective contract. Despite high 
turnover, short shifts, youth labour and employer discouragement, unionisation was 
around 65%. Georgie Pie was the odd one out, with a non-union contract containing 
low junior rates. These low labour rates threaten the market position of the 
cooperating fast food chains. Georgie Pie's anti-union stance was odd, in that 
supermarket and variety chains owned by the same Australian parent company had 
been quite cooperative in negotiations with the Distribution Workers Union. 
The Employment Contracts Act increased the negotiating power of employers, allowing 
them a wider choice of contract forms. In most areas of SWU coverage, the 
employer's choice of contract form reflected the strategic strength or weakness of 
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SWU members in that industry. Their preference, in line with the recommendation of 
employers associations, was for the least collective form possible. A number of 
groups U-Ireatened or took industrial action in support of a collective contract; not all 
were successful. Even the strongest groups of workers were negotiating to defend 
their present position against the cost cutting strategies of employers. This situation 
was made possible by the changes to bargaining under the Employment Contracts 
Act, by its interpretation in the courts4 , and by the economic background of 15.5% 
joblessness. 
However, some employers have chosen, for reasons of management strategy on 
fronts other than labour relations, to negotiate collectively as employers, in the closest 
form to the old award available under the Employment Contract Act. In the two indus~ 
tries based on tendering for contracts, the employers recognised that an increase of 
competitive in their labour market would undermine competitive stability in the market 
for their services. However I without blanket coverage of all employers, their 
multi-employer contract was itself an unstable solution. In the third case, Boards of 
Trustees joined cleaners in resisting the fragmentation of negotiations, since they did 
not agree that shouldering this additional burden of devolved employer responsibility 
would benefit their schools. 
Union membership losses were greatest on worksites where enterprise based 
collective employment contracts were not achieved. Membership remained highest 
where a multi-employer contract was achieved and/or on large well organised 
worksites, suitable for traditional methods of union organising. While membership fell 
32% in 1992, there were nevertheless members joining or rejoining the union as they 
encountered problems with their employer. 
"Our best organising tool is the actions of the employer. When the boss 
comes around and says I am going to knock your hourly rate back by $2 
an hour, they want to join the union very fast. II 
4 Two Employment Court cases have upheld employers' right to use a 'partial lockout' to force 
employees to accept a contract. In the Community Services Union vs. IHC case, employees were 
'locked out' of certain current conditions which the employer wished to drop from a collective contract. 
In the Northern Local Government Officers Union vs. The Yellow Bus Co. case, by a similar process 
employees were forced onto inferior individual contracts. 
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Underlying deunionisation in SWU's areas of coverage were the same problems which 
the clerical unions experienced; problems of organising and negotiating for fragmented 
groups of isolated workers on small worksites with uncooperative employers. The 
effects of labour market deregulation on the most fragmented and traditionally weakest 
sections of the workforce had already been indicated by the awards negotiations 
which broke down in 1989 without the backup of arbitration. The greater adverse 
effects of the Employment Contracts Act on low paid women workers was eminently 
predictable. 
"Us, the clerical and the shoppies always stood to be the most vulnerable." 
Conclusion 
Under the traditional system of national awards, centralised negotiation backed by 
clever use of court arbitrated relativities was sufficient for C&C officials to deliver wage 
improvements to members. From the mid 1980s C&C's negotiating position, the 
interpretation of awards and members' employment security were increasingly backed 
by industrial action. However, building workplace organisation through elected 
delegates and regular organiser servicing received attention only in the late 1980s. 
High employment turnover, scattered worksites and the difficulty of physical access 
limited the effectiveness of this for C&C cleaners, relative to cleaners employed in 
H&HW's large hospital and hotel worksites. 
Had C&C awards fragmented to separate enterprise bargaining, membership losses 
under the Employment Contracts Act would have been severe. Contract negotiations 
in commercial cleaning, dominated by multinational companies, could have met the 
difficulties encountered with the large accommodation hotels, but it would have been 
much harder to maintain members and organisation on scattered client worksites. 
Had the award for school cleaners broken down to the enterprise contract level, the 
situation for both negotiating and organising would have been difficult and closer to 
the situation for negotiations in small hotels, restaurants or, indeed, offices. However, 
for the three main areas of C&C coverage, employers' own interests in maintaining 
stable labour costs determined the outcome of multinational contracts and continuing 
high union membership. 
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Facing voluntary unionism and the Employment Contracts Act, C&C amalgamated with 
H&HW to form the SWU. The organisation of former C&C cleaners is no longer 
occupational, but nor is it really industry or sector based. SWU brings together a 
number of service sector occupations, all in the 'secondary' labour market; that is, 
working class service occupations. From the viewpoint of labour market segregation 
theory, this can be seen as bringing together similar kinds of people likely to compete 
in overlapping labour markets for service work, who share similar employment 
problems: low industrial strength, low skill or skill recognition, low pay, short hours, 
high turnover and high employment insecurity. 
Some SWU officials saw a potential for building unionism on the shared identities of 
members; there is a high concentration of women, and in particular Pacific Island and 
Maori women, in many of the occupations represented. However, the strong class 
analysis of male leaders - particularly in the former C&C - meant low priority was given 
to issues arising from the gendered and racially marked nature of low paid service 
work in a segregated .Iabour market. The less personalised emploment relations of 
cleaners and the leverage offered by client relations and the volatile contracts make 
a class analysis and 'classic' union tactics more appropriate for women cleaners, 
. compared with clerical workers and nurses or women tearoom and restaurants, 
although there are similar problems of organising logistics and fragmented industrial 
strength. 
However, 'classic unionism' strategies and the marginalisation of alternative 
perspectives and concerns are problematic while leadership remains unrepresentative 
of the union membership. This case study has documented the struggle of feminist 
unionists to improve representation of women, Maori and Pacific Island members in 
union decision making processes through standing committees. Widespread support 
for this organisational strategy was shown by the membership vote which, against 
leadership advice, achieved full voting rights for standing committee representatives 
on union executives. Specific representation would ensure that the voices of women, 
Maori and Pacific Island members were heard at policy level in a female dominated 
union organisation whose central decision making and strategising bodies continue 
to comprise mainly Pakeha men. 
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CHAPTER 10: THE GENDERED IMPACT OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 
Introduction 
The case studies of the unions for clerical workers, nurses and cleaners show 
differences and similarities in the effect of changes to labour relation legislation from 
the 1970s to the early 1990s. These differences and similarities reflect organising 
situations and industrial strength, as well as the particular characteristics of the 
occupation or industry. 
This chapter focuses on similarities and differences between these unions in the 
impact of the 'first round of bargaining under the Employment Contracts Act, 1991. As 
this thesis was being written, other findings at the aggregate level were emerging 
which confirmed the more detailed evidence of these case studies. Together the case 
studies and survey research indicate that loss of collective coverage and 
deunionisation was most likely in occupations which are recognised as hard to 
organise and industrially weak - in clerical work, sales and service work, and in small 
firms (Sarr 1992; Harbridge 1993:58). By February 1993 the gender pay gap was 
beginning to widen (Stats NZ 1993a&b), indicating that this major change in the labour 
relations system was disproportionately affecting the bargaining power of women. 
What was the response of the union movement to this situation? The chapter looks 
at the views of NZCTU leaders regarding the decollectivisation of 'unorganisable' 
workers, and at NZCTU labour relations policies which were developed in the wake 
of the Employment Contracts Act. 
Similarities and Differences in Contract Outcomes 
The case studies have examined the challenges of union organising in three female 
dominated occupations, revealing differences in collective organisation, industrial 
leverage and bargaining power, and the reasons for these differences. Examination 
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of the situation of differently placed groups within the membership of each union also 
helps explain why the bargaining power of some occupations in which women work 
is inherently low, and why unions for all three occupations have preferred the 
alternative of state arbitration. 
Earlier discussion of the labour market showed women - and particularly Maori and 
Pacific Island women - concentrated in a narrow range of occupations, many of them 
in the 'secondary' labour market. low pay, low skill recognition and casualisation 
which characterise jobs in the 'secondary' labour market (Doering & Priore 1971; 
Bowie 1983; Easton 1990a) are associated with industrial weakness and low 
bargaining power. The marginalisation of much of the female workforce in such 
'secondary' occupations has been highlighted by the gendered impact of the Employ-
ment Contracts Act which overturned a traditional framework for labour relations 
directed at balancing the bargaining power of workers and of employers. 
In New Zealand and Australia, where union negotiated awards set minimum wage 
rates and conditions for the most common female dominated occupations, the gender 
pay gap has been smaller than Great Britain and the United States where few women 
in low paid private sector occupations are unionised (Urban Research 1987:12; Hyman 
1987:9; NZCWA 1987:12-13; Sarr, 1992:3). Ways in which union officials used the 
arbitration system to improve award rates for their members have been detailed in all 
three case studies. Access to arbitration on negotiations was removed by legislative 
changes in the 1980s but it was the Employment Contracts Act which removed the 
award system itself. 
The Employment Contracts Act tilted the bargaining table in favour of employers by \ 
shifting the basis of bargaining from labour markets, in which all workers are I 
represented, to the level of the individual enterprise, at which low paid workers with 
similar interests are most fragmented and isolated. While multi-employer contracts are 
a possible choice for employers, without blanket coverage of the whole occupational 
labour market, competition and undercutting are likely to make these unstable. 
Employees' means of negotiating a enterprise collective contract are limited to moral 
suasion or industrial action. As we have seen, this greatly disadvantages those whose 
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workforce situation acts against effective industrial action. Even without the prohibition 
on strike action in support of a multi-employer contracts, the forms of bargaining 
available to workers would reflect industrial strength. 
The variation in bargaining outcomes in 1992 for different groups of union membership 
in these case studies indicate two central factors: employer strategies and the effects 
of workforce fragmentation. Particular patterns of fragmentation intersected with the 
adoption by employers of different negotiating options under the Act. Employers' 
options, however, were often influenced by interests in areas other than labour 
relations. 
Since the new Act shifted bargaining from the occupation to the enterprise, the 
number of employers in each market for a particular kind of labour became the crucial 
, factor for unions. This determined the number of separate successful negotiations 
which would be needed to replace the protection of national awards. For female 
dominated unions representing low paid, high turnover occupations, the award system 
had allowed them to negotiate minimum rates and protections in their particular labour 
market. Bargaining on enterprise contracts was shaped by the fragmentation of 
membership across thousands of offices, shops or tearooms and restaurants. 
This fragmentation was greatest among general clerical workers, employed in a labour 
market which encompasses all industries and all types of enterprise, despite pockets 
of concentration in particular industries or firms. For many in this situation bargaining 
'collectively' on an enterprise basis was meaningless. By 1990 the clerical unions' 
general award had become over 50 awards and industry or enterprise documents, but 
the Employment Contracts Act fragmented negotiations to literally thousands of 
separate worksites. The situation was similar for sections of coverage in which the 
Service Workers Union lost membership. Women in tearooms, restaurants and hotels, 
although less spread across industries, were employed in hundreds of small 
businesses. Here logistical difficulties in organising are compounded by short working 
hours and high membership turnover; that is, a greater temporal fragmentation of 
collective strength. 
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The fragmentation of cleaners' collective bargaining power through difficult organising 
logistics, short hours and high turnover could have lead to a similar outcome. 
However, commercial cleaning was consolidated in the hands of a small number of 
employers. This meant a small number of enterprise contracts covered the bulk of 
Cleaners & Caretakers Union cleaners. In school cleaning, the Services 
Commission's strategy for implementing employment contracts policy in the state's 
own labour market was to fragment national awards by devolving the 'employer' role 
to smaller units of state administration (Hill 1993a). The initial plan for the school 
cleaners' award was bargaining on a school by school basis as a further step towards 
'self-management' by Boards of Trustees. However, school trustees joined cleaners 
in rejecting this fragmentation, and the State Services Commission conceded to 
negotiate a multi-employer contract on their behalf with the union. 
Of the groups of women considered here, public sector nurses had the highest level 
of earnings, achieved through a strategy of professionalisation, which slowly levered 
up nurses' rates and conditions against the fulcrum of governments' political interest 
in quality public health services. As the interests of nurses and their state employer 
began to diverge in the 1980s, the advantage of nurses in public hospitals, relative to 
other nurses and other women workers, came to the fore. Employment in large 
numbers on large worksites by one state employer (or 14 Area Health Boards), as well 
as the centrality of nurses' labour to vital public services, made possible classic 
methods of organising and industrial action. However, the potential industrial muscle 
nurses derive from their strategic position was constrained by very real moral concerns 
for the situation of dependent patients, even when traditional ideologies about what 
was appropriate to professionalism or to femininity were put aside. 
In service work women work for their employer, but the service they perform is often 
for others. Ideology about service to others is an important aspect of the gender 
typing of women's occupations, as well as of their own socialisation. They are often 
reluctant to withdraw their labour because of the 'human costs' to clients, patients or 
children or co-workers. These 'human costs' are more likely or more immediate than 
in production and agriculture in which men's employment is concentrated. 
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The service aspect of women's work had different effects on industrial action in each 
of these three occupations. Clerical workers 'serviced' primarily their employer; 
socialisation to service others structured gendered office relations and expectations 
of loyalty in ways that added to logistical difficulties of union recruitment and industrial 
action. Clerical services were seldom central to the purpose of enterprises, making 
withdrawal of labour ineffective. In health services, service ideals were a constraint 
which nurses unions were increasingly turning into an industrial asset, by enlisting 
public sympathy or by capturing the moral high ground from employers. In 
commercial cleaning, the three way relationship between worker, employer and the 
client for services was most intriguing, and central to the tactics of union officials. As 
Dorothy Cobble points out, the growth in services means: 
The employment relationship is not the classic one described by Marx nor even 
the conventional adversarial one. This new third party, the customer, 
complicates and transforms the old diad. (Cobble 1991b:77) 
An inadequate understanding of differences between production and service work was 
indicated by the 'productivity' component of the Growth Agreement. Officials from all 
three unions groups felt that little prior consideration had been given to occupations 
in which formulas for measuring productivity were not readily arrived at. As Nancy 
Hartsock points out, however, in women's service work: 
Not only the qualities of things but also the qualities of people are important in 
women's work: quantity becomes peripheral. In addition, far more than the 
instrumental cooperation of the workplace is required. (Hartsock 1983:303) 
'Far more than instrumental cooperation' was unlikely to be encouraged by the 
bargaining tactics of some employers under the Employment Contracts Act. Quality 
service was more compatible with the high growth, high wage, high skill economic 
strategy which NZCTU officials sought (NZCTU 1991b, 1993:15,7; Douglas 1993: 
203-205), with a role for unions in skills formation, technology development and quality 
targets (Webster 1993:238,249). The importance of personal interaction and quality 
service has been noted in relation to tourism and hospitality as a economic 
development strategy for New Zealand (Henshall & Marsh 1984;NZ Tourism Board 
1990). The Service Workers Union's unsuccessful efforts to negotiate training and 
transferable skill recognition into hotel awards was a move in this direction, potentially 
complementing 'human resource' management. Comparative worth job evaluation 
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systems which emphasise the value of women's human relations skills (Burton 
1987:12,89-91; Burns & Coleman 1991 :28,36-37) also contribute to a discourse around 
bargaining which emphasises the value to employers of the quality of women's service 
skills rather than cost and quantity. With 60% of New Zealanders employed in the 
service sector (Dept Stats. 1988-89:335), assumptions and strategies based on factory 
production models need rethinking. 
The situation of workforce concentration or fragmentation, in which the number of 
employers was a crucial factor, was further structured by how employers saw their 
own interests in wage bargaining arrangements. These were not always determined 
simply by labour costs or free market ideology. As Craig Littler (1991 :53) points out, 
employers' strategies in relation to labour relations and the labour process may be 
structured by strategies in relation to other business concerns. The case study of the 
cleaners' unions provided an example of this. Employers in contract cleaning were 
primarily concerned with strategies in the markets for the services they sold. Their 
interests were not served by strategies which reduced labour costs but risked 
destabilising competitive positions in highly volatile contracting markets. Employers 
therefore acted collectively to negotiate multi-employer contracts - the option under the 
Act which was closest to the old blanket coverage awards. 
In the health sector, outcomes strongly reflected employer strategies. In public health, 
although the employer's role in negotiations was devolved to Area Health Boards, 
strategy was dictated by government, in the person of the Minister of Labour and State 
Services, Bill Birch (who in 1993 became Minister of Health). On 26 March 1992 he 
instructed Area Health Board general managers that there would be no multi-employer 
contracts and that progress was expected on flexible working hours and modification 
of penal rates (NZNA 1992). As detailed in the case study, through industrial action 
around the country nurses succeeded in resisting a 3% cut to overall earnings by all 
but two of the 14 Area Health Boards. 
The form bargaining took in the public health sector helped determine the negotiating 
strategies of private sector health employers. Since large collective 'enterprise' 
contracts were being settled in the public sector, their aim was to force their own 
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nurses and service workers onto individual contracts, with inferior rates and conditions 
for new employees. This would ensure lower labour costs for private health 
enterprises, enabling them to position themselves competitively to provide the 
tax-funded health services which the National government planned to put out to 
contract in 1993 and 1994 (Upton 1991 :31-35; NIPS 1992:32-40). 
The interests of private health sector employers, like those of contract cleaning 
employers, were structured by their interests in the market for their services. In this 
case, those interests coincided with, and were facilitated by the Employment Contracts 
Act, which was directed at 'freeing up' labour markets and adapting them to industry 
needs. In private health, however, pressure on wage rates was not the outcome of 
an uncompetitive or contracting industry, encouraging the movement of workers to 
new growth areas. This was a growth industry, in which lowered wage costs would 
underwrite the private provision of publicly 'funded health services. The question for 
the nursing profession was how far this privatisation by competitive contracting would 
undermine nurses' job security and collective solidarity, as well as their terms of 
employment. 
A common thread ran through the use of contractors for private sector cleaning, the 
likely increase of contractors in state hospitals and schools and the contracting out of 
health care to 'new' employers. As Craig Littler (1991 :67) suggests, favourable labour 
market conditions facilitated the development of a range of country-specific job, wage 
and union protections for employees. The present international trend towards 
sub-contracting is a strategy which enables employers to side-step these obligations 
and 'remarketise' employer-labour relations, against a background of high 
unemployment. Labour cost savings are facilitated by 'distancing' employment 
through subcontractors. As seen in the case study on cleaners, such a strategy was 
blocked in New Zealand by wage setting with blanket coverage of the whole occupa-
tional market for cleaners, whether directly employed or not. Enterprise based 
bargaining, however, opens up labour cost competition. 
Feminist unionists saw implications for women beyond the strictly economic in 
increased competition between contractors and therefore between workers, because 
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women's earnings through parttime or casual employment were important to their 
independence within family relations. 
"They will cut prices to meet contracts and people will have to accept those 
cuts ... Women working parttime are earning money but they are still dependent. 
The Employment Contracts Act is not going to help because it is going to take 
that little bit of financial freedom away. /I 
(Service Workers Official, Nov. 1990) 
The change from bargaining which fixed wage rates across occupational markets to 
bargaining enterprise by enterprise broke the collective strength of some occupational 
groups. It also put pressure on groups with considerable bargaining power, such as 
members of the NZ Nurses Association and the Services Workers Union employed in 
public hospitals. For the state as employer, management restructuring, bargaining 
'reform' and 'distancing' employment responsibility through the contracting out of 
health services were tightly interlinked as a strategy in relation to its large, readily 
organised workforces (Hill 1993a). The letting of contracts to provide public services 
on a short term basis, together with annual 'enterprise' bargaining for wage rates 
would mean that both public service 'products' and the labour which provide them are 
'remarketised' at regular intervals. Through this devolution of health care provision, 
the government could reap fiscal benefits while itself sidestepping both employer 
obligations and political flack. As employment is fragmented through the contracting 
out of public health services, there are lessons for the new Nurses' Organisation in the 
situation and strategies of unions covering the contract cleaning industries. 
In the market for clerical work, the shift to enterprise based bargaining atomised 
collective bargaining. The position of employers appeared consistent with Employers 
Federation and Business Roundtable philosophy, despite some earlier evidence of 
views of bargaining reform which varied by size of firm (NZCWU 1990b, 1991 a; 
McAndrew & Hursthouse 1990, 1991). No research has been done on the situation 
of clerical workers who dropped from collective coverage and union membership, 
particularly in NZCWU's region. While COMPASS officials represented members in 
collective bargaining, their experience suggests that large numbers of employers 
preferred to exclude clerical staff from collective contracts covering other employees. 
COMPASS organisers reported in early 1992 that these employees were either 
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retaining their old award rates and conditions on 'assumed' individual contracts i, or 
being given new individual contracts with little negotiation. 
Such exclusion separates clerical workers out from any collective solidarity which 
might develop on an enterprise or industry basis, while the Act itself precludes them 
choosing collective bargaining across their own occupational market. This individu-
alisation of employment relations is likely to reinforce relations of service and 'loyalty' 
between office workers and their employers. 
Variation in bargaining outcomes between different sections of membership in these 
unions suggests that the greatest decollectivisation of workers occurred where labour 
costs were already lowest - in the 'secondary' labour market where women, Maori and 
Pacific Island workers are concentrated (Hammond & Harbridge 1993; Sarr 1993; 
Brosnan, Rea & Wilson 1991; Brosnan 1988). Under the Employment Contracts Act, 
scattered workers with the least industrial leverage must rely on industrial action alone 
to back their negotiations. 
The 1985 strike by clerical workers, the 1989 strike by public hospital nurses and 
indeed the tayloresses' strikes between 1889 and 1891 (Street 1993) show that women 
are willing to take strike action to defend their position or where gains outweigh risks. 
However, the alternative of conciliation and arbitration suited the situation of many 
women workers, for reasons of logistics, moral constraints, personal vulnerability 
and/or socialisation. 
"Why should a resthome worker have to walk out and stand on the side of the 
road, leave the elderly people she works with day in and day out. Why should 
she have to go on strike to get her boss to bargain with her?" 
(Service Workers Union Officer, June 1992) 
In these case studies, outcomes of contract negotiations were inferior to the awards 
they replaced, even for well-organised, highly skilled workers with industrial leverage 
such as nurses in public hospitals. The evidence from these unions suggesting an 
i Under the Employment Contracts Act, if no new contract, collective or individual, was negotiated, 
employees retained the rates and conditions of the lapsed award on an 'assumed' individual contract 
for the duration of their employment in that particular job. Individual contracts need not be in written 
form unless requested by the employee. 
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overall loss of bargaining power under the new labour relations regime is borne out 
by research at the aggregate level discussed in the next section. 
"When I look at what we have actually lost in terms of working conditions and 
wages, living standards, workplace health and safety, those very basic things, 
they are being stripped away at an incredibly rapid rate." 
(Service Workers Union Officer, May 1992) 
However, the contract outcomes in these case studies cannot be read directly from 
assessments of union strength or willingness to strike. The variation shown resulted 
from particular configurations of factors shaping both the collective strength of workers 
and the interests of their employers. Although the Employment Contracts Act had 
shifted the balance of bargaining power further towards the employers (Anderson 
1991), factors affecting employers' contract choices were the industrial strength of the 
workforce, the number of employers in a particular labour market, and their interests 
in areas of management other than labour relations. Factors affecting workers' ability 
to bargaining collectively were workplace logistics, short hours and high turnover 
which fragmented collectivity, and the number of negotiations required, as well as 
moral constraints on taking strike action to back negotiations. The most important 
factor for both sides was the framework dictated by the new legislation itself. 
These case studies have shown the central importance to effective bargaining of being 
able to gather sufficient numbers of workers competing for the same work to exert 
some control over the price of their labour. Under the Employment Contracts Act, 
public health sector nurses were best able to do this, despite moral constraints on 
taking the industrial action which was their only recourse under the Act. However, the 
form of collective contract which they saw as most effective for them, a multi-employer 
contract covering all 14 regions, was expressly precluded by government. 
Most clerical workers, tearoom and restaurant workers, and some nurses could no 
longer attain a form of bargaining which could negotiate terms of employment of 
scattered members across the large numbers of small firms which provide a labour 
market for these occupations. Many of these workers were not able to bargain 
collectively. Also to be noted is the way parttime hours and high employment turnover 
increased the difficulty of building collective organisation among many low paid groups 
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of women workers. Most cleaners, on the other hand, benefited from the 
concentration of the commercial cleaning industry in the hands of a small group of 
major contractors who adopted a common strategy. A parallel situation arose in 
school cleaning. Employment by the state, with most School Boards' preferring to 
continue centralised wage negotiation through a mUlti-employer contract, countered 
the fragmentation of school cleaners by worksite. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Employment Contracts Act gave employers, but not 
employees, the option of a multi-employer contract as well as individual or collective 
bargaining on an enterprise basis. The number of employers in a particular 
occupational market affected employers' ability to bargain collectively, as well as 
workers'. In award bargaining employers had worked through the NZ Employers 
Federation (Roper 1993b:153) which by 1991 was promoting enterprise bargaining 
(NZEF 1990a, 1991). However, the bargaining outcomes for commercial cleaners and 
private sector nurses show that employers' choice of contract form could also be 
influenced by management concerns in areas other than labour relations - such as the 
need for either stability or improved competitive position in the market for the enter-
prise's services. 
Factors affecting the ability to bargain collectively underlay rather than dictated the 
form of contract bargaining adopted in each case. Bargaining outcomes were 
contingent on the people and politics of a particular situation - as is illustrated by con-
trasting the outcome for public sector nurses and school cleaners. In the first case, 
the government, ultimately the employer of both nurses and cleaners, blocked the 
possibility of a mUlti-employer contract. In the second, it did not. But the number of 
intermediary 'employers', their response of acquiescence or resistance, and the 
degree of bargaining fragmentation that was involved,. as well as the budgetary and 
political importance of each, account for this contrast. 
These factors which I have identified as shaping bargaining outcomes for workers, 
male or female, under the Employment Contracts Act may be relevant in analysing 
other legislative frameworks for labour relations and union organisation. Case studies 
'present the material from which theoretical prinCiples may be inferred ... their utility 
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rests upon their capacity to explain rather than their typicality' (Crompton & Sanderson 
1990:21). Since the selected unions reflect the range of occupations in which women 
are typically concentrated, these situations and outcomes can be extrapolated to 
unions organising other female dominated occupations and, as principles, are relevant 
to a consideration of all unions. 
The Distribution Workers unions, which cover shop assistants, the second most 
common job for women at the 1991 Census, dropped around 30% in members and 
revenue by May 1992. The Wellington based Distribution & General Workers Union 
(DAGWU), like the clerical unions, was a union with a majority female membership and 
women leaders. It was at the forefront of the struggle to raise women's issues in the 
union movement and press for legislative change2. In December 1990 DAGWU had 
not been able to renew its Retail Non-Food Award, covering 70,000 workers. Although 
concentration in retail ownership over the 1980s facilitated collective bargaining, 
particularly in supermarkets and variety store chains, many members in small shops 
were in a similar organising and negotiating position to clerical workers in small 'firms. 
These members were lost from collective coverage, with only those over 20 protected 
by the Minimum Wage Act. 
Shop work is a high turnover occupation, particular in small businesses which come 
and go. Like Clerical and Service Workers officials, DAGWU officials emphasised the 
importance of the market rate for shop work which was being lost under enterprise 
bargaining. 
"There is a lack of understanding about why the union is so concerned about 
losing this basic (award) rate, because it will undercut wages. A lot of workers 
say, yes, but I'm okay, I'm not losing anything. We say, yes but you'll move. 
60% of our membership changes jobs annually." 
(Distribution Workers Officer, May 1992) 
Nevertheless, officials pointed to their rapid negotiation of those contracts that were 
achievable: 
2 Interviews with key Wellington DWU officials 'snowballed' from case study material about feminist 
strategies within the union movement, but are drawn on here in relation to the impact of the Employment 
Contracts Act, in the absence of continuing comment from NZCWU officials following the demise of this 
union. 
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"If you look at the transport industry, 5% are covered by a collective employment 
contracts ... 75% of our (current) membership is covered, which is pretty good 
going in 12 months by a pissy girls' union that couldn't do anything." 
(Distribution Workers Officer, May 1992) 
Members in workplaces with collective contracts were now more involved in 
negotiations affecting them. Some retail workers in supermarket chains were able to 
focus on difficulties at the intersection of their working lives and family responsibilities 
through 'Friendly to Families' policies taken up with their employer. Members involved 
in negotiations: 
" .. .teellike they have got control over their own contracts ... because now we are 
dealing with things like our clothing or that arsehole of a manager that we never 
had been able to deal with before. That is the irony of the legislation." 
(Distribution Workers Officer, May 1992) 
The situation of unions representing teachers, the other main profession for women, 
was similar in some respects to that of public health sector nurses - including the 
moral constraints - and of school cleaners. Policy proposals for a 'more market' 
approach to education included the fragmentation of teachers' state awards by 'bulk 
funding' schools for teaching salaries on the basis of pupil numbers. Staffing 
decisions and wage negotiations would then be devolved to School Boards of 
Trustees. As with school cleaners, this course was resisted by both Trustees and the 
unions, but a separate multi-employer contract was conceded for teachers whom the 
State Services Commission considered to be in a 'management' role (Hill 1993a). 
TI1e collective negotiations of unions representing predominately male workers, 
particularly those in low paid, casualised occupations, were also affected by the shift 
of bargaining power to employers. The situation of contract cleaners was exactly 
paralleled by that of mainly parttime, extremely casualised but largely male security 
officers. They too secured a multi-employer employment contract because of 
employers' strategies in a highly competitive contracting industry. The Engineers 
Union was similarly successful in launching North and South Island multi-employer 
contracts to replace the very large coverage of its Metal Trades award (Webster 1993). 
These contracts were joined, in particular, by service station employers - a highly 
competitive field dominated by large petrol companies. 
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The male-led male dominated Amalgamated Workers Union, a 1991 amalgamation of 
the NZ Workers Union and Labourers Unions, covered low skilled, often casualised 
occupations in manual labour, agriculture, forestry and horticulture, and other, often 
outdoor, work. Difficulties in negotiating under the Act resulted in union membership 
losses for these male dominated occupations. Like the Clerical Workers and Hotel & 
Hospital Workers Unions, some sections of membership had suffered badly under 
voluntary unionism in 1984-85, and voluntary arbitration in 1989. Union strength was 
also adversely affected by the loss of a compulsory unionism clause for scattered farm 
workers and the privatisation of state forests (Fenton 1992). Both timber workers and 
building trades workers were unable to settle their awards in 1991 because of the 
Employment Contracts Act before the parliament (Harbridge 1991 :320). In March 
1992 the Amalgamated Workers union disaffiliated from the NZCTU, particularly 
incensed by an invitation to the National Prime Minister to address the NZCTU biennial 
conference and the NZCTU president's attendance at a retirement dinner for the 
previous National Prime Minister (Roth 1992a:248). Parallels between the situation of 
this union for low paid, male dominated occupations and the case studies of unions 
for low paid female dominated occupations bear out that it is the situation of workers 
rather than gender per se that accounts for adverse bargaining outcomes. 
However, the impact of the Employment Contracts Act was more significant for women 
because they are concentrated in greater numbers in occupations with little industrial 
leverage and typically on small worksites. Enterprise bargaining fragmented the 
degree of collectivity that the award system had facilitated through bargaining which 
covered all workers in an occupational labour market. It was labour market 
fragmentation or concentration which crucially shaped contract outcomes, but 
gendered processes shape the location of women and men in different labour market 
situations. 
AsseSSing the Consequences 
By late 1992 the effects of the Employment Contracts Act on women workers were 
becoming clear, not only to unions representing predominantly women members in 
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the private sector, but at the aggregate level of analysis of collective contracts, and of 
earnings statistics. 
The National government did little to measure the social consequences of its policy 
changes. By 1992 it was community and church organisations who began to research 
the poverty resulting from unemployment, social welfare cuts and market rents for 
state housing. There was no official assessment of the impact of labour market 
deregulation on the social groups already acknowledged as disadvantaged in the 
labour market. 
"The government won't collect the information, no matter how often we have 
asked and will continue to ask, because it is political dynamite." 
(NZCTU Officer, May 1992) 
In fact, an information gap was built into the Employment Contracts Act itself 
(Harbridge & Hince 1992:8; Harbridge 1993:45-46). Previously all negotiated 
documents were approved and registered by the Department of Labour, and were 
publicly available. The new Act required registration only of collective employment 
contracts covering 20 or more employees, and the content of these was confidential. 
Given the small size of most New Zealand enterprises (Dept Stats 1991c:20), this 
meant no official data was being collected on what was happening to most workers. 
Officials of female dominated unions in the private sector knew what was happening 
to their members, and to their organisations through membership losses. The case 
studies indicate the difficulties that many employees encountered in exercising their 
right under the Act to bargain collectively. However, since decollectivisation, as well 
as decentralised bargaining, was an objective of the Act (Harbridge & Hince 1992:10; 
Hince 1993:10), evidence from unions was seen by the government and those 
supporting deregulation as invalid - as purportedly reflecting the interest of officials in 
preserving the 'quasi-monopoly status' of existing unions (Brook 1989: 186; Myers 
1992:2-30). Politicians and employers, however, were using equally anecdotal 
evidence and very dubious statistics to maintain that the Act provided workers with 
opportunities for flexibility, choice and increased individual rewards. The Employment 
Contracts Act was portrayed as bene'fiting women as well as being the 'glue in the 
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economic recovery' (Myers 1992; Bolger Herald, 30.9.93:1; Birch 1993; Knowles 1993; 
Richardson and Shipley in Du Plessis 1993a:11,14; Shipley in Foulkes 1993b). 
In 1991 the Industrial Relations Centre at Victoria University had set up an unofficial 
register for collective employment contracts gathered from unions and 'from 
cooperating firms with over 50 staff (Harbridge & Moulder 1992:3). One year after the 
passage of the Act, a data base of 1101 collective contracts had been established. 
These contracts covered 17% of the total workforce and 31% of the then unionised 
workforce (26% of the numbers covered by awards in the 1989/1990 wage round). 
Of these workers covered by collective contracts, 47.5% were women (Hammond & 
Harbridge 1993:5). Some major contracts had not yet been settled for female 
dominated workforces in the public sector, including nurses. Nor did the sample 
include all private sector collective contracts. Harbridge and Moulder believed that 
those not submitted for analysis were likely to have substantially inferior wages and 
conditions. Nevertheless, this 'better end of the spectrum of contracts' (Harbridge & 
Moulder 1992:5) showed that the Employment Contracts Act had disadvantaged 
women. 
Almost all the contracts had been achieved at a cost to workers of concessions in 
leave, hours of work and penal rates. Comparison of contracts covering 
predominantly female employees with contracts covering 'mainly men' or 'mixed' 
employees showed that those covering 'mainly women' were less likely to stipulate 
days or clock hours outside of which a penal rate payment would apply. A small 
number of contracts with a wage increase of 4% or more or productivity based 
payments were significantly more likely to be for 'mainly men'. The mean annualised 
wage movement was only 0.24%, but this showed a gender difference: 0.37% in 
contracts for mainly men and 0.14% for mainly women. Although better holiday and 
sick leave clauses were retained in contracts which covered mainly women, 'men had 
done much better than women in their pay packets' (Hammond & Harbridge 1993:13). 
By September 1992 Raymond Harbridge (1993:46) estimated that numbers covered 
by collective bargaining had dropped by 336,000 or 45% over two years. These 
decollectivised workers were most likely to be employed in small firms, in the private 
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sector, in companies based in just one town and were 'the source' of the many 
anecdotes told of hardships encountered' (Harbridge & Moulder 1992:5). This 
description matches the situation of many women in clerical and service work for 
whom unions in these case studies were unable to negotiate collective contracts. No 
data has been gathered on individual contracts, whether freshly negotiated or 
'assumed' contracts continuing old award terms. 
In mid 1992 the University of Otago surveyed employment contracts in firms, 
including some state and local government enterprises (McAndrew 1992). This 
research indicated that the form of contract being adopted reflected workforce size 
and pre~Act union strength, and bore no relationship to the market circumstances or 
cost pressures under which firms operated. 
Crudely put, more concessions have been extracted from workforces that have 
moved onto individual contracts than from those that have retained collective 
contract coverage ... With a bottomless labour market and few statutory 
minima, employer responsibility and self-restraint and the industrial strength of 
particularly larger workforces have been the only moderating influences. 
(McAndrew 1992:280) 
The decollectivisation of more isolated and industrially weak workers by being 'moved 
onto individual contracts' has led to membership losses by private sector unions, and 
particularly those representing low paid female workforces, as the case studies show. 
The Employment Contracts Act required that contracts for 20 or more employees be 
registered with the Labour Department. In March 1993 a survey of collective contracts 
in 918 firms employing 213,000 employees (14% of the workforce) showed better base 
wages negotiated by unions and other employee organisations than by other 
bargaining agents or by employees themselves (Blaikie 1993). Together with 
McAndrew's study, this confirms international evidence that unionisation is associated 
with better rates and conditions (Curtin 1991; Sarr 1992:3). 
In New Zealand over the post-war decades, women's rate of unionisation has matched 
that of men, relative to their rate of workforce participation (Geare, Herd & Howells 
1979:9-10; Sarr 1992). In mid 1991 NZCTU surveyed its affiliated unions about women 
in pOSitions of union responsibility. The number of women in elected and/or paid 
pOSitions had greatly increased since the mid 1970s (NZPSA 1976; Geare, Herd & 
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Howells 1979), although only a few of the most strongly female dominated unions had 
women secretaries. There were relatively small numbers of women delegates, but the 
case studies for clerical workers and service workers have indicated why the 
organisation of delegates is ineffective in some female dominated occupations. 
In February 1993 the NZCTU ran the survey on its affiliates again. The results indicate 
the impact of the Employment Contracts Act on the unionisation of women (Sarr 
1993), confirming and extending the case studies for this thesis. In the public sector, 
membership boundaries, NZCTU affiliations and survey responses remained stable, 
as did membership. In fact, public sector unions whose membership had always been 
voluntary were showing a small increase in numbers, despite continuing pressure on 
public sector staffing levels. 
With regard to private sector unions the second survey does not compare easily with 
the first, because of amalgamations, the disbanding of the NZ Clerical Workers Union, 
lack of response 'from some large unions with almost exclusively male memberships, 
and the disaffiliation of the large male dominated Amalgamated Workers Union. Male 
unionisation is therefore under-recorded, overstating the relative proportion of women 
. members. However, the survey reflected a 'major deunionisation' of women in the 
private sector (Sarr 1993:2). In most unions responding to both surveys, women had 
dropped as a proportion of membership. Some 35,200 women members had been 
lost 'from private sector unions, mainly in clerical, service and retail occupations (Sarr 
1993:5). These are three of the four occupations, along with white collar technician, 
that Dorothy Cobble nominated as: 
The prototypic worker(s) of the post-industrial era ... the workers to whom 
organised labour must now appeal if it is to survive. (Cobble 1991 a:76) 
With regard to union office, women had maintained good representation in paid and 
elected positions, except for union presidents and union secretaries. In both public 
and private sectors the number of women presidents was down, and they represented 
much smaller numbers of members. Representation by women secretaries remained 
unchanged in the public sector. In the private sector, as a result of the impact of the 
Employment Contracts Act and amalgamations to ensure organisational survival, there 
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were now fewer women secretaries representing fewer members. Overall, the impact 
of the Employment Contracts Act: 
" ... has had a real effect on our ability to carry on with the things that we have 
identified which are important and one is to increase the participation of 
women, increase women organisers, more women secretaries. II 
(Distribution Workers Officer, May 1992) 
lhrough unemployment, deunionisation and disaffiliations, the NZCTU's official 
membership had dropped from 495,029 in 1990 to 356,869 in mid-1993 (Herbert 
1993). Although women were still nearly half of all members, they were one third of 
the National Executive, including two representatives of the National Women's 
Committee. Women's participation in union conferences had increased markedly, but 
decreased at national NZCTU conferences. At a Special Affiliates Conference in July 
1992, women were only 24% of delegates and 16 delegations out of 29 had no women 
at all (Sarr 1993). These changes represent a considerable setback to the work of 
feminist unionists in the private sector, which is likely to affect future policy and 
strategies of the union movement. 
The effects of labour market deregulation and the decollectivisation of women workers 
began to show in earning statistics collected by the Quarterly Employment Survey in 
February 1993 (Dept. Stats Feb. 1992; Stats. NZ 1993a&b). All measures of earnings 
showed the lowest increases since the quarterly series began in 1987 and the first 
annual average increase to fall below 1 %, with a marked fall-oft between November 
1992 and February 1993 measurements. Half the increase in total average weekly 
earnings was due to working longer hours rather than to increased pay. 
Even without pay equity assessments, there had been a continuing slow improvement 
in the gender pay gap. From 78.7% in October 1977 following implementation of the 
Equal Pay Act it crept to 80.2% in November 1987, to 81.1% in November 1990 and 
to 81.5% in February 1992 (Wilson 1988:App.3; Dept Stats 1991a:48, 1991b; Stats NZ 
1993a&b). In the year to February 1992 male and female hourly rates showed roughly 
the same percentage increase. By February 1993 differences were marked. Men's 
average ordinary time hourly earnings increased by 1.1% and total weekly earnings 
by 2%; the comparable figures for women were 0.3% and 0.6%. Not only were 
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women's average hourly ordinary time earnings barely moving, their hours of overtime 
and their average hourly earnings from overtime had both fallen - indicating the effect 
of changes to penal payments in health and hospitality. For the first time the gender 
pay gap was growing wider. At February 1993 women were averaging 80.5% of men's 
average hourly ordinary time rates and 73.5% of men's total average weekly earnings 
(Stats NZ 1993a&b). These changes were notable in the second half of the year to 
February 1993, reflecting the first slow round of contract settlements under the 
Employment Contracts Act. 
That the gender pay gap should be affected so quickly reflects the fragmentation of 
award bargaining and the concerted attack by employers on penal rates in the 1992 
round. Women were more likely than men to be in situations which reduced their 
ability to bargain collectively on a meaningful basis, or to back contracts with effective 
industrial action. The widening of a gender pay gap which had been gradually 
narrowing is attributable to the change in the structure of bargaining. 
Just as the form of bargaining dictated by the Employment Contracts Act has 
gendered implications, so too do other aspects of the labour relations change, and the 
. strategies adopted by the union movement in response. 
The case studies have illustrated differences and commonalities between some of the 
occupations in which women are concentrated. They document difficulties in resorting 
to industrial action - for both similar and different reasons. Despite variation in detail, 
there were commonalities in the views of officials of these unions in regard to 
arbitration, productivity increases and the Growth Agreement, occupational unionism 
and award bargaining. There was also some similarity of experience between the 
clerical workers unions and sections of the Services Workers Union on voluntary 
unionism, although this was very different from the position of the Nurses Association 
as a professional union operating in the public sector. 
The gendered patterns of the labour market mean that the internal debates of the 
union movement take on a gendered aspect. 
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The NZCTU Response 
The strategy developed by NZCTU officials for the 1990s was a corporatist one aimed 
at balancing the influence of business interests by securing closer involvement in 
government policy-making by a more tightly organised union movement. Part of the 
Compact was the restructuring of the union movement into large amalgamations of 
unions. These would have both greater negotiating strength and greater ability to 
deliver on deals with government. The Compact with the fourth Labour government 
offered cooperation by the union movement in exchange for influence on economic 
and social policy, and involvement in industry development. Some unionists saw this 
as collaborating too closely with economic strategists in both business and 
government (Harvey 1992:72). An industry or sector basis for union amalgamations 
and future collective bargaining would tailor unionism more closely to the organisation 
of industry and the shifting concerns of employers rather than to the patterns of the 
labour market and the interests of union members .. 
"It was proving to government that they were fulfilling what they were going to 
do, that is, restructure unions to reflect the environment and the economy -
delivering us on a platter." 
(NZ Clerical Workers Union Elected Officer, May 1992) 
Such a restructuring of unionism from occupational to industry based organisation 
would mean different things for different groups of men and women workers. For 
occupations found in more than one industry, industry specific unions would be a 
move away 'from organising and bargaining to protect wage rates and conditions in 
the occupational labour market in which those workers competed for jobs. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the segregation and concentration of women in the labour 
market is more markedly by occupation than by industry. Industry unionism has the 
merit of consolidating small unions for male dominated crafts, resolving possible 
problems over representation and demarcation as labour processes change (NZCTU 
i988c). However, these arguments have little relevance for the large unions covering 
less specialised female dominated occupations. As we have seen, redistribution by 
industry divided and dismantled one of the most important unions representing 
women, organising across a range of different industries. 
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Underlying this NZCTU strategy was an earlier policy direction adopted by Federation 
of Labour leaders - that of greater reliance on industrial strength as award bargaining 
tightened during recession. At the heart of tensions around policy directions in the 
union movement remained the old conundrum: arbitration or industrial action. 
The lynch pin is whether we lurch back to an arbitrationist model of industrial 
relations or pursue one based on the rights to organise, to bargain and to 
strike. (Harris 1992:8) 
The language of this statement indicates the writer's own position - that gains may be 
obtained through effective organisation and the freedom to take industrial action. 
However, these case studies have illustrated the constraints on such tactics and the 
importance of arbitration for many unions for female dominated occupations. 
As unions came under siege from recession, tighter bargaining, and Business 
Roundtable attack, NZCTU leaders saw the sustainable 'core' of the movement as 
those 'organisable' unions with industrial strength, rather than unions whose members 
had least industrial leverage and were most in need of alternative protections. 
"One reason why the NZCTU is focusing on industry rather than occupational 
unionism is because the people who will stay working in workplaces will be 
mainly men, that's the reality. Women's work is far more susceptible to 
casualisation." (ex-NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
As the case studies show, unions for female dominated occupations do not have a 
common position on every issue, yet large numbers of women as well as some men 
are in work situations which where they lack industrial strength. The position of private 
sector unions with industrial muscle organising predominantly male memberships 
continues to be hegemonic in the union movement. 
"The whole CTU organisation is really set up to reflect the view of the main 
affiliates, whose top people tend to be men." 
(Distribution Workers Official, Nov. 1990) 
It was the large male-led unions with industrial strength who in the 1970s and 1980s 
pushed for greater freedom to strike and less control by government through the 
arbitration system. That strategy changed to a corporatist one as the recession grew, 
but those unions continued to prefer industrial action to arbitration when negotiations 
and political manoeuvres failed. In a labour market structured by gender, however, 
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these strategies have gendered implications. At the time of the Growth Agreement, 
a Nurses Association official suggested that: 
'Those industries aren't doing too well at the moment so all workers have to 
take a collective response and a wage cut so they can get their documents 
settled. Where was the CTU two years ago when the clerical and restaurant 
and licensed hotels awards couldn't settle their documents? Did they tell the 
male unions to take a cut? If you think the union movement supports women 
as equally as it supports men, you are blind. 1/ 
(NZ Nurses Assn Official, Oct 1990) 
Nevertheless, the NZCTU's strategy, promoted through the structures in which unions 
were already involved, carried its own momentum. The strongest organisation in 
opposition to the Compact came from individual union activists who often did not have 
the organisational backing of their union leaders. That response was easily 
marginalised as 'politics'. Some unions who, like the clerical unions, opposed the 
Compact or the Growth Agreement focused on establishing the democratic position 
of their members on the issues but were not successful in joining together with other 
unions sufficiently quickly to mount effective opposition. 
"People tend to fall into line, they don't like it but if there's not a lot that they can 
put up instead, they go along with it. II 
(Distribution Workers Official, Nov. 1990) 
liOn important issues like the Compact, the affiliates who opposed it didn't get 
together. They all go away and moan about it but don't apply any strategy 
about where the power lies. There is a coincidence of interests sometimes and 
you have to go for that for all its worth. They don't do that. /I 
(ex-NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
Feminist campaigns discussed in earlier chapters indicate that alternative strategies 
can be successfully pursued by unions working together in areas of common interest 
However, a different set of alliances would have been needed to pursue collective 
interests effectively with respect to opposing the Compact or regaining the right to 
arbitration or national awards, and this did not happened in any effective way. Such 
interests cut across the collective identities, alliances and animosities already formed 
around gender issues. Another impediment to organising behind effective alternatives 
to proposals by NZCTU officials was the impact of labour relations changes on those 
unions most likely to oppose them. The case studies have indicated the workload 
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involved in enterprise based bargaining. This reduced the capacity of those unions 
to engage collectively at a more political level. 
"We have all gone into this narrow thinking, we have got to just look after our 
own membership, and tend to forget that it is quite easy to link up with other 
people and have a campaign." (Distribution Workers Officer, May 1992) 
Commitment to the strategy of combining industry unionism with workplace 
organisation and industrial action had an impact on the way NZCTU leadership 
opposed the Employment Contracts Bill. Dissatisfaction with that leadership led to an 
increase in the number of unions outside the NZCTU (NZCTU 1990:29-31, 
1992:31-40), although amalgamations and new affiliations in the early 1990s make 
NZCTU membership changes complex and fluid. 
Some unions, such as tl1e Seamen's Union, Buildings Trades Union, Printers Union 
and unions who now make up the Manufacturing & Construction Union, had always 
been independent of the NZCTU. Some new unions for middle class occupations 
such as APEX and the NZ Resident Doctors Association were not part of the NZCTU; 
nor were the North Island unions for Accountants Employees, and Air NZ pilots and 
flight planners, formerly covered by clerical workers unions and the PSA. Since the 
·1987 requirement for a minimum of 1000 members no longer applied under the 
Employment Contracts Act, smaller unions were again possible. Other unions have 
joined the NZCTU, such as the Association of University Teachers and the Electrical 
Workers Union, through its amalgamation with the Post Office to form the 
Communication & Energy Workers Union. A number of unions - the Amalgamated 
Workers Union, the Food & Chemical Workers Unions, one union for Railway Workers, 
the Southern Drivers Union and in 1993 the Communication & Energy Workers Union 
- disaffiliated in response to weak NZCTU leadership and high capitation fees, as well 
as past dissatisfaction with the Compact and Growth Agreement strategy. Among 
other unions adversely affected by enterprise bargaining - including the Clerical, 
Service and Distribution Workers Unions - the question of continuing affiliation was 
raised, by both officials and members. This was reflected in the comment of a Service 
Workers official: 
"Just as we need our union organisation more and more, it is becoming less 
and less relevant to us. No wonder we are looking around and saying, do we 
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stay within the trade union movement, within this kind of organisation and try 
and change it from inside or do we try to do something else. II 
(Service Workers Union Officer, May 1992) 
In May 1993 some non-NZCTU unions formed an alternative organisation, the Trade 
Union Federation (TUF), with an initial 15 affiliated unions with more than 35,000 
members (Labour Notes, June 1993:7; Roth 1993:267). Among the largest were the 
Manufacturing & Construction, Amalgamated Workers and Food Chemical Workers 
unions. As the acronym suggests, this Federation advocated a more militant 
opposition to the Employment Contracts Act than did NZCTU officials, as well as a 
revitalised welfare state. However, its collective position on, for example, arbitration 
was unclear. Female dominated unions continued to work within the existing NZCTU 
collective structure, for reasons expressed by elected officers of two unions with very 
different positions in the labour market. 
IISome members wanted us to leave the CTU over (the Growth Agreement and 
'productivity" I personally believe you have to stay within your umbrella 
organisation and be able to argue the toss inside - except we would have saved 
a lot of money in affiliation fees. II 
(NZ Clerical Workers Union Officer, May 1992) 
"It's one thing to oppose and not accept change that is put forward, but once 
that change becomes a reality you have to work within it, you have to be 
pragmatic about the new framework in order to live to fight another day. If 
(NZ Nurses Assn Officer, July 1992) 
The Employment Contracts Act was implemented in the context of economic 
recession, state deficits and high unemployment, and this context shaped bargaining 
power and contract outcomes. The new system was undoubtedly more flexible in its 
potential. Although the Clerical Workers and Service Workers Unions sought the 
continuation of arbitration as an alternative to strike action, officials noted that closer 
involvement in bargaining under Employment Contracts was raising the union 
consciousness of members. Some unions with more industrial leverage anticipate 
benefits in better economic times from a bargaining system in which they were free of 
'labour's leg-iron', arbitration. A Nurses Association official pointed out that employers 
were likely to face a more militant unionism when the economy and the demand for 
labour recover. 
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"Your turn will come and you will be terribly surprised at how aggro and 
vindictive the unions will be somewhere down the line, if we wait five years or 
ten years." (NZ Nurses Assn Officer, May 1992) 
Longstanding differences over the trade-off between arbitration and industrial action 
has meant limited sympathy and a certain impatience by industrially strong unions with 
unions organising occupations which used to rely on arbitration. The implication was 
that unions Wllich couldn~ effectively use 'classic' union tactics - workplace 
organisation, delegates, collective strike action - were not 'real' unions. This was 
reflected in remarks by NZCTU officials about the NZCWU and its collapse. 
"Realistically the clerical union did not organise workers to any great extent 
under the general clerical award. It enforced it when people had complaints 
and it organised politically for women ... It seldom organised workers in a classic 
sense, it organised them within a public relations framework." 
(NZCTU Officer, May 1992, my emphasis) 
Organising workers in this 'classic sense' means the organisation of workers on the 
same worksite who are able to engage in meaningful collective bargaining. 
"It depends what you think unionism is. For me, it is whether you can establish 
a collectivism and if you can't, it won't necessarily be unionism, it may be some 
other form of activism." (NZCTU Officer, May 1992) 
Reasons for the limited effectiveness of 'classic' tactics for some groups of workers 
have been explored in the case studies. The validity of alternative strategies is argued 
further in the next section, based on theories of union collectivity. It is indeed a matter 
of what unionism is, and what a union movement is for. 
What then was the position of NZCTU strategists on protecting workers in the 
scattered, casualised jobs of the low paid 'secondary' labour market (Doering & Priore, 
1971; Easton 1990a), such as lower paid, isolated clerical workers, tearoom, restaurant 
and hotel workers, labourers and orchard workers, nurse aides and cleaners? 
Despite the fact that in New Zealand the 'secondary' labour market has had unions 
and viable - if state supported - forms of collective bargaining for fifty years, one 
NZCTU official publicly described the workers being decollectivised by the Employment 
Contracts Act as the 'unorganisable rump' of the labour force. That is, it was the 
workers, not the labour relations system, who were defined as the problem (Crain 
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1991 :1158). 'Disadvantaged groups' in the labour market are seen as a concern for 
social policy (Pringle & Watson 1992:61) - via the Compact strategy - rather than the 
focus of NZCTU's strategy on labour relations. 
New Zealand's traditional labour relations regime offered some resolution of the 
problems of collective organisation in the 'secondary' labour market. that system 
was replaced by enterprise bargaining based on the right to strike, views about unor-
ganisable workers and classic unionism entered into the ongoing debate on NZCTU 
policy. Moreover, crucial votes about the nature of a desirable bargaining framework 
for the future came after massive membership losses in the unions with least 
bargaining power. In July 1992 the NZCTU convened a Special Affiliates Conference3 
which endorsed a new labour relations policy, without compulsory unionism or 
arbitration (NZCTU 1993). An amendment to restore arbitration when workers could 
not reach settlement with employers - that is, an alternative to industrial action - was 
defeated by a 51% majority vote (Roth 1992b). Those unions which would support 
such an amendment no longer had the membership card votes to carry it. Present 
NZCTU labour relations policy reflects the fact that: 
"AII organisations are influenced by the people who partiCipate in them, not the 
people who aren't there any more. II (NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
When the predicted impact of the Employment Contracts Act on fragmented private 
sector workforces eventuated, NZCTU leaders did not favour a return to national 
occupational awards, but proposed improvements to the employment contracts regime 
(Harris 1992). The focus was on the right to organise, to bargain and to strike, with 
the option of mUlti-employer industry bargaining. These would have priority over an 
enterprise document where it covered the majority of employees (NZCTU 1993:11). 
Interestingly, Harris' discussion of these proposals reflects some of the old principles 
clothed in weaker language. The NZCTU sought the right for workers, not just 
employer, to choose multi-employer contracts. Harris' proposals include a suggestion 
that negotiations should be supported, not by access to arbitration, but by a 
requirement of 'good faith' on the part of employers - reminiscent of the 'good 
3 At which Patricia Sarr (1993) noted reduced participation by women - see page 
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employer' clause in the State Sector Act. Arbitration would remain voluntary on 
disputes of interest, while, as always, personal grievances and disputes of rights under 
contracts would continue to be settled only by the Court. 
In addition, a new 'standards arbitration' was proposed, through which a 'norm' 
established in an industry would 'flow out' as an industry standard which 'protects the 
integrity of bargaining from being undermined by wages competition from fringe 
maverick employers' (Harris 1992:8). This norm would be established by those 
groups with 'industrial leverage'. What this implies is a form of blanket coverage on 
an industry, rather than occupational basis. Harris' argument against making 
compulsory arbitration available for contract negotiations was that it might be used as 
a reverse 'flow on' to limit stronger groups of workers to wage rates which suit small, 
rural or uncompetitive employers. The low minimums in the NZ Clerical Awards could 
be considered an example of such a strategy by employers. However, Harris's 
solution offers little to those in occupations which do not correspond to a particular 
industry. 
Within the NZCTU there was some debate about whether equity for the most 
disadvantaged in the labour market was in fact something for which unions could or 
should take a direct responsibility. One NZCTU official saw it as a question of: 
" ... whether the movement can reestablish an equity component in the labour 
market or whether that is done by something other than unions ... whether we 
pretend again that we deliver the minimum code or whether we look at a robust 
form of minimum protection. .. a basic form of worker rights that the union 
movement then builds on." 
(NZCTU Officer, May 1992) 
To protect those unable to achieve collective contracts, in May 1993 the NZCTU 
began to lobby for a statutory Minimum Code, extending the current Minimum Wage 
Act and Holidays Act and including coverage of employees under 20 years of age. 
The question remains whether this is best done through traditional supports to 
unionisation and collective bargaining or through statutory protections of the individual. 
Statutory minimum wage rates had been allowed to slip against inflation under the 
previous National governments but, as Peter Harris pointed out, nor was the system 
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of bargaining immune from changes in government policy. In the current view of 
NZCTU officials, statutory protections were preferable: 
'The award system was a very complicated way of delivering a minimum wage. /I 
(NZCTU Officer, May 1992) 
With impressive optimism about workers' willingness to risk their jobs to further 
interests which they did not share, Harris states: 
If the union movement has this sort of protection as a sufficient priority, and if 
there is a right to strike over non-industrial matters, the union movement has 
the potential to mobilise around equity claims. If it does not, the fault is with the 
movement, not the system. (Harris 1992:8) 
Equity issues are seen as something that union movement may 'potentially' take up. 
They appear to be proposed as additional, rather than central to the amended 
collective employment contracts regime for which the NZCTU now proposes to 
struggle politically and industrially. But there is ample evidence, from this study and 
from a growing literature of historical and contemporary analysis of women and 
unionism, that union movements and labour relations systems are both responsible 
for inadequate remedies to labour market inequalities (Boston 1980; Kessler-Harris 
1985; Cobble 1991a; Rubery 1988; Crain 1991). Labour relations systems shape 
organisational forms in union movements and unions participate in shaping labour 
relations systems. 
The labour relations policy developed by Labour pOliticians in consultation with NZCTU 
leaders, and taken to the 1993 election, did not involve a return to the framework of 
the Labour Relations Act, 1987 but merely added patches and safety nets to National's 
policy. The effect of the Employment Contracts framework on the union organisation 
of workers in the 'secondary' labour market did not seem to be the primary 
consideration of either Labour or NZCTU strategists (I\lZ Labour Party 1993a; Clark 
1993; NZCTU 1993). The loss of a framework for effective delivery of pay equity 
assessments was also a secondary consideration in labour relations policy making, 
despite the concern of Labour women MPs and the publication in election year of a 
Policy on Women (NZ Labour Party 1993b). Only the third party, the Alliance, gave 
a firm but unspeci'fied commitment to repeal the Employment Contracts Act and 
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implement pay equity (Alliance 1993:13). Policy by National, Labour and the NZCTU 
increasingly suggests a situation of: 
... government conducted as if men's interests are the only ones that exist. 
Claims to be representing women's interests ... may actually be tossed around 
among groups of men and used as a strategy for achieving their own goals. 
(Pringle & Watson 1992:57) 
The focus of the NZCTU seemed to be on those unions whose situation and 
workplace numbers allow them to bargain collectively on an enterprise basis, with 
industrial action backing claims where necessary. There is lack of recognition of the 
diversity of situations among workers in the labour market. In particular, NZCTU 
strategies neglect the situation of women in low paid, part-time or casualised 
employment in small firms, who lack the numbers and industrial leverage for effective 
collective bargaining on an enterprise basis. Situations typical for women remain 
slightly outside the frame of mainstream union thinking. 
Despite considerable progress over the past decade, a perception of difference as 
somehow illegitimate continues to permeate much union thinking on gender and race 
issues. Women, Maori and Pacific Island workers tend to fall outside the official dis-
. course of Labourism which locates people as workers and workers as men (Beilharz 
1987:398; Pringle & Watson 1992:61). Their situation and interests are overshadowed 
by the situation and interests of 'classic' unions. They are conceptualised as 
'disadvantaged', or 'marginal', collapsing a connection between social attributes and 
labour market situation which needs to be critically examined. 
The outcome is a union movement which pursues the collective interests of those 
most easily represented, with greatest industrial leverage, and excludes the interests 
of those for whom some form of collective organisation is most essential. Resulting 
strategies of acquiescence to enterprise bargaining, workplace reform in large, well 
organised companies and corporatist involvement in industry planning and government 
policy making further marginalise scattered low paid service workers. However, that 
large deunionised periphery, despite the insulating effects of segregation by gender 
and race, are potentially a drag on the bargaining position of industrially strong unions 
and the market value of labour. 
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The collective organisation of low paid women and other industrially weak workers, 
whether through 'classic unionism' or feminist strategies, would not be facilitated by 
a statutory Minimum Code. While a Code of minimum wage rates and conditions 
could be enforced by an expanded Labour Department, such statutory forms do not 
provide the kind of organisational spaces which allow new issues to be raised. 
Considerable progress was made in New Zealand towards pay equity and protection 
against sexual harassment because large female dominated organisations, such as the 
clerical unions, the Nurses Union and the Distribution & General Workers Union, 
considered them to be in the interests of their members. Within the union movement 
and in political lobbying by unions, the issues around which feminist unionists 
organised carried the political weight of a highly unionised female workforce. 
That high level of unionisation, and the large women-led unions of the 1980s, were the 
result of a labour relations system which facilitated collective bargaining for industrially 
weak workers. The unionisation and bargaining power of industrially weak sections 
of the female workforce, in particularly, have been reduced by the changes of the 
Employment Contracts Act. A statutory code, on recommendations from Labour and 
NZCTU leaders, could underpin wage rates and conditions. However, it could not 
prOVide 'pOlitical space' for women to organise around women's issues, as a way of 
developing among women workers the collectivity that is the heart of unionism. 
Conclusion 
The focus in this chapter has been on structural differences in the situation of unions 
for female dominated occupations which contributed to variations in bargaining power. 
Similarities of situation between groups of members in these unions help explain the 
gendered impact of the Employment Contracts Act. Factors affecting the bargaining 
strength of employees interacted with employers' strategies in the labour market and 
in the market for the firm's services, producing variation in negotiating outcomes. 
However, the concentration of women in occupations with scattered workforces and 
little industrial strength meant that the new labour relations regime has had a gendered 
impact. By February 1993 this began to be reflected in a widening gender pay gap 
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(Stats NZ 1993a&b). For this reason, the chapter considered in some detail the 
response of NZCTU leaders to decollectivisation and deunionisation in industrially 
weak sections of the union movement, in which women are overrepresented. Current 
NZCTU policies and strategies suggest that the situations in which women are 
common employed continue to be considered marginal to the main business of 
unionism. 
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CHAPTER 11: THE STRATEGIES OF FEMINIST UNIONISM 
I ntraduction 
This chapter returns to the theme of feminism in the union movement. From the detail 
of earlier chapters, it considers strategies developed by feminist unionists in the 1980s 
that differed from traditional unionism ~ or did they? 
Building on the supports to unionisation and bargaining provided by the traditional 
labour relations system, feminists set out to make unionism more relevant to women 
members and to make unionism 'a vehicle for female activism' in New Zealand 
(Cobble 1990:519). The construction of specifically 'women's interests' is considered 
in the light of theories of unionism and collective action (Offe & Wissenthal 1985). 
This chapter identifies a distinctive set of strategies directed at furthering the collective 
interests of women workers, particularly those for whom the strategies of 'classic 
unionism' were problematic. The Lfeminist judo' of achieving change through 
legislative intervention is compared to the traditionally strong role that unions have 
played in New Zealand in establishing the corporatist arrangements within which they 
operated. 
Collective Identities, Collective Interests 
A key difference between New Zealand's traditional labour relations framework and the 
Employment Contracts Act is that the first facilitated collectivism while the second 
individualises employment negotiations (Hince 1993:10). The outcomes of the first 
round of enterprise bargaining for clerical workers, nurses and service workers 
highlighted the link between bargaining power and the logistics of organising groups 
of workers into effective bargaining collectives. 
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Building union strength in order to negotiate collectively involves overcoming 
fragmentation at two different levels - firstly, at the level of logistics of organising 
workers competing in a particular labour market, and secondly, at the level of 
formulating the collective interests to be pursued (Offe & Wissenthal 1985). As 
discussed in Chapter 10, ways of overcoming fragmentation due to isolation, different 
hours of work, high turnover employment or number of employers are crucial in bring-
ing together the collective strength of those with common interests. 
The traditional system of negotiating awards with blanket coverage of particular 
occupations overcame fragmentation and other structural factors which diminished 
bargaining power. This system institutionalised wage negotiations at the level of the 
labour market. For isolated workers and industrially weak groups, centralised award 
negotiations requiring little participation by members had advantages which 
outweighed disadvantages. This was the case with clerical workers in small 
workplaces who felt vulnerable to employer pressure. However, the very centralised 
nature of the fully arbitrated award system meant that dialogue about organisational 
goals and the work of officials was generally poor, alienating some members from 
unionism. This was less the case for unions whose memberships were physically 
concentrated on large worksites, particularly those strategically well placed in essential 
production or the infrastructure. Scattered memberships, characteristics of some 
unions in this study, often meant little attention was given to servicing the workplace 
problems of individuals. Nor was attention given to issues which did not fit narrow 
definitions of what constituted an industrial matter (Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 1990:31). 
These 'mono logical' patterns of union leadership (Offe & Wissenthal 1985: 198) 
reached the limits of effectiveness by the late 1970s. All the case studies showed 
improvement in servicing the workplace needs of individual members and encouraging 
active participation in the organisation, although the timing of such changes varied 
between the unions studied. The strategies of feminist unionists to make unionism 
more relevant to women members were an important part of a general move to 
develop a more democratic, more participatory unionism. 
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The traditional labour relations system allowed the labour markets for the work women 
typically do to be organised with regard to some vital issues - minimum wage rates 
and conditions, penal payments, hours of work, parttime employment. However, other 
'life concerns' (Offe & Wissenthal 1985: 177) important to women in paid employment 
were excluded from negotiations. Incorporating some of these into a Working 
Women's Charter, feminist unionists built on the basic structure of the award 
bargaining system to raise issues of specific concern to women members. Their aim 
was to overcome dissatisfaction with compulsory unionism that, for example, the 
clerical unions identified among women members in the late 1970s (Moynihan 
1986:92). They hoped to involve more women in union activities and to raise the low 
proportion of women members in union decision making (NZPSA 1976; Geare, Herd 
& Howell 1979). 
Centralised negotiations offered a solution to the fragmentation of workers' bargaining 
power in occupations scattered across small worksites, or with high job turnover or 
short hours of work. The second source of fragmentation within any union, discussed 
in Chapter 3, is the 'insuperable individuality' of labour power which must be overcome 
to articulate a set of collective interests to be pursued (Offe & Wissenthal 1985: 
177-179). As Offe and Wissenthal argue, the content of bargaining needs to be such 
that members can see the broader interests of the group as also in their personal 
interest, despite some personal risk or the sacrifice of some aspect of individual 
interest for the collective good. The objectives or strategies of other unions cannot 
be applied as a standard formula or model for emulation. Collective interests must be 
developed as a result of collective deliberation by the group if members are to show 
'willingness to act'. In their view the articulation of collective interests is based on, and 
helps develop, a collective identity which underpins effective union action. 
This was what feminist unionists set out to do in the late 1970s. They sought to base 
the collective interests of female dominated unions on the gendered identity and 
gender specific work experience of women union members. The Working Women's 
Charter was developed through considering 'the entire spectrum of needs that 
(women) have when they are employed as wage workers' (Offs & Wissenthal 
1985:179). As more women became active in female dominated unions, such as the 
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Clerical Workers or Hotel & Hospital Workers, they focused on issues of gender as 
central to the 'spectrum of needs' on which to base the formulation of collective 
interests. Working lives and private lives interconnect in different ways for men and 
women and different racial groups 1 and are central to the personal identities which 
people carry in to the workplace. As discussed in Chapter 3, gender and race coin-
cide with particular labour The new generation of women leaders in the 
clerical and nurses' unions recognised gender as central to, not subordinated to, a 
strong collective identity among predominantly female members. 
Building collective identity as women workers, both in particular unions and within 
the union movement, was important to feminist unionists who tried to increase 
women's union participation. Each of the case studies showed examples of 
organising strategies which built collective identity around personal identity and issues 
arising out of the social relations within which identity is constructed. Service workers 
officials sought to increase members' active involvement by organising on the basis 
of their identity as women, Maori or Pacific Islanders with their own specific concerns. 
Nurses' union officials recognised that the 'nurse' identity was a strongly gendered 
one which could work for, as well as against members' interests as unionists. Clerical 
union officials aimed to rally and involve their large but scattered workforce through 
campaigns on issues like sexual harassment and pay equity. They were building 
unionism through the development among members of a collective identity as women 
at work. 
Low pay, parttime work and employment security were union concerns which many 
women shared with some men workers, though not of equal concern to all groups of 
women. Childcare, parental leave, sexual harassment, discrimination in employment 
opportunities and the comparable worth of women's skills with men's were all 
constructed as collective interests specific to women workers. Taking up such issues 
was seen by feminist unionists as a way to actively involve women members by 
making unionism more relevant to them. 
1 For example. tangihanga leave has been an important issue for Maori and Pacific Islands workers. 
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As Pringle and Watson suggest (1992:64-66), 'women's interests' are constructed 
relationally within intersecting social practices of gender, race and class, but they are 
not fixed or always coherent. They are constructed within changing labour market and 
workplace contexts and a changing legislative framework, as some issues are taken 
up and others not. In female dominated, women-led unions like the NZ Clerical 
Workers Union and the Nurses Union, issues specific to women were constructed 
as the collective interests of the union through executive meetings and membership 
meetings. The problem of sexual harassment, for example, was first raised at a 
membership meeting of the Central Clerical Workers Union. Contacts between women 
officials in the women's subcommittees of the Federation of Labour were important in 
developing this into a campaign which resulted in sexual harassment being included 
in legislation as grounds for personal grievance proceedings. It was the clerical unions 
that took a test case on equal pay for work of equal value under the Equal Pay Act, 
1972. Through feminist and union contacts, clerical union officials had heard of 
campaigns for pay equity beginning in Australia and Britain. 
These issues were taken up by the predominantly female executive of the NZ Clerical 
Association because they were trying to build a stronger collective identity across their 
extremely fragmented membership. Under voluntary unionism, membership levels 
would depend on women seeing relevance and benefits in unionism. Willingness to 
act, whether politically through involvement in campaigns or industrially against 
daunting logistics, depended on the union raising issues which were of interest to 
women clerical workers. The issues identified in the Working Women's Charter were 
relevant to members because of the strongly gendered nature of clerical work. But 
they were also of interest to feminists in other unions for female dominated 
occupations - particularly the Distribution Workers Unions, the Post Primary Teachers 
Association and the women's committee of the Public Service Association. 
Once articulated, issues specific to women such as sexual harassment, child care, 
parental leave, equal employment opportunity and pay equity were widely supported 
by women in organisations outside the union movement (Dann 1985; Woodley 1993; 
Wilson 1992). They drew the support of feminist women as concrete issues arising 
at the intersection of gender relations and employment relations, through which the 
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disadvantaged position of women in the labour market is constructed (Walby 1988). 
The importance of clerical work as a source of employment for women made the 
attention clerical union officials gave women's issues particularly valuable to the New 
Zealand women's movement. 
'~s a feminist working politically and in the trade union movement, my personal 
opinion about the NZ Clerical Workers Union going is it is the worst thing that 
could have happened," (Distribution Workers Officer, May 1992) 
Central to feminist unionists' strategy with members was union education to encourage 
collective identity among members. This was given early priority by the clerical unions. 
Seminars in which women members discussed individual and labour market problems 
raised feminist consciousness as well as union consciousness. These seminars were 
directed at developing collective identity and articulating collective interests. Public 
campaigns on particular issues of concern were initiated as women members and 
activists gathered together. These campaigns were both collective action at a political 
level and a more public form of education. Public campaigns could inform and unite 
women across different worksites and different occupations behind campaign goals 
at the political level. 
. Questions of collective identity were particularly interesting in the organisations 
representing nurses. In contrast to clerical workers and cleaners, the majority of NZ 
Nursing Association members were on large worksites and were key workers with 
considerable leverage in an important state 'industry'. As the legislative changes of 
1988 and 1991 made industrial action nurses' only means of protecting their position, 
officials were trying to develop a stronger union consciousness among members. The 
NZ Nurses Association's professionalisation strategy was based on collective identity 
- a strongly gendered identity as professional nurses. A widespread understanding 
among nurses of the gendered division of labour in health care reinforced rather than 
undermined nurse-equals-women ideology and professional identity, but had done little 
to promote collective identity as workers. In both the Nurses Association and the 
Nurses Union, union education was directed at reworking members' strong identity as 
nurses to include solidarity on labour relations issues. Officials of both unions 
constantly referred to the way the professional and the industrial were intertwined in 
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nursing work. Because of this, they argued, unionism was complementary, rather than 
incompatible to professionalism. 
In some employment situations for NZ Nurses Union members, the building of 
collective identity was directed at overcoming fragmentation and vulnerability, as with 
scattered clerical and service workers. Similar educational and campaign strategies 
were taken up by officials as they began to actively organise their more scattered 
nursing workforces in the late 1980s. Generally, however, the objective of a strong 
collective identity was to overcome moral constraints on industrial action. Indivi-
dualised ideals of service were shifting towards collective stands on professional 
standards of care, to be delivered by a nursing workforce with recognised skills and 
appropriate market rewards. As both health services and professional status were 
undermined by changes in the management of the state, nurse-patient loyalties which 
had been a moral constraint on action were being transformed into moral indignation 
which reinforced industrial action. 
Because of the way gender relations intersect with individual employment relations for 
both nurses and clerical workers, education by the Nurses Union and clerical unions 
featured assertiveness training and personal empowerment as part of union/feminist 
consciousness raising. 
"We think the way we can improve solidarity is to improve their self esteem, with 
things like pay equity and the Nurses are Worth More campaign." 
(NZ Nurses Union Official, Nov. 1990) 
In addition to more collective strategies, this aimed at helping members to deal 
themselves with day-to-day situations. Nursing tutors in Auckland recently introduced 
components on workplace interaction and conflict resolution into the nursing 
curriculum. They aimed to provide nurses with the skills to put into practice the 
concept of the autonomous nurse practitioner which is taught as part of nursing 
philosophy. However, union officials recognised that supporting individuals through 
collective strength and 'third party' intervention was the purpose of unions, particularly 
for nurses in isolated situations. Socialisation towards service and cooperation rather 
than conflict may weaken women's resolve in dealing with employers, but: 
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"If they have a union, a good feminist union, then what we see is providing them 
with the skills to get them out of that cycle. We can do the conflict for them, as 
long as they agree with the principles and what it is we are working towards." 
(NZ Nurses Union Official, Nov. 1990) 
In cleaning and other service work occupations, officials appreciated that members' 
identity as Maori or Pacific Islands people, and the strong community values of these 
groups, contributed to union solidarity, underpinning collective action. Employment 
relations which were often clearly exploitative meant industrial action was well 
supported by women members, particularly in disputes in which they were directly 
involved. Nevertheless, through the 1980s cleaners' union officials had gained more 
for members through arbitration than directly through strike action. 
Women's involvement in ongoing organisation and leadership of the Cleaners & 
Caretakers Unions was very low. As separate women-only organisation in the union 
movement began to increase women's participation and share of leadership positions, 
similar committees and some activities for women members were initiated by feminist 
unionists in the Hotel & Hospital Workers Unions - but not in the more conservative, 
male-led Cleaners & Caretakers Unions. The feminist campaigns in the wider union 
movement were important to women officials trying to raise the priority given to 
women's issues by male leaders of the Hotel & Hospital Workers Unions. 
In the later Service Workers Union, leaders agreed that separate organisation among 
women Maori and Pacific Islands members would build union identity among those 
members, encourage partiCipation and prepare them for future leadership roles. When 
these groups began to raise their own particular concerns, such as more translation 
of information, immigration or Treaty of Waitangi issues, these met resistance from the 
Pakeha male leadership. Moves were made (unsuccessfully) to limit the participation 
of these groups in overall decision making. 
The Service Workers Union can be recognised as itself a site of struggle between 
different groups articulating their different interests and strategising to achieve them. 
The standing committees wanted, and were a step towards, a more representative 
leadership which would, they hoped, give greater priority to the concerns of women, 
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Maori and Pacific islands members. However, the situation was very fluid. Numbers 
dropped in fragmented female dominated sections of coverage, and new unions 
jOined. Achieving agreement on interests and strategies in a large but more diverse 
organisation is likely to become more difficult. Division and differences over the 
interests of different groups, as well as physical fragmentation, may favour monological 
patterns of leadership at the expense of collective identity and union participation, 
particularly by women. However, members supported full voting rights for the standing 
committees, against the advice of union leadership, ensuring input into centralised 
decision making on the basis of identity as women, Maori and Pacific Islanders. 
Isolation and fragmentation, coupled with women's 'double burden', contributed to an 
'insurance mentality' among many union members, rather than active participation. 
Reinforcing the centralised nature of unions focused on award bargaining, low 
attendance at membership meetings often allowed leaders a fairly free hand to direct 
the strategies of the union. Yet there is ample evidence that members could and 
would indicate disapproval or organise to oppose some decisions by officials. A small 
groups of Catholic members actively opposed the clerical unions' support of abortion 
in the Working Women's Charter. Other Pakeha women members expressed strong 
disapproval of their secretary's Maori Nationalist politics. However, when Fintan 
Patrick Walsh supported the arbitration system or later when feminist Martha Coleman 
championed pay equity as in the interests of clerical workers, any accusation that a 
passive compulsory membership was being used by leaders for their own ends came 
from other unions who preferred other strategies. There was no ground-swell of 
disapproval from clerical union members themselves. 
During the 1980s legislative changes eroded the alternative to 'willingness to act' 
provided by arbitration on award bargaining and compulsory unionism. The 
development of collective identity and collective interests became more important, to 
support various forms of collective action - with strike action 'as a final resort' (Offe & 
Wissenthal1985:185). However, both collective interests and identity varied between 
different groups of workers. As well as the differences of situation and bargaining 
strength discussed in the last chapter, differences of identity and collective interests 
contributed to the differences of strategy adopted by different unions in the 1980s. 
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Offe and Wissenthal's theories of collective action focus on the tension between 
individual and collective interests within unions, and the role of collective identity in 
resolving this. This chapter draws on their discussion and on the case studies to 
consider the importance of collective identities in constructing collective interests 
among different groups of workers. Differences between identities and sets of 
collective interests led to tensions documented in the case studies. There were 
tensions, for example, between women clerical workers and male production workers 
on particular worksites, and tensions between nurses and other hospital workers which 
reflected perceptions of identity. 
Also documented are disagreements in the union movement over strategic directions. 
Differences between sets of collective interests based on both situation and identity 
contributed to tension between the recommended strategies of the NZCTU and the 
strategies developed by feminist unionists. There is little in Offe and Wissenthal's logic 
of collective action that privileges industry over occupational unionism, or a workplace 
collectivity of physically present workers over collectivity based on occupational 
identity. This thesis argues that organisational forms are strategic choices within the 
constraints of particular corporatist frameworks, and so too are the industrial or 
political forms of collective action taken by different groups of workers. 
The feminist unionist strategies identified in this chapter developed within a particular 
labour relations system and within the constraints of the employment situations in 
which women workers are concentrated. These studies show ways in which the 
development of collective identity and the construction of collective interests among 
groups of women workers became a focus for feminism in the New Zealand union 
movement. These underpinned feminist unionist strategies of a political as well as an 
industrial nature. 
Offe and Wissenthal argue that the articulation of collective union interests requires the 
overcoming of interest distortions in a capitalist society (1985:198-200). In a society 
that is also patriarchal, women's knowledge of their own work lives and labour market 
difficulties does not automatically develop into what Nancy Hartsock calls a collective 
standpoint. 
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(That) may be present on the basis of common threads of female experience, 
but it is neither self-evident nor obvious ... (it) represents an achievement both 
of science and of political struggle. (Hartsock 1983:303, 288) 
The leaven of 'science', in the case of the women-led unions studied here, was the 
development of a feminist theoretical analysis, both in New Zealand and spread 
through publications and an international feminist network. Analysis of members' 
situations was 'not objectively arrived at but subjectively and practically gained' 
(Farganis 1985:63). Theory was part of this process through the feminist and/or 
marxist (rather than liberal) understandings held by union officials as they analysed 
political developments, the experiences and problems of women members and the 
difficulties of negotiating on their behalf. The aim was to clarify how things worked, 
what choices were available and where challenges would be most effective (Bunch 
1983:255). 
Feminist analyses suggest that equity in the labour market is not furthered by 
submerging women's social identity, their specific situation and their different needs 
under the rubic of 'the worker' and a marxist analysis of class relations alone. Femi-
nist unionists identified 'classic' unionism as based on men's traditional experiences 
of work, underpinned by a masculine collective identity. 
''They've got brotherhood, it's like being in the Masons. I'm not criticising them, 
they've worked at that and irs been a strength for them ... but the working class 
in their terms is mostly males. Why would women see themselves as part of 
than" (NZ Clerical Workers Union Official, Nov. 1990) 
Among reasons for women's low union involvement in the past have been alienation 
from the jargon and formal rituals developed by traditional male unions (Geare, Herd 
& Howell 1979:14) and the imagery of working class masculinity around unions and 
industrial action. This was epitomised by the old Federation of Labour logo of raised 
arm and hammer. As a NZCTU woman official has pointed out, this persistent imagery 
belies the reality of high female unionisation in New Zealand (Foulkes 1993a: 1; Sarr 
1992). But just as women in clerical jobs are not 'real' workers and nurses are not 
'real' professionals, women have had difficulty being accepted as 'real' unionists (Crain 
1991 :1166). One union educator noted that when women officials' opinions differed 
from those of male unionists they were often accused of being middle class, 
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regardless of background. But the working class credentials of male officials were 
always valid, no matter how high they rose in union organisations. True staunchness 
required a confrontational style, which often alienates women from unionism. When 
nurses union officials conducted themselves in a style considered appropriate by 
women members for representing the profession in dealings with employers: 
"They call us the Gucci socialists ... 1 think both NZNA and us are viewed as soft 
unionists. You are supposed to talk people into striking." 
(NZ Nurses Union Official, Nov. 1990) 
Feminist unionists from women-led unions were not calling for 'brotherhood' to be 
made gender neutral, however, but rather for recognition that existing union traditions 
were built on a male identity, and that a similar identity among women was equally 
valid. Feminist unionism was not 'bourgeois deviationism' competing with 'true 
unionism', but the form taken by solidarity among women as workers, given the 
intersecting gender and class relations which affected them in paid employment. 
"My argument to people who were against the women's structure, when class 
was the issue as opposed to gender issues, was that your politics are your own 
beliefs and you believe in men. So what's wrong with women having some 
feminist politics?" (Distribution Workers Officer, May 1992) 
. In pursuing sucl1 politics within unions, the situation in the cleaners' unions and the 
Service Workers Union contrasts with the clerical unions. With women over 85% of 
clerical union membership, feminist women began to achieve leadership positions from 
the late 1970s. By the early 1980s union decision making structures were dominated 
by women and a coherent set of interests and strategies emerged which reflected the 
experience of clerical work and women's disadvantaged position in the labour market. 
Both the Cleaners & Caretakers and Hotel & Hospital Workers Unions had higher 
proportions of male members, often in fulltime, longer term jobs, with collective 
organising based on their own occupational concerns and a well-established male 
leadership. With around 85% women members, the Service Workers Union was at just 
that point of 'critical mass' at which other New Zealand unions have achieved 
leadership by women. In New Zealand as elsewhere, it was women officials who 
prioritised women's issues and women union leaders who pursued strategies based 
on a feminist analysis (Crain 1991; Curtin 1991). 
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Occupational unionism provided a form of organisation which reflected women's 
concentration in the labour market. Feminist unionists used the organisational space 
that female dominated unions provided to develop and pursue issues in the Working 
Women's Charter which male leaders and organisers had not considered important. 
"When you are a female dominated union, with your executive and your staff all 
women, you know. It is second sense to us what our issues are ... women's 
issues are very, very important, pay equity, Maori nurses." 
(NZ Nurses Union Officer, May 1992) 
Where women did not have the critical mass to affect leadership and strategies in their 
own union, they made smaller pOlitical spaces within unions or across unions. In 
these ways, feminist officials and active members met together to discuss issues and 
strategies. In women-led unions and in women's committees, they planned the 
campaigns on sexual harassment, equal employment opportunity and pay equity 
which attracted support from union members and from the wider public. 
Political consciousness and activism has also been extremely high among Maori since 
the mid 1970s, but, with the possible exception of Timber Workers, union organisation 
has not sufficiently reflected the labour market concentration of Maori or Pacific Islands 
workers for particular Maori and Pacific Islands concerns to affect union leadership or 
union strategies. Their efforts to achieve political space in NZCTu structures, and 
within the unions studies here, have had limited success. The option chosen by some 
Maori unionists was to organise separately outside the NZCTU. 
Some feminist unionists recognised that strategies to build unionism among less 
well-represented groups of membership meant changing structures and processes to 
ensure that the interests of those groups were articulated. It would mean changing 
the priorities of unions to genuinely include the concerns of those members. 
"Having women's, Maori and Pacific Islands identities as part of our image is 
a good way to promote unionism. It doesn't mean that we just go out there and 
get other people to agree with us, we actually try to agree with them as well, 
take on more the pOlicies of other groups that we may not have wanted to 
consider up till now. Do something for them as well as them doing something 
for us." (Distribution Workers Officials, Nov. 1990) 
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Feminist Unionist Strategies 
Building on collective identity, then, unions pursue collective action to further what 
union secretaries, executive members and meetings of the membership have adopted 
as their collective interests. Earlier chapters have presented case studies of two 
women-led occupational unions and one led by men. An important focus of these 
studies was the priority given to issues of speci'fic concern to women workers. 
Emerging from these and from the account of women-only organisations within the 
union movement is a set of strategies which I have been broadly describing as 
1eminist unionism'. These strategies contrasted with the mainstream strategies of the 
union movement, which were based on what some have referred to as 'classic' 
unionism (see pages 28 and 555). 
In the course of this research, I frequently encountered the view among unionists, 
usually male unionists, not only that the clerical unions did not get out and organise 
their members properly, but that they had no strategy with which to face voluntary 
unionism. The Engineers promoted a strategy of workplace reform and compre-
hensive training programmes, NZCTU officials proposed 'strategic unionism', but the 
clerical unions were described as 'having no strategy'. 
This research on the clerical unions suggests that they did indeed have longstanding 
strategies - though perhaps insufficiently labelled as such to the outside world. In the 
late 1970s efforts were made to service and involve the membership, as criticism of 
compulsory unionism grew (Moynihan, 1986:84-5, 95-5). In the 1980s the collective 
interests and strategies pursued by the unions began to reflected the very high 
proportion of women among union members and officials. As discussed in the last 
section, issues from the Working Women's Charter became an important focus of the 
work of clerical union officials in an effort to make unionism relevant to their women 
members. 
Officials acknowledged the importance of state supports which enabled unions to 
negotiate at the level of wage rates for occupational labour markets. Also 
acknowledged were the limitations of 'classic' organising tactics and industrial action 
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for clerical union members. An alternative set of strategies was devised, based on 
political rather than industrial power, and numbers in the labour market rather than 
numbers on worksites. 
'We have weaknesses and we have strengths as well and we use our strengths 
in a different way to try and eliminate our weaknesses. II 
(NZ Clerical Workers Union Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Until the end of 1989, the Clerical Workers Association provided a structure for officials 
of the regional unions to decide - or disagree about - strategic directions. NZCWU 
officials continued to gather for planning meetings and weekends. Far from sitting on 
their hands over the 1980s, they ... 
" ... had a style of organising that was probably more militant than most unions 
because we would have campaigns and develop strategies and say this is what 
we are going to do and how we are going to it. What is the knowledge that we 
have of our membership? That they are mostly women." 
(NZ Clerical Workers Union Officer, Nov. 1990) 
Labour relations legislation provided both the authority by which officials could 
intervene in individual employment relations and limited the 'industrial matters' on 
which members could be represented, either individually or collectively. It took three 
years for clerical union officials to negotiate a satisfactory clause on sexual harassment 
in their 1985 awards, and the awards for hotel workers and shop assistants showed 
less success. Employers refused to countenance pay equity assessments between 
typically female dominated and male dominated occupations, as did the Arbitration 
Court. Feminist unionists mounted political campaigns for legislation which would 
enable them to negotiating these issues with employers. This was a strategy 
appropriate to both the labour relations system and the industrial situation of scattered 
members in female dominated occupations like clerical, shop and service work - and 
an effective one. 
Other unionists did not always recognise effective but essentially political action as a 
legitimate union strategy: 
"1 think the clerical union at its peak organised much more effectively as a 
public relations activity, as an action group and an activists' group within the 
union movement, than it did among its members. It organised members within 
a public relations framework. The work it did was excellent (but) more clearly 
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driven on activism than it was on organisation of rank and file workers. /I 
(NZCTU Officer, May 1992) 
These campaigns were much more than public relations, although a high media profile 
was an acknowledged part of communication with the third of New Zealand women 
employed in clerical work. They were directed at policy change, initially within the 
union movement but primarily by government through new or changed legislation. 
The significant factor in the disbanding of the NZ Clerical Workers Union was not 
failure to achieve goals or lack of a strategy in the face of voluntary unionism. It was 
the removal of a labour relations framework which allowed scattered and industrially 
weak workers to negotiate at the level of the labour market. This was an unexpected 
and radical change to a framework for labour relations which had been in place for 
over a century. It impacted on unions other than the feminist and politically active 
clerical unions, as the case study of the Service Workers Union showed. 
The feminist unionist strategies encountered in the case studies - identified, then 
discussed below - were developed in several unions with large female memberships 
and in the women's union organisations described in Chapter 5. Despite differences 
between women's occupational situations, ways of operating were devised which were 
appropriate to memberships of scattered, mobile women in service work. 
To increase women's involvement in unionism and to make unionism relevant to 
women, feminist unionists emphasised union education with a strong feminist 
consciousness raiSing content and involving members in campaigns addressing 
the specific concerns of women at work. Three central strategies can be identified 
in relation to furthering issues that these unions and women's committees targetted 
as important to women. These were: using membership numbers; throwing with 
the weight of the state'; and revaluing women's work. To provide an organisational 
base for these strategies and to further women's collective interests in the union 
movement, women organised to establish autonomous political spaces for women. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, feminist unionists in New Zealand have had some success 
in overcoming the 'limits to unionism' as a vehicle for change for women (Milkman 
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1987:96; Cobble 1990:519). Crucial to this has been the existence of large occupa-
tional unions representing predominantly female members. As the feminist movement 
grew in New Zealand, women became more politically active in unions and some of 
these strongly female dominated occupational unions achieved women leaders. For 
the first time, these provided 'political spaces' in which predominantly women officials 
and members articulated the collective interests of the union and constructed 
'women's interests' in relation to a series of issues. 
The clerical unions provided the key example in this thesis of how the 'feminisation' 
of leadership allowed a large union for a female dominated occupation to became 
such a political space for women. The leadership of unions organising shop assistants 
and secondary school teachers also became 'feminised' by the 1980s, and were active 
on women's issues. The nurses' unions, always women-led but slow to consider 
themselves unions, added their weight to feminist unionists campaigns in the late 
1980s. The NZ Nurses Union, in particular, had a strong feminist analysis of their 
members' situation and gave high priority to sexual harassment and pay equity. 
Achieving the female leadership which allowed some unions to become bases from 
which feminist strategies could be pursued, was - and still is - a slow process, in which 
the proportion of female to male members is crucial. The Service Workers Union 
provides an example of struggle by feminist unionists in an union with a majority of 
women members but with a male dominated leadership. This parallels the situation 
of women in industry based unions and union federations elsewhere (Trebilcock 
1991 :412; Boston 1980; Milkman 1985, 1987; Kessler Harris 1985; Cobble 1990, 
1991 c; ICFTU 1991). In most examples from Britain and the United States, women 
had not achieved the 'critical mass' in union organisations to achieve leadership or 
prioritise women's issues, particularly at the national level (Curtin, 1991; ICFTU 1991). 
The key difference in New Zealand was a particular system of labour relations which 
supported union organisation by occupation. As a result, the patterns of women's 
labour market concentration was reJlected in their union organisation. 
As well as achieving leadership in some female dominated unions, feminist unionists 
created female dominated 'political spaces' in women-only groups and committees. 
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These were the focus of Chapter 5. Some brought together feminists active inside and 
outside the union movement, while others provided a meeting place for feminist 
unionists from different unions, including male dominated ones. Meeting in 
women-only groups allowed new issues to be explored, collective interests formulated 
and a stronger collective identity developed as women working for change within and 
through unions. Women's committees in the structures of the Federation of Labour 
and Council of Trade Unions, and in some unions, ensured that 'women's 
interests' were represented at national decision making levels. Initially there were 
tensions over 'separatist' organisation, with accusations of divisiveness and disloyalty 
(c.f. Kessler Harris 1985:120,126). In contrast to the historic accounts by Alice 
Kessler-Harris and Ruth Milkman, however, these changes occurred within the context 
of a widespread feminist movement and a feminist discourse with well developed 
arguments for women-only organisation. 
Autonomous pOlitical space within the structures of the union movement was both 
achieved by, and an important means of, gathering the strength of women's 
numbers to organise around issues affecting women at work. In order to speak with 
some authority in union and political circles on the Charter, sexual harassment or pay 
equity, feminist unionists needed to demonstrate the support of large numbers of 
women. They gathered numerical strength in three ways; through lobbying by unions 
which represented large numbers of women members; through organiSing women 
across different unions within the movement; and through working with women and 
their organisations outside the union movement. 
In the first instance, occupational unionism, supported by compulsory unionism and 
access to arbitration, enabled the widespread unionisation of women, counter-
balancing the logistical fragmentation of women across thousands of small workplaces. 
The voting power of these unions for female dominated occupations carried political 
weight within the movement. As women gained positions as union officials and 
leaders, this voting power was increaSingly used to establish policy relating to women 
workers in the Federation of Labour and NZ Council of Unions. 
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Secondly, the purpose of some 'political spaces' was to gather together feminist 
unionists from unions with varying proportions of women members. In these groups 
and committees, women educated one another and strategised on issues such as the 
Working Women's Charter, sexual harassment, pay equity or the status of standing 
committees for women and Maori. Women's committees also provided a place to 
discuss commonalities and differences between female dominated unions in relation 
to changes to labour relations framework. Strong personal networks between feminist 
union officials helped build alliances between unions which together represented large 
numbers of women workers. Feminist unionists isolated in male dominated unions 
frequently encountered difficulties in raising women's issues. Organising with other 
women outside their own union, they achieved policy change at a higher level of 
authority - the Federation of Labour or NZ Council of Trade Unions. Policy on 
women's issues in these umbrella organisations helped set policy in their own affilated 
union. 
The strategy of seeking political space within the union movement to organise around 
collective identity and collective interests was also employed by Maori unionists, and 
to a lesser extent, Pacific Island workers. Perhaps because of lower numbers of Maori 
or Pacific Island members than of women, as well as resistance by incumbent union 
leaders, Maori and Pad'fic Island workers, men and women, have not found the union 
movement as effective a vehicle for advancing their collective position as it has been 
for women. Effective organisation by these groups - extremely successful organisation 
in the case of Maori2 - has been largely outside the union movement, and the 
movement has been the weaker for that. 
At the widest level, feminist unionism gathered the political strength of women's 
numbers for a strategy that Hester Eisenstein has called 'feminist judo - throwing with 
the weight of the state' (Eisenstein 1986). Women's potential voting power can 
sometimes harness the power of the state through legislation addressing issues of 
2 Organisation among Maori has been political, rather than industrial - in groups as diverse as Nga 
Tamatoa and Te Ahi Kaa, the Maori Council and the Maori Women's Welfare League, and iwi 
organisations. Through political activism and the Courts, successes have been achieved with regard 
to language, land and the ownership of resources, rather than paid labour. See Awatere (1984), Kelsey 
(1990, 1993:243-52), Evans (1993) and the proliferation of literature relating to the Treaty of Waitangi. 
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specific importance to them. Legislation for equal pay in 19S0 and 1972 and 
employment equity in 1990 were all closely connected with election year politics 
(Corner 1988; Hill 1993b; Wilson 1992). Following a public campaign, sexual 
harassment procedures were included in the Labour Relations Act 1987. Like 
childcare and parental leave, these were issues for women at work which went beyond 
the narrow interests of a particular occupation or the members of a particular union. 
The campaigns drew support not only from female dominated unions but from women 
in political parties and state departments and a range of women's organisations 
beyond the union movement (Wilson 1992; Woodley 1993). Through this political 
power, women sought changes to labour relations legislation which would enable them 
to use the power of the state on behalf of women in dealings with employers. 
Revaluing women's work, to equalise women's market rewards with men's, has been 
a central strategy of women working through unions since World War Two. The first 
challenge was to the inequality of male and female wage rates for the same job, 
institutionalised by the Arbitration Court (Robertson 1991). In the 1970s feminists 
demanded women's unpaid labour at home be recognised as work, not 'acts of love' 
(Hartsock 1983:303). In the 1980s the linkages between women's unpaid and paid 
work were explored, and feminist unionists began to focus on the social practices 
embedded in occupational segregation which allowed women's work to be under-
valued and underpaid. They asserted that what women typically did was skilled work 
(Phillips & Taylor 1980; Steinberg 1990). Some detail of the pay equity campaign and 
the resulting legislation is provided in Chapter 7. As Chapter 5 recounts, part of the 
challenge for feminist unionists was to get collective strength of union movement 
behind its women members. 
The equal pay and pay equity campaigns were about changing the basis of reward 
for labour. The market has always affected reward levels, but the award system put 
a floor under low rates in the 'secondary' labour market, in particular. The original 
basis of occupational rates was living costs, and award claims tried to maintain real 
wages against inflation. Occupational relativities helped deliver this. Comparison with 
other countries shows that relativities benefited low paid women (Urban Research 
1987; Hyman 1987), but also institutionalised gender discrimination (NZCWA 1988; 
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Robertson 1992). Women argued not for abandonment of awards in favour of greater 
'freedom' to negotiate, however, but for a change in the basis of wage setting to 
eliminate discrimination in employer practices. in the 1950s and 1960s feminists inside 
and outside the union movement had sought comparison of men's and women's rates 
for the same job (Moynihan 1986; Corner 1988). In the 1980s they sought comparison 
of rewards for comparable skills in men's and women's typically different jobs (Urban 
Research 1987; Wilson 1988; Burns & Coleman 1991; Woodley 1993). By this time, 
however, employers were also seeking a change in the basis of bargaining, to reflect 
both the market and employers' ability to pay (NZBRT 1987, 1988b; NZEF 1990a). 
This appears to have meant 'whichever was lower', since Telecom's profitability in the 
1990s has translated into neither higher pay rates nor job retention. 
The strategy for achieving equal pay, equal employment opportunity, pay equity and 
sexual harassment provisions was 'feminist judo; throwing with the wejght of the state' 
(Eisenstein 1986). To do this, the potential voting power of women was used to 
secure state policy changes to benefit of women. Legislation on pay equity was 
secured in the months before the 1990 election. The last stages of the campaign ran 
parallel to NZCTU's corporatist strategy of the Compact and the Growth Agreement 
- also a strategy which used potential votes to harness state power to the benefit of 
working people. Unquestionably, NZCTU officials saw their own political strategy and 
a high public relations profile as legitimate union strategies. 
Women officials of the NZCTU recognised the parallel between the pay equity 
campaign and a Compact between unions and a Labour government. In fact, the 
same officials who viewed clerical union strategies as public relations rather than 
classic organising considered pay equity part of the Compact strategy, despite its 
origins in the work of clerical worker officials. 
"The Compact discussions were about a relationship with a Labour 
Government. Now one of the flow-ons from that relationship was the Pay Equity 
legislation. II (NZCTU Officer, May 1992) 
IIWhat we tried to do with pay equity legislation was to get government to deliver 
it with decent processes, aims and involvement and that is a Compact strategy. 
What women saw was that we werent going to get it done by industrial 
muscle," (NZCTU Official, May 1992) 
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These are logical views, coming from women with personal histories of commitment 
to' equal employment opportunity, in particular. As NZCTU officials, they did 
considerable work on employment equity as the Bill came before Parliament. 
However, while the employment equity campaign and the Compact were the two 
central union political issues of 1989 and 1990, NZCTU and government documents 
on the Compact and the Growth Agreement make no mention at all of pay equity or 
equal employment opportunity. 
The speci'f'ic concerns of women became part of the official policy of the union 
movement in the 1980s but, as detailed in Chapter 5, these issues continued to slide 
to the bottom of the priority list. Collective struggle in the labour market is the purpose 
of unionism, as was recognised in traditional supports to bargaining and unionisation 
in New Zealand. Yet the structuring of the labour market by gender and race, as well 
as class, has not been made central to that struggle. 
The greater adverse effect of bargaining 'reform' and the Employment Contracts Act 
on industrially weak workforces was predictable from an understanding of labour 
history and the labour relations system in New Zealand. In 1983 union economists 
. warned that a decentralised bargaining system would mean serious problems for 
workers in low paid occupations, declining industries and rural areas (Kirk & Campbell 
1983:98). The effects on women of 'liberalising' state supports to bargaining were 
pointed out not only by unions representing women but by the National Advisory 
Committee on the Employment of Women (NACEW 1990:13) and by Labour women 
politicians (Wilson 1989:106). The case studies of the Clerical Workers and Service 
Workers Unions documented the effects of the 1984-85 period of voluntary unionism 
and the 1989 breakdown of three major awards covering low paid women workers. 
Despite the effect of Employment Contracts Act on collective bargaining by already low 
paid women, Maori and Pacific Island workers, the evident inequality of their situation 
has not been made central to a campaign to reject the Act - which might have drawn 
together the support and resources of women's, Maori and Pacific Island organisations 
outside the union movement. 
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Throwing with the Weight of the State: Feminism or 
The work of Pringle, Rubery, Franzway, Court and Connell and Offe and Wissenthal 
suggests that the articulation of collective interests and strategies to pursue these 
interests are historically contingent and are constructed within the context of particular 
social and political relations and particular legislative frameworks for labour relations. 
Offe & Wissenthal (1985:218) warn that what support the state gives, the can 
take away. In New Zealand the Employment Contracts Act did indeed remove state 
supports to bargaining which had benefited industrially weak groups. 
Contrary to the arguments of free market lobbyists (NZBRT 1987; Upton 1987; Walker 
1989), there is no such thing as a 'non-interventionist' state, nor the 'withdrawal' of the 
state to allow 'free' collective bargaining. Given the inherent inequality of bargaining 
power between labour and capital, the state sets the framework for labour relations 
when it allows unfettered market forces to prevail, as much as through centralised 
regulation. Nor is state policy neutral with regard to the structuring of the labour 
market by gender and race, as past studies have also observed (Brosnan, Rea & 
Wilson 1991; Brosnan 1988). In its different aspects, seen in these case studies, the 
state is both regulator and a major employer. As Franzway, Court and Connell note: 
The fact that the state is both an actor in social struggle, and what is at stake 
in social struggle, appears again and again in different fields of sexual politiCS. 
(Franzway, Court & Connell 1989:40) 
If state power is contestable, within political or other institutional arenas, it is worth 
reconsidering the different ways unions in these case studies have harnessed state 
power. Because of the limited effectiveness of industrial action in many female 
dominated occupations, collective action by women has often focused on legislative 
change, rather than industrial struggle with employers. If the collective interests of 
different groups of women in the labour market are to be more fully represented 
through the NZCTU,a greater appreciation is needed of the similarities between 
feminist unionist political strategies and strategies in relation to the state which have 
been part of New Zealand union tradition. 
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The simplest relationship with the state observed in these case studies was that of the 
cleaners unions. Here the strategy was a traditional one of political influence to ensure 
a negotiating framework favourable to workers without industrial muscle. This 
operated through an equally traditional relationship with a Labour Party with historic 
origins in the labour movement. Until 1987 that framework included the possibility of 
benefiting from the better terms of employment enjoyed by state servants through 
relativity flow-ons recognised by the Arbitration Court. 
clerical unions went beyond this strategy of relativities to challenge traditional 
allocations of value to women's and men's work. They went beyond their own 
membership to work with other feminist unionists, a broader base of women members 
in a range of unions and the wider community of women's organisations. Feminist 
unionists drew on the potential power of an identifiably different 'women's vote' 
(Vowles & Aimer 1990:178) to demand legislation which could be used to redress a 
gendered imbalance of power in 'market' relations. This public appeal to ideals of 
'equity' challenged the fourth Labour government on its own traditional ideological 
ground. 
Yet these were not merely liberal feminist demands for equal citizenship, but a strategy 
which found leverage in the liberal democratic legitimations of the state (Offe 
1984: 135, 156) - and the ideals of equality which also underpin unionism working within 
the limitations of the capitalist state (Flanders 1970:38). The purpose of legislative 
changes to provide sexual harassment procedures and pay equity assessments was 
to use the power of the state against employers and on behalf of women. Within a 
socialist feminist analysis, it was a strategy of 'feminist judo' (Eisenstein 1986) en route 
to radical feminist and socialist change. As Zillah Eistenstein (1981) points out, 
pushing liberal systems to their limits can mean concrete interim gains, while 
encountering those limitations has the potential to radicalise those engaged in liberal 
democratic struggle. 
Employer organisations strongly contested the introduction of legislation providing for 
pay equity assessment (NZBRT 1990; NZEF 1989ab&c; Brook 1990b). They did not 
oppose legislation on sexual harassment, which was made grounds for personal 
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grievance procedures by the Labour Relations Act, 1987. This was carried over into 
the Employment Contracts Act, 1991. The difference was that pay equity would affect 
labour costs while sexual harassment procedures would not. Resistance to pay equity 
was in the collective interests of large employers, including the state as an employer 
of large numbers of women in health, education and welfare services. This resistance 
was consistent with the Business Roundtable's ongoing campaign to deregulate the 
labour market, freeing up wage negotiations through the removal first of wage 
relativities, then of national wage awards. The repeal of the Employment Equity Act 
when National came to power was a defeat for feminist unionists, but it is by no means 
the final outcome on the issue. Rather it reveals more clearly the political nature of the 
struggle against powerful employer interests in the labour market including the 
interests of the state as employer. 
A more complex relation exists between nurses and the state. Firstly, the state is the 
authority which grants professional recognition through nurse registration. That 
professional status gives nurses and their organisations greater control over their 
labour process than is enjoyed by most non-professional women workers. The state 
may take that support away, or employers (including the state) may find ways of using 
unqualified staff or of tightening control by non-nursing managers over autonomous 
nursing practice, as described in the case study of the nurses unions. However, the 
political consequences of the state withdrawing from an established responsibility for 
health give nurses potential leverage beyond the industrial strength which flows from 
centrality of nursing work to health care services. From the late 1980s the nurses 
unions began to work in coalitions with community groups concerned about govern-
ment health reforms, and in 1993 National's proposals to contract out public health 
services became an important election issue. 
With regard to state regulation of labour relations, however, the situation for most New 
Zealand nurses differs from that of cleaners or clerical workers in the private sector. 
The state not only sets the labour relations framework, and is the arbiter of equity in 
the labour market, but is a major employer within that framework. That is, a major 
employer of women has the ability to set its own rules. At the same time its derives 
legitimacy from its performance in regard to social equity - including equal access to 
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health care. This situation benefited nurses in the past with regard to 
professionalisation, and now offers possibilities for 'feminist judo' in nurses' industrial 
strategies. 
2The struggles of feminist unionists have been about institutional forms as well as 
within institutional forms (Offe & Wissenthal1985:202). Feminists have often stepped 
outside the framework of one established arena of struggle to change that system 
through collective action in other arenas. So too have leaders of the union movement 
(and indeed employers' organisations). In regard to state power, there is an essential 
similarity between the strategies of the New Zealand union movement, both historically 
and at present, and feminist unionist strategies, despite differences of content. Both 
the mainstream union movement and feminist unionists have worked to ensure that 
state regulation of labour relations enhances the power of workers, particularly those 
with least industrial strength, relative to that of employers. In this sense, 'throwing with 
the weight of the state' is a traditional strategy of unionism in New Zealand and 
Australia. 
A political strategy of some kind is essential, since a glance through New Zealand 
labour history shows that the state has been part of the problem3 as often as it has 
been part of the solution4• Unions pursued strongly political strategies to establish 
the arbitration system in 1894 and to extend it in 1936. The Labour Party originated 
as a political manifestation of the labour movement, and the allegiance of some 
unionists to Labour remains strong. The market advocates who gained ascendancy 
in fourth Labour government rejected a corporatist relationship with the unions (Oliver 
1989) and opposed the influence of unions affiliates within the Party. The Compact 
was a strategy to reestablish that influence formally at the level of NZCTU leaders and 
Cabinet members, to counter the erosion of social policies important to workers and 
to ensure input by union leaders into government policies on labour relations and 
3 In 1931 the right to arbitration was repealed at the height of the Depression; in 1951 a National 
government supported shipowners against unions in the Waterfront Lockout; in 1991 the Employment 
Contracts Act removed bargaining on the basis of occupational labour markets. 
4 In 1984, the Industrial Conciliation & Arbitration Act supported unionism through occupational 
awards; in 1936 compulsory unionism was added when the IC&A Act was restored after a three year 
gap. 
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industry development. As discussed in relation to arbitration and industrial action, the 
difficulty has always been formulating a: collective position on the state regulation of 
labour relations which suits unions very differently situated in the labour market. 
As argued earlier, it was because of the different positions of men and women in the 
labour market that the tensions between mainstream NZCTU strategies and feminist 
unionist arose. However, the political nature of feminist unionist strategies 
to achieve employment equity and sexual harassment procedures was very much 
within the tradition of New Zealand unionism. Feminist unionist strategies which went 
outside the frame of collective bargaining, arbitration, or industrial action and entered 
the pOlitical arena to change the framework of labour relations bargain fits the New 
Zealand pattern of corporatist arrangements between labour, capital and the state. 
Examination of feminist unionism in the light of Offe and Wissenthal's theories of 
unionism and collective action suggest that it is not difference, but inability to accept 
difference as contributing to collective strength, that has been the source of tension 
and gender politics within the union movement. 
Feminist strategies remained marginal to the strategies proposed by NZCTU leaders 
for the union movement, despite policy positions on women's issues. This has 
generally been the case in other countries also (ICFTU 1991 :43). This thesis suggests 
that lack of a feminist perspective on the labour market has led to an under-
appreciation of the historic strategies by New Zealand's own union movement. The 
benefits of a labour relations system which unionised women in 'secondary' labour 
market occupations are overlooked because our patterns of union organisation do not 
match overseas models. For all their imperfections, awards and occupational unions 
provided minimum rates and protections for jobs in the 'secondary' labour market, and 
high levels of unionisation for women as well as men. Since the 1970s, the organisa-
tional spaces provided by occupational unions facilitated the rise of women to 
positions of union leadership, to raise issues like childcare and parental leave, unequal 
pay and sexual harassment, and to make unionism more relevant to the situation and 
concerns of women workers. What the pOlitical strategies of feminist unionists tried 
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to do was to make the social inequalities arising from the intersection of gender, race 
and class relations the centre of policies regulating the labour market. 
Those controlling state power have, however, had their own agenda, in which 
responsibility for equity has become an election ploy, by Labour as well as National, 
rather than a primary concern in state 'management'. As Cabinets of both 
governments sought to manage the state sector, balance the state economy, and 
lower labour costs in the state labour market, they identified with the economic views 
of other large employers (Easton 1989; Jesson 1989). The interests of large 
employers in labour market 'flexibility' have dominated the traditional interests of small 
companies in centralised negotiations, low transaction costs and labour market stability 
(McAndrew & Hursthouse 1990, 1991; NZCWU 1990, 1991; Herbert 1990). 
The contradictions of the welfare state, between outcomes of different arenas of 
struggle within the state (Offe 1984), were still evident under the fourth Labour 
government. Progress was made on employment equity and on land rights as high 
unemployment, the loss of arbitration and flatter taxes impacted most strongly on 
women and Maori (Du Plessis & Jaber 1990; Kelsey 1990; Du Plessis Novitz 1991) . 
. Fiscal deficits and changing ideology on the role of the state meant that, by Labour's 
second term, social policy was subordinated to economic policy. As discussed in the 
case study of nursing, changes to labour relations legislation and management 
restructuring were central to ensuring control over labour costs and state spending in 
health services. Under National, policy contradictions in the area of the labour market 
were diminished, by the repeal of the Employment Equity Act, lowering benefit rates, 
the implementation of the Employment Contracts Act and funding cuts to a range of 
social services. 
At the 1993 election NZCTU leaders publicly recommended the opposition Labour 
Party, despite an earlier neutral policy and a special conference of NZCTU affiliates 
which declined to endorse any political party (Douglas 1988; Herbert 1993; Roth 1993: 
268). But the policies on social equity and labour relations which Labour presented 
were not strong enough to attract the support needed to return Labour to government, 
resulting in an initially hung parliament. In 73 out of 99 electorates voters chose a 
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radically change in the framework for parliamentary democracy - to proportional 
representation and decision making by consensus5. 
Conclusion 
Union theory on the relation between collective interests, collective identity and 
collective action (Offe & Wissenthal 1985) has been drawn on to argue the validity of 
feminist unionist strategies to build unionism specifically among women workers. 
The case studies have shown some of the reasons why political strategies were often 
more appropriate and more effective than industrial action for the service occupations 
in which many women are employed. Efforts to negotiate on new matters relevant to 
women members were blocked by employers or by narrow interpretations of 
legislation. Public campaigns drawing wide support from women on issues like sexual 
harassment and employment equity were political strategies to change the framework 
within which female dominated unions negotiated with employers. 
'Throwing with the weight of the state' - using political power to achieve a legislative 
framework which balances the bargaining power of workers in relation to employers -
is traditional to New Zealand unionism. This was the essence of the NZCTU's 
Compact with the Labour government and of unions' traditional right to state 
arbitration, as well as of the 'feminist judo' of legislation on equal employment 
5 National 49 seats 35.2% of votes 
+ 2 seats on special votes 
Labour 46 seats 34.7% of votes 
Alliance 2 seats 18.3% 
NZ First 2 seats 8.3% 
Mix Member Proportional 54% (highest, Auckland Central 69%) 
First Past the Post 46% 
Turnout 74.9% (NZ Herald 13.11.93) 
In the 1992 referendum between FFP and four forms of proportional representation, 
84% voted for change, 70.3% of them for MMP (but 48.3% turned out)(NZ Herald 
13.19.92). The 1993 referendum followed campaigns supporing FFP, first by 
politicians of both main parties, then by the Coalition for Better Government, well 
funded apparently by business interests (MacDonald 1993; Brook 1992). 
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opportunity and pay equity. Such political strategies, by employers as well as 
unionists and feminists, are part of changing patterns of corporatism between capital, 
labour and the state - which mayor may not be to the benefit of women. 
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CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION - FEMINISM AND CORPORATISM 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 disrupted a traditional pattern of corporatism in 
which women workers had an interest. Arrangements which facilitated bargaining at 
the level of labour markets had made possible high rates of unionisation among 
women and provided 'political spaces' in the union movement which feminists began 
to use to advantage in the 1970s and 1980s. As a strategy, corporatism has always 
been problematic as well as advantageous for workers, and theorists have focused on 
the tension between regulation and representation (Jessop 1979). From a feminist 
perspective, however, the continuing problem of corporatism has been ensuring that 
the situations and concerns of women workers are fully included, alongside the 
situations and concerns of men. That is the focus of this concluding chapter. 
The strategies of feminist unionists which have been identified in this study are part of 
the long, under-researched history of women's collective struggle in the labour market 
and in arenas determining the regulation of labour relations (Boston 1980:9-11; Street 
1993:vii-xii). The initial 'framework for industrial action, arbitration and unionism was 
developed on the work experience o'f men. Women have tried to stretch and widen 
this framework, through revised definitions, wider applications or additional legislation. 
Over 100 years o'f labour history slow changes have been made to incorporate the 
labour market situations and work experiences of women into the labour relations 
system and into the collective strategies of the union movement. 
During the first forty years various Arbitration Court rulings on what constituted an 
'industrial' union excluded many women from state supports to bargaining. A 1937 
amendment to the IC&A Act clarified the political intention of the time to support union 
organisation on an occupational basis, whether or not these were 'industry' specific 
(Moynihan 1986: 14-15). Separate Acts in 1960 and 1972 removed the institutionalised 
inequality of discriminatory female rates of pay in the public and private sector. In the 
1980s narrow definitions of what constituted 'industrial matters' for negotiation made 
it difficult to include issues like sexual harassment procedures and pay equity in award 
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talks. In the early 1980s parental leave was acrlieved through separate legislation. 
The Labour Relations Act, 1987 included a procedure for raising 'new matters', and 
discrimination and sexual harassment were included as grounds for personal 
grievance procedures. The Employment Equity Act, 1990 established a separate 
framework for state arbitration for a specific 'new matter', equal pay for work of equal 
value, before allowing its incorporation in award negotiations. All these changes to 
corporatist bargaining arrangements were achieved politically through the 
parliamentary system and through legislation regulating labour relations. It is to be 
noted, however, that most of these legislative changes were organised outside the 
corporatist framework within which the interests of 'capital', 'the unions' and 'the state' 
were represented. 
) Over the past decade changes to traditional corporatist arrangements have 
undermined the bargaining power of industrially weak unions, with particular impact 
on unions for female dominated occupations. A short period of voluntary unionism in 
1984-5 was followed by changes to the form of 'compulsory' union membership which 
increased the gap between workers covered by awards and actual union membership 
in occupations with scattered workforces and high job turnover. The Labour Relations 
Act, 1987 finally removed unions' right of access to arbitration on award negotiations. 
In 1989 unions were unable to settle awards affecting around a third of all women 
covered by awards (Coleman 1989). The Employment Contracts Act, 1991 changed 
the basis of bargaining from the occupational labour market to the individual 
enterprise, the level at which bargaining by scattered workers in 'secondary' labour 
market occupations is least effective. The impact on women workers very quickly 
became apparent in earnings statistics when the gender pay gap began to widen in 
the months following the expiry of most awards in 1992 (Stats NZ 1993a&b). 
i Until the 1980s, this history shows a traditional form of corporatism which initially 
excluded or discriminated against women workers, particularly through perpetuating 
lower rates of pay for women than for men. It also shows continuing struggle to have 
women workers and their specific interests more fully represented in corporatist 
bargaining arrangements. The construction of 'women's interests' within this particular 
arena of the state (Pringle & Watson 1992) was facilitated by the form corporatism 
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took in regulating bargaining at the level of occupational labour markets. Exclusive 
coverage by a registered union and the blanket application of awards to all described 
workers and their employers gave each union effective occupational closure, with 
organisation supported by forms of compulsory union membership. 
Occupational unions reflected the structuring of the labour market by gender and race, 
meaning that women were members of large female dominated organisations, which 
• were able to wield political power in a variety of arenas. Although these unions were 
led by men until the 1980s1, they increasingly pursued the labour market interests of 
their predominantly female members. From the 1980s as feminist unionists were 
elected to leadership in some of these unions, they sought to include some concerns 
specific to women union members among the issues which could be negotiated with 
employers. Once 'new matters' were permitted by the Labour Relations Act 1987, 
traditional negotiating on an occupational basis had the potential to provide both 
bargaining power and a flexibility which could benefit women workers. 
State supports to unionisation aimed at regulating occupational labour markets 
facilitated the development of unions for common female dominated occupations often 
considered 'hard to organise' (Moore 1986; Crain 1991:1158). As a result, New 
Zealand women have been highly unionised by international standards but were 
under-represented in union leadership (Geare, Herd & Howell 1979; NZPSA 1976; 
ICFTU 1991). From the mid 1970s, however, women became increasingly active in 
union decision making structures (Sarr 1992). As part of a new wave of feminist 
activism, both local and international, women began to bring a feminist analysis to 
unionism and to use the collective power of women's numbers in unions. 
liThe union movement has been more at the forefront of activities for women in 
this country than it has in other countries. We used the institutions that we had 
and used them effectively to address issues of labour market equity." 
(NZCTU Elected Officer, May 1992) 
1 The professional organisation for nurses was always women·led. but. as discussed in the case 
study. did not consider Itself a union and resisted registering a union for nurses employed In the private 
sector under the le&A Act until 1974. 
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As more women stood for union office and were hired as organisers, a few large 
unions with predominantly women members became organisational bases from which 
feminist unionists addressed gender inequality at work. They saw unions as vehicles 
for social as well as economic change, which could improve the situation of all women 
workers, as well members of a particular union. This thesis has explored the ways in 
which feminist unionists sought to develop a stronger collective identity among women 
workers, constructed new sets of speci'fically 'women's interests' and developed new 
strategies for furthering them. One of these strategies was the achievement of 
'political within the union movement through women-only organisations and 
committees for specific representation of women and Maori, and for women, Maori 
and Pacific Island workers within particular unions. These parallelled the political 
space provided by large women-led unions for female dominated occupations. 
Feminist unionists articulated concerns specific to women through the Working Wom-
en's Charter and through political action for legislation on such issues as parental 
leave, sexual harassment and employment equity. 
Detailed analysis of unions covering clerical workers, cleaners and nurses has shown 
how the concrete situation of different sets of workers in the labour market underlies 
the diverse positions that unions take on changes to the legislative framework for 
labour relations. Despite considerable differences in their situations, these unions 
representing female dominated occupations favoured the right to arbitration on 
disputes over award negotiation rather than relying solely on industrial action. They 
also preferred occupational awards as the continuing basis of bargaining. For nurses, 
national awards and relativities between nursing awards were linked to a strong 
collective identity as professional nurses, as well as a national labour market. For 
unions like the Services Workers and Clerical Workers (who represented the lower end 
of the clerical work market). the arbitration package underpinned high rates of female 
unionisation and provided legally enforceable minimum wages and conditions in the 
'secondary' labour market in which women, Maori and Pacific Island workers are 
concentrated (Brosnan 1987, 1988; Brosnan, Rea & Wilson 1991). 
A contrast between these commonalities of interest between unions for female 
dominated occupations and the collective interests of many unions representing 
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predominantly male workers accounts for the importance of gender politics within the 
union movement from the late 1970s. Collective action is underpinned by the forma-
tion of collective identity (Offe & WissenthaI1985), but identity is established relationally 
around differences, including those of gender (Pringle & Watson 1992:66). As feminist 
unionists moved into the 'political spaces' provided by women's committees and large 
female dominated unions in the 1980s, they presented a challenge not only to male 
dominance within the union movement but to changes in the corporatist arrangements 
between capital, labour and the state 'conducted as if men's interests were the only 
ones that exist' (Pringle & Watson 1992:57). 
A comprehensive women's history of New Zealand labour relations would focus on the 
slow incorporation of the occupational labour markets in which women are 
concentrated - including low paid, casualised service occupations in the 'secondary' 
labour market - and of concerns specific to women which their unions raised. 
In struggle over both the content of negotiations and the legislative framework for 
negotiations with employers' organisations and the state itself, unions sought to unite 
their bargaining power behind common strategies through the Federation of Labour 
and the NZ Council of Trade Unions. Tensions developed as feminist unionists 
challenged the way women were under-represented in union leadership and the way 
issues raised in the Working Women's Charter continued to be marginalised. 
However, gender politics were just one of several strong tensions running through 
these federal organisations. 
The longest standing differences have been between unions that felt able to use 
industrial action to back positions adopted in negotiations and those that relied on 
access to state arbitration to balance their bargaining power against that of their 
employers. This tension between 'mobilisation' unions and 'arbitrationist' unions 
(Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 1990:100) has a gendered aspect. Male workers are 
concentrated in production, transport and energy. These are key areas of the 
economy and infrastructure where withdrawal of labour is an effective strategy and 
where occupational interests were more aligned with industries. Recession and 
technological change affecting these areas of employment account for increasing 
dissatisfaction in the 1970s among some unions with corporatist controls and 
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increasing interest in industry based strategies in the 1980s. These unions have 
always been strongly represented in the union movement. However, not only have 
there been shifts of strategy by some of these unions away from arbitrated award 
bargaining, by 1992 membership losses under the Employment Contracts Act reduced 
the voting power of 'arbitrationist' unions. 
More recent differences to be bridged within the union movement have been between 
public and private sector unions, brought together in the NZCTU and under a single 
framework for labour relations bargaining. Differences between organising situations, 
styles of operating, industrial strength and preferred strategies have led to an increase 
in the number of private sector, male dominated unions outside the NZCTU and now 
organising together in the Trade Union Federation. The difficulty is to establish 
strategies which can both unite the union movement and serve the increasingly diverse 
interests of a range of unions in public and private employment, in 'primary' and 
'secondary' labour markets and in male and female dominated occupations. 
In considering union strategies, I have focused particularly on tensions arising between 
what I identify as 'feminist unionist strategies' and the 'classic unionism' and 
corporatist 'strategic unionism' espoused by NZCTU officials. 'Classic unionism' de-
scribes traditional methods of workplace organising through delegates, collective 
solidarity and industrial action. Reliance on these methods was to be supplemented 
by political negotiation between national NZCTU leaders and Labour politicians through 
the Compact. 
Feminist unionist strategies provided an alternative for groups of women workers for 
whom 'classic' strategies were unreaJistic. A distinctive feature was organising 
politically through public campaigns involving large numbers of women. Building on 
state supports to unionisation and bargaining which had resulted in large unions with 
female dominated membership, feminist unionists tried to increase women's 
involvement in their unions by addressing the ways in which women were disad-
vantaged in paid employment. Using the political power of large membership numbers 
and support from the wider women's movement, they tried to resolve this 
disadvantage by changing the legislative framework for labour relations. These 
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campaigns were on issues like equal pay, sexual harassment or employment equity 
which had not been resolved in award negotiations. Since they usually also met initial 
resistance within the union movement, campaigns generally targetted political arenas 
in ways that did not - in their early stages - work through 'macro corporatist' contact 
between union movement and political leaders (Wassenberg 1982). 
Just as 'women's interests' articulated in the New Zealand context are informed by an 
international feminist analysis, so too are opposing positions informed and influenced 
by international discourses. The international origins of the free market ideology 
espoused by New Zealand business organisations and some politicians in a tightening 
capitalist economy were touched -on in Chapter 4. Unionism rests on a recognition 
of differences of interest and of bargaining power between employers and workers. 
In New Zealand there is a growing understanding of the global nature of the capitalist 
econorny and unions have international connections. I would suggest, however, that 
the strategies currently being adopted by NZCTU officials draw too strongly on the 
articulation of labour's interests within the regulatory frameworks of other countries, 
rather than on the social and institutional arrangements developed in Australia and 
New Zealand. As I indicated in Chapter 4, patterns of corporatism elsewhere which 
haVe been relatively successful have been based on union organisation primarily in the 
production sector, with little representation of service workers in the 'secondary' labour 
market. Corporatism is often negotiated between labour, business and political 
leaders at the highest level, rather than in ways which facilitate direct input from groups 
in different occupational labour markets. These overseas patterns were proposed as 
a model for New Zealand with little consideration of their effect on women and other 
social groups rnarginalised in the labour market. 
Offe & Wissenthal consider that struggle within political forms and about political forrns 
is a feature of class of struggle (Ofte & Wissenthal 1985:202) and New Zealand labour 
history shows that this is equally true of labour relations. The interests of 'capital', the 
state' and 'the unions' are represented both within the institutional forms for labour 
relations negotiations and in other arenas in which the struggle is about the form these 
institutions should take. 'Classic' unions as well as 'arbitrationist' unions, feminist 
unionists as well as strategic unionists have tried to 'throw with the weight of the state' 
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(Eisenstein 1986). As the case studies indicate, the changes to form and content 
sought by feminist unionists have differed from those sought by the mainstream union 
movement, because of the different concerns and industrial positions of women in paid 
employment. 
In the 1980s, the Business Roundtable was pressing for labour market flexibility 
through change to the form of bargaining, not its content; specifically, an end to 
relativities and national awards (NZBRT 1987, 1988b). When feminist unionists tried 
to include new matters like sexual harassment and pay equity in direct negotiations, 
sexual harassment procedures were resisted by employers and pay equity was ruled 
out of jurisdiction by the court (Moynihan 1986:106; Urban Research 1987:44-17). 
Blocked wit~lin the institutions regulating bargaining, the strategy of feminist unionists 
was to step outside the corporatist framework and, gathering support from a range of 
individual women and women's organisations, take the issues to the parliamentary 
system to secure legislation which could include women's concerns on the agenda for 
negotiations. 
While unions other than female dominated ones were interested in introducing 'new 
matters' into award talks, Federation of Labour leaders and some unions with industrial 
strength were also seeking change in the form of bargaining, in a loosening of the 
traditional trade-off between arbitration and the right to strike (Walsh 1989:155). In 
1989 unions' inability to take employers to arbitration meant several awards for low 
paid, female dominated occupations remained unsettled for over a year. 
Greater 'flexibility' of bargaining form at the 'meso' level was accompanied by 
tightening informal relations at the macro level - but between government and big 
business, excluding union influence. Formal tripartitism was rejected by employers 
(NZBRT 1988b; Oliver 1989:12) but collective action by employers for full deregulation 
of the labour market was very much at the 'macro' level, between the Business 
Roundtable and Employers Federation and what has been called 'the fraternal state' 
(Pringle & Watson 1990). It was the old polka in a new pattern strongly led by capital, 
which politicians as state employers and managers of fiscal deficits were happy to 
follow. 
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The response of NZCTU officials was to tap Labour on the shoulder and ask formally 
to join the dance. In 1989 union leaders sought a new form of macro corporatist 
understanding with government to balance the influence of the Business Roundtable. 
The cost of a formal macro-level partnership, between a Labour government and the 
NZCTU, was greater conformity to a universalist model of corporatism (Lehmbruch 
1982; Rubery 1988:253). This would include the restructuring of union organisation, 
as well as collective bargaining (Boxall 1990:540), to reflect business organisation. 
What was essential to macro corporatist negotiation was that a disciplined union 
movement (and equally disciplined employers) would deliver on arrangements agreed 
upon by national leaders. This exchange between interest representation and control 
is at the heart of corporatism, and presupposes effective organisation (Jessop 1979: 
195,200). 
An exchange between interest representation and control was also the basis of 
traditional arbitration at the meso-level, when groups of employers and union officials 
settled state enforced terms of employment for a particular occupation. Wage fixing 
through corporatist bargaining organised at this level meant that the power of labour 
was not just in the hands of national leaders of the union movement. Large 
occupational unions provided 'political spaces' from which government policy and the 
legislative framework could also be influenced. This was now to be reorganised on 
an industry basis, with a macro-level Compact and future agreements to be settled by 
national NZCTU leaders. In the countries from which this model is drawn, industry 
based unionism reflects the patterns of worker organisation that have been historically 
possible within particular systems of labour relations regulation. New Zealand's labour 
history and patterns of regulation are specific to this country, but the relative merits of 
occupational and industry unionism have never really been publicly debated (Hill 
1991 b). However, the Compact with the Labour government presupposed a high level 
of organisation and union discipline under NZCTU leadership. Unorthodox strategies 
were to be brought into conformity with 'classic unionism' and the 'strategic unionism' 
of the Compact on an industry based model of union organisation. 
It was a strategy that disregarded the situation of many women workers. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, labour market statistics show that the segregation of women, 
600 
Maori and Pacific Island workers is much more marked by occupational than by 
industry. NZCTUs (1989a) plan to restructure the union movement into industry 
based, then large sector based unions, would obscure but not change this. Workers 
with certain skills and certain social attributes would continue to compete for jobs in 
occupational markets, many of which do not coincide with industry divisions. Although 
some industries and sectors are female dominated, the proportion of women relative 
to men is smaller. Under the NZCTU plan, there would be fewer organisational spaces 
in which women would be able to achieve the 'critical mass' at which women have 
become leaders and prioritised women's interests in the union movement, in 
negotiations and in strategies in relation to the state. 
Meantime, Business Roundtable and Employers Federation leaders were successfully 
furthering their interests through informal macro corporatist influence with politicians 
of the other main political party (Walsh & Ryan 1993:15), as well as more public 
strategies to direct the legislative outcomes of the parliamentary system (NZBRT 1989, 
1990, 1992; Brook 1990a&b, 1992; Danzon & 8egg 1991; NZEF 1989ab&c, 1990a&b, 
1991; NZBRT /NZEF 1992). The Compact was of no interest to employers' 
organisations and was rejected by the National government when it came to power in 
November 1990. However, union restructuring on an industry basis was partially 
furthered by the Employment Contracts Act through the collapse of one large 
cross-industry occupational union and loss of membership (and voting power) among 
some others - all in the already flexible 'secondary' labour market. 
National's Employment Contracts Act abolished meso level corporatism and refocused 
formal bargaining at the micro level of the individual worker and the individual 
enterprise. Most of the meso level organisation among employers had been facilitated 
by the award system, now abolished (Webster 1993:244), with policy developed 
through the Employers Federation (Roper 1993b:152). The Employment Contracts Act 
passed the initiative to individual employers, not employers' organisations (Boxall & 
Haynes 1991:6). Evidence from these case studies suggests that industry based 
associations, previously occupied with other policy areas, are taking a stronger role 
in labour relations, with some recommending that employers negotiate only individual 
contracts. This suggests organisation and discipline in adopting the Business 
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Roundtable's agenda is being improved through the different levels of the employers' 
'corporation' (Jessop 1979:195, 200), although a few employer groups have opted for 
multi-employer contracts. This is an area which warrants continuing research. 
The remedy proposed by the Labour Party and the NZCTU to the impact on unions 
of the Employment Contracts Act is to grant workers the right to initiate multi-employer 
contracts, backed by the right to organise and to strike. This little to 
fragmented, industrially weak workforces. The outcome for women concentrated in 
such workforces is continuing decollectivisation, deunionisation and considerable 
reduction in the organisational spaces in the union movement through which feminist 
unionists had organised around women's specific concerns at work and in markets 
for their labour. 
The New Zealand experience over the 1980s was that 'women's autonomous 
organisation outside and inside trade unions and pOlitical parties' was, as Cynthia 
Cockburn suggests, 1he route to change' on gender inequality in the labour market 
(Cockburn 1988:41). Union organisations which reflected women's concentration in 
particular occupations and women-only groupings within the union movement provided 
the political space for such autonomous organisation. This facilitated leadership by 
women, who tend to give greater priority to issues arising at the intersection of gender 
and class relations (Curtin 1991). Despite setbacks in the 1990s, these case studies 
help document some notable achievements by feminist unionists in the 1980s - the 
Working Women's Charter, parental leave, improved representation of women in the 
union movement, sexual harassment procedures, equal employment opportunity 
programmes and pay equity. 
Issues raised by Maori and Pacific Island workers have met less success. Committees 
for specific representation of these groups in the NZCTU and some unions have been 
less effective. The occupational concentration of these workers has not provided the 
'critical mass' to achieve significant union leadership. As with the individual unions 
studied here, the union movement has put little weight behind policy commitments 
which were achieved in relation to these groups. Nor has the movement forged the 
links it might have with well-organised Pacific Islands communities, or with the strong 
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organisational and political bases from which Maori have been highly effective over the 
1980s. 
Some of the successes of feminist unionists in the 1 such as legislation 
introducing pay equity assessments - were predicated on a particular framework for 
bargaining which has now been abolished, as has employment equity legislation itself. 
supports to unionism, on which feminist unionism was build, have also been 
removed. This has impacted most severely on unions covering the 'secondary' labour 
market and has already affected aggregate female unionisation rates in the private 
sector. Fewer women union leaders now represent small numbers of members than 
in the late 1980s (Sarr 1993). Nevertheless, unions representing most low paid 
women's occupations continue to exist under the Employment Contracts Act. Union 
representing nurses and teachers have retained very high rates of membership in 
these professions, and members are increasingly willing to defend their negotiating 
position with industrial action. Some feminist successes, such as sexual harassment 
procedures and equal employment opportunity programmes in the state sector, are 
a component of current legislation. The Equal Pay Act, 1972 is still in force, and may 
still offer some protections or possibilities within an enterprise bargaining framework 
(Hyman 1993). However, the new regime means that unions.are negotiating within a 
much more difficult environment. It remains to be seen to what degree the changed 
and changing union movement will be able to provide a base for feminist activism on 
the gender specific concerns of women workers in the 1990s. 
This research suggests that occupational unions have been a strategically useful form 
of organisation for women. While the content of women's work' varies culturally and 
historically, segregation by gender is itself extremely persistent (Cockburn 1988:32; 
Milkman 1987) and is likely to provide the context for gender politics around labour 
market inequality for some time to come. Within each historical., context, women's 
interests' are constructed as feminists seek out the libratory potential within the 
constraints of different situations (Pringle & Watson 1992). In this study we have seen 
the way some occupational unions led by women provided an organisational base for 
this. In reflecting the labour market segregation through which women are margina-
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Used and disadvantaged, occupational unions brought together large numbers of 
women in similar situations and with similar concerns. 
While equal employment opportunities was part of the campaign for employment 
equity, a strong position taken by feminist unionists was that there was nothing wrong 
with the work women do; it is skilled and socially valuable work. What they were 
seeking to change was the way that work was undervalued, giving women lower 
eamings than men. Increasing employment opportunities for women was one way of 
equalising male and female earnings. As long as the segregation of women into 
particular occupations persists, however, it provides the potential for autonomous 
organisation and collective action by women (Cobble 1990:541-2) which can be 
harnessed to challenge inequality. The case studies have provided examples of this. 
As women came to lead female dominated occupational unions, and as feminist union-
ists organised women-only committees, these organisations provided union education 
with a feminist perspective directed at connecting women's experience of work with 
collective action for change. The large memberships of female dominated unions like 
the clerical workers' and nurses' unions meant they had potential political strength, 
even when industrial action was problematic. 
Jill Rubery (1988) has raised questions about the role of labour relations regulation in 
constructing women's labour market disadvantage. This study of labour relations 
change in New Zealand suggests that regulation which operated at the level of 
occupational labour markets, rather than industries, facilitated unionisation and 
collective bargaining in the 'secondary' labour market in wbich women and racial 
minorities are concentrated. Regulatory supports to bargaining at this level overcame 
the fragmentation of collective bargaining strength and lack of industrial leverage which 
underlie labour market disadvantage. In New Zealand occupational unionism allowed 
women's concentration in particular occupations to provide the 'pOlitical space' to 
construct women's interests', and the political power of large membership numbers 
to achieve some changes to the regulatory framework for labour relations. 
Through traditional corporatist arrangements, in which labour capital and the state 
were represented, the labour market was regulated through a network of minimum 
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wage rates and conditions for each occupation. This meant that regulation was 
being organised through the same mechanism as the labour market inequality of 
women and racial minorities - occupational labour markets. Until the Equal Pay Act 
of 1 state regulation had helped perpetuate gender inequality by just this means. 
However, occupational awards could also deliver rights and remedies - including pay 
equity assessments - to large number of working women. This traditional form of 
corporatist bargaining, centred on occupational labour markets, was a form which had 
the potential for interest representation and state control on issues of gender inequality 
constructed through the labour market. With the rise of feminist unionism in the 1970s 
and 1980s this potential was beginning to be realised through the Employment Equity 
Act. However, the pursuit of Lflexibility' by large employers led to the repeal of that 
Act, and the change to bargaining enterprise by enterprise. 
Dorothy Smith (1979:176) suggests that 'the conditions of our action and experience 
are organised by relations and processes outside them and beyond our control'. 
Many women and their concerns were somewhat 'outside the frame' (Smith 1979:146) 
of the concepts and institutional forms of corporatism and unionism negotiated 
between men. But these accounts show women stepping repeatedly outside the 
forums in which their interests were marginalised and into other arenas to change the 
framework shaping the outcome of the original struggle. Different strategic possibilities 
open to feminists within different frameworks (Pringle & Watson 1992:54), but different 
frameworks, both discursive and legislative, are the result of feminist activism. Some 
of the issues pursued by feminist unionists in these case studies were reactions to 
changes in labour relations regulation, or to strategies proposed by I\lZCTU leaders, 
but others were issues - for example, equal pay. sexual harassment, equal 
employment opportunity and pay equity - identified and raised by feminist unionists 
themselves. 'The state" 'the unions' and 'the employers' found themselves obliged 
to assess their own interests and adopt positions on these demands. When 
resistance on these issues was met within the bargaining framework or were ruled out 
of court, feminist unionists set about trying to change the corporatist framework 
through political action. 
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What is notable from these accounts of feminist unionism in New Zealand in late 1970s 
~nd 1980s is that 'feminist judo' (Eisenstein 1986) was a successful strategy for 
women working through unions. Feminist unionists demanded representation for 
women within corporatist bargaining arrangements. When issues specific to women 
union members were excluded from negotiable 'industrial matters' - by court rulings, 
by employers, or by marginalisation within the union movement - they worked politi-
cally, using the parallel parliamentary system to change the institutional forms within 
which unions and employers negotiate. 
In the 1990s there have been severe setbacks - to pay equity, to union representation 
for women in the private sector and to the union movement as a whole. However, 
Craig Littler (1991 :51) cautions against 'collapsing strategy and outcomes ... To follow 
a strategy does not imply success'. Success may be partial, or meet later defeat by 
the reactive strategies of others, without invalidating the strategy. Feminist unionists 
strategies in relation to pay equity were successful in rallying members, in gaining 
support from other women and women's organisations and in achieving employment 
equity legislation through political pressure. However, this bid for equity was strongly 
countered by the Employers Federation (1989 ab&c; Burton 1989a&b), the Business 
Roundtable (1990; Brook 1990b) and Treasury (1990), and the Employment Equity Act 
was repealed by the National government. Employers too can step outside the 
bargaining arena and use their political power to get the rules changed; this exactly 
describes the Business Roundtable lobby for labour market deregulation (Roper 
1993b). Limited opposition and partial remedies from NZCTU leaders to changes 
which would impact most strongly on women also suggest that the labour market 
positions and specific concerns of women workers continue to be marginalised. 
What this study and the bargaining 'reforms' themselves make clear is the highly 
contested nature of the social institutions which surround employment relations and 
labour market negotiations. Institutional arrangements which were taken for granted 
for 50 years, or 100 years, can dissolve when the shifting interests of powerful groups 
lead to the rejection of established compromises. The struggle around the form and 
content of institutional arrangements is renewed against a different economic and 
political background. Outcomes of struggle in different arenas of labour relations, 
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politics and the state are 'always likely to be partial and temporary' (Pringle & Watson 
1992:63). The NZ Clerical Workers Union provides an example. A large private sector 
union, at the forefront of successful campaigns for legislative change on sexual 
harassment and pay equity, potentially benefiting large numbers of working women, 
collapsed because of radical change to a labour relations system originally established 
to support bargaining by workers with little industrial muscle. 
In showing this, the research provides empirical support for recent socialist feminist 
theorising on the intersecting practices of capitalism, patriarchy and state formation. 
Franzway, Court & Connell (1989) have suggested that the most seemingly 
intransigent structures of our society are the 'congealed' outcomes of struggle 
between unequal social groups pursuing collective interests in a variety .of arenas 
(Franzway, Court & Connell 1989:334-35). Social structures are therefore always 
amenable to resistance and to change. Underlying the occupational structuring of the 
labour market are the intersecting practices of gender, race and class relations which 
create and reproduce social inequality. Feminist unionists have focused on gendered 
practices at work and on wage bargaining which maintain women's disadvantage in 
the labour market. They have organised resistance to these practices, working both 
. through the unions of which New Zealand women were already members and through 
the pOlitical system in which they were voters. 
What the thesis seeks to emphasise is that, not only has unionism been a vehicle for 
feminism, but that feminism is a powerful means of organiSing and involving women 
in unionism. By articulating women's concerns and experiences at work and by 
providing an analytical framework to understanding women's marginalised position in 
the labour market, feminism can facilitate a stronger collective identity and the 
construction of collective interests among women workers, leading on to collective 
union action. 
"They say that women being in unions weakens the union, stops them being so 
militant. Women are busy talking about sexual harassment and 'peripheral' 
issues. But when you look at the organising that women have done and the 
power that women have had to change things ... women are a very positive 
source of organisation." (NZCWU Official, Aug. 1991) 
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APPENDIX 1 
NEW ZEALAND WORKING WOMEN I S CHARTER 
The NZ Council of Trade Unions endorses the New Zealand Workers Women's Charter: 
(i) The right to work for everyone. 
(ii) The elimination of all discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, political belief, 
marital or parental status, sexuality or age. 
(iii) Equal pay for work of equal value. 
(Iv) Equal opportunity of entry into occupations and of promotion regardless of sex, race, 
religion, political belief, marital or parental status, sexuality or age. 
(v) Equal education opportunity for all. 
(vi) Union meetings and special trade union education courses for all unionists to be held 
with paid time off for participants with special attention to gaining more active 
participation from women unionists. 
(vii) Equal access to vocational guidance and training, including on-the-job training, 
retraining, study and conference leave for all workers. 
(viii) Introduction of a shorter working week with no loss of pay, flexible working hours and 
part-time opportunities for all workers by union agreement. 
(ix) Improved working conditions for all workers. The retention of beneficial prOVisions 
which apply to women and extension of these to men. Other benefits to apply equally 
to women and men. 
(x) Removal of legal, bureaucratic and other impediments to equality of superannuation, 
social security benefits, credit, finance, taxation, tenancies and other related matters. 
(xi) ConSUltation with and special attention to the needs and requirements of all workers 
from ethnic communities with special attention to those of women. 
(xii) Wide availability of quality child care with Government, employer and community 
support for all those who need it, including industrial creches, after-school and school 
holiday care. 
(xiii) I ntroduction of adequate paid parental leave without loss of job security, superannuation 
or promotion prospects. 
(xiv) Availability of paid family leave to enable time off to be taken in cases of family needs. 
(xv) Sex education and birth control advice freely available to all people of appropriate age, 
and legal, financial, social and medical impediments to safe contraception, sterilisation 
and abortion to be removed so as to allow the individual concerns to make their own 
decision. 
(xvi) Comprehensive government funded research into health questions specific to women. 
(NZCTU 1992: 178-179) 
APPENDIX 2 
. LABOUR MARKET SEGREGATION BY SEX 












32.2 in 8 jobs 












































































This slight lessening of concentration in the most common jobs for women appears to reflect a drop in 
numbers of general clerks employed, although there was a small increase in secretarial and 
bookkeeping/accounts clerks jobs. Clerical Union officials reported a tightening of the clerical labour 
market from around 1989, which they attributed as much overall economic contraction as to technology 
changes which began in the early 1980s. 
Also notable is the increase in bank officers as the finance sector has expanded and the decrease in 
sewing machinists due to the contraction of domestic manufacturing, both reflecting from economic 
policy changes through the 1980s. 
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Primary school teacher 
Cleaner 
Bank Officer 
33.7% in 8 jobs 
Receptionist, info clerk 
Retail manager 
Sewing machinist 
38.5% in 11 jobs 
Office manager 
Dairy farmer/worker 




49.3% in 17 jobs 

































21.58% in 11 jobs 




28.30% in 17 jobs 
108 male dominated job categories have 3 or less women. 



















The two largest female job category with no men are plunket nurse (441) (men are around 4% of other 
nursing categories) and private housekeeper (300); all other jobs with no males are very small trades. 
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